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MARGUERITE: Il m’a assure´ que tu n’avais
jamais e´te´ amoureux.
JACQUES: Oh! pour cela il a dit vrai.
MARGUERITE: Quoi! Jamais de ta vie?
JACQUES: De ma vie.
MARGUERITE: Comment! a` ton aˆge, tu ne
saurais pas ce que c’est qu’une femme?
JACQUES: Pardonnez-moi, dame
Marguerite.
MARGUERITE: Et qu’est-ce que c’est
qu’une femme?
JACQUES: Une femme?
MARGUERITE: Oui, une femme.
JACQUES: Attendez . . .
Denis Diderot Jacques le fataliste et
son maˆıtre
We are happy to present SemDial 2012 (SeineDial), the 16th annual workshop on the
Semantics and Pragmatics of Dialogue. This year’s workshop is hosted at Universite´ Paris-
Diderot, named for the great encyclope´diste, himself a great writer of dialogues. SeineDial
continues the tradition of presenting high-quality talks and posters on dialogue from a
variety of perspectives such as formal semantics and pragmatics, artificial intelligence,
computational linguistics, and psycholinguistics.
38 submissions were received for the main session, and each was reviewed by three
experts. 16 talks were selected for oral presentation; the poster session hosts many of the
remaining submissions, together with additional submissions that came in response to a
call for late-breaking posters and demos.
We are lucky to have three world famous researchers as invited speakers—Eve Clark,
Geert-Jan Kruijff, and Franc¸ois Recanati. Each of these represents a broad range of
perspectives and disciplines. We are sure that their talks will stimulate much interest and
at least some controversy. Together with the accepted talks and posters we look forward
to a productive and interactive conference.
We are grateful to the reviewers, who invested a lot of time giving very useful feedback,
both to the program chairs and to the authors, and to members of the local organizing
committee, Anne Abeille´, Margot Colinet, and Gregoire Winterstein for their hard work
in helping to bring the conference to fruition.
We are also very grateful to a number of organizations, who provided generous financial
support to SeineDial:
• CLILLAC-ARP, Universite´ Paris-Diderot
• Laboratoire de Linguistique Formelle, Universite´ Paris-Diderot
• The Laboratoire d’excellence LabEx-EFL (Empirical Foundations of Linguistics),
Paris Sorbonne-Cite´.
• La re´gion Iˆle de France, through their competitive scheme Manifestations scien-
tifiques en Iˆle-de-France hors DIM.
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Referential Coordination through Mental Files
Franc¸ois Recanati
Institut Jean-Nicod
Ecole Normale Superieure
29 rue d’Ulm, 75005 Paris, France
recanati@ens.fr
http://www.institutnicod.org
On the standard model, linguistic communica-
tion makes it possible for the hearer to entertain
the thoughts expressed by the speaker, and what
makes that possible is the fact that the thoughts
in question are encoded in the speakers words.
However, there are challenges both to the idea that
communication results in the sharing of thoughts,
and to the idea that it works by encoding the
thoughts. After briefly reviewing the contextualist
challenge, which targets the latter idea, I will turn
to another challenge to the standard model, raised
by singular thought.
What characterizes singular thoughts, and es-
pecially indexical thoughts (the paradigm case),
is the fact that the modes of presentation through
which one thinks of objects are context-bound and
perspectival. Such modes of presentation are best
construed as mental files exploiting (and presup-
posing) certain contextual relations to the refer-
ence. This raises the communication problem,
first raised by Frege: if indexical thoughts are
context-bound and relation-based, how is it pos-
sible to communicate them to those who are not
in the same context and do not stand in the right
relations to the object? Arguably, one has to give
up the claim that communication involves thought
sharing, in such cases.
Following Frege, I will appeal to an important
distinction between linguistic and psychological
modes of presentation. Psychological modes of
presentation are thought ingredients, while lin-
guistic modes of presentation are encoded. Psy-
chological modes of presentation are perspectival
and context-bound: they are mental files whose
role is to store information one can gain in virtue
of standing in certain contextual relations to the
reference of the file, so they are available only
to subjects who are appropriately situated vis vis
the object. It follows that thoughts involving such
modes of presentation are not shareable with sub-
jects who are not in the right type of context. But
linguistic modes of presentation are fixed by the
conventions of the language and they are shared
by all the language users. They are public and
serve to coordinate mental files in communication
by constraining them to contain the piece of infor-
mation they encode. In this way communication
takes place even though the indexical thoughts en-
tertained by the speaker are, in some sense, pri-
vate and cannot be shared by the audience. Com-
munication no longer involves the replication of
thoughts only their coordination.
In the last part of the talk I will apply the coor-
dination model of communication to the referen-
tial use of definite descriptions, and I will discuss
a key objection based on the distinction between
semantic reference and speakers reference.
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Optimal Reasoning About Referential Expressions
Judith Degen
Dept. of Brain and Cognitive Sciences
University of Rochester
jdegen@bcs.rochester.edu
Michael Franke
ILLC
Universiteit van Amsterdam
m.franke@uva.nl
Abstract
The iterated best response (IBR) model is a
game-theoretic approach to formal pragmatics
that spells out pragmatic reasoning as back-
and-forth reasoning about interlocutors’ ratio-
nal choices and beliefs (Franke, 2011; Ja¨ger,
2011). We investigate the comprehension and
production of referential expressions within
this framework. Two studies manipulating
the complexity of inferences involved in com-
prehension (Exp. 1) and production (Exp. 2)
of referential expressions show an intriguing
asymmetry: comprehension performance is
better than production in corresponding com-
plex inference tasks, but worse on simpler
ones. This is not predicted by standard formu-
lations of IBR, which makes categorical pre-
dictions about rational choices. We suggest
that taking into account quantitative informa-
tion about beliefs of reasoners results in a bet-
ter fit to the data, thus calling for a revision of
the game-theoretic model.
1 Introduction
Reference to objects is pivotal in communication
and a central concern of linguistic pragmatics. If
interlocutors were ideal reasoners, speakers would
choose the most convenient referential expression
that is sufficiently discriminating given the hearer’s
perspective, while hearers would choose the referent
for which an observed referential expression is opti-
mal given the speaker’s perspective. But it would be
folly to assume that humans are ideal reasoners, so
the question is: how much do interlocutors take each
other’s perspective into account when producing and
interpreting referential expressions?
A lot of work has been dedicated to this is-
sue. For example, computational linguists have in-
vestigated efficient and natural rules for generat-
ing and comprehending referential expressions (see
Dale and Reiter (1995) and Golland et al. (2010)
for work directly related to ours). Many empirical
studies have addressed the more specific questions
of whether, when and/or how, hearers take speakers’
privileged information into account (Keysar et al.,
2000; Keysar et al., 2003; Hanna et al., 2003; Heller
et al., 2008; Brown-Schmidt et al., 2008). Also, eye-
tracking studies in the visual-world paradigm have
been used to investigate how quantity reasoning in-
fluences the interpretation of referential expressions
(Sedivy, 2003; Grodner and Sedivy, 2011; Huang
and Snedeker, 2009; Grodner et al., 2010). In recent
work closely related to ours, Stiller et al. (2011) and
Frank and Goodman (2012) proposed a Bayesian
model of producing and comprehending referential
expressions in a game setting similar to the kind we
consider here. We will more closely compare these
related approaches in Section 6. Despite these var-
ious efforts, it is still a matter of debate whether or
to what extent interlocutors routinely consider each
other’s perspective.
In order to contribute to this question, we follow
a recent line of experimental approaches to formal
epistemology and game theory (Hedden and Zhang,
2002; Crawford and Iriberri, 2007) to investigate
how much strategic back-and-forth reasoning speak-
ers and hearers employ in abstract language games.
The tasks we investigate translate directly to the kind
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of signaling games that have variously been used
to account for a number of pragmatic phenomena,
most notably conversational implicatures (see, e.g.,
Parikh (2001), Benz and van Rooij (2007) or Ja¨ger
(2008)). A benchmark model of idealized step-by-
step reasoning, called iterated best response (IBR)
model, exists for these games (Franke, 2011; Ja¨ger,
2011). IBR makes concrete predictions about the
depth of strategic reasoning required to “solve” dif-
ferent kinds of referential language games, so that
by varying the difficulty of our referential tasks, it is
possible to both: (i) test the predictions of IBR mod-
els of pragmatic reasoning and (ii) determine the ex-
tent to which speakers and hearers reason strategi-
cally about the use of referential expressions.
Our data shows that participants perform better at
reasoning tasks that IBR predicts to involve fewer in-
ference steps. This holds for comprehension and
production. However, our data also shows an in-
teresting asymmetry: comprehension performance
is better than production in corresponding complex
inference tasks, but worse on simpler ones. This
is not predicted by standard formulations of IBR
which makes categorical predictions about rational
choices. However, it is predicted by a more nuanced
variation of IBR that pays attention to the quantita-
tive information in the belief hierarchies postulated
by the model.
Section 2 introduces signaling games as abstract
models of referential language use. Section 3 out-
lines the relevant notions of IBR reasoning. Sec-
tions 4 & 5 describe our comprehension and pro-
duction studies respectively. Section 6 discusses the
results.
2 Referential Language Games
If speaker and hearer share a commonly observ-
able set T of possible referents in their immediate
environment, referential communication has essen-
tially the structure of a signaling game: the sender
S knows which t ∈ T she wants to talk about, but
the receiver R does not; the speaker chooses some
description m; if R can identify the intended refer-
ent, communication is successful, otherwise a fail-
ure. Such a game consists of a set T (of possible
referents), a set M of messages that S could use,
a prior probability distribution Pr over T that cap-
tures R’s prior expectation about the most likely in-
tended referent, and a utility function that captures
the players’ preferences in the game. We assume
that S andR are both interested in establishing refer-
ence, so that if t is the intended referent and t′ is R’s
guess, then for some constants s > f : U(t, t′) = s if
t = t′ and f otherwise. Additionally, if messages are
meaningful, this is expressed by a denotation func-
tion [[m]] ⊆ T that gives the set of referents to which
m is applicable (e.g., of which it is true).
Consider, e.g., the situations depicted in Fig. 1.
There are three possible referents T = {tt, tc, td}
in the form of monsters and robots wearing one ac-
cessory each that both S and R observe. Since
there is no reason to prefer any referent over an-
other, we assume that Pr is a flat distribution over
T . There are also four possible messages M =
{mt,mc,md1,md2} with some intuitively obvious
“semantic meaning”. For example, the message mc
for red hat would intuitively be applicable to ei-
ther the robot tt or the green monster tc, so that
[[mc]] = {tt, tc}.
Signaling games like those in Fig. 1 are the basis
for the critical conditions of our experiments (see
also Sections 4 and 5), where we test which refer-
ent subjects choose for a given trigger message and
which message they choose for a trigger referent.
Trigger items for comprehension and production ex-
periments are marked with an asterisk in Fig. 1. In-
dices t, c, d stand for target, competitor and distrac-
tor respectively.
We refer to a game as in Fig. 1(a) as the simple
implicature condition, because it involves a simple
scalar implicature. Hearing trigger message m∗c , R
should reason that S must have meant target state tt,
and not competitor state tc, because if S had wanted
to refer to the latter she could have used an unam-
biguous message. Conversely, when S wants to re-
fer to trigger state t∗c , she should not use the true but
semantically ambiguous message mc, because she
has a stronger message mt. Similarly, we refer to a
game in Fig. 1(b) as the complex implicature condi-
tion, because it requires performing scalar reasoning
twice in sequence (see Fig. 2 later on).
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tt t
∗
c td
Possible Referents
mt m∗c
md1 md2
Message Options
(a) simple
t∗t tc td
Possible Referents
m∗t mc
md1 md2
Message Options
(b) complex
Figure 1: Target implicature conditions. Hearers choose one of the POSSIBLE REFERENTS T = {tt, tc, td}. Speakers
have MESSAGE OPTIONS M = {mt,mc,md1,md2}. Trigger items are indicated with asterisks: e.g., t∗t is the referent
to be communicated on complex production trials.
R0
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md1
md2
S1
tt
t∗c
td
R2
mt
m∗c
md1
md2
tt
t∗c
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S0
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t∗c
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R1
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m∗c
md1
md2
S2
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t∗c
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m∗c
md1
md2
(a) simple
R0
m∗t
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md1
md2
S1
t∗t
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td
R2
m∗t
mc
md1
md2
S3
t∗t
tc
td
m∗t
mc
md1
md2
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t∗t
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R1
m∗t
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md1
md2
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t∗t
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td
R3
m∗t
mc
md1
md2
t∗t
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td
(b) complex
Figure 2: Qualitative predictions of the IBR model for simple and complex conditions. The graphs give the set of best
responses at each level of strategic reasoning as a mapping from the left to the right.
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3 IBR Reasoning
The IBR model defines two independent strands of
strategic reasoning about language use: one that
starts with a naı¨ve (level-0) receiver R0 and one that
starts with a naı¨ve sender S0 (Franke, 2011; Ja¨ger,
2011). If utilities are as indicated and priors are flat,
the behavior of level-0 players is predicted to be a
uniform choice over options that conform to the se-
mantic meaning of messages: R0(m) = [[m]] and
S0(t) = {m | t ∈ [[m]]}. Sophisticated player types
of level k + 1 play any rational choice with equal
probability given a belief that the opponent player
is of level k. For our experimental examples, the
“light” system of Franke (2011) applies, where so-
phisticated types are defined as:1
Sk+1(t) =

argminm∈R−1k (t) |Rk(m) |
if R−1k (t) 6= ∅
S0(t) otherwise
Rk+1(m) =

argmint∈S−1k (m) |Sk(t) |
if S−1k (m) 6= ∅
R0(m) otherwise
The sequences of best responses for the simple and
complex games from Fig. 1 are given in Fig. 2. On
this purely qualitative picture, the IBR model makes
the same predictions for comprehension and pro-
duction. In the simple condition, the trigger item
is mapped to either target or competitor with equal
chance by naı¨ve players; all higher level types map
the trigger item to the target item with probability
one. In the complex condition, the trigger items
are mapped to target and competitor in levels 0 and
1 with equal probability, but uniquely to the target
item for k ≥ 2.
The sequences in Fig. 2 only consider the actual
best responses of S andR, but not the more nuanced
quantitative information that gives rise to these. Best
responses are defined as those that maximize ex-
pected utility given what the players believe about
how likely each choice option would lead to com-
municative success. The relevant expected success
probabilities are given in Table 1 for sophisticated
1Here R−1k (t) = {m | t ∈ Rk(m)}. Likewise for S−1k .
types. (Naı¨ve types have no or only trivial beliefs
about the game.)
For reasons of space suffice it to give the intu-
ition behind these numbers. E.g., in the simple con-
dition R1 believes that the trigger message is used
by naı¨ve senders who want to refer to tt or tc. But
naı¨ve senders who want to refer to tc would also use
mt with probability 1/2. So, by Bayesian condition-
alization, after hearing mc, R1 believes the intended
referent is tt with probability 2/3.
Notice that whileR’s success expectations always
sum to one (there is always only exactly one in-
tended referent), S’s success expectations need not
(several messages could be believed to lead to suc-
cessful communication). A further difference con-
cerns when S and R are sure of communicative suc-
cess. In the simple condition, S1 is already sure of
success, but only R≥2 is. In the complex condition,
R2 is already sure of success, but only S≥3 is. So,
if we assume that human reasoners aim for certainty
of communicative success in pragmatic reasoning,
the simple condition is less demanding in produc-
tion than in comprehension, while for the complex
condition the reverse is the case.
4 Experiment 1
Exp. 1 tested participants’ behavior in a compre-
hension task that used instantiations of the signaling
games described in Section 2.
4.1 Methods
Participants. Using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk,
30 workers were paid $0.60 to participate. All were
naı¨ve as to the purpose of the experiment and partic-
ipants’ IP address was limited to US addresses only.
Two participants did the experiment twice. Their
second run was excluded.
Procedure and Materials. Participants engaged in
a referential comprehension task. On each trial they
saw three objects on a display. Each object differed
systematically along two dimensions: its ontologi-
cal kind (robot or one of two monster species) and
accessory (scarf or either blue or red hat). In addi-
tion to these three objects, participants saw a picto-
rial message that they were told was sent to them
by a previous participant whose job it was to get
them to pick out one of these three objects. They
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simple complex
level R S R S
1 〈2/3, 1/3, 0〉 〈1, 1/2, 0, 0〉 〈1/2, 1/2, 0〉 〈1/2, 1/2, 0, 1/3〉
2 〈1, 0, 0〉 〈1, 0, 0, 0〉 〈1, 0, 0〉 〈1/2, 0, 0, 1/3〉
3 〈1, 0, 0〉 〈1, 0, 0, 0〉 〈1, 0, 0〉 〈1, 0, 0, 1/3〉
Table 1: Success expectations for the trigger items in the simple and complex condition. Success expectations for R
are given in order for tt, tc and td, those for S in order for mt, mc, md1 and md2.
were told that the previous participant was allowed
to send a message expressing only one feature of a
given object, and that the messages the participant
could send were furthermore restricted to monsters
and hats. The four expressible features were visible
to participants at the bottom of the display on every
trial.
Participants initially played four sender trials.
They saw three objects, one of which was high-
lighted with a yellow rectangle, and were asked to
click on one of four pictorial messages to send to
another Mechanical Turk worker to get them to pick
out the highlighted object. They were told that the
other worker did not know which object was high-
lighted but knew which messages could be sent. The
four sender trials contained three unambiguous and
one ambiguous trial which functioned as fillers in
the main experiment.
Participants saw 36 experimental trials, with a 2:1
ratio of fillers to critical trials. Of the 12 critical tri-
als, 6 constituted a simple implicature situation and
6 a complex one as defined in Section 2 (see also
Fig. 1).
Target position was counterbalanced (each criti-
cal trial occurred equally often in each of the 6 pos-
sible orders of target, competitor, and distractor), as
were the target’s features and the number of times
each message was sent. Of the 24 filler trials, half
used the displays from the implicature conditions
but the target was either tc or td (as identified un-
ambiguously by the trigger message). This was also
intended to prevent learning associations of display
type with the target. On the other 12 filler trials,
the target was either entirely unambiguous or en-
tirely ambiguous given the message. That is, there
was either only one object with the feature denoted
by the trigger message, or there were two identical
objects that were equally viable target candidates.
Trial order was pseudo-randomized such that there
were two lists (reverse order) of three blocks, where
critical trials and fillers were distributed evenly over
blocks. Each list began with three filler trials.
4.2 Results and Discussion
Proportions of choice types are displayed in
Fig. 3(a). As expected, participants were close to
ceiling in choosing the target on unambiguous filler
trials but at chance on ambiguous ones. This con-
firms that participants understood the task. On criti-
cal implicature trials, participants’ performance was
intermediate between ambiguous and unambiguous
filler trials. On simple implicature trials, participants
chose the target 79% of the time and the competitor
21% of the time. On complex implicature trials, the
target was chosen less often (54% of the time).
To test whether the observed differences in tar-
get choices above were significantly different, we
fitted a logistic mixed-effects regression to the data.
Trials on which the distractor was selected were ex-
cluded to allow for a binary outcome variable (target
vs. no target choice). This led to an exclusion of 5%
of the data. The model predicted the log odds of
choosing a target over a competitor from a Helmert-
coded CONDITION predictor, a predictor coding the
TRIAL number to account for learning effects, and
their interaction. Three Helmert contrasts over the
four relevant critical and filler conditions were in-
cluded in the model, comparing each condition with
a relatively less skewed distribution against the more
skewed distributions (in order: ambiguous fillers,
complex implicatures, simple implicatures, unam-
biguous fillers). This allowed us to capture whether
the differences in distributions for neighboring con-
ditions suggested by Fig. 3(a) were significant. We
included the maximal random effect structure that
allowed the model to converge:2 by-participant ran-
2For the procedure that was used to generate the random
effect structure, see http://hlplab.wordpress.com/
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Coef β SE(β) z p
(INTERCEPT) 1.81 0.22 8.3 <.0001
AMBIG.VS.REST −2.56 0.45 −5.6 <.0001
COMPLEX.VS.EASIER −3.20 0.53 −6.0 <.0001
SIMPLE.VS.UNAMBIG −2.68 0.81 −3.3 <.001
TRIAL 0.00 0.01 0.3 0.8
TRIAL:AMBIG.VS.REST −0.07 0.03 −2.6 <.05
TRIAL:COMPLEX.VS.EASIER −0.01 0.03 −0.4 0.7
TRIAL:SIMPLE.VS.UNAMBIG 0.08 0.05 1.7 0.08
Table 2: Model output of Exp. 1. AMBIG.VS.REST, COMPLEX.VS.EASIER, and SIMPLE.VS.UNAMBIG are the
Helmert-coded condition contrast predictors, in order.
dom slopes for CONDITION and TRIAL and by-item
random intercepts. Results are given in Table 2.
All Helmert contrasts reached significance at p <
.001. That is, all target/competitor distributions
shown in Fig. 3(a) are different from each other.
There was no main effect of TRIAL, indicating that
no learning took place overall during the course of
the experiment. However, there were significant in-
teractions, suggesting selective learning in a subset
of conditions. In particular there was a significant
interaction between TRIAL and the Helmert contrast
coding the difference between ambiguous fillers and
the rest of the conditions (AMBIG.VS.REST, β =
−.05, SE = .02, p < .05) and a marginally sig-
nificant interaction between TRIAL and the Helmert
contrast coding the difference between the sim-
ple implicature and unambiguous filler condition
(SIMPLE.VS.UNAMBIG, β = .08, SE = .05, p =
.08). Further probing the simple effects revealed that
participants chose the target more frequently later in
the experiment in the simple and complex condition.
This was evidenced by a main effect of TRIAL on
that subset of the data (β = .03, SE = .01, p < .05)
but no interactions with condition. There were no
learning effects in the ambiguous and unambiguous
filler conditions; participants were at chance for am-
biguous items and at ceiling for unambiguous items
throughout. This suggests that at least some partici-
pants became aware that there was an optimal strat-
egy and began to employ it as the experiment pro-
gressed.
We next address the question of whether the data
supports the within-participant distributions pre-
dicted by standard IBR. Recall from Section 2 that
2009/05/14/random-effect-structure/
for the simple condition, IBR predicts R0 players to
have a uniform distribution over target and competi-
tor choices and R≥1 players to choose only the tar-
get. For the complex condition, the uniform distribu-
tion is predicted for both R0 and R1 players, while
only target choices are expected for R≥2 players.
This is not borne out (see Fig. 4(a)). On the one
hand, there were 3 participants in the simple condi-
tion and 5 in the complex condition who chose the
target on half of the trials and could thus be classified
as R0 (or R1 in the complex condition). Similarly,
there were 11 participants in the simple condition
and one in the complex condition who chose only
targets and thus behaved as sophisticated receivers
according to IBR. On the other hand, the majority of
participants’ distributions over target and competi-
tor choices deviated from both the uniform and the
target-only distribution.
One possibility is that some participants’ type
shifted from Rk to Rk+1 as the experiment pro-
gressed. That is, they may have shifted from ini-
tially choosing targets and competitors at random to
choosing only targets. However, while it is the case
that overall more targets were chosen later in the ex-
periment in both implicature conditions, there was
nevertheless within-participant variation in choices
late in the experiment inconsistent with a categori-
cal shift. Another possibility is that the experiment
was too short to observe this categorical shift.
5 Experiment 2
Exp. 2 tested participants’ behavior in a production
task that used instantiations of the signaling games
described in Section 2.
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Figure 3: Proportions of target, competitor, and distractor choices in implicature and filler conditions (Exps. 1 & 2).
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Figure 4: Distribution of participants over number of target choices in implicature conditions (Exp. 1 & 2).
5.1 Methods
Participants. Using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk,
30 workers were paid $0.60 to participate under the
same conditions as in Exp. 1. Data from two partici-
pants whose comments indicated that not all images
displayed properly were excluded.
Procedure and Materials. The procedure was the
same as on the sender trials in Exp. 1. Participants
saw 36 trials with a 2:1 ratio of fillers to critical tri-
als. There were 12 critical trials (6 simple and 6
complex implicature situations as in Fig. 1). Half
of the fillers used the same displays as the impli-
cature trials, but one of the other two objects was
highlighted. This meant that the target message was
either unambiguous (e.g. when the highlighted ob-
ject was tt in Fig. 1(a) the target message was mc)
or entirely ambiguous. The remaining 12 filler trials
employed other displays with either entirely unam-
biguous or ambiguous target messages. Two exper-
imental lists were created and counterbalancing was
ensured as in Exp. 1.
5.2 Results and Discussion
Proportions of choice types are displayed in
Fig. 3(b). As in Exp. 1, participants were close to
ceiling for target message choices on unambiguous
filler trials but at chance on ambiguous ones. On
critical implicature trials, participants’ performance
was slightly different than in Exp. 1. Most notably,
the distribution over target and competitor choices in
the simple implicature condition was more skewed
than in Exp. 1 (95% targets, 5% competitors), while
it was more uniform than in Exp. 1 on complex im-
plicature trials (50% targets, 47% competitors).
We again fitted a logistic mixed-effects regres-
sion model to the data. Trials on which the distrac-
tor messages were selected were excluded to allow
for a binary outcome variable (target vs. competi-
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tor choice). This led to an exclusion of 2% of tri-
als. In addition, the unambiguous filler condition
is not included in the analysis reported here since
there was only 1 non-target choice after exclusion
of distractor choices, leading to unreliable model
convergence. Thus, as in Exp. 1, CONDITION was
entered into the model as a Helmert-coded variable
but with only two contrasts, one comparing the sim-
ple implicature condition to the mean of ambigu-
ous fillers and the complex implicature condition
(SIMPLE.VS.HARDER), and another one comparing
the ambiguous fillers with the complex implicatures
(AMBIG.VS.COMPLEX). The model reported here
further does not contain a TRIAL predictor to con-
trol for learning effects because model comparison
revealed that it was not justified (χ2(1) = 0.06,
p = .8). That is, there were no measurable learning
effects in this experiment. We included the maximal
random effects structure that allowed the model to
converge: by-participant random slopes for CONDI-
TION and by-item random intercepts.
The SIMPLE.VS.HARDER Helmert contrast
reached significance (β = 3.04, SE = 0.5,
p < .0001) while AMBIG.VS.COMPLEX did not
(β = 0.08, SE = 0.41, p = .9). That is, there
was no difference between choosing a target in
the ambiguous filler condition and in the complex
implicature condition, suggesting that participants
were at chance in deriving complex implicatures in
production. However, they were close to ceiling in
choosing targets in the simple implicature condition.
The observed within-participant distributions are
better predicted by the qualitative version of IBR
than in Exp. 1 (see Fig. 4(b)). For the simple condi-
tion, IBR predicts S0 players to have a uniform dis-
tribution over target and competitor choices and S≥1
players to choose only the target. For the complex
condition, the uniform distribution is predicted for
both S0 and S1 players, while only target choices
are expected for S≥2 players.
In the simple implicature condition, 75% of par-
ticipants were perfect S1 reasoners. The remaining
25% chose almost only targets. That is, participants
very consistently computed the implicature. In con-
trast, the bulk of participants chose targets versus
competitors at random in the complex implicature
condition. Only 2 participants chose the target 5 out
of 6 times.
Comparing these results to the results from
Exp. 1, we see the following pattern: in produc-
tion the simple one-level implicatures are more read-
ily computed than in comprehension, while the
more complex two-level implicatures are more read-
ily computed in comprehension than in production.
That is, rather than comprehension mirroring pro-
duction, in this paradigm there is an asymmetry be-
tween the two. This is consistent with the quanti-
tative interpretation of IBR (as described in section
3) that takes into account players’ uncertainty about
communicative success.
6 General Discussion
In two studies using an abstract language game we
investigated speakers’ and hearers’ strategic reason-
ing about referential descriptions. Most generally,
our results clearly favor step-wise solution concepts
like IBR over equilibrium-based solution concepts
(e.g. Parikh (2001)) as predictors of participants’
pragmatic reasoning: our results suggest that inter-
locutors do take perspective and simulate each oth-
ers’ beliefs, although (a) message and interpreta-
tion choice behavior is not always optimal and (b)
perspective-taking decreases as the number of rea-
soning steps required to arrive at the optimal re-
sponse, as predicted by IBR, increases.
We also found evidence for an intriguing asym-
metry between production and comprehension.
While not predicted by the standard formulation of
the IBR model, this asymmetry is consistent with
an interpretation of IBR that takes into account the
uncertainty that interlocutors have about the prob-
ability of communicative success given a restricted
set of message and interpretation options. This calls
for a revision of the IBR model to incorporate more
nuanced quantitative information. Since, moreover,
there is a substantial amount of individual varia-
tion, further investigating the role of individual dif-
ferences on perspective-taking (e.g. Brown-Schmidt
(2009)) promises to be a fruitful avenue of further
research that could inform model revisions.
It could be objected that the comparison of im-
plicatures across experiments may be problematic
due to the different nature of the tasks involved in
the production vs. comprehension experiments and
differences underlying the involved inference pro-
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cesses. However, note that the version of the IBR
model that takes into account interlocutor uncer-
tainty predicts the asymmetry between production
and comprehension that we found precisely by in-
tegrating some of the differences involved in the
two processes: most importantly, since conversa-
tion is modelled as a dynamic game, the sender rea-
sons about the future behavior of the receiver, while
the receiver reasons “backward”, so to speak, using
Bayesian conditionalization, about the most likely
initial state the sender could have been in; this gives
rise, as we have seen, to different predictions about
when a speaker or a hearer can be absolutely certain
of communicative success. How this difference is
implemented mechanistically is an interesting ques-
tion that merits further investigation.
Frank and Goodman (2012) report the results of
an experiment using a referential game almost iden-
tical to ours and show that a particular Bayesian
choice model very reliably predicts the observed
data for both comprehension and production. In
fact, the proposed Bayesian model is a variant of
IBR reasoning that considers only a level-1 sender
and a level-2 receiver, but assumes smoothed best
response functions at each optimization step. In a
smoothed IBR model, players’ choices are stochas-
tic with choice probabilities proportional to expected
utilities (see Rogers et al. (2009) for a general for-
mulation of such a model in game theoretic terms).
This suggests a straightforward agenda for future
work: combining our approach and that of Frank
and Goodman (2012), smoothed IBR models that al-
low various strategic types for speakers and listeners
should be further tested on empirical data.
In related work investigating comprehenders’ ca-
pacity for deriving ad hoc scalar implicatures, Stiller
et al. (2011) found that subjects could draw simple
implicatures of the type we report above in a setup
very similar to ours, but failed to draw complex
ones. In contrast, our comprehenders performed
above chance in the complex condition (albeit only
slightly so). One possible explanation for this differ-
ence is that unlike Stiller et al. (2011), we restricted
the set of message alternatives and also made it ex-
plicit to participants that a message could only de-
note one feature. This highlights the importance
of (mutual knowledge of) the set of alternatives as-
sumed by interlocutors in a particular communica-
tive setting. While we restricted this set explicitly,
in natural dialogue there is likely a variety of factors
that determine what constitutes an alternative.
This suggests that future extensions of this
work should move towards an artificial language
paradigm. For example, whether a given message
constitutes an alternative is likely to be affected by
message complexity, which was held constant in our
setup by using pictorial messages. Artificial lan-
guage paradigms allow for investigating the effect
of message complexity on inferences of the type re-
ported here. Similarly, it will be important to fur-
ther test the quantitative predictions made by IBR,
e.g. by parametrically varying the payoff of commu-
nicative success and failure s and f and the interac-
tion thereof with message complexity.
One question that arises in connection with the
restrictions we imposed on the set of available pic-
torial messages, is the extent to which our results
are transferable to natural language use. This is a
legitimate concern that we would have to address
empirically in future work. But notice also that,
firstly, there is no a priori reason to believe that
reasoning about natural language use and reasoning
about our abstract referential games should neces-
sarily differ — indeed it has been noted as early as
Grice (1975) that conversational exchanges consti-
tute but one case of rational communicative behav-
ior. More importantly, even if reasoning about nat-
ural language were different in kind from strategic
reasoning in general, the kind of strategic IBR rea-
soning we address here is a specific variety of rea-
soning that has been explicitly proposed in the lit-
erature as a model of pragmatic reasoning. The re-
ported experiments are thus relevant in at least as
far as they are the first empirical test of whether hu-
man reasoners are, in general, able to perform this
kind of strategic reasoning in a task that translates
the proposed pragmatic context models as directly
as possible into an experimental setting.
We conclude that the studies reported are an
encouraging first step towards validating game-
theoretic approaches to formal pragmatics, which
are well-suited to modeling pragmatic phenom-
ena and generating quantitative, testable predictions
about language use. The future challenge, as we see
it, lies in fine-tuning the formal models alongside
further careful empirical investigation.
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Abstract
Communicative listener feedback is a pre-
valent coordination mechanism in dialogue.
Listeners use feedback to provide evidence
of understanding to speakers, who, in turn,
use it to reason about the listeners’ mental
state of listening, determine the grounded-
ness of communicated information, and ad-
apt their subsequent utterances to the listen-
ers’ needs. We describe a speaker-centric
Bayesian model of listeners and their feed-
back behaviour, which can interpret the
listener’s feedback signal in its dialogue con-
text and reason about the listener’s mental
state as well as the grounding status of ob-
jects in information state.
1 Introduction
In dialogue, the interlocutor not currently holding
a turn, is usually not truly passive when listen-
ing to what the turn-holding interlocutor is saying.
Quite the contrary, ‘listeners’ actively participate
in the dialogue. They do so by providing commu-
nicative feedback, which, among other signals, is
evidence of their perception, understanding and
acceptance of and agreement to the speakers’ ut-
terances. ‘Speakers’ use this evidence to reason
about common ground and to design their utter-
ances to accommodate the listener’s needs. This
interplay makes communicative listener feedback
an important mechanism for dialogue coordination
and critical to dialogue success.
From a theoretical perspective, however, the in-
terpretation of communicative feedback is a diffi-
cult problem. Feedback signals are only conven-
tionalised to a certain degree (meaning and use
might vary with the individual listener) and, as
Allwood et al. (1992) argue, they are highly sensit-
ive to their linguistic context – e.g., the speakers’
utterances – and the communicative situation in
general.
We present a Bayesian network model for inter-
preting a listener’s feedback signals in their dia-
logue context. Taking a speaker-centric perspect-
ive, the model keeps representations of the men-
tal ‘state of listening’ attributed to the listener in
the form of belief states over random variables,
as well as an estimation of groundedness of the
information in the speaker’s utterance. To reason
about these representations, the model relates the
listener’s feedback signal to the speaker’s utter-
ance and his expectations of the listener’s reaction
to it.
2 Background and related work
Feedback signals, verbal-vocal or non-verbal, are
communicative acts1 that bear meaning and serve
communicative functions. Allwood et al. (1992,
p. 3) identified four basic communicative functions
of feedback, namely contact (being “willing and
able to continue the interaction”), perception (be-
ing “willing and able to perceive the message”), un-
derstanding (being “willing and able to understand
the message”), and attitudinal reactions (being
“willing and able to react and (adequately) respond
to the message”). It is also argued that these func-
tions form a hierarchy such that higher functions
encompass lower ones (e.g., communicating under-
standing implies perception, which implies being
in contact). Kopp et al. (2008) extended this set of
basic functions by adding acceptance/agreement
(previously considered an attitudinal reaction) and
1Note, however, that listeners might not be (fully) aware
of some of the feedback they are producing. Not all should
be considered as necessarily having communicative intent
(Allwood et al., 1992). Nevertheless, even such ‘indicated’
feedback is communicative and is often interpreted by inter-
locutors.
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by regarding expressions of emotion as attitudinal
reactions
Feedback signals can likely take an infinite num-
ber of forms. Although verbal-vocal feedback sig-
nals, as one example, are taken from a rather small
repertoire of lexical items such as ‘yes’, ‘no’, as
well as non-lexical vocalisations such as ‘uh-huh’,
‘huh’, ‘oh’, ‘mm’, many variations can be produced
spontaneously through generative processes such
as by combination of different vocalisations or re-
peating syllables (Ward, 2006). In addition, these
verbalisations can be subject to significant pros-
odic variation. Naturally, this continuous space
of possible feedback signals can express much
more than the basic functions described above.
And listeners make use of these possibilities to ex-
press subtle differences in meaning (Ehlich, 1986)
– which speakers are able to recognise, interpret
(Stocksmeier et al., 2007; Pammi, 2011) and react
to (Clark and Krych, 2004).
For a computational model of feedback produc-
tion, Kopp et al. (2008) proposed a simple concept
termed ‘listener state.’ It represents a listener’s
current mental state of contact, perception, under-
standing, acceptance and agreement as simple nu-
merical values. The fundamental idea of this model
is that the communicative function of a feedback
signal encodes the listener’s current mental state.
An appropriate expression of this function can be
retrieved by mapping the listener state onto the
continuous space of feedback signals.
In previous work (Buschmeier and Kopp, 2011),
we adopted the concept of listener state as a repres-
entation of a mental state that speakers in dialogue
attribute to listeners through Theory of Mind. That
is, we made it the result of a feedback interpret-
ation process. We argued that such an ‘attributed
listener state’ (ALS) is an important prerequisite
to designing utterances to the immediate needs a
listener communicates through feedback. The ALS
captures such needs in an abstract form (e.g., is
there a difficulty in perception or understanding)
by describing them with a small number of vari-
ables, and is in this way similar to the “one-bit,
most minimal partner model” which Galati and
Brennan (2010, p. 47) propose as a representation
suitable for guiding general audience design pro-
cesses in dialogue.
For more specific adaptations, a speaker needs
to consider more detailed information, such as
the grounding status of previous utterances (Clark,
1996). Knowing whether previously conveyed in-
formation can be assumed to be part of the com-
mon ground (or even its degree of groundedness
[Roque and Traum, 2008]) is important in order to
estimate the success of a contribution (and initiate
a repair if necessary) and to produce subsequent ut-
terances that meet a listener’s informational needs.
Analysing an inherently vague phenomenon
such as feedback signals in their dialogue context
is almost only possible in a probabilistic frame-
work. It is difficult to draw clear-cut conclusions
from listener feedback and even human annotators,
not being directly involved in the interaction, have
difficulties consistently annotating feedback sig-
nals in terms of conversational functions (Geertzen
et al., 2008).
A probabilistic framework well suited for reas-
oning about knowledge in an uncertain world is
that offered by Bayesian networks. They represent
knowledge in terms of ‘degrees of belief’, meaning
that they do not hold one definite belief about the
current state of the world, but represent different
possible world states along with their probabilit-
ies of being true. Furthermore, Bayesian networks
make it possible to model the relevant influences
between random variables representing different
aspects of the world in a compact model. This is
why they are potentially well suited for reasoning
about feedback use in dialogue. Using a Bayesian
network, the conditioning influences between dia-
logue context, listener feedback, ALS, as well as
the estimated grounding status of speaker’s utter-
ances can be captured in a unified and well-defined
probabilistic framework.
Representing grounding status not only in de-
grees of groundedness but also in terms of de-
grees of belief, adds a new dimension to the ap-
proach put forth by Roque and Traum (2008). Deal-
ing with uncertainty in the representation of com-
mon ground simplifies the interface to vague in-
formation gained from listener feedback, and re-
moves the need to prematurely commit to a specific
grounding level. This keeps the information status
of an utterance open to change.
Bayesian networks have already been used
to model problems similar to the one in ques-
tion. Paek and Horvitz (2000), for example, use
Bayesian networks to manage the uncertainties,
among other things, in the model of grounding
behaviour in the ‘Quartet’ architecture for spoken
dialogue systems. Rossignol et al. (2010) on the
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other hand created a Bayesian network model of
dialogue system users’ grounding behaviour. There
the Bayesian network simulates consistent user
behaviour which can be used for experimenta-
tion with, and training of, dialogue management
policies. Finally, Stone and Lascarides (2010) pro-
pose to combine Bayesian networks with the logic
based Segmented Discourse Representation The-
ory (SDRT; Asher and Lascarides, 2010) for a the-
ory of grounding in dialogue that is both rational
(in the utility theoretic sense) and coherent (by
assigning discourse relations a prominent role in
making sense of utterances).
3 A Bayesian model of the listener
A speaker’s Bayesian model of a listener should
relate dialogue context, listener feedback, the at-
tributed listener state as well as the grounding
status of the speaker’s utterances to each other.
Constructing such a model either needs corpora
with fine-grained annotations of all these aspects
of dialogue (to ‘learn’ it from data) or detailed
knowledge about the relations (to design it). Apart
from the fact that adequate corpora are practic-
ally non-existent, structure-learning of a Bayesian
network can only infer conditional independence
between variables and not their underlying causal
relations. The top-ranking results of a structure
learning algorithm might therefore differ substan-
tially, resulting in networks that disagree about
influences and causal relationships (Barber, 2012).
For this reason, we take the approach of construct-
ing a Bayesian network by ‘hand’, making – as is
not uncommon in cognitive modelling – informed
decisions based on research findings and intuition.
3.1 Assumed causal structure
When analysing or modelling a phenomenon with
Bayesian networks, it is helpful to think of them as
representing the phenomenon’s underlying causal
structure (Pearl, 2009). Network nodes represent
causes, effects or both, and directed edges between
nodes represent causality. A directed edge from a
node A to a node B, for example, models that A is
a cause for B, and that B is an effect of A. Another
directed edge from B to a third node C, makes B
the cause of C. Being intermediate, it is possible
that B is both an effect (of A) and a cause (of C).
Figure 1 illustrates the causal structure of
listener feedback in verbal interaction that we as-
sume. In a given situation, a speaker S produces
S L
IS
Utterance
 Expec-
tations
ALS Mental state
Situation
Feedback
IS
Figure 1: Speaker S reasoning about the mental state of
listener L. S’s utterances cause L to move into a certain
state of understanding. This influences L’s feedback
signals, which are evidence for S’s attributed listener
state of L.
an utterance in the presence of a listener L and
wants to know what L’s mental state of listening is
towards her utterance, i.e., whether L is in contact,
has perceived, understood and accepts or agrees
with S’s utterance. As it is impossible for S to dir-
ectly observe L’s mental state, she can only try to
reconstruct it based on L’s communicative actions
(i.e., L’s feedback) and by relating it to the dia-
logue context: her utterance, her expectations and
the communicative situation.
To make a causally coherent argument, we as-
sume, for the moment, that L’s unobservable men-
tal state is part of the Bayesian listener model
(parts unobservable to S are drawn with grey
dashed lines in Figure 1). L’s mental state results
from the effect of S’s utterance, the communicative
situation as well as L’s information state. L’s men-
tal state, on the other hand, causes him to provide
evidence of his understanding by producing a feed-
back signal. In this way closure is achieved for the
causal chain from utterance, via mental state and
feedback signal, to S’s reconstruction ‘ALS’ of L’s
mental state.
This causally coherent model can easily be re-
duced to an agent-centric model for S, which con-
sists of only those influences that S can observe
directly (drawn with black solid lines in Figure 1).
Although this leads to a ‘gap’ in the causal chain,
nodes retain their roles as causes and/or effects.
It should be noted, however, that the causal
model only provides the scaffolding of a more
detailed model to be presented next. Each node is
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a mere place-holder for a complete network struc-
ture. These sub-networks are constructed accord-
ing to information that is available and useful to
model feedback interpretation for a speaker.
3.2 Attributed Listener State
The core of the Bayesian model of the listener is
the reconstruction of the listener’s mental state, the
attributed listener state. As described in Section 2,
the model should give an estimate of whether the
listener is in contact, how well she perceives and
understands what the speaker says and to which
degree the listener accepts and agrees to the utter-
ance’s content. As in previous models of (attrib-
uted) listener state (Kopp et al., 2008; Buschmeier
and Kopp, 2011) the notions of contact, perception,
understanding, acceptance and agreement are mod-
elled with one variable each. Here, their values C,
P, U , AC and AG, however, should be interpreted
in terms of ‘degrees of belief’ instead of in terms
of strength (which is modelled in terms of the vari-
ables’ states – see Section 4.1).
The influences among the ALS variables are
modelled after Allwood et al. (1992)’s hierarchy
of feedback functions and Clark (1996)’s ladder of
actions: perception subsumes contact, understand-
ing subsumes perception and contact, acceptance
and agreement subsume understanding perception
and contact. This means, for instance, that if under-
standing is assumed, perception and contact can be
assumed as well. A lack of perception, on the other
hand, usually implies that understanding cannot be
assumed. Thus, the influences are the following:
C influences P, P influences U , and U influences
AC and AG (see the central part of Figure 2 for a
graphical depiction).
3.3 Contextual influences on ALS
The most important information for inferring the
ALS is the listener’s feedback signal itself. Thus, if
it is recognised as having the communicative func-
tion ‘understanding’, there is a positive influence
on the variables C, P and – especially – U . Vari-
ables AC and AG on the other hand are negatively
influenced since speakers usually signal feedback
of the highest function possible (Allwood et al.,
1992; Clark, 1996).
To take into account the context-sensitivity of
feedback signals, features of the speaker’s utter-
ance need to be considered in ALS estimation as
well. If for example the speaker’s utterance is
simple2, the degree of belief in the listener’s suc-
cessful understanding of the utterance should be
high – even if explicit positive feedback is absent.
A further influence on ALS variables is how cer-
tain the listener seems to be about his mental state.
A feedback signal can imply that a listener is still
in the process of evaluating the speaker’s statement
– and is not yet sure whether she agrees with it –
often by lengthening the signal or being hesitant
of its production (Ward, 2006). This uncertainty
could also influence the ALS.
Finally, situation specific influences and the
influence of a speaker’s expectations about the
listener’s behaviour are often connected to the dia-
logue domain and to known preferences in the
listener. In a calendar assistant domain, which is
the task domain we are working with, when presen-
ted, e.g., with a tight schedule and a new appoint-
ment of low priority, the likelihood is high that a
listener rejects this new appointment.
3.4 Influences on Information State
The ALS mediates between the contextual factors
described above and the information state. This
makes the grounding status of the objects in the
information state conditionally independent of the
multitude of possible influencing factors which
reduces the model’s complexity significantly.
Each of the ALS variables influences the ground-
ing status variable to a different degree. Believing
that the listener is in full contact but neither per-
ceives nor understands what the speaker is saying,
for example, should lead to a low degree of be-
lief in the groundedness of the object. In contrast,
assuming the listener to have at least some under-
standing might be enough to consider information
to be sufficiently grounded.
This part of the model can be considered one ele-
ment of the speaker’s ‘grounding criterion’ (Clark,
1996). The influences between ALS and inform-
ation state map the listener’s mental state (in-
ferred from evidence of understanding) to groun-
dedness of objects in information state. Whether
the amount of groundedness is then considered
‘sufficient for current purposes’ (another element
of the grounding process) is to be determined else-
where.
2The notion of ‘simplicity’ is complex in itself. Here it is
assumed that an utterance is simple if (i) it is not unexpected
by the listener, (ii) it does not contains much new information
and (iii) it is short.
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Figure 2: Structure of the Bayesian model of the listener.
The variables shaded in grey are fully observable to a
speaker (FB function, modality, polarity, and progress
are derived from the listener’s feedback signal).
4 Formal definition
We will now present the complete formal definition
of the Bayesian model of the listener3.It consists
of a network structure, the node-internal structure,
including their states, and parameters.
4.1 Model and node-internal structure
Figure 2 shows the structure of the full Bayesian
network model of the listener. It reflects the causal
structure sketched in Section 3.1 and Figure 1,
and shows how the ALS sub-network, described
in Section 3.2, acts as a layer mediating between
context and information state.
Context itself consists of evidence nodes (drawn
in shades of grey in Figure 2) that are directly
observable to a speaker, and nodes for abstract
concepts such as difficulty of the speaker’s utter-
ance, uncertainty of the listener, and the trade-off
that the speaker expects the listener to make.
The node Difficulty reflects properties of the
speaker’s utterance and is part of the dialogue con-
text. As described in footnote 2, it is an abstraction
of utterance Length (having the states short, me-
dium, long), of how Expected the utterance is (low,
medium, high) as well as the Novelty of the in-
formation that is encoded in the utterance (new,
old). Difficulty itself has the states low, medium
and high. It influences the variables P and U in the
ALS.
3A machine readable specification in the standardised ‘Ba-
yesian network interchange format’ (XBIF) is available from
http://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.94357 .
The nodes FB-function and Uncertainty reflect
properties of the listener’s feedback signal. It is
assumed that the communicative function of the
listener’s signal is classified externally and then
represented in the node FB-function. This node can
take the states c, p, u, ac, ag, ¬c,¬p,¬u,¬ac,¬ag,
and none, which correspond to the basic functions
as identified by Allwood et al. (1992) and Kopp et
al. (2008). Feedback functions are distinguished
according to their polarity (e.g., understood [u]
versus not-understood [¬u]). If the listener did not
provide feedback, the state none might be chosen.
The variable FB-function directly influences each
of the ALS-variables.
Uncertainty is an abstract concept derived from
the Polarity of the feedback signal (positive, neut-
ral or negative), whether the signal conveys that
the listener is still in Progress evaluating what the
speaker uttered (ongoing, finished), and the Modal-
ity used to give feedback (verbal, non-verbal, mul-
timodal). For example, a setting where Polarity is
neutral, only one Modality is used, and Progress
is ongoing, results in a degree of belief where the
listener’s uncertainty is high. The listener’s uncer-
tainty has an influence on the ALS-variables P, U ,
AC and AG.
Trade-off is an example of a domain-specific
node that reflects the speaker’s domain knowledge
and his expectations of the listener’s behaviour
in the calendar assistant domain that we are us-
ing. It should not be considered to be an integral
part of a general model of a listener. The trade-
off a listener is expected to address depends on
how many Constraints, i.e., other appointments a
proposed appointment potentially interferes with
(none, one, a few, many) and the Priority of the new
appointment as compared to the priorities of the
constraining appointments (lower, similar, higher).
Trade-off itself can be low, medium and high and
influences the variables AC and AG in the ALS.
Each of the ALS variables has the three states
low, medium, and high. The variable Ground-
ing with five states low, low-medium, medium,
medium-high and high is more fine-grained and
reflects a simple model of degrees of grounding
(Roque and Traum, 2008). In general, both the ALS
variables as well as the Grounding variable could
be modelled with higher or lower number of states,
and even as continuous random variables. Table 1
gives an overview of all variables/nodes and their
states.
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Table 1: Variables and their states in the Bayesian model
of the listener. ‘Meta nodes’ correspond to the nodes
described in Section 3.1 and displayed in Figure 1.
Meta nodes Variables States
ALS Contact low, medium, high
Perception low, medium, high
Understanding low, medium, high
ACceptance low, medium, high
AGreement low, medium, high
Utterance Difficulty low, medium, high
–Expectable low, medium, high
–Length short, medium, long
–Novelty new, old
Feedback –FB-function none, c, p, u, ac, ag,
¬c,¬p,¬u,¬ac,¬ag
Uncertainty low, medium, high
–Modality verbal, non-verbal
multimodal
–Progress ongoing, finished
–Polarity negative, neutral,
positive
Expectations Trade-off low, medium, high
–Constraints none, one, a few, many
–Priority lower, similar, higher
Inform. state Grounding low, low-medium,
medium, medium-high,
high
4.2 Model parameters
An important advantage of Bayesian networks over
other probabilistic modelling approaches is that
through the structure of the model (i.e., assuming
conditional independences) a large reduction in
the number of model-parameters is possible. The
structure of our model allows a reduction of the full
joint probability distribution with 1.870.672.320
parameters to a factored distribution consisting of
only of 5.287 parameters.
As estimating this much smaller number of para-
meters by hand is still a tedious and error-prone
task, we generated the model’s parameters from a
‘structured representation’ of the conditional prob-
ability tables cpt(Xa) for each variable/node Xa
and its influencing variables Xi ∈ parents(Xa) =
{Xi, . . .Xi+n} in the following way:
1. Set the strength of influence that each variable
Xi exerts on Xa by defining a weight wi ∈ [0,1]
so that ∑i+nk=i wk = 1.
2. For each variable Xi and its states xi j ∈
states(Xi) = {xi1 , . . .xiz} assign a value ιxi j ∈
[−1,1]. xi j influences Xa negatively if ιxi j < 0,
positively if ιxi j > 0, and does not have an in-
fluence if ιxi j = 0.
3. Now, for each possible combination of
states (xi j , . . . ,xi+n j) ∈ {states(Xi) × . . . ×
states(Xi+n)}, calculate its weighted influ-
ence µ(xi j , . . . ,xi+n j) = ∑
i+n
k=i wk · ιxk j .
4. For each state xa j ∈ states(Xa) = {xa1 , . . .xaz},
assign a value oxa j ∈ [−1,1]. Similarly to the
definition given in step 2 above, oxa j determ-
ines the influence each combination c from
step 3 has on a state xa j . A natural assign-
ment for a variable with states low, medium
and high would be Xalow = −1;Xamedium =
0;Xahigh = 1.
5. Now for each entry in the conditional
probability table cpt(Xa) calculate a
preliminary value p˜(xa j |xi j , . . . ,xi+n j) =
N (oxa j ,µ(xi j , . . . ,xi+n j), where
N (oxa j ,µ(xi j , . . . ,xi+n j)) is the value of
the Gaussian probability density function at
oxa j and with mean µ(xi j , . . . ,xi+n j).
6. Finally, normalise cpt(Xa) column-wise to
convert the values p˜(xa j |xi j , . . . ,xi+n j) into
probabilities p(xa j |xi j , . . . ,xi+n j).
In summary, this method generates the condi-
tional probability table for a variable Xa by defin-
ing weighted means for each combination of states
of its influencing variables. These are then used as
means for Gaussian probability density functions,
from each of which values at points oxa j associated
with the states of the variable Xa are calculated.
These are then converted to probabilities and put
in the CPT.
With this method, instead of having to define the
complete CPTs manually, i.e., a number of xCPT =
|states(Xa)| ·∏i+nk=i |states(Xk)| parameters for each
variable, only xSR = |parents(Xa)|+ |states(Xa)|+
∑i+nk=i |states(Xk)| parameters are needed to define
this structured representation of a conditional prob-
ability table. The loss of expressiveness caused by
the structured representation was not limiting for
defining the model – on the contrary, with its 254
parameters, it allowed for a straightforward expres-
sion of the relationships between variables.
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Example 1 – Feedback-function: (a) FB-function = u (b) FB-function = ¬u. Fixed: length = normal, expected = medium,
novelty = new, modality = verbal, progress = finished, polarity = neutral, priority = similar, constraints = one.
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Example 2 – Difficulty: (a) length = long, expected = low, novelty = new (b) length = short, expected = high, novelty = old
Fixed: FB-function = none, polarity = neutral.
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Example 3 – Uncertainty: (a) modality = nonverbal, polarity = neural, progress = ongoing (b) modality = both, polarity = positive,
progress = finished. Fixed: FB-function = ac, length = normal, expected = med, novelty = new, priority = similar, constraints = a few.
0 0.5 1
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med
high
0 0.5 1 0 0.5 1 0 0.5 1 0 0.5 1 0 0.5 1 0 0.5 1 0 0.5 1 0 0.5 1
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Figure 3: Plots of the belief states for three examples, each in two contrasting conditions. Conditions (a) are
plotted with black, conditions (b) with grey comb lines. The x-axes show the degrees of belief of each variable’s
states. Variables are abbreviated as follows: DIFficulty, UNCertainty, TRade-off, GRounding. C, P, U , AC and AG
are the ALS-variables.
5 Results
With the structure of the model defined, and the
conditional probability tables generated from the
structured representation, we use the Bayesian net-
work and sensitivity analysis program SAMIAM4
(Darwiche, 2009) to illustrate how the model be-
haves in some interesting situations. Figure 3
shows the belief states of the abstract context vari-
ables Difficulty, Uncertainty and Trade-off ; the
ALS-variables C, P, U , AC and AG; as well as
the information state variable Grounding. The be-
lief states are calculated given a certain fixed as-
signment of (some of) the variables representing
the user’s behaviour and the dialogue context. For
each example, two contrasting belief states are dis-
played next to each other (conditions [a] drawn
in black, conditions [b] in grey), reflecting the ef-
fect of a change in some variables while the others
remain fixed.
Example 1, shows the influence a listener’s feed-
back signal, in the form of its feedback function,
has on ALS and grounding. It is assumed that the
speaker will produce an utterance of normal length,
that will not be unexpected, yet still contain new
information. The belief state of the variable Dif-
ficulty (see Figure 3) indicates that this utterance
4http://reasoning.cs.ucla.edu/samiam/
will be of medium to high difficulty to the listener.
It is further assumed that the listener either gives
verbal feedback of function (a) understanding, e.g.,
‘uh-huh’, or (b) non-understanding, e.g., ‘huh’ in
response. The signal also conveys that the listener
finished evaluating the utterance and thus, as the
belief state of the variable Uncertainty indicates,
seems to be rather certain about his evaluation. As
a result, the belief states of all ALS variables show
that feedback of type understanding in contrast to
non-understanding results in a shift of the probabil-
ity mass towards medium and high states. Similarly,
for the variable Grounding, a higher degree of be-
lief in groundedness of the utterance’s content can
be observed in the understanding condition (a).
Example 2 varies the difficulty of the speaker’s
utterance from (a) higher difficulty to (b) lower
difficulty. The change in the evidence variables
Length, Expected and Novelty is clearly reflected
in the belief state of the variable Difficulty. It is
assumed that the listener does not provide any feed-
back (i.e., FB-function is none). As a result, the
probability mass in the belief states of the ALS
variables P and U shift towards the medium and
low states for the difficult utterance, and is more
evenly distributed between the medium and high
states for the simpler utterance. The same holds
for the variable Grounding. The degree of belief
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in the utterance being grounded is higher for the
simpler utterance. Notably, the belief states of the
variables C, AC and AG are almost not affected.
Utterance difficulty does not have a large impact
on the listener being in contact, his acceptance of,
or agreement with the utterance.
In Example 3 the listener responds to an utter-
ance about an appointment which overlaps with a
few other appointments (Constraints = a few) all of
similar priority (Priority = similar). In both condi-
tions, the listener communicates acceptance – but
with different levels of uncertainty. In (a) the feed-
back signal is provided non-verbally, with neutral
polarity and an indication that the listener’s evalu-
ation process is still ongoing (e.g., a hesitant and
lengthened ‘okay’). The belief state of the variable
Uncertainty is mostly distributed between medium
and high. In (b) feedback is provided both verbally
and non-verbally, with a positive polarity and evid-
ence that the evaluation is finished (e.g, a head nod
in combination with an acknowledging ‘okay’).
Here the probability mass of Uncertainty is mostly
distributed among the states low and medium. As
a result, the belief states of the ALS variables for
these two conditions differ for the variables P, U ,
AC and for AG (though only slightly). Although
acceptance is communicated in both cases, higher
uncertainty of the listener results in a shift of prob-
ability mass towards medium states instead of me-
dium and high states. This also holds for the degree
of belief in the utterance being grounded.
For each example the influences of variable
changes on the belief states might seem small, but
they might nevertheless make a significant differ-
ence in a decision theoretic process that operates
on these probabilities. It should also be noted that
the communicative situation was never impaired
severely or even approached a breakdown. In gen-
eral, the model parameters were chosen in such
a way that negative feedback is required to make
the low states of the ALS-variables likely, i.e., the
model is optimistic about the listener’s ability and
willingness to perceive, understand, accept, and
agree with what the speaker communicates.
6 Discussion and conclusion
Listener feedback is crucial for speaker–listener
coordination in dialogue as it provides rich and
subtle cues of the listener’s mental state, as well
as of the grounding status of information. We have
presented a Bayesian network model for interpret-
ing listener feedback for exactly these issues. It
is important to note that the details of the model
presented here should be regarded as just one con-
crete instantiation of a Bayesian model of listeners,
and that we certainly did not (nor did we aim to)
integrate everything that could influence the inter-
pretation of feedback.
Nevertheless, our first modelling results reveal a
number of interesting findings. Applying Bayesian
networks enables a specification of the factors that
contribute to the meaning of a feedback signal in a
coherent, well-defined and interpretable formalism.
Using this formalism, our model allows for direct
reasoning about a listener’s mental state, given
certain evidence of perception, understanding, ac-
ceptance and agreement as provided by the listener
in form of feedback, as well as the dialogue con-
text. Built into the formalism is the capability to
use the model diagnostically, i.e., reasoning from
(assumed or asserted) listener states to possible
feedback signals that most probably signal those.
This can, for example, be used by the speaker to
infer what kind of listener feedback would be most
helpful under a particular uncertain dialogue situ-
ation. Having an idea of which kind of feedback is
useful at the moment opens up the opportunity to
produce a specific cue for the listener.
While reasoning about the listener’s mental
state and the groundedness of information, the
model considers dialogue context in the form of a
speaker’s utterance and the speaker’s expectations
of the listener’s reaction to the utterance. How-
ever, this must certainly be extended. For example,
in a referential communication scenario, the situ-
ation could be modelled in terms of visibility and
saliency of referents; in a noisy environment, the
noise level could have an influence on the probabil-
ity of an utterance being perceived and understood.
Dialogue context could also be modelled in more
sophisticated ways, for example by considering
speech acts, and the ambiguity of the speaker’s
utterance.
An advantageous property of the model is its
compatibility with incremental processing of feed-
back and incremental grounding in spoken dia-
logue systems. The model is constructed to run in
parallel to a system’s incremental output genera-
tion and, therefore, can influence the system beha-
viour even while it is being generated and synthes-
ised (Buschmeier et al., 2012). Furthermore, the
model is able to leverage subtle information about
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the listener’s progress in processing the speaker’s
utterance, modulated, e.g., prosodically onto the
feedback signal. It should be noted here, however,
that the model currently does not regard temporal
and discourse relationships – apart from the trivial
relation that an utterance is followed by a feedback
signal – in dialogue. Our plan is to make the model
dynamic, taking influences of dialogue history and
previous listener state on feedback interpretation
into consideration (Stone and Lascarides, 2010).
Finally, using Bayesian networks makes it pos-
sible to adjust parameters to specific needs, even
automatically and incrementally through learning.
As described earlier, feedback signals are only con-
ventionalised to a certain degree. It is likely that
their usage and meaning differs between individual
listeners. Currently, our model does not consider
this, but idiosyncratic feedback meaning of listen-
ers can easily be modelled via the model’s struc-
ture and parameters. This bears the potential to
make listener’s idiosyncrasies ‘transparent’ and
our Bayesian model of a listener can thus serve as
a good starting point for studying the listener spe-
cific semantics and pragmatics of communicative
feedback behaviour.
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Abstract
Judgements of taste are intrinsic to ev-
eryday conversational interactions. People
make assessments, agree and disagree, and
negotiate these judgements as a core part
of how they participate in activities, create
and share knowledge, and manage their re-
lationships with one another. This paper
proposes a ‘conversational aesthetics’ that
sees aesthetic assessments in terms of the
pragmatics of talk-in-interaction.
A review of the literature of conversation
analysis (CA) picks out conversational de-
vices people routinely use when making as-
sessments. These devices then inform the
analysis of a transcribed conversation pre-
sented (unanalysed) in Anita Pomerantz’
foundational 1984 paper on conversational
assessment (Pomerantz, 1984) that deals
with apparently aesthetic issues, in this
case, judgements of taste about artworks.
This analysis suggests that people accom-
plish aesthetic judgements using the same
generalized and ordinary mechanisms of
conversational assessment that are ubiqui-
tous in everyday talk. Analysing Pomer-
antz’ data in terms of more recent devel-
opments in CA also poses some interest-
ing methodological questions, and suggests
further research into how people can of-
fer up multiple parameters for judgement in
aesthetic assessments, and how this process
may involve shifts and step-wise drifts be-
tween conversational topics.
1 Introduction
Art historical approaches to aesthetics have con-
ventionally treated judgements of taste as by-
products of specific formal or perceptual qualities
of the objects being judged (Greenberg, 1939), as
circumscribed by historical and institutional con-
ventions (Kristeller, 1951) (Danto, 1964) (Dickie,
2004), or as constituted by the societal and inter-
personal relationships entailed between those in-
volved through their participation in aestheticised
spaces, objects or cultural contexts (Bourriaud,
2002), (Kester, 2004). However, as Michael Cor-
ris, a conceptual artist from the 1960s group Art
& Language has pointed out, “such social effects
are generally demonstrated rhetorically” (Corris,
2006), rather than with reference to any specific
forms of evidence and analytical methods.
Recent ethnomethodological studies have anal-
ysed naturalistic video recordings of people in
galleries and museums to demonstrate how their
attention to, and thereby experiences of artworks
are constituted through their interpersonal interac-
tions (Lehn, 2006). However, these studies have
focused almost exclusively on people’s move-
ments, gestures and physical orientation; partly
because of the practical challenges of record-
ing conversations in galleries (Hindmarsh et al.,
2002), and partly to remedy a perceived imbal-
ance in favour of using interviews and surveys
in the field of visitors studies (Lehn and Heath,
2001).
Building on this approach to aesthetics as an
essentially interactional activity, but looking at in-
teractions outside the specific institutional context
of the art gallery or museum, this paper draws on
the methods of conversation analysis (CA) to ask
what everyday judgements of taste look like in
terms of the analysis of talk-in-interaction. The
literature of CA is reviewed here in order to iden-
tify key conversational devices people routinely
use in everyday assessments. These devices are
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then used as a toolkit to analyse a naturalistic con-
versation about an artwork.
2 Mechanisms of conversational
assessment
An obvious example of the ubiquity of judge-
ments of taste in conversation are the everyday
assessments of the weather that Erving Goffman
terms ‘small talk’ or ‘safe supplies’ of chat, read-
ily available to neutralise the potentially offensive
situation of ‘painful silence’ (Goffman and Best,
1982).
In order to develop a CA-informed approach
to aesthetic assessments, the following introduc-
tion to CA mechanisms and methods highlights
low-level conversational devices people use when
making these kinds of routine judgements of taste.
2.1 Sequence and turn-taking
Goffman’s sociological approach sees these ‘sup-
portive’ or ‘remedial’ exchanges as interactional
norms with which speakers state and reinforce
their social relationships (Goffman and Manning,
2009). Sacks (1987) builds on this basis to
identify the apparatus used by participants to co-
ordinate their conversational exchanges as se-
quences of utterances organised in elegantly in-
terlocking ‘turns’ (Sacks and Schegloff, 1974a)
bound together by frequently observable ‘conven-
tional parts’ or ‘adjacency pairs’(Schegloff and
Sacks, 1969) such as exchanges of greetings.
Schegloff (1968) shows how conventional parts
of these pairs are evidently relevant to conversa-
tional participants by highlighting the way they
work to overcome or mark problems in their talk
that regularly appear when a relevant part of a pair
is omitted.
For example, by showing how people deal with,
account for and ‘repair’ (Schegloff et al., 1977),
(Schegloff, 1992) misunderstandings, mishear-
ings or ‘attributable silences’ (Stephen C. Levin-
son, 1983) at different turn positions in tele-
phone conversations, Schegloff (2004) demon-
strates various uses of the word “hello”: to initi-
ate a simple exchange of greetings, or as a second
part response to the first part of a telephone ring-
ing, or in the midst of a conversation as a presence
indicator to resume an interrupted call.
In the same way, an apparent request for a per-
sonal assessment of wellbeing: “How are you”,
can be used as an initial greeting, as a recipro-
cation of an earlier mutual enquiry (Schegloff,
1968), (Heritage, 1998), as an occasion to draw
the conversation to a close (Schegloff and Sacks,
1969), or as kind of conversation restart marker or
topic shifter: a way to “move out of talk about a
trouble” (Jefferson, 1985).
Focusing on terms that are demonstrably rel-
evant to participants themselves (through regu-
lar production or marked omission), CA devel-
ops a mico-analysis of sequentially relevant ut-
terances by cataloguing the methodical organisa-
tion of talk, and extrapolating types from that data
(Sacks, 1987).
This approach self-consciously denies the rele-
vance of any quantitative measures or theories of
communication that are ‘outside of talk’ (Sche-
gloff, 1993), relying instead on observing the
work people do to make their talk and behaviour
contingently and situatedly intelligible in the
sense of ‘observable-and-reportable’ (Garfinkel,
1994). In this way, the relative preference for
some methodical organisations of talk, and the
dispreference for others emerges from systematic
observations.
This notion of conversational preference is the
basic building-block of CA required for develop-
ing a picture of how a CA-informed aesthetics
might work.
2.2 Preference organisation and aesthetic
assessments
Levinson (1983) distinguishes between the com-
mon definition of preference as an explicit wish
from the technical sense of preference as the con-
versational path of least resistance: the one least
marked by requests for clarification or repair from
subsequent speakers.
This structure of preference and dispreference
is one of the key analytical tools in CA because
so much of what is relevant and available to con-
versational participants is only observable in the
delays, pauses, softenings and deferrals that char-
acterise the production of a dispreferred response,
whereas agreement and contiguity is the hard-to-
detect, unmarked norm (Sacks, 1987).
Combining analytical sensitivity to regular se-
quences and marked omissions, as well as dis-
preference and ‘reluctance markers’ (Bilmes,
1988) that characterise deferred or marked re-
sponses, CA uses preference organisation as a
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“formal and anonymous apparatus for agreemen-
t/disagreement” (Sacks, 1987) that is teleologi-
cally independent of conversational context and
topic.
In the following example, Pomerantz (1984)
demonstrates the preference organisation of an
assessment in which an initial assessment is
‘shaped’ for agreement, i.e. designed in such a
way as to orient towards an agreement-preferred
response:
A: God izn it dreary.
→ (0.6)
A: Y’know I don’t think-
(D) B:
[ .
hh- it’s warm though,
1: An agreement-preferred initial assessment shape
featuring assessment of the weather. (Pomerantz,
1984) (NB:IV:11.-1).
In (1), an agreement-preferred initial assess-
ment shape indicates that whereas the preferred
response would be for immediate agreement
(Sacks, 1987), the dispreferred disagreement in-
dicated here with a (D), is marked as problematic
by an attributable silence (Stephen C. Levinson,
1983) of 0.6 seconds and a partial softening of the
disagreement with the weakened agreement mod-
ifier: “though” (Pomerantz, 1984).
This example demonstrates how even small-
talk is coordinated with the same preference ap-
paratus of delays, pauses and softenings of dis-
preferred responses common to participation in
and agreement and disagreement with any assess-
ment, even once the topic of the conversation
moves beyond initial setting talk (Sacks and Sche-
gloff, 1974b), (Maynard, 1984). As later exam-
ples will demonstrate, the same low-level mecha-
nisms used here to talk about the weather are used
in similar ways in extended conversations about
art.
To summarise, the CA notion of preference
sees assessments as organised sequences of ut-
terances produced in interlocking turns, used to
defer, delay and/or soften the impact of dispre-
ferred second parts, or to reinforce the contiguity
and agreement of preferred seconds with respect
to their prior turn shapes.
2.3 Socioepistemic authority
“[W]ith an assessment, a speaker
claims knowledge of that which he or
she is assessing.” (Pomerantz, 1984).
Building on the idea of the authoritative pri-
macy of recounting first-hand experience (Sacks,
1984), Pomerantz shows how participation and
epistemic authority to assess are indexed in the
participants’ own terms by the way speakers ac-
count for not assessing something. Where an ini-
tial assessment invites a second response, a sec-
ond speaker will regularly account for their not
producing a second assessment by claiming insuf-
ficient access to or knowledge of the thing being
assessed (Pomerantz, 1984).
Heritage (2005) uses these analytical build-
ing blocks systematically to index differences in
‘epistemic authority’ in talk as people introduce
and negotiate different topics for assessment in
conversation. An initial assessment sets out an
‘information territory’ with associated epistemic
rights for different participants, which may be
modified, challenged, downgraded or confirmed
by subsequent assessments.
These modifications can be pre-emptive, for ex-
ample, a speaker can downgrade the epistemic au-
thority of an initial assessment with the use of an
evidential such as ‘seems’ to shape an assessment
for subsequent modification (Heritage and Ray-
mond, 2005). Similarly, the authority of assess-
ments can be pre-emptively bolstered by shap-
ing them in the strongest terms for an agreed re-
sponse, for example using the negative interrog-
ative tag-question: ‘isn’t it?’ (Heritage, 2002) to
constrain subsequent assessments.
Specific prefixes such as ‘Oh’ often indicate a
state-change in information territory which Her-
itage (1998) observes people using systemati-
cally in a way that re-orients the temporal or top-
ical state of the conversation towards a new infor-
mation territory in which participants may claim
more or less authority to assess. This is ob-
servable in conversations in which co-participants
compete for epistemic priority, claiming or ceding
information territory by systematically differenti-
ating their positions on assessments, even when
seemingly reaching agreement.
For example, in (2), D and C are being asked by
A to offer an assessment of a newly acquired print:
“D’yuh li:ke it?”, after which a second assessment
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A: D’yuh li:ke it?
(+) D:
.
hhh Yes I do like it=
(-) D: =although I rreally::=
C: =Dju make it?
A: No We bought it, It’s a
.
hh a Mary Kerrida print.
D: 0:h (I k-)=
A: =Dz that make any sense to you?
C: Mn mh. I don’ even know who she is.
A: She’s that’s, the Sister Kerrida, who,
D:
[.
hhh
D: Oh that’s the one you to:ld me you bou:ght.=
C:
[
Oh-
d
A:
b
Ye:h
(2) The evaluation of a new artwork from (JS:I. -1) (Pomerantz, 1984, p.78).
becomes relevant. C’s subsequent question, and
disclaiming of any knowledge of the author (“I
don’ even know who she is.”) soften and defer
the dispreferred critical assessments (Pomerantz,
1984) indicated by the bracketed minus mark.
Applying Heritage’s (1998) observations about
how this process demarcates information territo-
ries to Pomerantz’s example, both C and D use
‘Oh’ in this extract while differentiating their re-
sponses to A’s question. Firstly, when C asks who
made the print, and A explains who the author is,
D replies using “O:h (I k–)=” possibly beginning
to mark a different information territory from C’s.
Later, when A initiates a comprehension check:
“=Dz that make any sense to you?”, C explic-
itly disclaims knowledge of the author of the print
(“I don’ even know who she is.”), accounting for
the lack of a second assessment, demonstrating
diminished epistemic rights to assess the print.
Once again, D follows A’s explanation about the
author with another “Oh”, marking a state-change
and a subtle temporal shift from A’s explanation
about the author to a prior conversation between
D and A about the print: “Oh that’s the one you
to:old me you bou:ght.=”. Finally, C then uses an
‘Oh’, seemingly to acknowledge the differentia-
tion.
This illustrates what Heritage (2005) charac-
terises as “a systematic dilemma at the heart of
agreement sequences” in which co-participants
generally seek mutual agreement, but when pro-
viding it, “must respect the other party’s informa-
tion territories and associated epistemic rights”.
It also demonstrates how the process of shift-
ing between these territories by means of subtle
temporal shifts and marked state-changes can be
linked to shifts between conversational topics.
2.4 Topical shift
Conversational sequences are conventionally tied
together into contiguous topics by questions or
assessments being followed by responses on the
same topic. However, topics evidently do change
(Sacks, 1987), often by means of disjunctive
topic-shift markers such as ‘anyway’, ‘so’, or
‘Oh!’ (Jefferson, 1984), (Maynard, 1984).
Sacks (1987) also observes unmarked ‘step-
wise’ topic shifts, which Heritage and Atkinson
(1984) describe as the aspect of conversation most
“complex. . . and recalcitrant to systematic analy-
sis”. This may be partly due to the complexity
of the coordination of minute overlaps in speech
and rapid uses of acknowledgement tokens such
as ‘OK’, ‘Yeah’, or ‘mhmmm’ that characterise
step-wise topic shifts (Jefferson, 1981), making it
hard to identify segues from one topic to the next:
a kind of ‘topical drift’. It may also be an inherent
limitation of CA’s methodological commitments:
if the shift between topics is unmarked by partici-
pants, it may be unavailable for analysis.
If topics in conversation can be seen as infor-
mation territories with different associations of
epistemic rights for each participant, assessment
sequences provide participants with specific con-
versational devices for moving between those ter-
ritories, such as parameter shifts.
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2.4.1 Parameter shift
A1 A: God izn it dreary..
.
A2 P:
.
hh- it’s warm though
(3) Pomerantz’ (1984) example showing the
contrastive assessment of “a shifted parameter”,
(NB:IV:11.-1).
In (3), Pomerantz revisits her earlier example
of weather-talk to point out what she calls ‘a
shifted parameter’ (Pomerantz, 1984) by which
the weather is assessed, in this case marked by
a “though”. Here, the parameter of assessment
shifts from the appearance of the weather, to the
temperature. Pomerantz later expands on these
kinds of shifts in parameter, and how they can
start to modify the way participants refer to the
things they are assessing.
Pomerantz uses example (4) in a footnote to
highlight an unusual type of assessment that
agrees with, then upgrades its prior, and then ac-
complishes what she calls a “subtle referent shift”
(Pomerantz, 1984) of the upgraded assessment.
A: They look nice together.
B: Yes they’re lovely. But I
particularly like the blue
en gray, en white,
A:
[
Yeah
B: What’s so nice about this is
you get two nice pieces.
(4) A further example of “parameter-shift” in
(JS:II:137) from Pomerantz (1984, p.98).
Here A assesses two vases, citing the parameter
of their looking nice together. B initially agrees,
even upgrading this assessment: “Yes they’re
lovely”, then, marking the parameter-shift with a
“But”, slightly modifies the assessment to point
out the colours. A concurs with an interjected ac-
knowledgement token “Yeah”. B then modifies
the overall parameter of A’s assessment: the nice-
ness of the objects “together”, instead assessing
their colour and appearance, and finally empha-
sising that: “you get two [distinct] nice pieces”.
In terms of Sacks’ and Jefferson’s distinction
between disjunctive and step-wise shifts, these
parameter shifts are marked by disjunctive ‘but’
or ‘though’ tags, deployed within an organisation
of assessment sequences that tend towards over-
all agreement and contiguity, softening dispre-
ferred disagreements by means of a subtle step-
wise shift. In Heritage’s terms, this could be seen
as co-participants asserting the independence of
their assessments by shifting between subtly dif-
ferentiated information territories.
Analysing assessment sequences that display
this type of topical drift via parameter shift is
problematic as much of the CA apparatus for deal-
ing with assessments and their epistemic territo-
ries depends on reliably reading second assess-
ments as “produced by recipients of prior assess-
ments in which the referents in the seconds are the
same as those in the priors” (Pomerantz, 1984).
An assessment that has undergone sufficient pa-
rameter shift to amount to a kind of topical drift
could be seen and treated by conversational par-
ticipants as a “fully sentential declarative assess-
ment” (Heritage and Raymond, 2005). Alterna-
tively, it may be seen as a grey area characterised
by Jefferson (1981) in her analyses of the com-
plexity of topic-shifting in phone conversations
as an ambiguously attributed information territory
in which the interactional cohesiveness of an ex-
change may be expressed as normal1 while at the
same time the conversation is undergoing an un-
marked ‘topical rupture’ (Atkinson and Heritage,
1984).
The following section uses the CA methods and
conversational devices outlined above to analyse a
conversation about an artwork presented, but not
analysed in any detail, in Pomerantz’ paper on
conversational assessment. (Pomerantz, 1984).
3 Conversational Aesthetic Assessment
Analysing Pomerantz’s example of an conversa-
tion about judging an artwork demonstrates how
the same conversational devices ubiquitous in ev-
eryday talk are present in extended aesthetic as-
sessment sequences.
Informed by more recent developments in CA,
this analysis also suggests how participants nego-
tiate the assessment by shifting between various
information territories within an overall conversa-
tional topic.
1Jefferson observes how this ambiguity about topical ter-
ritory seems to engender exaggerated forms of recipient
assessment feedback and affiliation such as “collaborative
completion” (Jefferson, 1981).
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A: D’yuh li:ke it?
(+) D:
.
hhh Yes I do like it=
(-) D: =although I rreally::=
C: =Dju make it?
A: No We bought it, It’s a
.
hh a Mary Kerrida print.
D: 0:h (I k-)=
A: =Dz that make any sense to you?
C: Mn mh. I don’ even know who she is.
A: She’s that’s, the Sister Kerrida, who,
D:
[.
hhh
D: Oh that’s the one you to:ld me you bou:ght.=
C:
[
Oh-
d
A:
b
Ye:h
D: Ya:h.
A:
[
Right.
(1.0)
A: It’s worth something,
(1.0)
A: There’s only a hundred of’m
(0.5)
D: Hmm
E: Which picture is that.
A: The one thet says Life.
(1.5)
A: ( ).
(-) D:
.
hhh Well I don’t- I’m not a great fan of this type of a:rt. There are
certain- ones I see thet I like, But I like the w- =
E: =Is there ano thuh way of spelling Life?.
(-) D:
[
-more realistic-.
A: hhmh!
E: That’s all I wd loo(hh)k fo(h),
D:
[
hh!
(-) D: Yih d-know why I don’t go fer this type of uh: art, Becuz it- it
strikes me ez being the magazine adverti:sement ty:pe. Which some
uh-uh some a’ them are really great. But tuhm I-my, taste in art is
for the more uhit-t-treh- it tends tuh be realistic.
(5) Evaluation of a new artwork from (JS:I. -1) (Pomerantz, 1984). In Pomerantz’ transcription, a ‘-’ sign
indicates critical assessment and a ‘+’ sign marks an appreciative assessment.
3.1 Sequence, Turn and Preference
Organisation
In (5), the same low-level organisation of se-
quences, turns and preference make the conver-
sation amenable to a CA-informed analysis.
A first offers up a print for assessment: “D’yuh
li:ke it?”, after which a second assessment be-
comes relevant to all those addressed. D responds
immediately with a token preferred affirmation
upgraded by an emphatic “Yes I do like it=”.
However, D’s final assessment: “I don’t go fer this
type of uh: art =although. . . ”, produced only af-
ter a long series of turns by multiple participants
can be seen as presaged by the modifier token “al-
though”.
Possibly reacting to this marker of an immanent
critical assessment, C interrupts2 D’s, offering up
an alternative candidate parameter for assessing
the print: its authorship (“=Dju make it?”).
This interruption, as well as E’s later interrup-
tion: “=Is there ano-thuh way of spelling Life?”3
both take place just before D produces a critical
2Pomerantz (1984) uses Jefferson’s CA transcription
style in which an equals sign at the beginning or end of an
utterance indicates an interruption or lack of a pause or gap
between speaker turns, and square brackets stretching over
one or more lines indicate overlaps (Atkinson and Heritage,
1984).
3It is unclear from the transcript whether E’s question is
a topic-relevant interjection or a side conversation.
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assessment, suggesting a degree of spontaneous
group coordination in the softening of D’s dispre-
ferred assessment, which remains relevant but de-
ferred until the last seven turns.
Four long pauses of 0.5 - 1.5 seconds after A
says “Right”, mark the sustained absence of a
second position assessment relevant to A’s initial
question, and indicate that these pauses can be
read as attributable (even painful) silences (Goff-
man and Best, 1982).
D’s ultimately critical assessments start out
shaped in a manner directly counter posed to A’s
initial question: (“D’yuh li:ke it?”) with “’hhh
Well I don’t-”, which D softens somewhat with
a weakened critical assessment: “I’m not a great
fan”, and a generalisation of the referent from A’s
specific print to “this type of a:rt.”.
3.2 Indices of Epistemic Authority
This conversation demonstrates an intense nego-
tiation over information territories (Heritage and
Raymond, 2005), in which participants seem to
compete over who has primary epistemic author-
ity to assess the print on their own terms.
D’s partial repeat and modification of the ini-
tial question: “D’yuh li:ke it?”, with stress on the
copula “do”: “’hhh Yes I do like it=”, is an ex-
ample of what Tanya Stivers (2005) describes as
a method of asserting primary rights from second
position.
C’s epistemic authority in the assessment of
the print is first undermined by A’s explicit com-
prehension check: “Dz that make any sense to
you?”, shifting referent from the object of the
overall epistemic struggle (the print), to C’s com-
prehension of A’s prior turn, which C answers
with an agreement tag “Mm mh”, and then fails
to produce a second assessment, accounting for
this omission by claiming lack of knowledge or
access: “I don’t even know who she is”.
D interrupts A’s explanation of who the author
is with several ‘oh’-prefixed responses: “Oh that’s
the one you to:ld me you bou:ght.=”, shifting to
talk about a different time and a different conver-
sation, possibly constituting a shift to an informa-
tion territory that is differentiated from C’s decli-
nation to assess the print.
This marked shift from the question of the au-
thorship of the print to the subject of a prior con-
versation between A and D, functions as another
deferral and also as a claim of D’s epistemic au-
thority to assess. These shifts between informa-
tion territories are accompanied by shifts between
parameters for an assessment.
3.3 Parameter Shift
In this conversation, participants offer up different
parameters for assessment, withholding or shift-
ing away from clearly critical, dispreferred sec-
ond assessments.
For example, C interrupts D when offering
up an important criterion for assessing the print:
its authorship, and particularly, whether A them-
selves is the author. A series of turns follow in
which the question of the authorship of the print
functions as a backdrop to a rapid offering-up of
multiple possible assessment criteria including:
• authorship,
• knowledge of the author,
• monetary value,
• scarcity,
• knowledge about the print,
• correct spelling,4
• how ‘realistic’ it is, and
• how much like a magazine advert it is.
After the initial discussion of authorship is con-
cluded, a quick exchange of “Ye:h, Ya:h, Right”
acknowledgement tokens between A and D marks
readiness for a topic shift (Jefferson, 1984), which
in this case is organised as a parameter-shift from
the local assessment of the criterion of author-
ship, back to the deferred overall assessment of
the print.
A then offers two further parameter-shifts,
proposing new criteria for assessment in each sub-
sequent turn: “It’s worth, something,” or “There’s
only a hundred of’m”. Each of these short turns
are marked with attributable silences of up to
1.5 seconds, that Maynard (1980) characterises
as failed speaker transitions, marking attempts at
topic shifts where further topical talk from oth-
ers becomes relevant but in this case, remains
unsatisfied when A themselves takes up the next
turn again. D finally interjects with an emphatic
“Hmm”, marking D’s turn to propose assessment
criteria, starting with how realistic the print is.
D’s dispreferred critical assessment is some-
what softened by E’s concurrent interruption, pos-
4Assuming that E’s interjection about the correct spelling
of the word “Life” in the print relates to the print in question
and is not a side conversation, see note2.
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sibly checking on a spelling within the print, and
suggesting that the spelling is “all I ws loo(hh)k
fo(h),”, i.e. a relevant criterion for E’s judgement
of the print.
D’s quick prespeech inbreath “ .hhh” (Jeffer-
son, 1985) is followed by the delivery of a critical
second assessment including the introduction of
a further parameter for assessment, which func-
tions as an account for the dispreferred response:
the likeness of the print to a type of advertising.
4 Discussion
The CA-informed analysis of aesthetic assess-
ments presented so far proposes conversational
aesthetics as a distinctive set of interactional prac-
tices identifiable in the regular use of specific con-
versational devices. Future work may involve
identifying more such devices as well as build-
ing on this initial analysis of how topical shift and
step-wise drift are managed in aesthetic assess-
ments.
4.1 Aesthetics as Information Territory
The conversation about A’s print demonstrates as-
sessments of taste in which the mechanisms of se-
quence, turn and preference organisation operate
in each local assessment of various parameters, as
well as in the overall global assessment via the
deferral and softening of D’s dispreferred second
assessments.
Even after deferral, it seems that D’s second as-
sessments are softened to oblique critical assess-
ments of “this type of a:rt”, rather than a direct
answer to A’s initial question “D’yuh li:ke it?”.
D’s conclusion: “I-my, taste in art is for the more
uh:: uh it-t-treh- it tends tuh be realistic” is fur-
ther softened by accounting for the assessment via
a claim of “my taste”, which functions here as
the most explicit demarcation of an information
territory to which D can claim exclusive access
and absolute rights to assess. Even in this terri-
tory the assessment is still marked by agreement-
disagreement assessment sequences (“some a’
them are really great. But”), and tentative eviden-
tials such as ‘tends to be’ (Heritage and Raymond,
2005).
In building up a picture of these core features of
conversational aesthetic assessment, it is useful to
bear in mind the CA view that any aesthetic dis-
cussion, however large or small, in any context,
can be seen as a series of assessment sequences
in which dispreferred second assessments are de-
ferred by pauses, softenings and disjunctive pa-
rameter shifts.
4.2 Future Work: Parameter Drift
This paper has suggested how marked, disjunctive
parameter shifts in which multiple candidate pa-
rameters are offered up for assessment can organ-
ise and facilitate a kind of step-wise topic shift.
There are also unmarked drifts into different pa-
rameters and sub-topics such as E’s apparent con-
fusion about which print is being discussed segue-
ing, unmarked, into either a separate side con-
versation about another print, or possibly into a
discussion about whether the correct spelling of
‘Life’ in a print is a relevant parameter for its as-
sessment.
The initial work presented here suggests that
the nesting of local assessments with different
parameters within an overall assessment may be
seen as a landscape through which co-participants
negotiate epistemic authority over their respective
information territories. Further research is pro-
posed into how, through this process, subtle topic
shifts may be introduced into conversations, mak-
ing new topics relevant to participants in the same
way that in (5), the author of the print “Mary Ker-
rida” becomes relevant to the assessment.
This begs the question of whether shifts of topic
via shifts in assessment parameters might help to
explain how participants accomplish movement
from topic to topic. The resulting availability of
new and possibly unexpectedly relevant themes,
contexts and objects for discussion might be use-
ful as a pragmatic description of what could be
called a creative conversation.
However, even if this idea is borne out by avail-
able conversational data, picking out shifts in the
meanings and content that are brought into these
interactions through assessment sequences rather
than concentrating only on the structure and reg-
ularities of the shifts themselves stretches CA’s
methodological commitment to analysing only
those interactions available to researchers and ev-
idently at issue to the conversational participants.
Bearing the limitations of a CA-informed con-
versational aesthetics in mind, the next steps of
this research will involve selecting naturalistic
conversational data from the British National Cor-
pus (BNC) (Burnard, 2000), re-transcribing some
conversations in CA style using the newly pub-
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lished Audio BNC (Coleman et al., 2012) and
analysing everyday dialogue sampled outside spe-
cific aesthetic/gallery contexts that demonstrates
some of the conversational devices of aesthetic as-
sessment discussed in this paper.
4.3 Conclusion
It may be inconsistent to move from a CA-
informed structural analysis to an interpretative
analysis by taking into account the ostensible
meaning or the assessed content of conversational
topics. However, the availability of taste-talk and
art-talk in the CA literature itself is the basis for
this initial attempt to describe the machinery of
everyday conversational aesthetic assessments.
Treating aesthetic assessments as conversation-
ally negotiated information territories highlights
the difference between this approach and art-
historical aesthetic theories that have tended to
focus on the centrality of the work of art itself,
either as mimesis, expression, form, narrative or
conceptual content, or on its positioning within
specific socio-political contexts or relations (den
Braembussche, 2009).
An analysis of how these theories relate to
this conversational aesthetic approach is beyond
the scope of this paper, but it is worth pointing
out that post-modernist theories of art and cul-
ture (Lyotard, 1984) and some related sociolog-
ical aesthetic theories (Wolff, 1993) make com-
pellingly similar observations about the social
construction of art, as well as the ways in which
art can be used to as a healthy and respectful out-
let for discussion and dissonance within a society
(Mouffe, 2002).
These theories are, however, methodologically
at right-angles to a CA-informed approach to aes-
thetics. Although CA accounts of sequence, turn-
taking, preference organisation, negotiated epis-
temic authority and step-wise topic shift may
seem irrelevant to conventional aesthetic dis-
courses, the material evidence available to CA en-
ables a systematic interactional analysis of how
people make aesthetic assessments in everyday
speech, without prioritising specific formal, nar-
rative or contextual norms other than those evi-
dently relevant to conversational participants.
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Abstract
This paper describes a symbolic model of
rational action and decision making to sup-
port analysing dialogue. The model ap-
proximates principles of behaviour from
game theory, and its proof theory makes
Gricean principles of cooperativity deriv-
able when the agents’ preferences align.
1 Introduction
Grice (1975) and Neo-Griceans model the
link between dialogue processing and general
principles of rational behaviour by assuming
that agents abide by a strong cooperativity
principle—namely, people normally believe what
they say and help other agents achieve the goals
that they reveal through their utterances. This
principle provides cooperativity on at least two
levels: a basic level that ensures coordination
on the conventions governing linguistic mean-
ing (basic cooperativity); and a level concerning
shared attitudes towards what is said, including
shared intentions (content cooperativity). But not
all conversations are content cooperative. For ex-
ample, Tomm and Dave don’t share intentions in
(1), taken from chat recordings of an online ver-
sion of the game Settlers of Catan where players
negotiate over restricted resources:
(1) a. Tomm: Got any clay to trade for
sheep/wheat?
b. Dave: Only got 1 and I’m holding on
to it, sorry.
However, even though Settlers is a win-lose
game where players’ interests are often opposed,
its players often do share intentions, as they must
cooperate to bargain for resources they need in
the game.
(2) a. William: can i get a sheep or a wheat?
b. i have too much wood.
c. Cat: i can give you a wheat.
d. William: good
[they exchange 1 wheat for 1 wood]
Conversely, dialogue (3) is content cooperative
(and basic cooperative) on the assumption that A
andB are constructing a plan to achieve the same
goal—that they both eat at Chop Chop:
(3) a. A: Let’s go to Chop Chop by car.
b. B: But there’s no parking.
c. A: Then let’s take the bus.
But (3b) implicates that B rejects the intention
underlying (3a)—to go to Chop Chop by car. The
grounds for the rejecting moves in (1) vs. (3)
are different. In (1) Dave can fulfil Tomm’s in-
tention but chooses not to, presumably because
of his conflicting preferences. In (3) A and B
(transiently) have different intentions because of
their conflicting beliefs about the optimal way to
achieve a shared preference: to eat at Chop Chop.
There have been several attempts to make
models of conversation that abide by Gricean
principles of cooperativity formally precise; for
instance, by expressing axioms in a logic that
supports defeasible reasoning about the cogni-
tive states of dialogue agents (e.g., Schulz (2007),
Asher and Lascarides (2003)). Such models
include (default) axioms Sincerity (following
Grice’s maxim of Quality (Grice, 1975, p46)): if
31
a cooperative agent says something then he nor-
mally believes it. They also include axioms at the
level of intentions. For instance, the following
default axiom of Strong Cooperativity is adapted
from Grice’s analysis of what an utterance means
in cooperative conversation (Grice, 1969, p151):
if an agent says something that implies he has a
particular intention φ that he also intends should
be recognised, then a cooperative agent should
normally adopt that intention φ too (e.g., (Grosz
and Sidner, 1990, p430), Asher (in press)). But
such formalisations are incomplete because they
do not handle cases like (1) where content co-
operativity breaks down: the default axioms just
given don’t apply in such contexts. Nor do they
predict when adopting shared intentions is opti-
mal in a strategic setting (e.g., (2)). Furthermore,
(3) shows that, rather than expressing content co-
operative behaviour in terms of the default adop-
tion of the other agents’ intentions, it would be
better to define it in terms of shared preferences;
that way, rejection is rational when conflicting
beliefs yield a different optimal way to achieve
a shared preference.
This paper provides a cognitive model within
which one can explore reasoning about the men-
tal states of dialogue agents. We will derive
Gricean principles of cooperativity, formalised as
defeasible principles, from a characterisation of
certain games, using game theory as the founda-
tion of strategic reasoning and also as the basis
for linking inferences about conversation to ra-
tional action. In game theory, agents act so as
to maximise their expected utility—utility being
a measure of preference, and the term expected
ensuring that decisions about action are made rel-
ative to one’s beliefs about what the outcomes of
the actions will be, including beliefs about what
other agents will do. Nevertheless, we argue in
Section 2 that game theory on its own provides
an incomplete picture, which makes it difficult to
use to derive defeasible principles. The symbolic
cognitive model presented in Section 3 addresses
this problem. It provides axioms approximating
rational behaviour from game theory that link di-
alogue actions and mental states, and its proof
theory allows us to derive Gricean principles of
cooperativity when the agents’ preferences align.
We relate this approach to prior work in Section 4
and point to future work in Section 5.
2 Our Model
Our model for strategic agents is one that is based
on logic and on game theory. Like many oth-
ers, we use a variant of a Belief Desire Inten-
tion (BDI) logic to formalise Gricean implica-
tures. But because we countenance misdirection
and deception as features of strategic conversa-
tion, we draw a distinction between Public and
Private attitudes and thus introduce a new atti-
tude for public commitment. Speaking makes an
agent publicly commit to some content (Hamblin,
1987). Traditional mentalist models of dialogue,
couched within BDI logics, equate dialogue in-
terpretation with updating mental states: e.g., in-
terpreting an assertion that p is equivalent to up-
dating one’s model of the speaker’s mental state
to include a belief in p (e.g., Grosz and Sidner
(1990)). But they are not equivalent in (4):
(4) a. Loreleil292: Can anyone give me some
clay for some wheat?
b. AMI123: Sorry have none of that!
[in fact, she has 2 clay]
We interpret (4b) as a negative answer even if
we know AMI121’s beliefs are inconsistent with
this. To do justice to this, we follow Asher and
Lascarides (2003) and separate the representation
and logic of dialogue content from that of cogni-
tive states and then link them via defeasible trans-
fer principles. This separation was originally mo-
tivated by calculable implicatures being unavail-
able as antecedents to surface anaphora; insincer-
ity provides a new motivation.
In common with game theoretic models of
conversation (e.g., Parikh (2001)), we adopt a
second principle: people say things that will
maximise their expected utility. So if the Gricean
maxims of conversation hold, they do so be-
cause they maximise the agents’ expected util-
ity. We also maintain that agents’ preferences
evolve as dialogue proceeds, at least partly be-
cause agents learn about other agents’ prefer-
ences from what they say and then adjust at least
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some of their preferences in the light of this infor-
mation. People’s preferences are typically par-
tial and get more specific or evolve as they learn
more through conversation.
This last assumption poses a problem for or-
thodox game theory. Game theory assumes each
player has a completely defined preference func-
tion over the possible actions in the game. It
models uncertain and partial information that one
player has about another player’s preferences and
the actions that other play is contemplating per-
forming by a probability distribution over player
types, where each type is associated with a com-
plete set of actions and a complete utility func-
tion.1 Game theory, however, does not provide
general principles for restricting the set of player
types one needs to consider or the probability dis-
tributions over them. This gap has bite in mod-
elling conversation, because the possible signals
that grammars of natural languages allow are un-
bounded, as are the coherent signals in context.
So dialogue agents generally face the task of iso-
lating their game problem to a set of signals that
is small enough to effectively perform inference
over, but large enough to yield reliable decisions
about optimal actions.
To represent dialogue processing it would be
better not to remain silent on how one identi-
fies which player types—and hence which ac-
tions and preferences—are relevant, but rather
to consider a partial theory or description of the
agent’s preferences that is updated or revised as
one learns more about the agent or one consid-
ers actions that one didn’t consider before. This
is what we do here. This approach yields a
more compact and tractable cognitive model and
a proof theory in which we can reason, in the light
of new evidence, about what type of player to
consider in our reasoning. Standard game-theory
provides models that can verify the soundness of
our proof theoretic reasoning. Whether the sen-
tences in this theory are assigned probabilities is
not terribly relevant. But what is important is that
elements of this theory get revised in the light of
1Game theory allows players to have imperfect knowl-
edge of what action other players play, but that is not rele-
vant here.
new evidence, as Alchourro´n et al. (1985) sug-
gest. This can either be done by conditionalising
a probability distribution over new evidence, or
more symbolically via a theory that incorporates
general but defeasible principles about human ac-
tion and the preferences that underlie them.
In our symbolic model, instead of a probability
distribution over every possible complete model
of the game we begin with just one partial model.
We will describe this model in a way that meshes
easily with inferring preferences from observing
what agents do. We demonstrate one advantage
of this approach here: the proof theory afforded
by our symbolic axioms of rational behaviour,
which approximate those from game theory, is
sufficient to derive Gricean principles of coop-
erativity, among them the default axioms of Sin-
cerity and Strong Cooperativity that we discussed
in Section 1. We thus gain a logical link be-
tween strategic conversation and content cooper-
ative conversation.
3 Cognitive Modelling
To reason about an agent’s motives and actions
we use a familiar modal logic: Baφ means agent
a believes φ, and Iaφ means a intends to bring
about a state that entails φ. We assume that Ba
abides by the modal axioms KD45 (so its ac-
cessibility relation in the model is transitive, eu-
clidean and serial); so an agent’s beliefs are mu-
tually consistent with one another and closed un-
der logical consequence, and agents have total in-
trospection on their beliefs or lack thereof. We
make Ia abide by the modal axiom D (so its
accessibility relation in the model is serial), so
contradictory intentions are ruled out. We also
assume that intentions are doxastically transpar-
ent: i.e., Iaφ ↔ BaIaφ is an axiom. We also
need a modal operator for public commitment,
which is distinct from belief: Pa,Dφ means agent
a publicly commits to φ to the group of agents
D. Following Asher and Lascarides (2008), we
make Pa,D K45 (one commits to all the conse-
quences of one’s commitments and one has total
introspection on commitments or lack of them).
Unlike belief, commitments can be contradictory
because one can declare anything.
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Reasoning about mental states is inherently de-
feasible, so we add to our logic the weak con-
ditional from Commonsense Entailment (Asher,
1995): A > B means If A then normally B.
We call this language CL (standing for cogni-
tive logic). This logic has many nice properties;
for instance, soundness completeness and decid-
ability (Asher, 1995). Decidability is maintained
even in a dynamic version of the CL (Asher and
Lascarides, 2011), but for the sake of simplicity
we will consider the static version here.
The dialogue’s logical form creates public
commitments in CL: if the logical form stipulates
that agent a is committed toK at turn n—soK is
the content of a clause or of coherently related di-
alogue segments—then this makes Pa,dK true in
CL, where K is the CL-representation of the for-
mula K in the separate logic of dialogue content,
and D is the set of dialogue agents (how K maps
to K is detailed in (Lascarides and Asher, 2009)
but doesn’t concern us here).2
3.1 Preferences
Besides a representation of dialogue content and
BDI attitudes, we need a symbolic way of rep-
resenting preferences and commitments to pref-
erences. CP-nets (Boutilier et al., 2004) provide
a useful formalism for extracting commitments
to preferences from utterances (Cadilhac et al.,
2011). Standard CP-nets capture complete infor-
mation: they are a compact representation of a
preference order over all the possible outcomes
of actions that agents can perform. To represent
partial preferences, we build a partial description
of a CP-net (Cadilhac et al., 2011), which ap-
proximates preferences as revealed by dialogue
moves. This avoids having to postulate a range
of player types, each associated with complete
preferences. Instead, agents will reason with and
revise partial descriptions of preferences as they
observe new evidence through dialogue moves.
A CP-net for an individual agent has two com-
ponents: a directed conditional preference graph
(CPG), which defines for each feature F its set
2K captures all a’s current commitments, including on-
going commitments from prior turns. So there is no need to
conjoin an agent’s commitments from each turn in CL.
Food
A

B

Drink
The CPG
Preferences for A:
fish A meat
fish: white A red
meat: red A white
Preferences for B:
fish ∼B meat
fish: white B red
meat: red B white
The CPTs
Figure 1: A CP-net for the food and drink game.
of parent features Pa(F ) that affect the agent’s
preferences among the various values of F ; and a
conditional preference table (CPT), which spec-
ifies the agent’s preferences over F ’s values for
every combination of values in Pa(F ) (thus CP-
nets have a similar structure to Bayesian belief
networks (Pearl, 1988)). The CP-net for a game
consists of a CP-net for each player. For exam-
ple, the CP-net in Figure 1 represents a game
where A chooses what A and B will eat, and B
chooses what they will drink (they must eat and
drink the same thing). Agent A’s preferred Food
is fish, but the Wine he prefers is dependent on
the food: white wine for fish and red for meat.
Agent B is indifferent about what he eats, but
like A his choice of Wine is dependent on what
he eats. The logic of CP-nets follows two ranked
principles when generating the preference order
over every outcome from this compact represen-
tation: first, one prefers values that violate as few
conditional preferences as possible; and second,
violating a (conditional) preference on a parent
feature is worse than violating the preference on
a daughter feature. So Figure 1 yields the fol-
lowing partial order over all outcomes for each
agent:
(5)
(fish,white) A (fish, red) A
(meat, red) A (meat,white)
{(fish,white), (meat, red)} B
{(fish, red), (meat,white)}
There are efficient algorithms for identifying the
(unique) optimal strategy in this case (e.g., Bon-
zon (2007)): i.e., to eat fish and drink white wine.
Dialogue interpretation yields commitments to
preferences that are partial. For example, by
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Receive
C

Give
r-wood C ¬r-wood
r-wood : g-wheat C g-sheep
Figure 2: Cat’s commitments to preferences in dia-
logue (2). Receive and Give’s values are r-x and g-x
where x is wheat, clay, sheep, rock or ore.
uttering (2c) Cat commits to the partial CP-net
in Figure 2: In words, Cat would rather receive
wood than not, and given her preference for re-
ceiving wood she would rather give wheat than
sheep. This is computed recursively from the dis-
course structure of Cat’s commitment (Cadilhac
et al., 2011), although we don’t detail the map-
ping here.3
Crucially, the CP-net description in Figure 2
is partial: it doesn’t reveal Cat’s preferences for
giving wheat or sheep in a context where she
doesn’t get wood—(2c) says nothing about that.
Cat’s actual preferences may also differ from
these commitments (e.g., because of insincerity).
So to choose an optimal action, agents face a
complex calculation in (defeasibly) estimating an
agent’s complete actual preferences from com-
mitments to them.
Accordingly, we treat the preference state-
ments in the CP-net descriptions as formulas
within a background theory that provides defea-
sible inferences about preferences and behaviour.
Our background theory is CL; so CL must be able
to express and reason about descriptions of CP-
nets. Specifically, we complete the partial in-
formation in a CP-net description by adding as-
sumed preferences that defeasibly follow from it
via the default axioms in CL, with agents default-
ing to being indifferent among values for features
for which preference information is missing en-
3We take William’s and Cat’s commitments in (2) to be
as follows (Lascarides and Asher, 2009). William’s turn
commits him to Plan-Elab(a, b), which means that he com-
mits to the contents of both (2a) and (2b) and to (2b) elab-
orating a plan to achieve the goal underlying (2a) (that goal
is to obtain a sheep or wheat, and the plan afforded by (2b)
is to get one of these by trading wood). Cat’s utterance (2c)
commits her to Plan-Elab(pi, c), where pi is William’s first
turn (with content Plan-Elab(a, b)). Cadilhac et al’s (2011)
recursive algorithm yields Figure 2 from Plan-Elab(pi, c).
tirely. In logical terms this means we will have
formulae in CL of the form: χ > (φ:ψ a ¬ψ),
where χ is a well-formed formula of CL.4 In
other words, if χ is true then normally the de-
scription of a’s preferences includes φ:ψ a ¬ψ
(note that the antecedent χ may express infor-
mation about preferences too). We’ll give some
examples of such formulae in the next section.
Further, CL’s nonmonotonic inferences about an
agent’s preferences may change if the range of
actions that are considered to be a part of the
game changes (though we forego specific exam-
ples here). Overall, through the (nonmonotonic)
logic of CL’s >, one can support decisions about
what action to perform even if knowledge of pref-
erences is partial.
CL can now link preferences to other proposi-
tional attitudes. Indeed, choosing optimal actions
requires a link between preference and belief:
since a (joint) CP-net G can include variables
whose values one doesn’t control, one needs to
check that one’s optimal state(s) are not doxas-
tically improbable (this is a crude way of ensur-
ing that agents act so as to maximise expected
utility rather than acting with wishful thinking
about what’s feasible). We supply a notion of
doxastic improbability in CL via its nonmono-
tonic consequence relation: i.e., a state is belief
compliant if its negation does not defeasible fol-
low from the premises and background theory of
CL axioms. So to identify an agent’s optimal
belief-compliant state(s), we filter out any opti-
mal state that is defeasibly inconsistent with his
beliefs (as we mentioned in Section 3, this is de-
cidable). Within CL this leads to the definition
of a CP-solutiona(φ,G) for agent a and (joint)
CP-net G:
Definition 1 CP-solutiona(φ,G) holds iff:
1. a is a player in the joint CP-net G; and
2. s ` φ for every belief-compliant optimal
state s of G. I.e., where Γ is the premises—
in other words, CL’s background theory plus
information about the mental states of the
players in G—we have Γ 6|∼Ba¬s, and for
4Since the features in our CP-nets all take finite values,
they can be represented in CL using Boolean variables.
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any state s′ that is strictly more optimal in
G than s, Γ|∼Ba¬s′ holds.
For example, if B’s model of A’s and his own
preferences are those in Figure 1, then by Defini-
tion 1 CP-solutionB(fish∧white, G) holds: while
meat∧ red is equally preferred by B, it is not be-
lief compliant because G defeasibily entails that
A will choose white and not red. We’ll see this
in the next section, when we use CP-solutions to
define CL axioms that approximate principles of
rational action from game theory.
3.2 Axioms of Rationality
To encode means-end reasoning of rational
agents in our symbolic model, we need CL ax-
ioms that make agents pay-off maximisers (cf. ra-
tionality from game theory) and basic coopera-
tive. Pay-off maximisers intend actions that are
an optimal trade-off between their preferences
and their beliefs about what’s possible; and an
agent intending ψ means in the context of his cur-
rent beliefs he prefers ψ to all alternative actions.
We capture these two principles with the axioms
Maximising Utility (a) and (b):
Maximising Utility:
a. (G ∧ CP-solutiona(ψ,G)) > Iaψ
b. (Iaψ∧player(i, G)) > CP-solutiona(ψ,G)
Maximising Utility part (a) ensures a intends
ψ only if ψ follows from all belief-compliant
optimal states (by Definition 1). Indeed, agent
a’s intentions are conditional on all of a’s be-
liefs (thanks to Definition 1) and all of a’s pref-
erences and those of any player that affect a’s
preferences. The latter property follows because
the weak conditional > validates the Penguin
Principle—i.e., default consequences of rules
with more specific antecedents override conflict-
ing defaults from less specific antecedents. So if
a more specific game G′ is known to hold and
it yields conflicting intentions to those resulting
from G, then the intentions from G′ are inferred
and those from G aren’t. Axiom (b) likewise
conditions a’s preference for ψ on all his be-
liefs (thanks to Definition 1). It yields (default)
constraints on G from intentions: if one knows
Iaψ and nothing about G or about a’s beliefs,
then the minimal CP-net G that satisfies the de-
fault consequence is simply the global preference
ψ a ¬ψ. As agents converse, each dialogue
action may reveal new information about inten-
tions, and via Maximising Utility part (b) this
imposes new constraints on G. But while Max-
imise Utility part (b) is conservative about ex-
actly which of a’s beliefs his preference for ψ
is conditioned on, his dialogue moves can reveal
more precise information—e.g., the utterance I
want to go to the mall to eat should be sufficient
to infer eat : mall i ¬mall. A detailed algo-
rithm for extracting preferences and dependen-
cies among them from conversation is detailed
in Cadilhac et al. (2011), but the details of this
aren’t relevant for our purposes here.
Basic cooperativity follows from an axiom that
makes all agents intend that their commitments
be shared among all the other dialogue agents:
Intent to Share Commitment:
(b ∈ D ∧ Pa,Dφ ∧ ¬Pb,Dφ) > Pa,DIaPb,Dφ
If a commits, when addressing b (among oth-
ers), to content φ and b hasn’t committed to this
yet, then normally a is also committed to intend-
ing that b so commit. This rule captures basic co-
operativity because b committing to a’s commit-
ments entails he understands a’s commitments
(Clark, 1996). Indeed, it captures something
much stronger than basic cooperativity—an in-
tention that your contribution be accepted by oth-
ers. While this is stronger than basic cooperativ-
ity, we think it’s rational even in non-cooperative
dialogue contexts: why commit to content if you
don’t intend that others accept the commitment?
In addition, we regiment a constraint on asser-
tions proposed by (Perrault, 1990, p180), by re-
fining this axiom for assertions: when a’s address
to b commits him to an assertion K, then nor-
mally Pa,DIaBbK.
Now let’s examine more carefully the special
case of Gricean cooperativity. We start by defin-
ing a Grice Cooperative game:
Definition 2 A game is Grice Cooperative
(GC) just in case for any of its players a and b
1. their speech acts normally have their con-
36
ventional purpose (e.g., they normally ask a
question so as to know a true answer); and
2. (φ : ψ a ¬ψ) > (φ : ψ b ¬ψ)
(i.e., the agents’ preferences normally
align).
We can now prove all the axioms in Fact 1.
Fact 1 Sincerity: (Pa,Dφ ∧GC) > Baφ
Sincerity for Intentions:
(Pa,DIaφ ∧GC) > Iaφ
Sincerity for Preferences:
(Pa,D(φ : ψ a ¬ψ) ∧GC) > φ : ψ a ¬ψ
Competence:
(Pa,Dφ ∧ Pb,D?φ ∧ a, b ∈ D)→
((BbBaφ ∧GC) > Bbφ)
Cooperativity:
(b ∈ D ∧ Pa,DIaφ ∧GC) > Ibφ
These axioms make any declared belief, inten-
tion or preference in a GC conversation nor-
mally an actual belief, intention or preference
too (cf. the Gricean maxim of Quality (Grice,
1975, p45)). Competence makes belief transfer
the norm (if b asked whether φ). This default
likewise follows from Grice’s Maxim of Quality
as he described it in (Grice, 1989, p371): he stip-
ulates that in order to contribute to a conversation
via the Maxim of Quality, one must say what is
true. To do otherwise is not to contribute inferior
information; rather, it contributes no information
at all. Furthermore, Lewis (1969) argues persua-
sively that unless such a principle of competence
forms the basis of cognitive modelling, then one
cannot construct a sound philosophical argument
that explains why linguistic conventions come
into being in the first place, or why we assume
that a speaker whom we understand is speaking
the same language as we are—a hallmark of ba-
sic cooperativity. Finally, Cooperativity makes a
declared individual intention normally a shared
actual intention (recall the Gricean notion of ut-
terance meaning in conversation (Grice, 1969,
p151) and the corresponding notion of Strong
Cooperativity from Section 1). Such principles
of sincerity and cooperativity are usually taken as
primitive axioms in BDI approaches to dialogue;
here, we derive them when agents D are players
in a joint game G that satisfies Definition 2.
Outline Proofs: Sincerity: Suppose Pa,Dφ
and GC hold and moreover that φ expresses
a proposition that is capable of being believed.
Then we’ll show that if all the normal GC con-
sequences hold (see Definition 2), then Baφ must
also hold.
By Intent to Share Commitment, Pa,DIaBbφ
defeasibly follows from our premises for any
b ∈ D. By Maximising Utility and the fact
that I is a D modality, IaBbφ defeasibly implies
Bbφ a ¬Bbφ. Upon learning of a’s commit-
ment and the fact that the game is GC (in par-
ticular, clause 1 of Definition 2 means that the
preference underlying a’s move φ that we have
just derived is a’s actual preference), we infer
Bbφ b ¬Bbφ. Assume further that belief prefer-
ences pattern after factual preferences. That is:
(Bbφ b ¬Bφ)→ (φ b ¬φ)
(¬Bbφ b Bφ)→ ¬(φ b ¬φ)
So φ b ¬φ. Now suppose that ¬Baφ. Then
assuming we prefer our belief actions when we
have them, ¬Baφ a Baφ, and therefore ¬(φ a
¬φ). Thus the game cannot be a normal GC
game, contrary to our assumptions. So Baφ.
Now, Weak Deduction is a valid rule of the
weak conditional > (Asher, 1995): if Γ, φ|∼ψ,
Γ|∼/ψ and Γ|∼/¬(φ > ψ) then Γ|∼(φ > ψ). So
Weak Deduction yields the desired > statement,
(Pa,Dφ ∧ GC) > Baφ. 2. We can also derive
(though we don’t show it here) a stronger version
of Sincerity where a doesn’t believe alternatives
to what he said, yielding scalar implicatures.
Sincerity for Intentions: Suppose Pa,DIaφ∧
GC. By Sincerity (which we’ve just proved),
BaIaφ. Since intentions are doxastically trans-
parent (i.e. BaIaφ ↔ Iaφ), the result follows
with an application of Weak Deduction. 2.
Sincerity for Preferences is proved in a sim-
ilar way, using also the assumption that prefer-
ences are doxastically transparent. 2.
Competence: Suppose Pb,D?φ∧Pa,Dφ∧ b ∈
D ∧ BbBaφ and a GC game. Given Defini-
tion 2, the intention that normally underlies ask-
ing a question (i.e., to know an answer) and Max-
imising Utility ensures that b’s asking φ implies
Bbφ ∨ Bb¬φ b ¬(Bbφ ∨ Bb¬φ). So by GC
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(i.e., the agents’ preferences normally align), we
also have: Bbφ∨Bb¬φ a ¬(Bbφ∨Bb¬φ). By
Maximising Utility we can assume that b’s ask-
ing a question together with a’s response are both
optimal moves in equilibrium. These moves then
should realise the preference Bbφ ∨ Bb¬φ b
¬(Bbφ∨Bb¬φ). Furthermore, by Sincerity, Baφ.
There are two choices now: either a is trustwor-
thy or not. If a is not trustworthy, then his com-
mitment to φ is no indication of its truth. But
then there is a move (do not ask a whether φ)
that would have been more advantageous for b
(given that listening to someone and processing
the response is a cost). So given that Pb,D?φ is
the equilibrium move—in other words, this is a
move that is optimal for b in that it maximises
his expected utility—b must believe a to be trust-
worthy, and so Bbφ. Using Weak Deduction thus
yields Competence. 2.
Cooperativity: Assume b ∈ D ∧ Pa,DIaφ ∧
GC. By Sincerity for Intentions, we have
Iaφ. By Maximising Utility, we can in-
fer CP-solutiona(φ,G), where G is the GC
game with at least a and b as players. By
GC and Competence, this defeasibly entails
CP-solutionb(φ,G). And so Maximising Utility
yields Ibφ. Using Weak Deduction gets us the
desired > statement. 2.
Intention and belief transfer in a GC conver-
sation is a default: even if preferences align,
conflicting beliefs may mean agents have dif-
ferent CP-solutions making their intentions dif-
ferent too (by Maximising Utility), and Compe-
tence may apply but its consequent isn’t inferred.
Thus rejection and denial occur in GC dialogues
(see (3)). On the other hand, in GC environ-
ments interpretations are normally credible: e.g.,
by Sincerity and Competence B’s assertion (3b)
yields belief transfer that there’s no parking. This
is a simple, symbolic counterpart to the much
more elaborate result concerning credibility from
Crawford and Sobel (1982).
4 Related Work
In contrast to Gricean formalisations in BDI log-
ics, we have conditioned Gricean behaviour on
shared preferences rather than shared intentions
(see Definition 2) and we have derived Gricean
axioms from a more general axiomatisation of
human behaviour rather than treating them as
primitive.
Signalling games provide a basis for predicting
conversational implicatures (e.g., Parikh (2001),
van Rooij (2004)) and also insincerity—the less
aligned the preferences, the less credible the sig-
nals (Crawford and Sobel, 1982). But signalling
models either take a signal to mean whatever it
is optimal for it to mean (thereby bypassing lin-
guistic convention) or the mapping [.] from sig-
nals to meaning is fixed and monotonic (e.g., Far-
rell (1993), Franke (2010)), with pragmatic in-
terpretations being entirely epistemic in nature:
they arise when the optimal interpretation of s is
distinct from [s]. Our model differs in its view
of conventional meaning: while we acknowl-
edge that some pragmatic inferences are epis-
temic (e.g., see Sincerity), we also believe that
[s] goes beyond lexical and compositional se-
mantics because it is constrained to be coherent
(Lascarides and Asher, 2009). But this makes
computing [s] defeasible, which reflects the fact
that all inferences about coherence are defeasible.
So in non-cooperative conversation, an interlocu-
tor must test rigorously his defeasible inference
about what the speaker is publicly committed to,
as well as test the credibility of that commitment
(i.e., whether the speaker believes it). We hope
that CL can model such tests, but leave this to fu-
ture work.
5 Conclusions
We have proposed a qualitative model of cogni-
tive reasoning with several desirable features for
modelling dialogue: it supports reasoning with
partial information about preferences; and it dis-
tinguishes the public commitments one makes
through utterances and private mental states that
affect and are affected by them. The axioms of
the cognitive logic approximate rational action
from game theory and compel agents to be ba-
sic cooperative. We showed that Gricean prin-
ciples of sincerity and cooperativity are deriv-
able from them when the agents’ preferences nor-
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mally align.
We have focused here entirely on the cogni-
tive model; linking it to dialogue content is ongo-
ing work. The cognitive logic should also be dy-
namic since dialogue actions trigger changes to
mental states: our static CL can be made dynamic
with no cost to complexity by exploiting pub-
lic announcement logic (Asher and Lascarides,
2011). Finally, progress in analysing strategic
conversation requires an extensive study of data
in many domains: e.g., political debate, com-
mercial negotiations, courtroom cross examina-
tion and others. The Settlers dialogues cited here
are all taken from our ongoing corpus collection
effort, in which utterances are aligned with ma-
chine readable game states. We hope to release
this corpus, labelled with rich semantic and cog-
nitive information, in due course.
Acknowledgements: This work is supported
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Abstract
A disjunction may pragmatically imply that
only one of the disjuncts is true. The tra-
ditional Gricean account of this exhaustivity
implicature is not without problems. Nev-
ertheless, we think that not the Gricean pic-
ture itself, but the underlying conception of
meanings as chunks of information may be
unfit. Starting instead from a conception of
meanings as proposals, within the framework
of inquisitive semantics, we develop, alge-
braically characterise and conceptually mo-
tivate a formal semantics and pragmatics, the
latter still Gricean in spirit.
Among the difficulties we discuss and resolve
are the problem of characterising relevant al-
ternatives, the problem of embedded impli-
catures and the unwanted negation problem.
The analysis is extended to a pragmatic ac-
count of mention-some questions.
1 Introduction1
1.1 Some problems for a Gricean pragmatics
Sentence (1) asserts that it is rainy or windy, and
may pragmatically imply that not both are the case.
(1) It’s rainy or windy.
The existence of a ‘not both’-implicature is sug-
gested by the fact that one can say ‘it’s rainy or
windy or both’ without a sense of redundancy, as
1Many thanks to Floris Roelofsen and Jeroen Groenendijk
and three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. Any
remaining mistakes are of course my own. Financial sup-
port from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research
(NWO) is gratefully acknowledged.
well as the fact that a ‘both’-response to (1) would
be slightly unexpected.
If we translate (1) as p∨q, the traditional Gricean
account of the ‘not both’-implicature of (1) reads as
follows (roughly adopted from (Chierchia, Fox, &
Spector, 2008)):
Reasoning pattern 1 (Traditional account)
1. The initiator said p ∨ q.
2. If p ∨ q is relevant, then presumably p, q and
p ∧ q are too.
3. The initiator could have said p ∧ q, which is
stronger and relevant.
4. The reason for the initiator choosing p ∨ q over
p∧q might be that he does not believe that p∧q.
5. It is likely that the initiator has an opinion as to
whether p ∧ q is true.
6. Hence, the initiator must believe that p ∧ q is
false.
There are a number of weaknesses in this approach,
many of which have to do with characterising the
set of relevant alternatives used in step 2 of the
reasoning above. As argued in (Chierchia et al.,
2008), under certain natural assumptions regarding
the concept of relevance, the set of relevant alterna-
tives grows too big to yield any implicature at all
(except implicatures of ignorance). This has been
partially solved by postulating lexically specified
scales of alternatives (Horn, 1972). However, it is
not so clear conceptually and technically where the
scales come from, and they are not immune to trou-
ble, either.
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For instance, in what Spector (2007) calls the un-
wanted negations problem, the Gricean approach
predicts that a triple disjunction p ∨ q ∨ r, given its
scalar alternative (p∧q)∨r, would imply ¬r - some-
thing which is clearly not the case.
(Chierchia et al., 2008) discuss the problem
of embedded implicatures, i.e., implicatures that
seem to arise from within the scope of, e.g., a quan-
tifier.
(2) a. Each student read Othello or King Lear.
b. Each student read Othello and King L..
Since (2b) is a scalar alternative to (2a), the above
reasoning predicts the implicature that the speaker
believes that not every student read both. But this
is arguably too weak. What should come out is
the implicature that every student did not read both.
For this, the alternatives would have to be computed
within the scope of the quantifier, but this seems to
go against a genuinly Gricean pragmatics.
Another weakness, independent of how the set
of alternatives is characterised, is what (Sauerland,
2005) calls the epistemic step. Going from step
4 to 6 in reasoning pattern 1 above requires a
strengthening from not believing, to believing that
not, i.e., from ¬◻ϕ to ◻¬ϕ. This strengthening
does not follow from the Gricean maxims and logic
alone, but requires an extra, stipulated assumption,
given in step 5 above.
It has been noted that the implicature of (1) is
perhaps an instance of a larger class of exhaustivity
implicatures (Rooij & Schulz, 2006). For example,
similar pragmatic strengthening seems to be going
on in (3), paraphraseable as ‘it’s either only rainy,
or only windy, or both rainy and windy’:
(3) It’s rainy or windy or both.
However, it is not clear what, if any, the relevant
alternatives to (3) should be that would yield an
exhaustivity implicature. Replacing any disjunc-
tion(s) in (3) by a conjunction results in a formula
equivalent to p ∧ q, incorrectly predicting the same
‘not both’-implicature as for (1).2
Related to the issue of exhaustivity are mention-
some questions (e.g., Rooij & Schulz, 2006). Such
2We assume that for the aims and approach of this paper,
the two sentences (1) and (3) can be straightforwardly trans-
lated into propositional logic as p ∨ q and p ∨ q ∨ (p ∧ q),
respectively.
questions do not ask for an exhaustive answer, but
rather are satisfied with the responder mentioning
some possible instances:
(4) a. A: I will pick up the key this afternoon.
Will your father or mother be home?
B: My father will be home.
b. A: Where can I buy toilet paper around
here?
B: In the shop around the corner.
Here B’s responses do not imply that A’s mother
will not be home or that the shop around the corner
is the only place that sells toilet paper. This lack of
exhaustivity can be tied to the pragmatics debate by
observing that the indicative counterpart of (4) does
not imply exhaustivity:
(5) You can pick up the key this afternoon. My
father or mother will be home.
However, reasoning pattern 1 above does not pro-
vide any means for canceling the ‘not both’ impli-
cature in this case.
We note that the authors cited so far have all
come up with solutions, partial or whole, to these
difficulties for the traditional Gricean account. For
reasons of space, however, we will not discuss these
solutions in the present paper.
1.2 Aims and approach
So far, we have discussed (all too briefly) several
difficulties for a traditional Gricean pragmatics, that
have to do with characterising relevant alternatives
(the requirement for scales, the unwanted negation
problem), the ad-hoc nature of the epistemic step,
and a more general account of exhaustivity (exam-
ple (3), mention-some questions). This paper is de-
voted to overcoming them while maintaining the
Gricean spirit.
Our approach is to base an in essence Gricean
account of the implicatures of (1) and (3) upon
a new conception of meaning. Existing accounts
are built upon a classical, boolean semantics, that
models meanings as chunks of information, or
upon a dynamic semantics, based on the view of
meaning as context change potential (e.g., Rooij
& Schulz, 2006). We follow the framework of
Inquisitive Semantics in taking this one step fur-
ther, regarding meaning as information exchange
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potential (Groenendijk & Roelofsen, 2009; Cia-
rdelli, Groenendijk, & Roelofsen, 2009; Roelofsen,
2011). There are various ways to make this slo-
gan more concrete, and how this is done will de-
termine properties of the resulting semantics and of
the pragmatics built upon it.
Basic inquisitive semantics (InqB) follows from
a conception of meanings as requests for informa-
tion (Roelofsen, 2011). InqB has the merit that ut-
tering a disjunction introduces several semantic al-
ternatives, among which a responder is offered a
choice. This enrichment of the semantics provides
new handles for the pragmatics. Indeed, InqB has
been used as a semantic foundation for a pragmatic
account of the ‘not both’-implicature of (1), that
avoids the problematic ‘epistemic step’ described
above (Groenendijk & Roelofsen, 2009). However,
InqB, and thereby the pragmatics, does not distin-
guish between (1) and (3), yielding wrong predic-
tions. Section 4 contains a brief comparison of our
approach with (Groenendijk & Roelofsen, 2009).
Unrestricted inquisitive semantics (InqU), as de-
fined in (Ciardelli et al., 2009; Ciardelli, 2010), is a
more promising candidate for an account of (1) and
(3). For one, it shares with InqB the merit that dis-
junction introduces alternatives. Second, InqU, un-
like InqB, assigns distinct meanings to (1) and (3),
offering at least a semantic handle for a Gricean ac-
count to also differentiate between them. For this
reason, we will base our pragmatic account upon
InqU.
InqU lacks the thorough conceptual motiva-
tion and algebraic characterisation that (Roelofsen,
2011) developed for InqB. Developing a pragmatic
account of (1) and (3) based on InqU cannot be
achieved (both technically and conceptually) with-
out first filling in some of the gaps in our under-
standing of InqU. We will do so by motivating a
version of InqU from scratch, starting from a par-
ticular conception of meaning, and characterising it
algebraically.
Based on this semantics, our essentially Gricean
account of examples (1) and (3) will turn out to be
technically remarkably simple and conceptually il-
luminating, and it overcomes all of the mentioned
weaknesses of the traditional approach.
2 Unrestricted inquisitive semantics
InqU, as defined in (Ciardelli et al., 2009), is based
on a view of meanings as proposals to update the
common ground in one of several ways, or, in the
same paper and in the same breath, as proposals
to take certain possibilities into consideration, or to
draw attention to those possibilities. The road from
this conceptual stance to the fully-fledged seman-
tics has not been paved, and the endpoint, i.e., the
semantics, has not been characterised algebraically.
This is what we attempt in the current section.
2.1 Meanings as proposals
We consider only the language of propositional
logic:
Definition 1 (Syntax) For ϕ ranging over formu-
lae, p over proposition letters:
ϕ ∶= p∣∣(ϕ ∨ ϕ)∣(ϕ ∧ ϕ)∣(ϕ→ ψ),
with ¬ϕ ∶= ϕ→ .
The semantics for this language is defined relative
to a suitable model:
Definition 2 (Model) A modelM is a tuple ⟨W, I⟩,
where W is a set of worlds and I is an interpreta-
tion function that, relative to a possible world, maps
each proposition letter to a truth value.
Based on a model, an epistemic state is defined
as any subset of the set of possible worlds of the
model:
Definition 3 (Epistemic state) An epistemic state
based on the model ⟨W, I⟩ is a set s ⊆W.
We think of meanings as proposals. One does
not propose a piece of information; rather, one pro-
poses doing something with that information, such
as updating the common ground with it. Hence, we
define meanings, proposals, as sets of functions on
epistemic states:
Definition 4 (Proposal [to be refined]) A pro-
posal based on the model ⟨W, I⟩ is a set of
functions on epistemic states based on ⟨W, I⟩, i.e.,
functions f ∶ ℘W→ ℘W.
Because in the present paper we will not be con-
cerned with, e.g., revision mechanisms, we restrict
ourselves to functions that are eliminative and dis-
tributive. This allows us to simplify the definition
of the resulting semantics, and will make it look
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and feel like InqB, despite the conceptual shift, as
well as InqU in (Ciardelli et al., 2009), as we will
see shortly. A function on states is eliminative iff
it only eliminates worlds, i.e., it does not change
the worlds or create new worlds. Conceptually, this
means that we consider only functions that model
information growth, not loss; i.e., all functions are
actual update functions.
Definition 5 (Eliminativity) f ∶ ℘W → ℘W is
eliminative iff ∀s ⊆W, f(s) ⊆ s.
A function is distributive if we could, instead of ap-
plying the function to a state s, apply the function
to all singleton substates of s, take the union of their
outputs, and obtain the same result. In other words,
this means that updates operate locally on worlds,
not necessarily globally on states.
Definition 6 (Finite distributivity)
f ∶ ℘W → ℘W is finitely distributive iff ∀s, s′ ⊆W,
f(∅) = ∅ and f(s ∪ s′) = f(s) ∪ f(s′).
Any eliminative, distributive function can be
fully characterised by its effect on the uninformed
stateW (Benthem, 1989):
Fact 1 (Update decomposition) For all f ∶ ℘W →℘W, if f is eliminative and finitely distributive, then
for all s ⊆W, f(s) = f(W) ∩ s.
This means that every such update function f corre-
sponds to a unique static object f(W). We will call
such objects ‘updates-as-states’, or just ‘updates’
when no confusion can arise. (We do not call them
‘states’, because even though that is what they are,
it is not what they represent, conceptually.) Using
this result, we refine the definition of proposals to
be sets of updates-as-states:
Definition 7 (Proposal) A proposal A based on
the model ⟨W, I⟩ is a set of updates-as-states based
on ⟨W, I⟩, i.e., A ⊆ ℘W. Let [ϕ] denote the pro-
posal denoted by a formula ϕ.
What [ϕ] consists in will be defined by the seman-
tics.
Through Fact 1, a proposal becomes the same
kind of object as a proposition in InqB, i.e., a set of
states. However, crucially, it represents a different
kind of object, namely, a set of update functions.
Furthermore, we think of proposals in a different
way. How we think of proposals must be expressed
in a meta-language, for which we choose English.
Definition 8 (The Proposal View) Every formula
ϕ is paraphrasable as ‘let’s execute one of the up-
dates in [ϕ]’.
This view on meaning will determine how the se-
mantics is to be defined.
2.2 Conjunction and disjunction
Let us first look at the semantic operation that
should underly a conjunction of sentences. Mean-
ings, spelled out in our meta-language according to
the Proposal View, behave as follows under con-
junction:
Observation 1 (Behaviour of conjunction) Let’s
do one of the updates in A and let’s do one of the
updates in B ≡ Let’s do two updates, one in A and
one in B ≡ Let’s do one of the updates in A ⊓B ∶={a ∩ b ∶ a ∈ A, b ∈ B}.3
Hence, we will take the semantics of conjunction to
be pointwise intersection.
The proposal {W} is the identity element for
pointwise intersection, i.e., for all A ∈ ℘℘W, A ⊓{W} = A. Pointwise intersection is associative and
commutative. It is not idempotent: if a proposal,
consisting of multiple updates, is made twice, a dif-
ferent update can be chosen the first and the second
time, and both of them executed, giving a differ-
ent result than if the proposal had been made only
once (cf. footnote 2). These properties imply that
the set of proposals with pointwise intersection and
its identity element form a commutative monoid:
Fact 2 ⟨℘℘W,⊓,{W}⟩ is a commutative monoid:
1. A ⊓ {W} = A
2. A ⊓ (B ⊓C) = (A ⊓B) ⊓C
3. A ⊓B = B ⊓A
Because pointwise intersection is not idempotent, it
cannot give the meet with respect to any partial or-
der (the non-idempotency would be in conflict with
the reflexivity of the order). However, commuta-
tive monoids come with a partial order, called the
divisibility order, with respect to which pointwise
3If A and B are the same proposal, it is not evident that
pointwise intersection is indeed adequate. For instance, ‘let’s
have coffee or tea, and let’s have coffee or tea’ would be
equivalent to ‘let’s have coffee, tea or both’. However, a dy-
namic stance on conjunction (‘and then’) makes this result
acceptable.
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intersection would have given the meet, had it been
idempotent.
Definition 9 (Divisibility order)
A ≤ ⊓B iff ∃C.B ⊓C = A.
This can be read as follows: A ≤ ⊓B iffA can be ⊓-
decomposed, i.e., factorized, intoB and some other
proposal C, i.e., iff B is a divisor of A.
Let us now turn to the semantic operation that
corresponds to disjunction. We spell out the Pro-
posal View again:
Observation 2 (Behaviour of disjunction) Let’s
do one of the updates in A or let’s do one of the
updates in B ≡ Let’s do one of the updates in A or
one of the updates in B ≡ Let’s do one of the up-
dates in A ∪B.
Hence, we will take take the semantics of disjunc-
tion to be given by set union.
The proposal ∅ is the identity element for union,
and union is associative, commutative and idempo-
tent, so we have:
Fact 3 ⟨℘℘W,∪,∅⟩ is a commutative, idempotent
monoid, i.e.:
1. A ∪ ∅ = A
2. A ∪ (B ∪C) = (A ∪B) ∪C
3. A ∪B = B ∪A
4. A ∪A = A
Every commutative, idempotent monoid has a par-
tial order with respect to which it is a join-
semilattice, and the operation a join operator. We
will call this the semilattice order. It can be defined
analogously to the divisibility order, but with ∪ in-
stead of ⊓, but happens to correspond to the inverse
of set inclusion.
Definition 10 (Semilattice order) A ≥ ∪B iff∃C.B ∪C = A (iff A ∪B = A iff B ⊆ A).
Fact 4 ⟨℘℘W,≥ ∪⟩ is a join-semilattice, with ∪ as
join.
Union and pointwise intersection interact in the
following ways. First, ∅, the identity element for∪, is an annihilator for ⊓, i.e., ∅ ⊓A = A ⊓ ∅ = ∅.
Second, ⊓ distributes over ∪. These properties im-
ply that the two monoids together form a commu-
tative, idempotent semiring, i.e., a semiring with
the unional properties that the first operation (∪) is
idempotent and the second operation (⊓) commuta-
tive.
Fact 5 (Algebraic characterisation)⟨℘℘W,∪,⊓,∅,{W}⟩ is an idempotent semiring,
i.e.:
1. ⟨℘℘W,∪,∅⟩ is a commutative, idempotent
monoid;
2. ⟨℘℘W,⊓,{W}⟩ is a commutative monoid;
3. A ⊓ (B ∪C) = (A ⊓B) ∪ (A ⊓C);
4. ∅ ⊓A = A ⊓ ∅ = ∅.
2.3 Two orders: entailment and compliance
There are two orders on the set of proposals, the
semilattice order (≥ ∪) and the divisibility order (≤⊓). If we associate entailment with the semilattice
order, then entailment will allow for ∨-introduction,
but not for ∧-elimination. If we associate entail-
ment with the divisibility order, entailment will al-
low for ∧-elimination, but not for ∨-introduction.
The choice is guided conceptually, by seeing what
one may generally conclude from a proposal (# in-
dicates that the entailment does not go through):
Observation 3 (Behaviour of entailment)
1.
Let’s have coffee and a biscuit
Let’s have coffee
2.
Let’s have coffee
Let’s have coffee or beer
#
These observations show that entailment on propos-
als should not allow for ∨-introduction, but for ∧-
elimination.
Hence, we associate entailment with the divisi-
bility order, i.e., the order with respect to which ⊓
is almost-but-not-quite a meet operation:
Definition 11 (Entailment)
For any A,B ∈ ℘℘W, A entails B, A⊧B, iff A ≤⊓B (iff ∃C.B ⊓C = A).
Note that, because pointwise intersection is not
idempotent, A⊧B does not mean that after ex-
pressing A, expressing B is redundant.
The semilattice order can be interpreted as fol-
lows. If A ≥ ∪B, i.e., B ⊆ A, then all updates
proposed by B are already proposed by A. If this
is the case, we say that B complies with A, or that
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A makes B compliant. For clarity, we associate a
new symbol with the semilattice order thusly inter-
preted:
Definition 12 (Compliance) A makes B compli-
ant, A∝ B, iff A ≥ ∪B (iff B ⊆ A).
Compliant responses to an initiative will play an
important role in our pragmatic account of the im-
plicatures of (1) and (3) in section 3. In par-
ticular, both implicature-yielding and implicature-
providing responses can be characterised by means
of the notion of compliance.
We wish to emphasize that from an algebraic
viewpoint, entailment and compliance are both
equally fundamental notions.
2.4 Implication
For implication, it is much less clear to which ex-
pression in our metalanguage the semantics of im-
plication should correspond. Much more than in
the case of conjunction and disjunction, we believe
this is a matter of technical convenience and empir-
ical adequacy. In the present paper, we make only
a semi-motivated choice and spell out some formal
properties.
In InqB, although not presented here, implica-
tion requires that for every possible update with the
antecedent, an update with the consequent is cho-
sen, and that the common ground is updated in a
way that effectively implements this mapping from
antecedent possibilities to consequent possibilities.
Following the same strategy in the unrestricted case
leads to the following definition (from Ciardelli et
al., 2009):
Definition 13 (Conditional proposal)
A ⇒ B ∶= {{w ∈ W ∶ for all α ∈ A, if w ∈
α then w ∈ f(α)} ∶ f ∶ A→ B}
This notion of implication has some properties
that one would expect of implication. For instance,
A ⇒ B gives us a proposal C such that A ⊓ C ⊧
B, i.e., modus ponens is a sound derivation rule.
Nevertheless, unlike in classical semantics, A⇒ B
does not in general give us the entailment-weakest
proposal C such that A ⊓ C ⊧B. In fact, there is
no unique such proposal. This was pointed out to
me by Roelofsen (p.c.) for the original definition
of entailment in (Ciardelli et al., 2009), but it holds
also for the new definition of entailment adopted
here:
Fact 6 (No relative pseudo-complement)
There is not generally a unique ⊧-weakest proposal
C such that A ⊓C ⊧B.
To see this, consider a model with three worlds
a, b, c, let A = {{a, b}}, B = {{a},{b}}.
The proposals {{a, c},{b, c}}, {{a},{b, c}} and{{a, c},{b}} are all entailment-weakest proposals
C such that A ⊓C ⊧B.
We do have the following result:
Fact 7 (Singleton consequent) If B is a singleton
proposal, thenA⇒ B is the unique ⊧-weakest pro-
posal C such that A ⊓C ⊧B.
Proof sketch for reasons of space: if B is a sin-
gleton set, there is only one possible mapping from
A-updates to B-updates, and we can rewrite A ⇒
B = {{w ∈ W ∶ if w ∈ ⋃A, then w ∈ ⋃B}} ={⋃A ∪⋃B}. This is just classical material impli-
cation with an extra set of curly brackets.
2.5 Semantics
To obtain InqU, we associate the basic operations
of our semiring of proposals with the logical con-
nectives.
Definition 14 (Unrestricted inquisitive semantics)
For p a proposition letter, ϕ and ψ formulae:
1. [[p]] = {{w ∶ w(p) = 1}};
2. [[]] = {∅};
3. [[ϕ ∨ ψ]] = [[ϕ]] ∪ [[ψ]];
4. [[ϕ ∧ ψ]] = [[ϕ]] ⊓ [[ψ]];
5. [[ϕ→ ψ]] = [[ϕ]]⇒ [[ψ]].
Due to fact 7, we know that negation ¬ϕ, de-
fined as abbreviating ϕ → , denotes the pseudo-
complement of [[ϕ]].
The semantics is equivalent to InqU in (Ciardelli
et al., 2009), apart from the notion of entailment
(and apart from some technical differences in how
empty sets are treated). Classical semantics can be
obtained from it by taking as semantic objects the
unions of proposals:
Fact 8 (Conservativeness) For any formula ϕ,⋃ [[ϕ]] gives its classical meaning.
The classical meaning⋃A of a proposalA captures
the information provided by the proposal.
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2.6 Example
As the reader can verify, (1) and (3), translated
as [[p ∨ q]] and [[p ∨ q ∨ (p ∧ q)]], are assigned the
proposals depicted in figure 2.6. It is illustrated for
a model that consists of four worlds (small circles),
that differ with respect to two proposition letters p
and q (‘10’ indicates that p is true and q is false,
‘11’ that both are true, etc.). All rounded rectangles
represent updates-as-states.
11 10
01 00
(a) [p ∨ q]
11 10
01 00
(b) [p ∨ q ∨ (p ∧ q)]
Figure 1: The proposals denoted by (1) and (3) are dis-
tinct.
3 Unrestricted inquisitive pragmatics
Before presenting our account in detail, we will
roughly sketch the division of labour employed to
overcome the difficulties for a Gricean pragmatics
mentioned in the introduction. The difficulties, re-
call, had to do with characterising relevant alter-
natives (the requirement for scales, the unwanted
negation problem), the ad-hoc nature of the epis-
temic step, and a more general account of exhaus-
tivity (example (3), mention-some questions).
Following (Groenendijk & Roelofsen, 2009),
and in line with the collaborative nature of propos-
als, we assume that implicatures arise not from sen-
tences in isolation, but from responses to an initia-
tive. The initiator chooses which reponses are com-
pliant, thereby suggesting a particular range of im-
plicatures. The relevant alternatives for computing
implicatures of a response are the update functions
proposed by the initiator, in accordance with the
following inquisitive version of the Gricean maxim
of relation:4
4‘Alternative’ here is a slightly misleading notion, for some
updates may be included (qua state) in others, and hence not
be genuine alternatives.
Definition 15 (Maxim of relation (inquisitive))
Include in your proposals only functions that up-
date the common ground with relevant information.
The relevant alternatives can thus be taken straight
from the semantics, which renders the lexically
specified, syntactic-semantic scales unnecessary,
and the unwanted negation problem will not even
occur.
The epistemic step will be made unnecessary by
spelling out the context change potential of propos-
als in terms of drawing attention to, or away from,
certain possibilities. As we will show, the prag-
matic behaviour of both examples (1) and (3), as
well as mention-some questions, are all captured
by the same, simple reasoning pattern. In addition,
a semantic characterisation of implicature-avoiding
responses will be given.
3.1 Attending and unattending possibilities
We have defined InqU as a static semantics. Pro-
posals are sets, static objects, instead of update
functions on a context (although of course the el-
ements in the set are conceived of as update func-
tions on the common ground). Indeed, we have said
nothing yet as to what kind of context proposals
should change. Presumably, the context will record
which proposals have been made, who committed
to which update functions, etc..
For the present purposes, we assume rather mini-
malistically that the context change potential of a
proposal is, for each proposed function, to draw
attention to the possibility that it is truthfully ex-
ecuted, i.e., to the possibility that the actual world
is contained in the update-as-state, thereby ‘unat-
tending’ all previously attended possibilities. This
attentive aspect of proposals occurs also, quite cen-
trally, in (Ciardelli et al., 2009).
For responses to an initiative, we can characterise
its attending/unattending potential as follows (it is
more natural here to call updates-as-states possibil-
ities):
Definition 16 (Attending/Unattending)
A proposal B attends the possibilities in B. In re-
sponse to a proposal A, B unattends the possibili-
ties α ∈ A s.t. α ∩⋃B /∈ B.
For instance, replying to p ∨ q with p unattends the
possibility that q. Replying with the stronger p ∧ q
does not unattend any possibility, since given the
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new information, the possibility that p (q) holds is
still attended.
3.2 An account of (1) and (3)
Making explicit the attentive effect of proposals re-
veals that answering compliantly can be partly a
destructive act. Given that all possibilities raised
by the initiator are relevant in accordance with the
maxim of relation, unattending any one of them will
require a good reason. A reasonable explanation
is that the responder knows that the possibility is
not, in fact, a live possibility. This reasoning pat-
tern is spelled out below for example (1), translated
as p ∨ q, with the response p.
Reasoning pattern 2 (Unrestr. inq. account)
1. The initiator said p ∨ q, attending the possibili-
ties that p and q.
2. The possiblities that p and q are relevant.
3. The responder said p, unattending the possibil-
ity that q.
4. The reason for unattending this relevant possi-
bility may reasonably be that the responder be-
lieves that q is false.
The same reasoning works for (3), translated as p∨
q ∨ (p∧ q), with the response p. Now p∧ q is added
among the unattended possibilities, but this makes
no difference, since ¬q already entailed ¬(p ∧ q).
Responding to either example (1) or (3) with
‘both’, p ∧ q, does not unattend any possibility. It
provides so much information that the possibilities
for p and q coincide, but they are still attended given
the new information (cf. definition 16). Hence, this
response does not yield an implicature for either ex-
ample.
Responding to the examples with p ∨ q, how-
ever, does make a difference. In response to (1)
it does not unattend any possibility and no implica-
ture arises, whereas in response to (3) it unattends
the possibility that p ∧ q, yielding a ‘not both’ im-
plicature. We think this is as it should be.
Finally, we would like to be able to say that (1),
although it does not imply anything, suggests that
not both p and q obtain, while (3) does not. The
following definition of suggestion achieves this.
Definition 17 (Suggestion)
For a proposal A and state α, A suggests that the
actual world is in α iff all singleton responsesB s.t.
A∝ B, imply that the actual world is in α.
This definition says that any proposal suggests what
its singleton compliant responses imply. Sugges-
tions only turn into implicatures when a singleton
compliant response is given.
3.3 Responses that do not unattend
There is an interesting class of non-compliant
responses that explicitly avoid the ‘not both’-
implicature:
(6) A: Will John or Mary come to the party?
B: Well, at least John. / John, and maybe
Mary too.
We say that these responses are cautious in the
sense of choosing one compliant response, but not
wishing to unattend another one.
Definition 18 (Cautious response)
B is a cautious response to A iff for some B′,B′′
s.t.A∝ B′,B′′,B = B′∪(B′⊓B′′). B is properly
cautious iff in addition, A /∝ B.
Furthermore, a cautious response is maximally cau-
tious iff one of the compliant responses it is com-
posed of, is the original proposal itself:
Definition 19 (Maximally cautious response)
B is a maximally cautious response to A iff for
some B′ s.t. A ∝ B′, B = B′ ∪ (B′ ⊓ A). B is
properly cautious iff in addition, A /∝ B.
Maximally cautious responses do not unattend any
possibility, hence they do not give rise to an exhaus-
tivity implicature. The reader may verify that in re-
sponse to p∨ q, p∨ (p∧ q) is a properly, maximally
cautious response (cf. example (6)).
3.4 Mention-some: relevance in interaction
In reasoning pattern 2, step (iv) is clearly the de-
feasible one. In particular, it relies on the assump-
tion that the possibilities that the initiator deemed
relevant, remain relevant when the responder se-
lects one of them. Of course, this assumption is
not always appropriate. In particular, in response
to mention-some questions, exemplified in (4) in
the introduction, selecting one possibility renders
all others irrelevant (Rooij & Schulz, 2006).
For instance, in response to the first example (‘I
will pick up the key...’), after ascertaining that the
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father will be home, the possibility that the mother
will be home as well is no longer relevant - one per-
son being home is sufficient for picking up the key.
Therefore, step (iv) in reasoning pattern 2 does not
go through, and the response does not yield the ‘not
both’-implicature.
More generally, because what is relevant may
change during an interaction, responses to a
mention-some question do not come with an ex-
haustivity implicature, and hence mention-some
questions do not come with an exhaustivity sugges-
tion.
3.5 Embedded implicatures
The difficulty of embedded implicatures, recall,
was that in order to get the correct implicatures for
disjunctions embedded under a quantifier, the rela-
tive alternatives somehow have to be computed in
the embedded position (cf. example (2)). Clearly,
InqU has the advantage that alternatives are a fun-
damental, compositionally computed part of the se-
mantics. Indeed, no work remains to be done except
to show the present account behaves well.
As we do not wish to introduce a complete first-
order machinery, we will assume a finite domain{d0 . . . dn} and the existence of sufficiently many
propositional variables, such that we may treat a
universal quantifier as a conjunction over all indi-
viduals in the domain. This simplistic account of
quantification suffices for the present purposes.
Without loss of generality, let our domain consist
of Mary, John and Bob, {m,j, b}. Let kd denote
the fact that individual d read King Lear, and sim-
ilarly od for Othello. The problematic sentence in
(2) then translates as:
(7) (om ∨ km) ∧ (oj ∨ kj ) ∧ (ob ∨ kb)
As the reader can verify by distributing the conjunc-
tions over the disjunctions, the proposal denoted by
this formula contains an update for om ∧ oj ∧ ob , an
update for om ∧ oj ∧ kb , etc..
Responding compliantly by selecting any one of
these possibilities unattends all the others. By rea-
soning pattern 2, such responses yield the implica-
ture that every student read only either Othello or
King Lear, not both (and similar, weaker implica-
tures arise for non-singleton compliant responses).
The formula as a whole, then, suggests exhaustiv-
ity in exactly the same way as examples (1) or (3);
there is no problem with embedded implicatures.
4 Comparison to basic inq. pragmatics
We will briefly compare our approach to the in-
quisitive pragmatics based on InqB, developed in
(Groenendijk & Roelofsen, 2009), at least as far as
examples (1) and (3) are concerned. Skipping over
some important, but for the present scope inessen-
tial, differences, their account of (1) could read as
follows:
Reasoning pattern 3 (Basic inq. account)
1. The initiator said p ∨ q.
2. p and q are compliant responses, while p ∧ q is
not.
3. p ∧ q is stronger than either p or q.
4. The reason for not making the stronger re-
sponse p ∧ q compliant might be that the ini-
tiator believes p ∧ q to be false.
First, note that this account, like ours, has no dubi-
ous epistemic step. Deciding to not make a stronger
response compliant, like unattending a possibility
in our approach, is an active deed that needs justi-
fication. Second, this account requires the assump-
tion that relevance is closed under conjunction (for
where does p∧q, as an alternative, come from?). In
our account, on the other hand, what is relevant is
determined solely by the initiator.
More concretely, this account fails for (or was
not designed for) example (3) (p ∨ q ∨ (p ∧ q)).
First, in InqB p ∨ q and p ∨ q ∨ (p ∧ q) denote
the same proposition. Second, transfering reason-
ing pattern 3 to the richer InqU would not work.
For p ∨ q ∨ (p ∧ q), step (ii) would no longer apply,
and no implicature would result.
5 Conclusion and outlook
Starting from the view of meanings as propos-
als, we conceptually motivated and algebraically
characterised an unrestricted inquisitive semantics
(InqU). The algebraic backbone of InqU turned out
to be a commutative, idempotent semiring, and this
gave rise to a new entailment order, and a compli-
ance order of algebraically equal stature. We hope
that the algebraic characterisation of InqU will help
to link inquisitive semantics to other formalisms,
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such as propositional dynamic logic (see Eijk &
Stokhof, 2006 for a recent overview). This could
lead to a transfer of many interesting results, proofs,
and concepts.
Based on InqU, we defined an essentially
Gricean account of some exhaustivity implica-
tures, and showed how it overcomes a number
of difficulties for the more traditional Gricean ac-
count. Among the difficulties we discussed were
the problem of characterising relevant alternatives,
the problem of embedded implicatures and the un-
wanted negations problem. In addition, an analysis
was given of the pragmatics of mention-some ques-
tions. The core ingredients for dealing with these
analyses are the inherent, semantic notion of alter-
native in InqU and the pragmatics’ focus on ini-
tiative/response pairs rather than single utterances.
Both essentially followed from the same conceptual
starting point: to conceive of meanings as propos-
als.
The present paper could not do sufficient jus-
tice to existing semantic and pragmatic theories of
the phenomena discussed, several of which have al-
ready been mentioned. (Rooij & Schulz, 2006) cov-
ers most of the phenomena discussed, and a com-
parison between our approach and theirs will be
interesting also from a methodological viewpoint:
they, too, build a Gricean pragmatic theory on a
non-classical semantics, in their case a dynamic se-
mantics. The interactive view on pragmatics seems
very much in line with Spector’s account of exhaus-
tivity implicatures in terms of a question under dis-
cussion (Spector, 2007). (Chierchia et al., 2008)
contains many more interesting challenges for a tra-
ditional Gricean pragmatics, each of which must be
investigated from the viewpoint of unrestricted in-
quisitive semantics and pragmatics. And there is
much, much more.
For now, the relative ease (fingers crossed) with
which the same reasoning scheme could be applied
to the various phenomena discussed in this paper is
at least a promising start.
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Abstract
Modal verbs sometimes license actuality
inferences, as in the sentence, ‘Mayra knew
that Jeff could see the mountains’, which
licenses the inference that Jeff did see the
mountains. While advances have been
made into modeling the interpretation of
modal verbs with actuality inferences, far
less has been done to determine, in a given
discourse, which reading interlocutors are
most likely to share. Previous work with
corpora (Moon, 2011) indicated that, in
uses of modal verbs in complement clauses,
the type and tense of the matrix verb and
the presence of intensifying adverbs (e.g.,
so carelessly) were sentence-level linguis-
tic features which correlated with actual-
ity inferences.This study runs and analyzes
experiments with human subjects for sta-
tistically significant correlations among the
features observed in corpora and the pres-
ence of actuality inferences. It is found that
sentence level features do significantly bias
subjects towards a particular reading and,
furthermore, that the interaction between
modal verbs and the types of matrix verb
with which they occur is statistically signif-
icant.
1 Introduction
Theoretical semantic interpretations of modal
verbs have posited multiple readings, one of
which is selected by an agent based on the con-
text in which the modal occurs (e.g., (Kratzer,
1981),(Veltman, 2005)) or the syntactic con-
stituent to which the modal applies (e.g., (van der
Auwera & Plungian, 1998),(Boland, 2006)). Al-
though the choice among readings can be con-
strained by lexical properties of the modal verb,
the readings available for a given modal verb still
differ significantly in their temporal and inferen-
tial properties. For example, on one reading of
sentence (1) below, Jeff did see the mountains,1
and a realized ability is expressed.
1. Mayra said that Jeff could see the mountains.
On another reading, Mayra is being reported
to have suggested that Jeff see the mountains and
there is no felicity requirement that Jeff has seen
the mountains before the time the utterance is
made. Although sentence (1) is a completely nat-
ural sounding utterance, without additional con-
text, it allows variability in temporal and infer-
ential meaning which needs to be resolved in or-
der for the correct semantic interpretation to pro-
ceed. Existing semantic theories can interpret
each reading, but they have very limited ability
to constrain or predict which reading interlocutors
are most likely using in a given discourse.
In a discourse context which allows multiple
readings of a modal verb, do sentence-level lin-
guistic features facilitate interlocutors in convey-
ing and interpreting matching modal verb read-
ings? If so, does each relevant feature make a uni-
form contribution in biasing interlocutors towards
a particular interpretation, or are there, rather, in-
teractions among features making combinations
of features have a greater effect than the sum of
their individual contributions? Three specific re-
search questions within these big questions are in-
vestigated in this study: In complement clauses
such as in sentence (1) above, 1) Does the pres-
ence of a modal verb interact with the particu-
lar type of matrix (embedding) verb? 2) Does
changing the tense of the modal verb from past
1The high likelihood of actuality inferences given sen-
sory verbs has been observed by (Vendler, 1957) and others.
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to present lower the likelihood of readings with
actuality inferences across matrix verb type? and
3) Does information in the embedded clause mak-
ing the actuality inference stronger (i.e., intensi-
fying adverbs) increase the likelihood of a read-
ing with actuality inferences equally across ma-
trix verb type?
1.1 Background
Actuality inferences are important for natural
language processing because they attribute non-
modal meaning to modal verb uses.2 For human
interlocutors, an actuality inference updates the
common ground of the discourse with (defeasi-
ble) information about the actual world, as op-
posed to the hypothetical or purely epistemic in-
formation introduced by other readings of modal
verbs. Actuality inferences also carry temporal
inferences with them: If an agent attributes an ac-
tuality inference to a modal verb use, it follows
that the time of the described event precedes the
utterance time.3
The problem of interpreting modal verbs in au-
tomated tasks has proven to be difficult. State
of the art systems such as MacCartney 2006 and
MacCartney et al. (2009:57) use lexical asso-
ciation with one inference pattern. The FraCas
test set (Cooper et al., 1996), on which more lin-
guistically rich entailment models are tested, only
contains two uses of would and none with could.
When textual inference tasks are discussed, modal
interpretation is often either being overlooked or
making inadequate predictions.
Uses of modal verbs with actuality inferences
are particularly useful for automated inferencing
systems to detect due to the information they con-
tribute to the actual world of the discourse as well
as the significantly lessened computational mod-
eling required. The independent variables tested
with subjects in this study were chosen with con-
sideration for their tractability as encodable fea-
tures for automated tasks.
2(Hacquard, 2006), unlike (Bhatt, 1999), claims that
modal verbs with actuality entailments in French and Italian
do need to be modeled with possible worlds. Although her
reasons could be argued to apply to the English data, they
are somewhat dependent on her particular theory of event
and modal scope interaction.
3Some accounts such as (Marneffe, Manning and Potts,
2012) treat actuality inferences as including future uses, pro-
vided there is speaker certainty (e.g., paraphrasability with
will.)
1.2 Preliminary Work
In a previous study (Moon, 2011), 375 instances
of could and would from an 80,000 line cor-
pus of weblogs were hand-classified according
to whether or not their most prominent reading
was one with an actuality inference or one with-
out an actuality inference. Within the actual or
non-actual uses, examples were classified accord-
ing to coarse-grained taxonomic categories such
as counterfactual, hypothetical, dispositional, and
habitual in the past, following various modal tax-
onomies (e.g., (Portner, 2009), (Ziegeler, 2000),
(Celce-Murcia & Larsen-Freeman, 1999)).
Examples were sorted into syntactic categories
in order to allow the classification problem to be
potentially described by construction-based rules
(cf Fernandez et al. 2007). The most prominent
syntactic categories which emerged were: Condi-
tional (Cond): instances in the consequent clause
of a conditional sentence. Free-Standing (FS):
instances in a main clause, possibly with adjuncts
or coordination. Relative Clause (RC): instances
in a clause headed by a noun phrase. Comple-
ment Clause (CC): instances in a clause which
is the complement of a verb. Other (OT): in-
stances in adjunct or coordinating constructions
which seemed to exhibit exceptional properties.
For sentences with the modal verb would, the
syntactic construction was found to be a strong
factor in determining whether a given use of the
modal was likely to have an actuality inference
or not. For could, however, the syntactic con-
struction was less helpful. As shown in figure 1,
many constructions were almost equally likely to
encode actual or non-actual uses.
Additional feature exploration was done in the
corpus data within construction type in order
to determine which linguistic expressions corre-
lated with actuality inferences. For complement
clauses with could, certain properties of the ma-
trix verb type, matrix verb tense, and intensifying
adverb phrases appeared to correlate with actual-
ity entailments.
In this study, the generalizations from corpus
data mentioned in (Moon, 2011) are treated as
independent variables in an experimental study
with human subjects. It is proposed that, if the
same features which emerged in corpora are var-
ied in controlled linguistic contexts with statisti-
cally significant correlations to the presence of ac-
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Figure 1: Given an actual occurrence of the modal could
(black) or a non-actual occurrence (gray), this chart shows
the likelihood that a particular construction will be used (fig-
ure from Moon 2011). Cond = Conditional, FS = Main
Clause, RC = Relative Clause, CC = Complement Clause,
OT = Other.
tuality inferences, their validity as features deter-
mining the modal verb reading is strongly corrob-
orated.
2 Research Question 1: Matrix Verb
Type and Modal Verbs
It was observed in corpus data (Moon, 2011) that
the matrix verb type appeared to be a strong deter-
mining factor in actuality entailments. Although
Levin verb classes (Levin, 1993) were first con-
sidered, it was the three general classes defined in
Karttunen’s work (Karttunen, 1973), (Karttunen,
1974) which emerged as forming separate cate-
gories with respect to actuality inferences.
Karttunen proposed that three types of ma-
trix verbs respond differently regarding whether
or not they allow presuppositions in their scope
to project. Factive verbs, and most other verbs,
are considered to be holes to presuppositions, al-
lowing presuppositions in their scope to perco-
late. Verbs of saying and telling are considered
to be plugs, relativizing any presuppositions in
their scope to the beliefs of the reported speaker.
Propositional attitude verbs, such as believe, are
claimed to alternatively allow or disallow the per-
colation of presuppositions in the clauses in their
scope. Karttunen’s work on presupposition pro-
jection remains very influential in both implemen-
tations (e.g.,(Clausen & Manning, 2009)) and ex-
perimental work (e.g., (Smith & Hall, 2011)).
Actuality inferences would be difficult to cat-
egorize as presuppositions. In English, they are
pervasively cancelable: Allowing continuations
which re-construe the modal reading as one with-
out an actuality inference as in sentence (2):
2. Mayra knew that Jeff could see the crime taking
place, {but he was actually sleeping at the time/if
he wanted to}.
To speak of actuality inferences projecting
through embedded clauses would also not be ac-
curate, since the unembedded modal clause in it-
self rarely has an actuality inference. Therefore,
Karttunen’s theory is not straightforwardly tested
in this study, rather, it provides a classification of
embedding verb types which has proven helpful
for presupposition projection and also correlates
with presence or absence of actuality inferences.4
By alternating the matrix verb class with the
presence or absence of a modal verb, we test
whether the verb classes behave as holes, plugs,
or filters regarding the assertion in their scope in
cases such as sentence (3) where the modal is
omitted.
3. Mayra {knew/thought/said} that Jeff saw the
crime taking place.
When the modal is included, as in sentence (2)
above, there are two possible outcomes: The first
hypothesis is that the modal verb will make a uni-
form contribution across matrix verb type in low-
ering the likelihood of a reading with actuality in-
ferences. In this case, the contribution of each
feature is uniform and can be composed to repre-
sent the overall likelihood of a particular reading.
An alternative hypothesis is that the presence of
a modal verb will have a greater effect with some
matrix verb types than with others. If the second
hypothesis holds, then it follows that the contribu-
tion of the modal verb and the contribution of ma-
trix verb type in determining a modal verb reading
cannot be described by any simple combination of
the contribution of each part. Rather, the semantic
theory must represent the fact that the interaction
of modality and matrix verb type is greater than
the combination of its parts.
4One application of this observation is that, in automated
systems such as that of (Clausen & Manning, 2009), the reg-
ular expressions used to locate factive verbs for representing
presupposition projection can be used to detect embedding
verbs with modal verbs in their complement clause and en-
code predictions regarding actuality inferences.
52
3 Research Question 2: Past under Past
Embeddings versus Past under
Present Embeddings
There are various phenomena which are said to
exhibit sequence of tense (sot) effects (Abusch,
1997), (Ogihara, 1995). This study examines one
specific type of sot phenomena: Past under past
embedded clauses in which the central past tense
modal verb, could (Quirk et al., 1985) (Crouch,
1993) occurs under a past tense embedding verb.
The modal verb could allows a simultaneous
reading: A reading in which the reported event
occurred at the time of the subject of the main
clause’s reported speech act:
4. Yvette said that Jill could jump on the trampo-
line for twenty minutes.
In sentence (4), there is a simultaneous reading
on which Jill has the ability to jump on the tram-
poline for twenty minutes, also called the generic
reading (Bhatt 1999:173). At the time of Yvette’s
reported speech act, Jill had the ability to jump
on the trampoline for twenty minutes. It is even
possible for the (defeasible) inference to be made
that Jill has, at the time of Yvette’s saying that she
could jump on the trampoline for twenty minutes,
already jumped on the trampoline for twenty min-
utes in the past at least once.
Sentence (4) also involves a sequential read-
ing: A reading in which the potential event of Jill
jumping on the trampoline for twenty minutes oc-
curred before Yvette’s act of reporting Jill’s abil-
ity. This is sometimes called an episodic reading
(Bhatt 1999:173).
Cross-linguistically, some languages which
have morphological aspectual marking on their
modal verbs distinguish generic from episodic
readings in that only the latter can occur with the
perfect aspect (Bhatt, 1999). In English, however,
both the episodic and generic readings of sentence
(4) license actuality inferences, provided that, on
the episodic reading, the utterance time is taken to
be after the time of the potential event in the scope
of the modal (i.e., Jill’s jumping on the trampoline
for twenty minutes). Such readings might be de-
scribed as being metaphysical or historical (Con-
doravdi 2002:77-84)5 in that they describe a past
5(Condoravdi, 2002) does not include could among her
modals for the past, however, it seems that this reading of
could is included in her description of metaphysical uses of
non-root modals (2002:78).
prediction about an event which was future at the
time of reported speech, but past relative to the
time of the utterance. The potential event in the
scope of the modal might or might not have oc-
curred at the speech time. On the reading in which
Jill did jump on the trampoline for twenty min-
utes, the prediction of the reported speaker held
and, on the reading in which Jill did not jump
on the trampoline, the prediction of the reported
speaker has proven to be incorrect. Only the for-
mer reading licenses an actuality entailment.
It is hypothesized that, when subjects accept
an actuality inference in past under past embed-
dings, they are accepting a historical (or possibly
generic) reading. In accepting a historical read-
ing, they are rejecting the reading in which the
past under past sentences describes a prediction
about an event which follows the speech time.
In past under present embeddings, the three
verb classes are still used, but with the embed-
ding verb is in the present tense rather than in the
past tense. As discussed in section 4.1, past un-
der past embeddings allow various sot phenom-
ena, each of which locates the embedded (telic)
event as preceding the speech time. It is hypoth-
esized that, by using a present tense embedding
verb, such as sentence (5), the modal will be in-
terpreted as referring to a future prediction rather
than a comment on a past event.
5. Rika understands that Jordan could report her
to the authorities.
The modal in sentence (5) most prominently
describes a hypothetical future possibility rather
than Jordan’s past ability.
Given the readings available, it is hypothesized
that readings with actuality inferences do not oc-
cur in past under present embeddings. This effect
is hypothesized to be uniform across matrix verb
type.
4 Research Question 3: Intensifying
Adverb Phrases
One feature which emerged and which has not re-
ceived a lot of attention with respect to actuality
entailments were intensifying adverbs such as so
emphatically or so carelessly. Such expressions
were used in the corpus data most frequently with
actual readings. In general, intensifying adverb
constructions modify an actual event. However,
non-actual readings with so + ADVERB are licit
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as in sentence (6):
6. Judson believes that Imri could so quickly for-
get his parents.
Sentence (6) can be uttered, for example, as a
speculation about Imri’s anticipated mental state
during his future absence. The reading without an
actuality inference, without a background context,
does not, however, seem to be the most prominent
one.
The presence of intensifying adverb phrases
is hypothesized to increase the number of sub-
jects accepting readings with actuality inferences
across matrix verb type.
5 Methods
It was not feasible to test every possible value of
the proposed features (3 x 2 x 2 x 2 = 24 con-
ditions), so only select combinations were tested,
resulting in twelve test conditions:
(ia) factive verb, past, no modal: Marian was
amazed that Dewayne silenced the witness.
(ib) factive verb, past, modal: Marian was
amazed that Dewayne could silence the witness.
(ic) factive verb, past, modal, so-phrase: Mar-
ian was amazed the Dewayne could so effectively
silence the witness.
(id) factive verb, present, modal: Marian is
amazed that Dewayne could silence the witness
(iia) saying verb, past, no modal: Marian said
that Dewayne silenced the witness.
(iib) saying verb, past, modal: Marian said that
Dewayne could silence the witness.
(iic) saying verb, past, modal, so-phrase: Mar-
ian said that Dewayne could so effectively silence
the witness.
(iid) saying verb, present, modal: Marian says
that Dewyane could silence the witness.
(iiia) propositional attitude verb, past, no
modal: Marian believed that Dewayne silenced
the witness.
(iiib) propositional attitude verb, past, modal:
Marian believed that Dewayne could silence the
witness.
(iiic) propositional attitude verb, past, modal,
so-phrase: Marian believed that Dewayne could
so effectively silence the witness.
(iiid) propositional attitude verb, present,
modal: Marian believes that Dewayne could so
effectively silence the witness.
5.1 Subjects
A total of 41 subjects were tested, with five results
discarded due to acquisition of English as their
primary language later than three years of age.
Subjects were recruited through two introductory
linguistics courses as well as through the author’s
personal contacts. All subjects were undergradu-
ate students at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign except one individual living in an-
other US city. Twenty-six of the subjects were
female and ten male. The age range was from 18-
41 years old (average 21). All but one subject re-
ported their English proficiency as level ‘5’ on a
scale from 1-5 where 1 was ‘beginner’ and 5 ‘ad-
vanced’ (one reported 4). Two bi-lingual speak-
ers considered themselves to be more proficient
in a language other than English (Spanish and
German). Their results were included since they
claimed to use English as their primary language
prior to age three and self-reported their profi-
ciency as ‘advanced’. Other languages spoken by
subjects but considered less primary than English
included Danish, French, Hindi, Japanese, Ko-
rean, Mandarin Chinese, Taiwanese, and others.
Only four subjects were not born in an English-
speaking country but moved to one by age three.
5.2 Apparatus
Experimental results were collected via online
surveys through SurveyGizmo Student Edition.
Subjects completed the survey in two parts which
could be taken at separate times at the subjects’
convenience. Thirty-six subjects were tested via
online surveys (12 scripts, 3 subjects each). Sub-
jects were presented with a scenario containing
the target sentence and asked whether the predi-
cate embedded under the scope of the modal had
already occurred at the time when the dialogue
was taking place. Subjects answered ‘yes’ or ‘no’
and then rated their certainty on a five-point scale.
Finding a context in which subjects can poten-
tially read the modal as having an actuality in-
ference and potentially read it as being predictive
is difficult. Each dialogue involved a scenario in
which two agents, Ann and Jacob, took discourse
turns. Ann’s role was to present a topic which
Jacob then commented on either requesting more
information or affirming what was said. The tar-
get data were always presented preceded by the
discourse particle, well. An example is in figure
(2).
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Figure 2: Example of SurveyGizmo interface
In each of the 36 scenarios (three examples of
each of the twelve conditions tested) in which
the independent variables were manipulated, there
was, at a minimum, a historical and a predictive
reading available.6
On the historical reading of the scenario in fig-
ure (2), Ann is reporting Jarrett’s presumption af-
ter the time during which Lizette could have sab-
otaged the play. The discourse particle is read as
introducing an affirmation that Jarrett’s presump-
tion has some relation to the present unspecified
state of affairs. On a predictive reading, the dis-
course particle is read as providing additional in-
formation explaining the situation discussed in the
first and second turns.
By the use of already in the question, the actu-
ality inference is suggested to the subject. How-
ever, for it to be possible, the subject must read
the modal report as historical, not predictive. If
the subject can only get a predictive reading, then
she will not respond that there is an actuality infer-
ence. This bias was the same across conditions.7
6The complete set of scenarios used in testing is avail-
able at https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/lcoulter/
ExperimentalScripts.
7When subjects in a pilot study were presented with sen-
tences without a discourse context, particular problems were
6 Results
Results were run for ‘yes’ or ‘no’ responses only
(with degree of certainty measured separately), as
shown in figures 3 and 4 . A sample sentence is
given for each of the twelve conditions and in-
dexed in the results table in figure 3 in section 5
above.
Figure 4 shows the basic trajectory of subjects’
responses by showing the percentage of ‘YES’ re-
sponses to each condition.
encountered with future readings. The pilot used two other
conditions: past temporal adverbs and future temporal ad-
verbs. It was predicted that future temporal adverbs, as in
Mary said that Jarrett could cook the fish tomorrow, subjects
would overwhelmingly report no actuality inference. How-
ever, it was found that a significant number of subjects ac-
cepted an actuality inference. It was surmised that subjects
attributed an additional level of evidentiality to the data, as-
suming that whoever was reporting the data was reporting it
after the quoted tomorrow had passed. Perhaps some notion
of Grice’s relevance maxim (Grice, 1975) can then explain
the assumption subjects made that there would be no point
in reporting an overtly future prediction unless it had come
to pass. The addition of a brief dialogue as a control condi-
tion helped ensure that subjects evaluated the possibility of
an actuality inference at the utterance time.
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Figure 3: Results of study of complement clauses with could. Alphanumeric labels correspond to sample conditions
Figure 4: Plot of percentage of subjects accepting actuality
inferences by condition and verb type. Y axis = percent-
age of subjects giving a ‘yes’ response (e.g., 100% means
all subjects responded with ‘yes’ to all three samples of the
condition).
6.1 Matrix Verb Type and Modal Verbs
Regarding the research question of how the ma-
trix verb interacts with the presence or absence of
a modal verb, it was found that assertions project
through verbs of saying or telling on par with
holes such as factives.
Column (a) in figure 3 is taken to illustrate the
isolated effects of past under past embeddings in
which no modal is present. Sot are known to oc-
cur in such contexts, which allow a sequential or
a simultaneous past reading. Without the modal
present, predictive readings would not be possi-
ble. The internal argument of the embedded verb
referred to a telic event in all the data, so habitual
readings were less likely.
The results are that factive verbs (YES: 100%)
and verbs of saying and telling (YES: 97.2%) re-
sult in subjects almost always reporting actuality
inferences, but propositional attitude verbs show
a near even split among interpretations (YES:
54.62%). These results are somewhat surprising
compared to those predicted in (Karttunen, 1973),
(Karttunen, 1974) for presupposition projection.
Figure 5: Effects of the modal verb could on actuality in-
ferences by verb class.
Without the presence of a modal verb, an actu-
ality entailment exists in the embedded clause,
however, subjects do not treat information in the
scope of verbs of saying and telling as less ac-
tual. Whether human subject judgments on pre-
suppositions are the same in this context is a topic
for future experiments. As will be seen in the re-
sults of column (b), introducing uncertainty in the
embedded clause drastically changes subjects’ re-
sponses.
For column (b), past under past embeddings
with could, the percentage of subjects making an
actuality inference greatly decreases for all em-
bedding verb types, but much more sharply for
verbs of saying and telling (NO: 81.48%), which
pattern identically to propositional attitude verbs
(NO: 81.48%). Factive verbs remain majority ac-
tual (YES: 61.11%).
Column (b) gives evidence for the role of ev-
identiality in interpretation: When another per-
son’s views are words are being reported, the pres-
ence of the modal makes the report epistemically
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uncertain. On epistemically uncertainty readings
of could, it is the subject of the main clause who is
unsure, but it can often be inferred that the person
reporting the speaker’s view is epistemically un-
certain. The effects of evidentiality can be seen if
co-indexing occurs as in ‘I said that I could cook
the fish’ which can be easily read with the actual-
ity inference that the speaker actually did as she
said.
For ANOVA analysis, the binary ‘yes’ or ‘no’
responses and five-point certainty scale were con-
verted to an even ten-point continuum of 0.5-
interval values from −4.5 to 4.5 (‘very certain’
‘no’ and ‘very certain’ ‘yes’, respectively).8,9
A 2x3 ANOVA was run crossing modality (2
levels: Presence or absence of the modal) and
verb class (3 levels: Factive, saying or telling, and
propositional attitude), as show in categories (i-
iii) a-b of figure 3.
This measure was run to determine the effect of
the presence of the modal on the interpretation of
the three verb classes as shown in figure 5.
The verb type was found to be statistically sig-
nificant (F (2, 70) = 119.6; p < 0.001) with
factive verbs raising the likelihood of assertions
projecting and propositional attitude verbs low-
ering the likelihood. The presence of a modal
verb was also statistically significant (F (1, 35) =
319.07; p < 0.001) in lowering the likelihood of
actuality inferences across matrix verb type. The
interaction between verb type and the presence
of the modal verb was also statistically signifi-
cant (F (2, 70) = 53.55; p < 0.001), with verbs
of saying or telling being affected most strongly
by the presence of a modal verb greatly lowering
their likelihood of being interpreted as having an
actuality inference.
6.2 Past versus Present Tense Matrix Verb
Column (d) in figure 3 sought to see to what extent
the tense of the embedding verb interacted with
actuality inferences in complement clauses. It
was found that, under present embeddings, about
half of the subjects still accepted the actuality in-
ference under factive verbs (NO: 50.9%). How-
8The resulting ten point scale placed the origin at the mid-
point between an answer of ‘yes’ with certainty of one and
an answer of ’no’ with certainty of one.
9See (McKinstry, Dale, and Spivey, 2008) for experimen-
tal evidence that the divide between ‘yes’ and ‘no’ responses
is more of a continuum than binary.
Figure 6: Interaction of tense with other features.
ever, with verbs of saying or telling (NO: 86.11%)
and propositional attitude verbs (NO: 97.22%) the
percentage of subjects rejecting actuality infer-
ences increased to nearly absolute agreement.
Column (d), along with column (b), show that
the combination of verb tense and embedding
verb type are the strongest features determining
whether or not a modal verb licenses a prominent
reading in which an actuality inference holds.
A 2x3 ANOVA was run crossing tense of the
matrix verb (2 levels: Past and present) and ma-
trix verb type (3 levels: Factive, saying or telling,
and propositional attitude) as in (i-iii), (b and
d) of figure 3. The measure did not show a
statistically significant interaction between verb
type and tense (6), but both tense and verb type
were found to be statistically significant in them-
selves (F (1, 35) = 11.68; p < 0.003, F (2, 70) =
76.08; p < 0.001, respectively) in that present
tense lowers the likelihood of a reading with an
actuality inference.
6.3 Intensifying Adverbs
Column (c) in figure 3 adds an intensifying adverb
phrase to the past under past modal embedding
to see if sentence-level features in the embedded
clause can coerce subjects to make actuality in-
ferences. If so, then it shows more clearly which
embedding verbs strongly prevent actuality infer-
ences.
It was found that all embedding verb types led
more subjects to accept actuality inferences, but
only factives (YES: 75.92%) were above the 50%
threshold. Verbs of saying were very close to an
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Figure 7: Interaction of ‘so + adverb’ phrases with other
features.
even split (NO: 52.7%), with propositional atti-
tude verbs remaining least actual (NO: 68.51%).
A 2x3 ANOVA of intensifying adverb phrases
(2 levels: Presence or absence of the adverb)
given verb type (3 levels: Factive, saying or
telling, and propositional attitude) was also run.
This measure showed the adverb to be statisti-
cally significant (F (1, 35) = 31.05; p < 0.001)
in raising the likelihood of a reading with an ac-
tuality inference when it was present. Verb type
(F (2, 70) = 94.68; p < 0.001), again, was sta-
tistically significant, but the interaction of the two
was not statistically significant.
7 Discussion
Although English does not have overt morpholog-
ical markings helping distinguish uses of modal
verbs with actuality inferences from uses with-
out, there are a number of sentence level linguistic
features which assist in limiting the most likely
reading. Furthermore, when embedded in a dis-
course context allowing both historical and pre-
dictive readings, subjects systematically interpret
the discourse markers and context in a way that
facilitates the most likely reading of the modal
based on sentence level features.
Matrix verb type was the most prominent fea-
ture in determining actuality inferences. This
fact cannot be straightforwardly explained by the
theory from which the verb classes were chosen
(Karttunen, 1973), (Karttunen, 1974), but it rather
shows that levels of evidentiality and intuitions
about the limitations of epistemic knowledge in-
fluence modal verb readings.
The second most prominent determining fea-
ture was the past tense of the main verb. Sot phe-
nomena are predicted to occur in past under past
embeddings, making the possibility of actuality
inferences clear. However, the uniform trajectory
across verb type, as shown in figure 4, indicates
that embedding verbs play a much stronger role
than tense in determining the reading.
In response to the big research questions, it was
found that sentence level features do indeed help
determine which reading interlocutors are most
likely to attribute to a given use of a modal in that
the features tested: Matrix verb type, matrix verb
tense, and intensifying adverbs all had a statisti-
cally significant effect on the modal verb reading.
It was found that some features have a uni-
form contribution to what reading interlocutors
are most likely to choose. When the matrix verb
is in the present tense, all matrix verb types have a
lower likelihood of being interpreted as having ac-
tuality inference. Similarly, intensifying adverbs
have an effect across verb type of increasing the
likelihood of a reading with actuality inference.
Other features, such as the interaction between
modal verbs and the matrix verb type can not be
represented as a simple combination of the ma-
trix verb type combined with the contribution of
the modal. Rather, verbs of saying or telling are
much more affected by the presence of a modal
than factive or propositional attitude verbs. These
results present particular challenges for any the-
ory attempting to represent a probabilistic bias to-
wards one reading in terms of uniform contribu-
tions of constituents in a compositional semantic
approach.
The results of our study have an impact on the-
oretical models of the role of sentence level fea-
tures on modal verb interpretation in discourse.
They also have applications for automated models
of modal verb interpretation, providing tractable
features correlating with a strong likelihood of
modal verb readings with actuality inferences.
In future work, we will test features correlating
with actuality inferences in other syntactic con-
structions and with other past central modal verbs.
We will also work to improve our discourse sce-
narios in order to measure when human subjects
make actuality inferences rather than measuring
whether they accept or reject them when they are
suggested.
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In learning a language, children need to learn both
the conventional forms for their community, and
how to use those forms. I will argue that chil-
dren learn language – both forms and uses in the
course of conversation.
I will draw on findings from adult offers of new
words and evidence for children’s uptake; from
adult reformulations of child errors and children’s
attention to these reformulations, and from adult
scaffolding of children’s early ’narratives’, where
children rely on adult knowledge of an event in
order to make their contribution.
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Abstract
Conversational turns often proceed with
very brief pauses between speakers. In or-
der to maintain “no gap, no overlap” turn-
taking, we must be able to anticipate when
an ongoing utterance will end, tracking the
current speaker for upcoming points of po-
tential floor exchange. The precise set of
cues that listeners use for turn-end bound-
ary anticipation is not yet established. We
used an eyetracking paradigm to measure
adults’ and children’s online turn process-
ing as they watched videos of conversa-
tions in their native language (English) and
a range of other languages they did not
speak. Both adults and children anticipated
speaker transitions effectively. In addition,
we observed evidence of turn-boundary an-
ticipation for questions even in languages
that were unknown to participants, suggest-
ing that listeners’ success in turn-end antic-
ipation does not rely solely on lexical infor-
mation.
1 Introduction
Turn-taking in human communication is efficient:
we usually switch between speakers with brief
pauses. Though there is a wide distribution of
gap lengths in everyday conversation, the median
gap between conversational turns is close to zero
milliseconds, and maintaining brief inter-speaker
junctions may be universal to human languages
(de Ruiter et al., 2006; Heldner and Edlund, 2010;
Stivers et al., 2009). These gaps, though brief, re-
sult in minimal overlap, and beg the question of
how we manage to come in with such precise tim-
ing.
Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (1974) noted
that inter-speaker gaps are too brief for listeners
to be relying on turn-end silences before start-
ing up their response. They suggested that in-
stead we track ongoing turns for cues to their
eventual end, using linguistic information about
syntactic, propositional, and intonational struc-
ture. Using these cues, listeners should be able
to predict the moment at which a speaker will
stop speaking with high accuracy. This insight
was important, but they did not further inves-
tigate which cues—whether linguistic or non-
linguistic–listeners track.
More recent research has addressed this ques-
tion, investigating which linguistic cues might be
most informative in anticipating the close to an
ongoing turn. Corpus study of available cues
has yielded somewhat inconclusive results since
so many linguistic boundaries co-occur (Caspers,
2003; Ford and Thompson, 1996). Even if reli-
able turn-end cues were apparent, we could not be
confident that listeners actually attended to them
to in conversation without experimentally manip-
ulating them and measuring their effects on listen-
ers.
De Ruiter and colleagues (2006) created an ex-
perimental paradigm to measure turn boundary
anticipation while also beginning to test which
cues were most informative in this process. They
extracted utterances from a recording of a sponta-
neous conversation and presented them to partici-
pants over headphones. Participants were asked to
press a button at the moment they anticipated the
speaker would stop speaking. Participants were
extremely accurate in identifying the moment be-
fore a turn was about to end. To test the effects
of different cues on anticipation, they separately
controlled for the presence of intonation and lex-
ical information. There was no significant differ-
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ence between participants’ accuracy when intona-
tion was present and when it was omitted from
the stimulus. When lexical information was taken
away, however, participants’ accuracy declined
significantly. De Ruiter et al. thus suggested that
word-level information is of primary importance
in turn-boundary anticipation.
Although the de Ruiter study was carefully
controlled, the button-pressing task was explicit,
and might easily have focused participants’ atten-
tion on words and word-level information more
so than they would have been otherwise, espe-
cially since the instructions asked for precisely-
timed responses. If this were the case, their re-
sults would reflect a use of linguistic cues under
somewhat unnatural conditions. In addition, de
Ruiter et al. (2006) did not control for all prosodic
cues—duration was left unmodified in their stim-
uli. This information might have accounted for
some of their accuracy effects in the condition
without intonation.
Many people have the intuition that intona-
tion and rhythm are part of the prediction pro-
cess, but may be more important prior to the end
of the turn, at which point lexical information
may be most informative. Carlson, Hirschberg,
and Swerts (2005) showed that listeners can use
prosodic cues to predict the strength of upcom-
ing prosodic breaks. The estimation of upcom-
ing prosodic breaks can help listeners determine
when a speaker-switch will be appropriate, even
without lexical information (Carlson et al., 2005;
Heldner et al., 2006). These experiments were
run on “offline” judgments, unlike those in the
de Ruiter et al. (2006) study—which found no
prosodic effects. Could prosodic effects emerge
during online speech processing under different
experimental circumstances?
Our current work uses eye-tracking as an im-
plicit measure of turn boundary anticipation. This
method allows us to study both adults and chil-
dren and to systematically manipulate the content
of the videos we track.
Tice & Henetz (2011) explored eyetracking as
a possible alternative method for measuring on-
line turn processing, which they call Observer
Gaze. They seated participants in front of a
large screen, under which was tucked a small
digital video camera tilted toward participants’
faces. While viewing a one-minute dyadic, split-
screen conversation in English, participants con-
sistently tracked the current speaker with their
gaze. In addition, they anticipated the ends of
turn boundaries by looking at the next speaker on
question-answer pairs. Observer Gaze is founded
upon natural looking behavior—observers tend to
look at the current speaker during his or her turn
(Kendon, 1967; Bavelas et al., 2002). It requires
little or no instruction and allows experimenters to
collect high temporal resolution looking data over
the course of a conversation. Thus, this method
provides a measure of turn-boundary anticipation
that we can use to investigate the cues that con-
tribute to this ability.
Since it is a passive method founded on natural,
spontaneous behavior, Observer Gaze can be used
with both child and adult participants to begin ex-
ploring the developmental trajectory of turn-end
boundary prediction. We are interested in com-
paring adult turn-end prediction skills with those
of children because of the protracted development
of turn-taking. By age five, children’s turn-taking
skills are still not up to the timing standards of
adults. Even in adjacency pairs, when the re-
sponse is often restricted and the context makes
clear who the next speaker is, children’s responses
are still delayed. It has been proposed that their
delay is due to complexity and predictability level
of responding to the question at hand (Garvey and
Berninger, 1981; Casillas et al., in preparation),
but we do not yet know whether children’s de-
lay is due to the need to formulate a response
or a slowly developing ability to predict turn-end
boundaries. The eye-tracking method described
above makes it possible to compare adults and
children directly, allowing for investigation of this
question in our study.
In the current study, we introduce a simple
method for controlling word-level information in
the speech signal: we show participants videos
of languages that they do not speak. Though the
non-lexical signals in the videos (e.g., intonation,
prosody, gaze, gesture) are foreign to the partici-
pants, the information may still be robust enough
to support online turn-tracking. Because the lin-
guistic cues are foreign, eye gaze behavior while
watching a foreign language (which has similar,
but not identical cues) is a stringent test of the use
of non-lexical cues in online-turn-processing. To
keep the stimuli engaging for children, we used
child-oriented speech (as described below) in the
video stimuli.
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2 Methods
2.1 Participants
Seventy-two pre-school aged children (19 three-
year-olds, 32 four-year-olds, and 21 five-year-
olds) and 11 adults participated in the study. All
were native speakers of English who had little to
no language experience with the four non-native
languages used in the stimuli (see Procedure be-
low).
2.2 Materials
The video segments were recorded in a sound-
attenuated booth by two native speakers of each
language (all non-native English speakers en-
rolled in graduate study in the U.S.) Each person
was audio recorded from a lapel microphone (one
on the right channel and one on the left) feeding
into a Marantz PMD 660 solid state field recorder.
Participants were video-recorded from the iSight
of a MacBook. Pairs of speakers were selected by
native language, and ranged from acquainted indi-
viduals to good friends. They were asked to speak
on four topics for 20 minutes (five minutes each
on favorite foods, entertainment, hometown lay-
out, and pets). Following this recording they were
asked to choose a topic relevant to young children
(e.g., riding a bike, eating breakfast, siblings) and
improvise on that topic as if they were on a chil-
dren’s television show until they had at least 30
seconds of continuous material. Most pairs took
less than three minutes to record these “child-
friendly” improvised conversations, and the re-
sulting recordings remained natural but engaging
for both young children and adults. The audio
and video recordings were aligned afterward us-
ing video editing software.
The child-friendly videos were then edited to
include 30 seconds from each language with max-
imal turn activity and were wedged between en-
tertaining filler videos (e.g., running puppies,
singing muppets, flying bugs) for an experimental
duration of approximately six minutes long. The
order of the non-English videos (videos 2–5) was
varied in four versions of the experiment so that
no consistent order effects might skew the data.
The first and last videos in English (videos 1 and
6) were always kept the same.
2.3 Procedure
Participants were seated in front of an SMI 120Hz
corneal reflection eye tracker and a large screen
with speakers placed on a table at each side of
the screen. The eye-tracker is mounted beneath a
flat-panel display; the display is in turn mounted
on an ergonomic arm so that it can be positioned
at a comfortable height approximately 60cm (an
adult arm’s length) from the participant. After be-
ing seated, participants were told that they would
hear videos in a number of different languages.
We then asked each participant what languages
they could speak. We used a 5-point calibration
routine in which participants followed a point on
the screen with their eyes. For purposes of engag-
ing children, Elmo (an animated puppet) was used
as the calibration image.
In the body of the study, participants watched a
six-minute video containing six 30 second dyadic
conversations with 15–30 second filler videos be-
tween them. The first and last conversations
(numbers 1 and 6) were in American English and
the intervening conversations (2–5) were recorded
in Hebrew, Japanese, German, and Korean. After
each conversation, adult participants were asked
if they understood any part of the speech to make
a second check for any lexical access during the
non-English videos.
3 Results and discussion
Child and adult observers in both the English and
non-English videos were more likely to keep their
eyes on a speaker when that person was speak-
ing rather than when they were silent (Table 1),
though they also glanced back at silent partici-
pants between 15 and 20% of the time. Chil-
dren were less likely than adults to keep their eyes
on the current speaker while watching the non-
English videos, but still showed a reliable dif-
ference in gaze to a speaker during speech and
during silence. This result indicates that partic-
ipants were performing basic turn-tracking with
their gaze while viewing the stimuli (Kendon,
1967). When point-of-gaze is averaged across the
entire recording in this way, there do not appear to
be large developmental differences between chil-
dren and adults in their ability to track the current
speaker, though the adults were slightly more con-
sistent.
We next turn to the question of the quick, an-
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Figure 2: Children and adults’ gaze to the upcoming speaker during pre- and post- gap 200 ms windows of
speaker switches. Error bars show standard error of the mean across participants.
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Group Language Current Non-current
Children English 0.64 0.17
Non-Eng 0.48 0.19
Adults English 0.63 0.16
Non-Eng 0.61 0.21
Table 1: Average proportion of gaze during speech
segments to the current and non-current speaker. Child
and adult observers look to the non-current speaker
16–20% of the time the current speaker is talking, and
look at neither speaker 18–33% of the time the cur-
rent speaker is talking. Children watching non-English
videos were least likely to be looking at the current
speaker during his or her speech.
ticipatory eye-movements around conversational
turns observed in previous work (Tice and Henetz,
2011). We test for the presence of turn-end antic-
ipation by measuring shifts in gaze near the inter-
speaker gap. Using the average direction of gaze
(between previous and upcoming speakers), we
compare the 200 ms window prior to the onset of
an inter-speaker gap and the 200 ms window fol-
lowing the offset of that inter-speaker gap. Since
it would take adults and children at least 200 ms
to plan an eye movement, any significant shift in
gaze during the 200 ms post-gap window indi-
cates a movement planned prior to the onset of
speech by the second speaker. Using this com-
parison, we find that while viewing English and
non-English stimuli, participants tend to antici-
pate upcoming turn-end boundaries such that they
spontaneously shift between the current and pre-
vious speaker before the previous speaker has the
opportunity to begin his or her response (Figure
1).
Speaker exchanges in the non-English videos
that sounded similar to English question-answer
adjacency pairs1 were coded as “questions” for
the analysis. We find that both adult and child
observers show divergent performance on ques-
tion and non-question exchanges during all of the
videos. Though their gaze begins to shifts dra-
matically in nearly every case across the pre- and
post- gap windows, participants show an advan-
tage for question-answer pairs such that they are
more likely to shift earlier on and already be look-
1Judgments were made by the first author primarily based
on auditory information, including but not limited to a ris-
ing intonation. This judgment is meant to represent which
switches the participants were most likely to think were
questions in the non-English videos.
ing at the answerer when he or she begins to speak
(Figure 2).
This behavior indicates spontaneous response
anticipation during online processing of the stim-
uli. The average inter-speaker gap across lan-
guages and exchange types was 335 ms. The av-
erage for questions across languages was 319 ms
and 350 ms for non-questions, though the stimuli
contain many cases of sub-200 ms inter-speaker
gaps. This means that listeners may still rely on
a turn-end pause in some cases. However, if par-
ticipants were universally reacting to silence, we
would not expect the earlier switch in question-
answer pairs. More generally, the pattern of re-
liable performance even with inter-speaker gaps
shorter than 200 ms suggests that participants
make use of cues that are present in the signal
prior to the turn-end silence.
We fit two separate linear mixed-effects mod-
els (Gelman and Hill, 2007) to participants’ av-
erage gaze direction at pre- and post- gap win-
dows: one model for adult data and another for
the child data. We used a maximal random effects
structure to control for variability between partic-
ipants on the variables of interest. Model coef-
ficients suggest that the advantage for questions
over non-questions was significant or nearly sig-
nificant for both children and adults (t=-7.03 and
-1.76, respectively). For children, there was also
a significant effect of language group (English vs.
non-English, t=-9.29) and a significant interaction
between language group and turn type (question
vs. non-question, t=6.27). The effect of language
group was also nearly significant in the adult data
(t=-1.77), and there was no interaction between
language group and turn type.
These statistical results suggest that adults were
able to integrate non-native cues in their on-
line turn processing more effectively than chil-
dren were, providing some guidance for an ac-
count of the development of turn-end anticipa-
tion. For both age groups, there was a significant
effect of turn type: question vs. non-question.
There may have been many divergent cues in
these cases which led participants to earlier and
more successful anticipation in the presence of
questions. However, since the determination of
what counts as a “question” in the non-English
videos mainly relied on prosodic similarity to En-
glish questions, we have reason to believe that it
is precisely because speakers rely on intonational
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Figure 3: Children and adults’ trajectory of gaze over the preceding and following 1-second window of inter-
speaker gaps for questions and non-questions in English and non-English videos. Error bars show standard error
of the mean across participants.
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Figure 1: Frequency of saccades over the time course of one video in English. Vertical bars in blue indicate
inter-speaker gaps.
Predictor   SE t
Children
Switches (Non-Question) -0.31 0.04 -7.03
Lg group (Non-English) -0.43 0.05 -9.29
Switches x Lg group 0.33 0.05 6.27
Adults
Switches (Non-Question) -0.17 0.1 -1.76
Lg group (Non-English) -0.16 0.09 -1.77
Switches x Lg group 0.005 0.07 0.07
Table 2: Average direction of gaze to the each speaker
while he or she is speaking and silent. 1 = looking
exclusively at the current speaker and -1 = exclusively
at the non-current speaker.
information that they show this advantage. Thus
it would be inaccurate to characterize online turn-
processing as solely dependent on lexical infor-
mation. Rather, participants perform remarkably
well when no lexical information is present at all.
Consistent with our previous work, the current
results provide us with further empirical evidence
for spontaneous anticipation of turn-end bound-
aries. Our results were calculated for without dis-
tinction between fixations, long movements, and
saccades because of the frequent sampling of the
tracker and our decision to analyze anticipation
by averaging over pre- and post- gap windows.
The anticipatory looking behavior we observed
is unlikely to be due to continuous gaze shifting
during the video, since saccades show spiked in-
creases only near potential turn boundaries, not
between. For example, a time-course render-
ing of eye-tracking data from one representative
video of English conversation shows a consider-
able spike in saccades prior to turn gaps (Figure
3). Thus, we do not believe that random shifting
accounts for our results.
Because each non-English language in this ex-
periment is represented by a single stimulus, we
cannot compute reliable across-language differ-
ences for each language. Since some of the
languages have more overlap in linguistic struc-
ture with English, gaze behavior may be signif-
icantly better on these items. For example, En-
glish speakers can make predictions about the
strength of upcoming Swedish prosodic bound-
aries nearly as well as Swedish speakers do, but
Chinese speakers are at a disadvantage in the
same task (Carlson et al., 2005). A follow-up
study of our work using eye tracking with mul-
tiple items from each language would enable us
to check for effects of linguistic similarity in lan-
guages that the participants do not actually speak.
Finally, in the current study we did not include
a baseline condition with no linguistic informa-
tion at all. Tice & Henetz (2011) found that suc-
cessful gaze anticipation relies on the presence of
linguistic information for English. But, we have
no direct comparison of gaze behavior in condi-
tions without any linguistic information and with
linguistic information in a language the partici-
pants don’t speak. This must be added in future
work.
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4 Conclusion
Children and adults track the current speaker with
their gaze. They also spontaneously make antici-
patory looks to upcoming speakers at speaker ex-
changes, indexing their online processing of turn-
structure (their anticipation of an ongoing turn’s
end and the beginning of a responder’s turn).
Their anticipatory gaze is stronger when prosodic
and other non-lexical cues suggest question status
(e.g., ending in a high-rise terminal).
Even without lexical information, we track
turns as they unfold. Participants not only contin-
ued to track current speakers during non-English
videos, they showed an advantage for question-
type turns over non-question-type turns. A model
of how we manage to take turns on time must ac-
count for prosodic and other non-lexical informa-
tion.
We found that adults and children performed
almost equally well, with the exception that chil-
dren had more difficulty maintaining speaker
tracking and anticipation during the non-English
videos. This may in part be due to their uninhib-
ited lack of interest which resulted in more vari-
able looking patterns than well-behaved adults.
Investigation of this possibility will require more
data from both age groups and denser devel-
opmental data. Children’s success in predict-
ing turn-end boundaries and tracking the current
speaker suggests that they master this skill early
on. It therefore seems likely that their delays in
responding to questions (Garvey and Berninger,
1981; Casillas et al., in preparation) has more to
do with formulating a response than anticipating
when to come in.
In the present study we used recordings of
non-English languages to test for turn-processing
success when lexical information is not present.
Though the non-lexical stimuli are highly natural-
istic, they do not directly test which English cues
English speakers use. There is a significant ef-
fect of language group for child participants and a
similar, but non-significant effect for adults, sug-
gesting that we can most accurately measure turn-
processing performance in English by using En-
glish stimuli. To perform the appropriate exper-
iment, we must create phonetically-manipulated
stimuli to control for turn-end linguistic cues in-
cluding prosody and lexical information. We plan
to run this follow-up study to compare how per-
formance changes with carefully controlled, but
less naturalistic stimuli.
Until recently, we did not have any experimen-
tal evidence of turn-end anticipation. But, in the
past few years at least two studies have demon-
strated that turn-end prediction is a measurable
behavior (de Ruiter et al., 2006; Tice and Henetz,
2011). The present study is the first to show
evidence that we spontaneously predict turn-end
boundaries when attending to languages that we
do not speak. This result tells us that the ability
to predict upcoming turn-end boundaries is not
reliant on lexical information alone; rather, we
spontaneously apply (even non-native) prosodic
and non-verbal information to continue tracking
upcoming turn junctures accurately. Taking all
of the experimental work on turn-end anticipation
together, our turn processing mechanism is best
characterized as a flexible one which makes use
of the information available to it in the current
conversational environment. These findings indi-
cate that further experimental work will be able
to distinguish what cues are attended to as speech
unfolds and prediction takes place under different
conditions.
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Abstract 
French has three types of root polar questions: 
with est-ce-que, with an inverted clitic, or with 
a declarative clause. We provide semantic and 
pragmatic properties that set questioning 
declarative clauses (Q-decl) apart from the two 
other types, showing that their content is a 
proposition (like with ordinary declaratives) 
rather than a question. We provide data from a 
radio talk show, which illustrate their use in 
conversation, in comparison with that of 
interrogatives. They are not regular queries but 
constitute an appeal to the addressee to endorse 
the proposition. Using logistic regression 
models, we point out which factors favor the 
use of Q-decl over the other types. 
  
1. Introduction 
It is usually said that French has three types of 
clauses that are used for expressing yes-no root 
questions (Borillo 1978, Mosegaard-Hansen 
2001, Marandin 2005).  They are illustrated in 
(1). 
 
(1) a. Est-ce que Paul sera là ?   
         ‘will Paul be there’     
      b. Paul sera-t-il là ? 
      c. Paul sera là  ?  
 
In (1a), the clause is introduced by the 
interrogative complementizer est-ce que ; (1b) 
is characterized by the presence of a verbal 
suffix identical to the subject clitic ; the 
syntactic form of (1c) is identical to that of a 
declarative clause. It is also usually said that 
(1c) can be distinguished from an asserted 
declarative clause by a rising intonation. 
However, we will leave intonation aside, 
because the correlation between rising / falling 
intonation and clause type is not one-to-one. 
Although most declarative clauses used fro 
questioning have a rising intonation, this is not 
true of all, and some such clauses must be 
recognized on a contextual basis (Mosegaard-
Hansen 2001, Beyssade-Marandin 2006).  
Some languages do not distinguish between 
root declaratives and interrogatives on a 
syntactic basis, while others do. In some, the 
form used for polar interrogatives is also found 
in other constructions (this is the case in 
English, for instance, the subject auxiliary 
construction being part of a number of 
constructions, such as conditionals, Fillmore 
1999), while a form dedicated for 
interrogatives is found in other languages. 
French distinguishes formally between root 
declaratives and interrogatives, while at the 
same time using declaratives to ask yes-no 
questions, and uses both a form dedicated to 
interrogatives (the complementizer est-ce que) 
and a form also found in different 
constructions (the verb with a verbal suffix 
appears in conditionals, with certain initial 
adverbs etc.). Hence the three forms in (1): the 
interrogative with est-ce-que (est-ce-que-cl) 
(1a), the inverted clause (inv-cl) (1b), and the 
declarative clause with a questioning use (Q-
decl-cl) (1c). 
When different forms are found with similar 
uses, the natural question is to ask whether 
they differ, and how. Following Ginzburg and 
Sag 2000, we distinguish between the semantic 
type of the clause and its illocutionary import, 
and, more generally, its uses. Thus,  
– declarative, interrogative refer to syntactic 
forms and properties; 
– proposition and question are the semantic 
types (or content) of declaratives and 
interrogatives,  respectively;    
- assertion, query refer to the speech act. A 
speech act is typically (but only typically) 
associated with a clause type (form + content). 
Est-ce-que-cl, inv-cl and Q-decl-cl are 
constructions, that is, associations of syntactic, 
semantic and pragmatic properties. 
The plurality of forms in (1) thus raises two 
different questions: (i) do the forms in (1) 
differ semantically? More precisely, is the 
content of a Q-decl-cl a proposition (as 
expected from its form) or a question (which 
would be in keeping with what is presented as 
its use)?  (ii) does a Q-decl-cl have the same 
uses as the interrogatives in (1a,b)? The first 
question has been raised for English 
(Gunlogson 2003, Šafářová 2007). Although 
she does not clearly distinguish between 
content and use, Gunlogson's proposal includes 
the idea that the content of a Q-decl-cl is a 
proposition.  The second question is raised for 
English by the same authors (in particular), but 
crucially for French by Mosegaard-Hansen 
(2001). For Gunlogson, it is the intonation 
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which is responsible for allowing the use of a 
proposition as if it were a question (hence the 
term rising declarative); crucially, intonation 
removes the speaker's commitment which is 
necessary for an assertion. Šafářová (2007) is 
specially interested in characterizing the 
contexts appropriate for Q-decl-cl. She 
proposes three types of contexts (↑ indicates 
rising intonation, and S the speaker): 
– Speaker and addressee are not previously 
committed to the content of the clause: 
questions based on contextual evidence 
(You’re leaving for vacation today ↑) or try-
out statements (S1. John has to leave early. 
S2. He’ll miss the party then ↑)  
– Utterances associated with Speaker’s 
commitment only, whether they introduce new 
information (You remember X?), or check the 
addressee's approval (S1. How did you like the 
movie? S2.  I thought it was good ↑) 
– Previous addressee only is committed (re-
prise or echo questions) (S1. That copier is 
broken S2. It is ↑ Thanks, I’ll use a different 
one). 
Mosegaard-Hansen (M-H) is also mainly 
concerned with interactional factors favoring 
one or the other of the three forms in (1). She 
proposes that two factors are crucial in the 
choice of a Q-decl-cl, the accessibility of 
information, and the participation structure of 
the dialogical situation. The first factor is that 
Q-decl-cl tend to be about events that are 
known to the addressee and not to the speaker, 
while the interrogatives in (1a,b) tend to be 
about other types of events (e.g. known to both 
speaker and addressee, to all participants, or on 
topics known to be disputable). The second 
factor is that a simple structure favors Q-decl-
cl over (1a,b), where a structure is as simple as 
possible if the roles of speaker and person 
responsible for the content of the utterance are 
endorsed by the same person, and similarly for 
the addressee and audience.      
We address both issues. First, we show that the 
semantic type of Q-decl-cl is a proposition 
rather than a question. Second, on the basis of 
previous observations as well as on our 
intuitions, we make some hypotheses about the 
illocutionary import of Q-decl-cl. As suggested 
in M-H (2001), and worked out in Beyssade & 
Marandin (2006), Farkas & Bruce (2010), 
Ginzburg (2012), we assume that speech acts 
are analyzed along two dimensions: the call on 
addressee (the uptake that the utterance 
projects for the addressee) and the 
commitment of the speaker. We test those 
hypotheses on a corpus (EPAC, Bazillon et al. 
2011), with quantitative observations, which 
we check with a statistical model. This corpus 
is a radio talk show, between a host, callers 
and experts who answer the callers' questions. 
We show that the content of a Q-declarative is 
indeed a proposition (like that of an ordinary 
declarative. In addition, its use is neither that 
of an ordinary declarative, nor exactly that of a 
query. In fact, the speaker hands the content of 
the clause over to the addressee in order for 
him/her to take responsibility.  
 
2. French questioning declaratives are 
propositional 
We show that Q-declaratives are indeed 
declaratives, that is, their content is a 
proposition rather than a question (like 
interrogatives). We illustrate our points with 
attested data, in particular from our corpus.  
 
2.1. Use of the predicate question 
A Q-declarative is not natural for elaborating 
the noun question (Gunlogson 2003). 
Examples (2) and (3) propose sentences with 
an est-ce-que-cl and an inv-cl. Q-declaratives 
cannot be substituted for the interrogatives 
here. Note that the interrogative clause is the 
complement of the identity verb; it has the 
form of a root interrogative because it is used a 
a quote.      
 
(2) a. mais la question fondamentale est : est-
ce qu’ on peut faire des élections libres 
aujourd’hui, accessibles à tout le monde ? 
(EPAC file 0813) 
‘but the fundamental question is, is it possible 
to organize free elections nowadays, open to 
everybody’ 
b. #la question fondamentale est : on peut 
faire des élections libres aujourd’hui ?  
 
(3) a. ma question c'est euh l'enseignement 
des langues importe-t-il à l'éducation 
nationale ? (EPAC file 0902) 
‘my question, it is euh is language teaching 
important for the ministry of Education ?‘ 
      b. #ma question c'est euh l'enseignement 
des langues importe à l'éducation nationale ?  
 
However, the interpretation of such data is not 
completely straightforward: the noun question 
itself can refer to the act as well as the content 
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of the clause, and can also be the equivalent of 
‘issue’.    
 
2.2. Polarity subjunctive 
Some predicates (verbs of communication, 
propositional attitudes), which select indicative 
complement clauses, may, in certain non 
positive environments, interrogatives among 
them, take a subjunctive clause. We illustrate 
the fact with an inverted verb (mood 
alternation is possible, but less frequent, with 
est-ce que, Huot 1986). On the other hand, Q-
declaratives do not license the subjunctive.  
 
(4) a. Vous n'avez pas peur de la mort. Et moi, 
croyez-vous que je la crainsIND /craigneSUBJ ? 
‘You are not afraid of death. Do you think that 
I am afraid of it? (J. d’Ormesson, Le bonheur à 
San Miniato, 1987, p. 225) 
     b. Vous n'avez pas peur de la mort. Et moi, 
vous croyez que je la crainsIND /*craigneSUBJ ? 
  
Broadly, in a semantico-pragmatic approach, 
the subjunctive mood is motivated in contexts 
where the interpretation requires taking into 
account alternative situations (to the one 
described in the sentence) (Farkas 1992, 
Godard 2012). An interrogative or a negated 
belief verb creates such an environment, hence 
the subjunctive in (4a). The fact that Q-
declaratives do not license the subjunctive in 
the complement of such verbs indicates that 
their interpretation does not create alternative 
situations, as interrogatives do.  
 
2.3. Coordination with a wh- question 
It is difficult to conjoin Q-declaratives with 
wh-questions, while this is completely natural 
with interrogatives (1a,b). 
 
(5) a. Que pensent-ils et est-ce qu'ils 
continuent à faire aveuglément confiance au 
gouvernement de Georges Bush ? (EPAC file 
0813) 
‘what do they think and do they continue to 
have full confidence in GB’s government ‘ 
    b. *Que pensent-ils et ils continuent à faire 
aveuglément confiance au gouvernement de 
Georges Bush ?  
 (6) a. pourquoi reçoit-on cet avis et doit-on 
le rajouter aux revenus imposables ? (EPAC 
file 0326) 
‘why do we receive this notice and must we 
add it to our taxable income’ 
      b. *Pourquoi reçoit-on cet avis et on doit le 
rajouter aux revenus imposables ? 
 
This is an indication that the content of Q-
declaratives is of a different type from that of 
interrogatives (1a,b), given the general 
constraint on symmetrical coordination (with 
et), which requires that the conjuncts be of the 
same semantic type. If Q-declaratives denoted 
questions, they should be amenable to 
coordination with other questions. 
 
2.4. Expression of speaker’s attitude  
Q-declaratives are compatible with expressions 
of the speaker’s epistemic attitude towards the 
content of the clause. In particular, they are 
compatible with markers expressing degrees of 
certainty, for instance je crois, je présume, 
peut-être, which are not felicitous in 
interrogatives (Gunlogson 2003).  
 
(7) a. Xavier dans l'Isère en ligne. Vous êtes 
médecin aussi je crois ? (EPAC file 0325) 
‘X. from Isère on the phone. You are also a 
doctor, I think ?’ 
      b. *Est-ce que vous êtes médecin aussi je 
crois ? 
  
(8)  a. Et ça s'appelle un CLIS sur les initiales, 
je présume ? (EPAC file 0902) 
‘It is called a CLIS on the initials, I suppose ?’ 
      b. *Est-ce que ça s’appelle un CLIS sur les 
initiales je présume ? 
 
(10) a. beaucoup de questions là-dessus ; on va 
commencer peut-être avec Étienne Boisserie ? 
(EPAC file 0402) 
‘many question on this topic. We’ll start 
maybe with EB ?’) 
       b. *Est-ce qu’on va commencer peut-être 
avec Etienne Boisserie ?  
 
We may conjecture that the speaker’s 
orientation towards querying requires a 
complete lack of certainty. In this respect, Q-
declaratives are closer to assertions than to 
queries, since modifiers expressing the 
speaker's uncertainty are natural in 
declaratives. 
 
2.5.  Tags 
Q-declaratives are compatible with question 
tags (oui, non, hein, c’est ça, n’est-ce pas),  
which are impossible with interrogatives 
(Beyssade & Marandin 2006). 
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(11) a. C'est une question de fond quand même 
euh, hein ? (EPAC file 0920) 
‘but it’s a fundamental question really, no ?’ 
       b. *Est-ce que c’est une question de fond 
quand même, hein ? 
  
(12)  a. [le seul moyen de trouver du travail en 
Irak] c'est euh dans les services de sécurité, 
non ? (EPAC file 0813) 
‘The only way to find work in Irak, it’s euh to 
work for security, no?’ 
       b*Est-ce que le seul moyen de trouver du 
travail en Irak , c’est dans les services de 
sécurité, non ? 
 
A plausible interpretation of this contrast is to 
say that a tag takes as its argument the content 
of the sentence it modifies, which must be of 
type proposition. 
 
3. The use of Q-declaratives and 
interrogatives: observations and hypotheses 
 
3.1. Presentation of the corpus 
The first quantitative study available (to our 
knowledge) is that of M-H (2001). It is based 
on a mixed corpus (4h35’ of recording) 
comprising everyday dialogues, radio talk 
shows and one school examination (note that 
alternative questions and rhetorical questions 
have been included, which we exclude). Q-
declaratives outnumber the two other 
constructions (see Table 1). But, as the author 
herself stresses, the genre is a decisive factor: 
the distribution in radio debates is more 
balanced. This suggests that the type of 
activity or the type of move is relevant in the 
choice of one of the constructions.  
 
 Q-decl-
cl 
Est-ce-
que-cl 
Inv-cl total 
In the 
whole 
corpus  
204  
(83%) 
36 
(14%) 
7 (2%) 247 
In radio 
debates 
31 
(61,5%) 
16 
(28%) 
6 
(10,5%) 
53 
Table1. Distribution of the 3 forms in M-H 
 
Here we use the EPAC corpus Bazillon et al. 
(2011) which is to our knowledge the only 
existing French corpus annotated for question 
types. It consists of transcriptions of 35 
sessions of a popular daily radio talk show Le 
téléphone sonne (France Inter) which 
corresponds to a 20h’s recording in 2005, each 
session lasting about 45 minutes, with a single 
host, a dozen of experts and a dozen of callers.  
Callers ask questions over the Internet or the 
phone about an issue of general concern (tax 
systems, war in Iraq, etc.), the host reads them 
or gives the floor to the caller, then he asks 
experts to elaborate on the topic. Interrogatives 
have been identified and annotated by the 
authors: 546 root polar questions have been 
identified, including Q-declaratives, excluding 
alternative and rhetorical questions. The 
distribution of the three constructions is almost 
even in the corpus (Table 2).   
est-ce-q-cl inv-cl Q-decl-cl Total 
214  
(39%) 
154  
(28%) 
178 
(31%) 
546 
Table2. Distribution of the 3 forms in EPAC 
 
We randomly extracted 17 sessions (10 jours), 
comprising 258 root polar questions, and 
studied them for several parameters.  
 
3.2. Frequency and register 
It is often said that the three forms in (1) differ 
in frequency and register: Q-declaratives 
would be the most frequent in everyday 
conversations, and would, more generally, 
belong to an informal register, while est-ce-
que-cl and inv-cl would belong to a formal 
register. However, as shown by M-H, all three 
forms can co-occur within the same setting. 
They may well differ regarding some aspect of 
the context, notably whether the speech is 
planned or not. We compare the numbers 
according to the role of the speaker in the 
conversation (host, caller, expert). 
 
3.3. Speech act 
Given that the content of a Q-declarative is a 
proposition, if the speaker were committed to 
it, the utterance would simply correspond to an 
assertion. But this is not the case. Responses 
with factive adjectives (Génial, ‘great’) are 
appropriate for assertions, but not for queries 
(15a,b) or Q-declaratives. Assuming that these 
adjectives require the content to be part of the 
set of facts in the common ground (Fernàndez 
& Ginzburg 2002), if the speaker is not com-
mitted to the content of the Q-declarative, the 
addressee cannot treat it as belonging to the 
common ground. 
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(13) a. S1 Il va neiger demain.     
  ‘it is going to snow tomorrow’ 
   S2 Super / Génial. (‘great’) 
      b. S1 Est-ce qu’il va neiger demain ?   
  ‘Is it going to snow tomorrow?’ 
  S2  #Super / #Génial.   
    c. S1 Il va neiger demain ?  
   S2 #Super / #Génial.  
  
Note that these responses are appropriate if the 
Q-decl-cl is interpreted as an indirect proposal 
(which implies speaker's commitment):  
 
(14)  S1 Je fais des lasagnes pour ce soir ? 
  ‘I'll make lasagna to-night ?’ 
   S2 Super. (‘great’) 
 
If the speaker is not committed to the 
proposition, then the call on addressee must 
resemble that of a query. Since queries require 
an explicit response, we compare the numbers 
of reactions to the different forms. We also 
look at the kind of response, since a negative 
response is more natural with an interrogative 
than with a declarative. 
 
3.4. Relations between participants 
As shown by M-H, Q-decl-cl are favored when 
the addressee is more authoritative on the topic 
than the speaker. This goes well with the lack 
of speaker's commitment to the proposition: 
the speaker appeals to the addressee to take 
responsibility for the proposition. We look at 
the number of subjects in the 2nd person, and 
the presence of a vocative, comparing again Q-
decl-cl and the other forms.   
Appeal to the addressee is unsufficient to 
characterize the speaker's attitude. The 
proposition seems to be presented in such a 
way that the speaker is invited to agree.  To 
test the hypothesis, we look at the proportion 
of confirmations and rejections to Q-decl-cl, as 
well as to the proportion of question tags.  
This hypothesis is supported by the fact that Q-
declaratives are difficult outside con-
versational exchanges, as in written 
questionnaires, where the participants are 
unknown to each other (the interrogatives 
belong to free indirect speech, hence the form 
of a direct root interrogative, with a subject 
corresponding to the one who asks the 
question). 
 
(15) a. [about filling tax forms] il faut cocher 
avec soin les cases relatives au temps de 
travail: est-ce qu'on est en temps plein ? est-ce 
qu'on est à temps partiel ? (EPAC file  0326) 
‘you have to carefully fill the boxes concerning 
the duration of your employment: do you have 
a full time job? do you have a part time job?’ 
   b. il faut cocher avec soin les cases relatives 
au temps de travail: #on est à temps plein ? # 
on est à temps partiel ? 
 
3.5. Role in conversation 
Conversational roles of queries are diverse: 
topic generation, topic shift, conversation 
management (giving turns, questioning about 
who or where the speaker is, whether one hears 
or understands the question). In our corpus, the 
main roles for Q-decl are conversation 
management and topic management. 
Q-declaratives may refer to the ongoing 
conversation more easily than the other types. 
With epistemic and communication verbs 
(15a), they may have a null object interpreted 
as referring to the content just uttered (as in Tu 
vois ? ‘You see’, Tu comprends ? ‘you 
understand’). They are mostly in the present 
tense, but with modal verbs, they may be in the 
imperfect (with 2d person subject), for queries 
referring to the ongoing conversation (15b): 
 
(15)a. Host to expert: vous confirmez, 
monsieur Doudrich ?  (EPAC file 0920)  
‘You confirm, Mr D. ?’ 
      b . Host: Aude Hapiot, vous vouliez ajouter 
un commentaire ?  (EPAC file 0402) 
‘A.H., you wanted to add a comment ?’ 
 
When used to monitor the cooperation between 
participants, they may be used as checking or 
reprise queries, and, more generally, to prevent 
conversation lapses. In our corpus, the host 
uses Q-decl to introduce the participants (16), 
to check their attention and readiness to take 
the floor (17), (15b), to propose the floor to a 
participant (mainly the experts) (18). They also 
serve to make explicit who is speaking to the 
(absent) audience.   
 
(16) Host to caller : vous êtes je crois à Issy-
les Moulineaux Fatiha ? bonsoir ! 
Caller : oui bonsoir 
‘you are in I-l-M, I think Fatiha? Good 
evening’ – ‘yes, good evening’ 
 
 (17) Host to expert [on the phone]: vous avez 
entendu la question de Xavier ? vous l'avez 
compris ?  (EPAC file 0813) 
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 ‘you heard X's question? You understood it?’   
 
(18) Host to expert : Élisabeth Dupoirier, vous 
êtes euh (), vous partagez cette analyse? 
‘E. D., you are euh you agree with this 
analysis? 
 
Q-declaratives in (17) should be compared 
with (19a,b): when there is a real trouble on 
the line, and hence the possibility of an 
unplanned situation, the host systematically 
uses inv-cl or est-ce-que. On the other hand, 
when everything is under control and routinely 
unfolding, he uses Q-declaratives. As for (18), 
the host gives the floor by anticipating the 
expert’s opinion about the topic. He uses 
interrogatives when he anticipates the expert 
might disagree with the caller’s or his own 
opinion or orientation (19c).       
  
(19) a. Host to caller: Frédéric ne nous 
entend pas.  Frédéric, est-ce que vous m'enten-
dez bien là, Frédéric ? Frédéric ? non, 
visiblement il ne nous entend pas (EPAC 
file0825)  
‘F. does not hear us. F. , do you hear me F. ? 
F.? no, clearly, he does not hear us’ 
  b. Host to caller: êtes-vous toujours là, 
madame ? non, elle n'est plus là  (EPAC 
file0326)  
‘are you still there, madame ? no, she is no 
longer connected’  
 c. Host to expert: est-ce qu'on peut en dire 
un mot ? […] monsieur Dubois ?  
[no answer] (EPAC file 0920) ‘can we say a 
few words about it, Mr D.’   
 
Q-declaratives may also be used for topic 
management. The formulaic Tu sais, Tu as vu 
ce qui est arrivé à X (you know, you’ve seen 
what happened to X…) are used to introduce a 
new topic by a speaker who pretends that the 
addressee is already informed.  In our corpus, 
the host uses Q-declaratives to reformulate a 
question (20), to reprise an assertion literally 
or quasi literally (21), or to refocus on the 
current discourse topic. Dislocated const-
ructions (left (20) and right dislocation (21)) 
are typically used in the last case: 
 
(20) Host: votre question Stéphane en fait 
c'est sur les prix tout simplement ? 
Caller: sur les prix, sur la qualité aussi  (EPAC 
file 0816) 
‘your question, S., it concerns really just 
prices?’  ‘– it’s about prices, about quality too’  
 
(21) [about a new cancer hot line]  Host: il est 
d'ores et déjà opérationnel ce numéro ? 
‘it’s already operational, this number?’   
 Expert: oui  il est ouvert depuis lundi   
(EPAC file 0325) 
‘yes, it’s been in operation since Monday’   
 
We annotate our corpus with two variables: 
conversation management (yes/no) and 
dislocation (yes/no) for topic management. 
 
4. Usage properties of the Q-Declaratives 
As it stands, the EPAC corpus is already 
annotated for a question type variable Q-type 
whose values are (Est-ce, Decl, Inv-cl) and a 
speaker identity variable SpkI being an 
enumeration of the 90 different speakers. As 
can be seen from a first observation of the 
data, the overall distribution of question type is 
roughly uniform (see Table 2, Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Q-decl distribution 
 
We further annotated the data with variables 
identified to be of interest for our study. These 
are : 
• SpkS,  indicates the status of the speaker 
in dialogue (Host, Caller, Expert). 
• Subj, the person of the subject (2nd, 
other)1 
• Voc, the absence or presence of a 
vocative (yes,no) 
• Disl, the absence or presence of a 
dislocated phrase (yes,no). 
• Polarity of the clause (+, -) 
• Tense, the clause tense (present, other) 
• ConvM, the conversational management 
role (yes,no) 
• Question tags such as non, oui, hein, 
c’est ça…(yes,no) 
• Resp, encodes the answer type 
(confirmation, rejection, no-answer)                                                         1 2nd person subjects are mostly polite vous.  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We also took into consideration a variable 
which is a potential cause of some 
idiosyncratic random variation, that is the 
speaker identity SpkI (since we have 90 
different speakers).  
In order to identify the properties specific to 
the Q-declaratives, we fit three mixed effect 
logistic regression models, one for each type of 
clause and then compare the significant factors 
for each model. Each such model attempts to 
predict a binary variable given all the above 
mentioned predictors on the full dataset. 
4.1 The statistical models 
The Q-declarative model attempts to predict 
the positive outcomes of a binary variable 
Q_decl (yes,no) given the vector of variables 
X including all the above mentioned 
predictors. 
We first observe that SpkS=Caller is a 
categorical predictor for declarative questions 
since no Caller ever utters a Q-decl-cl as 
outlined in Table 3: 
 
 SpkS=Caller SpkS=Expert SpkS=Host 
Q-decl=yes 0 7 76 
Q-decl=no 90 29 56 
Table 3: Joint distribution of Q-decl and SpkS 
 
To avoid numerical instability, we therefore 
recoded the tri-valued SpkS variable as a two 
valued SpkS’ variable (Host, Other). 
Another perfect predictor is the question tag 
variable, which is only found in Q-decl (Table 
4). As a consequence we did not include it in 
our models. 
 
 Q-tag=no Q-tag=yes 
Q-decl=no 175 0 
Q-decl=yes 66 17 
Table 4: Joint distribution of Q-decl and Q-tag  
 
All the remaining variables are set as fixed 
effects except the variable SpkI set as random 
effect, yielding the model : 
 
€ 
P(Q_ decl = yes |X) = e
α+SpkI i +βX
1+ eα+SpkI i +βX  
 
The full model is then reduced by model 
comparison where we can remove the polarity, 
subject, vocative and tense variables 
(likelihood ratio test : χ2  p-val=0.24). The 
random effect has an almost null variance and 
is removed as well2. 
 
  Estimate Std. Err z value Pr(>|z|)     
(Intercept)           -0.1965     0.3462  -0.568  0.5702     
speaker = Host     2.5212     0.4950  -5.093  3.52e-07 *** 
conv.mgt= yes     2.0396     0.4570   4.463  8.07e-06 *** 
Resp       = rej      -1.1996     0.5206  -2.304  0.0212 *   
Resp       = none  -1.2657     0.4887  -2.590  0.0096 **  
Disloc    = yes      1.4462     0.6552  2.207   0.0273 *   
 
Model 1: Q-Declaratives model 
 
The goodness of fit of the model is satisfactory 
(accurracy = 84%).  
Five out of six remaining effects are 
significant. First, as shown in Table 3 and 
Figure 2, the speaker status reveals that the 
host status clearly favors the use of Q-
decl while callers and experts rarely use them: 
 
Figure 2: Q-declaratives given SpkS 
 
 The use of Q-declaratives is also favored by 
contexts of conversation management as 
shown in Figure 3 where we can see that more 
than the half of Q-declaratives are uttered in 
contexts of conversation management:  
 
Figure 3 : Q-declaratives given conversation 
management                                                         
2 We do not have enough data to get proper convergence 
when fitting a model with all possible interactions among 
all variables. However we get proper convergence when 
fitting model 1 augmented with all interactions of order 
2. It turns out than none of them are significant. The 
model with interactions can indeed be reduced back to 
model 1 without interactions (likelihood ratio test : χ2  p-
val=0.41). 
Decl=no Decl=yes
Caller
Expert
Host
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80
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As one might have expected, conversation 
management and speaker status are strongly 
associated variables, as shown in Table 5 
where we can see that the Host is largely 
responsible for managing the conversation. 
 
 SpkS=Host SpkS=Other 
ConvM = No 81 119 
ConvM = Yes 51 7 
Table 5: Non independence of ConvM and 
SpkS variables (χ2 = 5.187 10-10) 
 
Third, regarding responses, we see in Figure 4 
that a Q-decl strongly favors a confirmation 
answer whereas other types don’t. 
 
Figure 4: Q-declaratives given Response types  
Regarding dislocations, matters are less clear. 
Although the variable is significant and cannot 
be removed from the model (likelihood ratio 
test : χ2 p=0.02), the only thing we can observe 
is that the proportion of dislocations in the 
context of Q-decl is approximately twice the 
proportion of dislocations in the context of an 
interrogative clause as shown in Table 6:     
 
 Disl=no Disl=yes 
Decl=no 166 9 
Decl=yes 74 9 
Table 6: Joint distribution of Dislocation and 
Declarative variables  
In order to contrast the use of Q-decl with 
other types of questions, we also fitted two 
additional models, one for Est-ce que-cl and 
another one for Inv-cl. 
We used a similar model and protocol to 
predict the Est-ce que-cl on the same data set 
using as fixed effect predictors  the same 
variables as above and the Speaker Identity as 
a random effect: 
€ 
P(Est − ce − que = yes |X) = e
α+SpkI i +βX
1+ eα+SpkI i +βX  
We also reduce the full model by removing the 
non significant factors : polarity, vocative, 
conv.management, dislocation, tag and tense 
variables (likelihood ratio test, χ2 = 0.16).  
 
  Estimate Std. Error  z value Pr(>|z|)     
(Intercept)     -3.7594     0.7773  -4.837   1.32e-06 *** 
speaker = Host -1.4150     0.5892   2.401   0.016333 *   
subject =2        -1.8603     0.5642   3.297    0.000977*** 
Resp=rej           0.4009     0.4263    0.940    0.346997     
Resp=none       1.6056     0.4125    3.893    9.91e-05 *** 
 
Model 2: Est-ce que-clause 
 
Finally, our third model amounts to predict a 
binary inv-cl variable on the same data set with 
the same protocol: 
€ 
P(inv − cl = yes |X) = e
α+SpkI i +βX
1+ eα+SpkI i +βX  By model reduction, we remove the speaker, polarity, vocative, answer and  tag variables 
(likelihood ratio test, χ2 = 0.37).  
     Estimate   Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)    
(Intercept)             -0.6916    1.1981   -0.577    0.56375    
Conv.mgmt= yes -1.0792     0.5973   -1.807    0.07079 . 
Dislocation= yes -3.7507     2.2490   -1.668     0.09537 . 
Resp          = rej   1.2634      0.5427    2.328     0.01992 * 
Resp          = none 0.2708    0.5738    0.472     0.63693 
Tense         = pres   2.1575      0.8483    2.543    0.01098 * 
Model 3: Inv-clause 
4.2 Synthesis 
In order to identify the characteristic properties 
of Q-decl, we contrast our different models. In 
Table 7, we cross each factor with each clause 
type. Cells are ticked with + (respectively -) 
when the factor is significant with a positive 
(respectively negative) coefficient for the 
question type and with () when not 
significant3. 
 
 Q-DECL EST-CE 
QUE 
INV-CL 
SpkS=Host + -  
ConvM +  - 
Resp=rej - + + 
Resp=none - +  
Disl=yes +  - 
Q-tag=yes +   
Subj=2  -  
Tense=pres   + 
Table 7: A comparison of the 3 models 
                                                         3 Although it is a categorical predictor not included in 
the actual models, we have also included for 
completeness the question tag variable in the table. 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Resp=non−conf
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The main observation is that a Q-decl is 
mainly used in context of conversation 
management by the Host speaker (Figure 5 and 
Figure 6), which can be explained since the 
corpus is a multiparty conversation with 
certain speakers over the phone: the host is 
assigning turns, questioning about who or 
where the addressee is, whether he or she hears 
or understands the question etc. Q-decl are 
primarily used for conversation management 
(57% of the time).
 
Figure 5: clause-type distribution given 
conversation management 
 
Figure 6: clause-type distribution given SpkS 
 
As we have already seen in Table 4, the Q-
declarative is the only clause type which is 
used with question tags.   
 
Q-decl mostly receive a confirmation response 
(74%) while other types exhibit a more 
balanced distribution : 28% confirmative 
responses for est-ce-que-cl, 35 % for inv-cl.  
Responses with oui, non, si (‘yes’, ‘no’) are 
appropriate both after assertions and after 
queries. But assertions differ from queries 
because they do not require an explicit 
response, viz. an answer or a reply related to 
the issue raised by the query (although some 
sort of reaction, possibly non linguistic, seems 
to be needed). In this respect, Q-declaratives 
resemble queries: they require an explicit 
response. In our corpus, 85% of Q-declaratives 
receive an explicit response.  
Confirmation responses are not favored with 
est-ce-que and inv-cl. While lack of response 
and rejective response are both factors of est-
ce-que and inv-cl models, the lack of an 
explicit response is only significant with est-
ce-que, and rejective response is only 
significant with inv-cl.  
 
Figure 7: clause-type distribution given 
Response 
4.3. Further explorations 
There are two variables for which we expected 
to get some effects which cannot be observed 
by our models. The Vocative variable is the 
first of them. Although it never plays a 
significant role for predicting a given type of 
question independently of the others. 
Nevertheless, the distribution of the vocative 
variable is strongly dependent on the clause 
type as can be seen in Figure 9: 
 
 
Figure 9: Q-type distribution given Vocative 
 
Proportionally, vocatives are indeed used more 
in Q-Decl than in other types. This is not a 
matter of chance, a chi square test of 
independence between the two binary variables 
Decl(+,-) and Vocative(+,-) reveals a true 
association (χ2 ; p-val=1.58 10-8).  
The other variable that does not show up 
immediately is the 2d person subject which is 
more present in proportion in Q-decl than in 
Est−ce Inv−Cl Q−Decl
ConvM=no
ConvM=yes
Q−type distribution given conversation management
0
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other types as shown up by Figure 10. Again 
there is a strong association between the 
Decl(+,-) and 2nd person(+,-) variables (χ2 ; p-
val=3.69 10-10). 
 
Figure 10: Q-type  given 2d pers Subject 
 
The type of response may be associated with 
the clause polarity. Cooper & Ginzburg 2011 
claimed on the basis of a corpus study (BNC) 
that positive questions tend to be answered 
positively and negative ones negativeley. It is 
true that our Q-decl are most of the time 
positive clauses. However, clause polarity did 
not appear as significant among our types, nor 
did we find an association between polarity 
and clause type (Table 8, (χ2 = 0.12).  
 Q-decl Est-ce que inv-cl 
Polarity=+ 78 74 56 
Polarity=- 5 27 18 
Table 8 : Polarity given clause type 
Conclusion  
 We have shown that, semantically, Q-
declaratives are bona fide declaratives (their 
content is a proposition). Pragmatically, we 
compare the properties of the three different 
forms in a radio talk show. The main features 
that emerge are the following: Q-decl like 
queries, and unlike assertions, are followed by 
an explicit response, and they tend to be 
confirmed. They have two main roles: 
conversation management and topic 
management.  
It remains to be seen whether these properties 
hold in other situations. While the first might 
be correlated (in part) with the status of the 
speaker who uses them (the host), we expect 
the second property to be more general. In 
future work, prosody should be taken into 
consideration and  might provide further 
distinctions among our 3 types. 
Another open question is how our results may 
extend to other languages (such as Hebrew or 
modern Greek) which also have more than one 
type of polar questions, among them Q-
declaratives. 
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Abstract
When people describe the character of felt ex-
periences such as a headache they can use
their bodies as a resource to help them com-
municate. It has been proposed that when
speakers use gestures, pose and facial expres-
sions to describe an experience their listen-
ers simulate or mimic these cues in order to
help them understand the character the expe-
rience. We test this model using data from
dyadic conversations in a laboratory setting.
The results show that listeners do not normally
match the expressive gestures that speakers
use in describing their experiences and that
while speakers gesture more strongly for more
negative experiences their listeners do not.
Rather than re-creating the speaker’s experi-
ence through mimicry, listener gestures ap-
pear to be used primarily for engaging with
the concrete particulars of an experience and
not its ‘subjective’ effects.
1 Introduction
Communicating the character of a felt sensation,
such as a pain, seems harder than communicating
about, say, the concrete events that caused a pain
(although see (Wittgenstein, 1958)). Felt experience
can be difficult to articulate and there is no guarantee
that it is shared from person to person. Nonetheless,
we do have the capacity to empathise with each oth-
ers experience although the particular mechanisms
behind empathy are still disputed and unclear (Pre-
ston and de Waal, 2002).
Much of the debate about empathy concerns the
in principle possibility (or impossibility) of know-
ing another’s experience. Here we are concerned
with the empirical question of how people actually
go about trying to communicate their experiences in
conversation. In particular, we are interested in the
role of gesture, and embodiment more generally, in
this process.
Gestures, posture and facial expressions are fre-
quently used in conversation to complement and
provide additional information to the accompanying
speech (Kendon, 2004; McNeill, Cassell and Levy,
1998). Temporally and semantically coupled with
the verbal elements raised in speech, these embodied
depictions can potentially provide a more direct rep-
resentation of the imagistic and embodied aspects of
a speaker’s message. Gestures can be particularly
useful when depicting the visual or spatial domain,
due to their own physicality. Gestures, posture and
expressions can also provide a more direct expres-
sion of an embodied experience through direct dis-
plays or demonstrations of aspects of an experience.
In order to obtain a better understanding of how
people use gestures, posture and expressions in com-
municating about their experiences we have col-
lected a corpus of speech, video and body movement
data. In this corpus, pairs of participants take turns
to describe to each other recalled experiences that
invoke significant elements of embodied experience,
for example a toothache or a yawn. Here we report
an initial investigation of the use of gesture in the
expression of these experiences in an interaction. A
basic premise of our approach is that it is the use of
gesture in the live dynamics of an exchange rather
than, for example, in telling a story to a camera or an
experimental confederate, that is key to understand-
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ing how experience is communicated in practice. It
is also clear from the literature that gestures in in-
teraction differ from those produced in monologue
(Bavelas and Gerwing, 2011). More specifically, we
are interested in how speakers’ gestural descriptions
of their experience contribute to the listeners’ under-
standing and what listeners do in response to demon-
strate their understanding.
A key hypothesis about how expressions and ges-
tures contribute to communication is that listener’s
automatically mimic them in order to ‘simulate’ or
‘reconstruct’ the described experience and, thereby,
enhance their understanding of what was said. For
example, Hatfield et al. (1993) claim there is an au-
tomatic and continuous tendency to mimic one an-
other in social interactions. Defining mimicry as a
form of synchronisation of posture, facial expres-
sion, movement and instrumental behaviour of oth-
ers including mimicking and synchronising vocal
utterances (Hatfield, Capioppo and Rapson, 1993).
Similarly, Chartrand and Bargh (1999), drawing on
James principle of Ideomotor-action, propose that
merely thinking about behaviour increases the ten-
dency to engage in that behaviour. This perception-
behaviour link is, they claim, a natural and non-
conscious connection between the act of perceiving
and the act of behaving, such that perceiving an ac-
tion being done by another automatically makes one
more likely to engage in the same behaviour. They
suggest a two-step process for this process of direct
environmental causation of social behaviour: (1) au-
tomatic perceptual categorisation and interpretation
of social behaviour (environment to perception), (2)
perceptual activation continuing on to activate cor-
responding behaviour representation (perception to
behaviour). Here, they propose the sequence from
perception to behaviour occurs entirely automati-
cally, so should occur even amongst strangers and
should occur even in the absence of a reason to do
so, such as pursuing an affiliation goal (Chartrand
and Bargh, 1999).
Two predictions follow from this model. First,
that speaker descriptions of felt experiences accom-
panied with gestural expressions should cause the
listener to produce similar behaviour or gestures.
Second, that the strength and form of the listen-
ers responses should match the strength and form
of the gestures produced by the speaker. More
specifically, the more unpleasant or painful (nega-
tive) the experience being described by the speaker
the more mimicry produced through the empathetic
responses produced by the listener in sympathy with
the speaker.
We test these predictions against the behaviour of
speakers and listeners in our corpus. In order to do
this we first introduce a taxonomy of gesture types
used to code participants responses.
1.1 A Taxonomy of Descriptive Gestures
There are many different uses of gesture and many
different gesture taxonomies. For current purposes a
simple taxonomy is required that allows us to dis-
criminate basic functional differences. A review
of literature categorising different types of gestures
within an interaction follows, seeking to build a tax-
onomy of each in which a suitable context for the
gestural descriptions of sensation can be placed.
Gesture, for current purposes, includes anything
non-verbal1 that is produced as part of the conversa-
tion including hand movements, postures shifts and
so on. For a simple taxonomy to categorise ges-
tures describing felt experience, we exclude gestures
that form para or meta narrative elements of inter-
action. Para-narrative elements are where gestures
are about or managing the interaction itself rather
than the semantic content of what is being commu-
nicated. Meta-narrative elements are where gestures
are about the speech itself, again not the semantic
content or the interaction. What we are interested in
are the narrative elements of an interaction, these re-
fer to gestures that depict or are about the content of
the speech. For the purposes of our study we focus
on ‘narrative’ or ‘topic’ gestures (Bavelas, Chovil
and Lawrie, 1992) that relate to the content of the
speech. These are spontaneous gestures that occur
mostly synchronously with speech, also referred to
as as physiographic (Efron, 1941) or lexical move-
ments (Krauss, Chen and Chawla, 1996).
2 Method
In order to elicit unscripted accounts of felt expe-
riences we asked people to describe to each other
1Note: We use non-verbal as a gloss to mean non-speech
communicative actions such as conversational facial displays,
gestures and body movements.
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Figure 1: An Intense Throbbing Pain.
recalled experiences such as a toothache or a yawn,
that have an embodied element and could provoke
empathetic responses.
2.1 Participants
A total of 24 participants were recruited. Partici-
pants ages ranged from 18 to 60, consisting of 12 fe-
males and 12 males placed in 12 pairs. The aim was
to elicit unrehearsed and spontaneous descriptions in
an interaction. However, as the study required par-
ticipants to wear motion capture suits with reflective
markers, we were aware of the effect of this on the
interaction, such as the assumption that participants
movements (and by extension, their gestures) were
being studied.
2.2 Materials
The corpus of speech, video and body movement
data were captured in the Performance Laboratory
at QMUL. Video footage included a full body face
on view of each participant for the duration of the
study. Motion capture data was also obtained for
participant using a Vicon optical marker system al-
though we do not report this data here. A set of cards
were placed on a small table next to where the par-
ticipants stood. Each participant was given a stack
of these cards and were asked to take turns select-
ing one card at a time. There were 8 cards in to-
tal per participant, the experiences written on sets
of cards were a headache, the taste of a nice meal,
a toothache, a stomach ache, a backache, a yawn,
laughing out loud and a back massage.
2.3 Procedure
The participants were given written instructions out-
lining the study procedure. They were asked to re-
call specific instances of the experiences stated on
the cards and talk about them to each other. When
it was their turn each participant was to explain the
details of a previous experience they have had of the
sensation written on the card to their partner for no
longer than a 2 minutes. An emphasis was placed
on describing how this experience felt or the partic-
ular sensation they felt at the time of the experience.
On each description the listening participant was en-
couraged to talk and ask questions at any time, the
process was described in the instructions as an ex-
change. In attempt to allow participants to practise
and settle into the irregular nature of having a con-
versation in the conditions of the lab, the first two
experiences that came up in the set of cards in each
session were practise experiences that were not anal-
ysed, these were a headache and the taste of a nice
meal. Aside from the two practise experiences at the
beginning of the stack, the cards were shuffled into
random order for both participants in each session.
2.4 Coding
For the coding process, the video and audio descrip-
tions of each experience was separated into separate
items. As we are interested in topic gesture, these
were coded for each item. The participants were la-
belled cardholder (CH) and non-cardholder (NCH)
for each item. On the first pass, any occurrences of
physiographic gesture were coded without specify-
ing their nature. On the second pass, topic gestures
were separated into three types: Iconic, Metaphoric
and Abstract Descriptive, the annotator following
the definitions indicated in the taxonomy below. It
is important to mention that all topic gestures were
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coded irrespective if it was the cardholder or non-
cardholder that performed it, so both speaker and
listener were coded for their gesture and the same
definitions were used for each. On each pass, only
one camera view was coded at a time, so for exam-
ple, while coding the cardholders gestures the non-
cardholder was not in view.
Iconic Gesture
Metaphoric Gesture
Abstract Descriptive 
Gesture
Topic Gesture
Wednesday, 9 May 2012
Figure 2: Gesture Taxonomy.
In order to differentiate between narrative gesture
types in this study we adopt McNeill’s subdivision
of spontaneous gesture into Iconic and Metaphoric
subcategories (McNeill, Cassell and Levy, 1998)
and supplement it with the ‘Abstract Descriptive’
topic gestures described by (Rowbotham et al.,
2011).
Iconic gestures include a depiction that is intrin-
sic to the content that is being conveyed, for example
a gesture describing a ball will depict a characteris-
tic intrinsic to a ball, such as making a fist to rep-
resent roundness by making the hand round. Iconic
gestures are always a concrete entity or action rather
than abstract or analogous. Perhaps more relevant to
us is iconic gestures that act out being in pain or the
cause of the pain. For example, when describing an
experience of stubbing a toe, the speaker may hop
around on one foot depicting the outward behaviour
caused by stubbing their toe. This mimicry of their
behaviour is intrinsic to the original action and so
therefore we class as a iconic gesture. They encode
a speakers viewpoint on a communicated depiction.
Ekman and Friesen (1969) include deictics, spatial,
kinetographs, pictographs and rhythmic elements in
this category. Beattie (2002) suggests that the con-
tent of these gestures to describe action, shape, size,
direction, speed, and relative-positions.
Metaphoric gestures: are usually pictorial but
unlike iconic gestures, metaphorics depict abstract
ideas rather than a concrete object or event. The
topic of the metaphor being the abstraction, the ve-
hicle or gestural image being the offered virtual ob-
ject spatially localised, and the common ground of
meaning is where the topic and vehicle are linked
in properties, such as physical containers. For ex-
ample, in a description of a backache an interlocutor
describes the most extreme sensation of that particu-
lar pain by saying ‘and that was the crest of it’, while
reaching high and pointing to the top point in the
gesture space, spatially highest gesture metaphor-
ically signifying the most intense pain. We ex-
clude what Gullberg (2009) calls conventionalised
gesture, otherwise known as emblems and symbolic
gesture (Ekman and Friesen, 1969; Krauss, Chen
and Chawla, 1996). These have a known meaning
across a culture and are independent of speech, al-
though can accompany it. Here we exclude as they
lack the spontaneous descriptive characteristic that
focuses on the quality of the experience.
Absract Descriptives Rowbotham, Holler and
Lloyd (2011) make an additional subtype of topic
gesture they term abstract descriptive, these ges-
tures describe inner experiences and are categorised
by featuring ‘imaginist and semantically related to
speech but containing information which could not
be visually accessed (subjective experience of pain),
therefore not iconic according to McNeill”. (Row-
botham et al., 2011; Hyden and Peolsson, 2002)
These gestures describe the felt sensation without
acting it out, and express more than just the location
of the sensation. They specifically refer to the in-
ner sensation of the experience, put plainly, what the
sensation feels like. For example, when describing
the sensation of stubbing ones toe we might depict
the pain with a gesture that uses our hands to rep-
resent the rhythmic quality of a throbbing pain by
mimicking it in the rhythm of our hand movement,
or perhaps the intensity intrinsic to the pain would be
depicted by the tenseness of our fingers. This type
of gesture does not represent an analogy of the felt
experience so cannot be a metaphoric gesture but on
the other hand cannot be symbolised concretely, as
the felt experience is only accessible to the experi-
encer. This indicates that they lie somewhere on the
borders of iconic gesture and metaphoric gesture.
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3 Results
We report data for 9 pairs of participants and for
four target items: Toothache, Backache, Yawn and
Laugh. Excluded were a stomach ache and a back
massage, these were excluded because for these par-
ticular items, one pair of participants proceeded to
talk about another persons experience of the sen-
sation on their card, for example describing their
fathers backache or a dogs yawn, this resulted in
although unrehearsed and spontaneous description,
not a personal account. Also excluded were two
sessions where the participants didn’t follow the in-
structions, where both participants talked about one
experience that came up on one participants card at
the same time, comparing experiences rather than
describing their own individual experiences, these
were very different interactions to the other sessions.
The overall distribution of different gesture types
is reported in Table 1.
 
  
 
 
 
Gesture Type Mean Std. Deviation Median Sum 
Abstract Descriptive 1.56 2.090 1.00 184 
Iconic 3.58 4.463 2.50 423 
Metaphoric .07 .252 .00   8 
Table 1: Overall Occurances of Different Gesture Types
Because Metaphoric gestures were low frequency
in these data (0.07 per item, less that 1.3%) they are
excluded from the statistical analysis.
The initial inspection of the data for the depen-
dent variables, number of occurrences and duration
of gestures, showed a strong positive skew towards
zero so a Tweedie distribution was used for the Gen-
eralised Estimating Equations analyses reported be-
low.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Item Mean Std. Deviation Median Sum 
Backache 2.88 3.844 2.00 184 
Laugh 1.89 2.356 1.00 106 
Toothache 3.52 5.106 1.50 197 
Yawn 2.00 2.300 1.00 120 
Table 2: Average Gesture Use for Each Target Item
(Excluding Metaphorics)
The four target items are not directly compara-
ble but were ranked according to Experience Type
to reflect the intuitive degree of (un)pleasantness in-
volved. For analysis we ranked them in the variable
Experience Type as follows: 1 Laugh, 2 Yawn, 3
Backache, 4 Toothache to provide a ranking from
Dependent Variable: Occurrences
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Results of GEE Analysis for Frequency of Gestures 
 
Source 
Type III 
Wald Chi-
Square df Sig. 
(Intercept) 33.655 1 .000 
Role 49.821 1 .000 
Gesture Type 19.700 1 .000 
Experience Type 11.499 3 .009 
Role * Gesture Type 5.135 1 .023 
Role * Experience Type 1.332 3 .722 
Gesture Type * Experience 
Type 
2.635 3 .451 
Role * Gesture Type * 
Experience Type 
4.042 3 .257 
Dependent Variable: Occurrences 
 
 
Table 3: Results of GEE Analysis for Frequency of
Gestures
Dependent Variable: Average Duration
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Results of GEE Analysis for Average Duration of Gestures 
 
Source 
Type III 
Wald Chi-
Square df Sig. 
(Intercept) 20.766 1 .000 
Role 51.953 1 .000 
Gesture Type 1.924 1 .165 
Experience Type 5.178 3 .159 
Role * Gesture Type 4.485 1 .034 
Role * Experience Type 2.961 3 .398 
Gesture Type * Experience 
Type 
5.994 3 .112 
Role * Gesture Type * 
Experience Type 
3.560 3 .313 
Dependent Variable: Average Duration 
 
 
Table 4: Results of GEE Analysis for Average Duration
of Gestures
positive to negative experience.
In order to check if the order of presentation has
an effect on the frequency of gesturing item num-
ber was correlated with total number of gestures
produced this was not significant (Kendalls Tau-b =
0.03, p (two-tailed) = 0.49.
Two main Generalised Estimating Equation
(GEE) analyses were carried out on a) the frequency
of occurrence of gestures and b) the duration of ges-
tures under the conditions defined by the three ex-
perimental factors: Role of the participant (Card-
holder vs. Non-Cardholder), Gesture Type (Iconic
vs Abstract Descriptive) and Experience Type (from
1 positive to 4 negative). All two-way and three-way
interactions were included. Participant ID was in-
cluded as a subject factor. Pair identity, Role, Order
and Item specified as within-subjects variables.
As Table 3 shows, there were main effects of
Role, Gesture Type and Experience Type and a Role
X Gesture Type Interaction on the likelihood that
a gesture would be produced (occurrences). The
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largest effect is Role, with Card Holders producing
approximately three times as many gestures as Non-
Card Holders. The effect of Experience Type (i.e.
target item) is illustrated in Table 2. Descriptions of
Toothaches prompted the most gestures and Laughs
the least.
The interaction between Experience Type and
Role is illustrated in Table 5. The people describ-
ing an experience rely more on Abstract Descriptive
than Iconic Gestures. The people listening to them,
by contrast, show the reverse pattern, replying more
on Iconic gestures than on Abstract Descriptives.
The second GEE analysis, reported in Table 4,
shows the results for average gesture production
time. This replicates the main effect of role with
Cardholders producing longer, i.e. more sustained,
gestures than Non Cardholders. The overall aver-
age duration of gestures for two different categories
of gesture are not reliably different, nor are the four
different Experience Types. However, the interac-
tion between role and Experience Type is Replicated
with Card Holders taking longer over Abstract De-
scriptives than Iconics and Non Cardholders show-
ing the reverse pattern.
In order to test whether patterns of use of Iconic
and Abstract Descriptive Gestures vary systemati-
cally with the different levels of the Experience Type
variable i.e. from positive (1) to negative (4) four
additional Univariate General Linear Model analy-
ses were carried out on the frequency of gestures. It
is important to note that the model fit is not as good
for the current data and the statistical power is lower
than the GEE analysis. However, this does provide
a way to compare the trends for the different roles
and different gesture types across the four levels of
Experience Type.
For Cardholders, Iconic gestures show a reli-
able linear pattern of increase across from positive
to negative experience (F(3,55) = 3.47, p = 0.01).
However, Abstract Descriptive gestures do not show
the same pattern (F(3,55) = 1.01, p = 0.11). For Non
Cardholders neither Iconic gestures (F(3,55) = 0.73,
p = 0.28) nor Abstract Descriptive Gestures (F(3,55)
= 0.06, p = 0.73) show a reliable pattern of increase
from positive to negative Experience types.
4 Discussion
Overall, there is little evidence of direct mimicry in
this corpus, people listening to the description of an
experience rarely produce gestures or expressions
that match, in any simple way, those produced by
the speaker. Patterns of listener gesture are system-
atically different from those of the people they are
listening to.
The results show that speakers (Cardholder) per-
form more gestures, with a longer duration than lis-
teners (Non Cardholder) for each item. This is ex-
pected, as the task structure ensures that the de-
scription of the Cardholders experience should take
precedence, resulting in the speaker performing a
more in depth gesticulation about the felt experience
on the card to communicate the experience to the
Non Cardholder.
The manipulation of (un)pleasantness of experi-
ence affects speakers and listeners differently. More
Iconic gestures were performed than Abstract De-
scriptive gestures for both the Cardholder and the
Non Cardholder. For example, when describing a
toothache, the speaker might add iconic gestures de-
scribing the location of the pain by pointing to it, or
perhaps detailing that they had to eat on the other
side of their mouth, accompanied gesturally by per-
forming a chewing motion and pointing to that side
simultaneously.
When comparing the ratio of Iconic to Abstract
Descriptive gestures, the Cardholder produced a
higher ratio of Abstract Descriptive gestures than
the Non Cardholder. We speculate that the higher
amount of Iconic gesture suggests that both partici-
pants focus more on the concrete context of the sit-
uation surrounding the experience than the felt ex-
perience itself. Interestingly, the Non Cardholder’s
focus’ even less on the sensation of the felt experi-
ence than the contextual aspects of the experience
so would be more likely to mimic the contextual de-
scriptions back to the Cardholder. We might specu-
late that the Non Cardholder actually avoids engag-
ing with the description of the felt experience as the
abstract descriptive gestures are not seen to mimic
the Cardholders.
Returning to Chartrand and Barghs’ (1999) work,
their findings suggest that the mimicry of postures
and gestures are a continual source of informa-
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Note: CH = Cardholder, NCH = Non-Cardholder.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 Illustrating the Interaction Betwee  Gestur  Type and Role 
Role Gesture Type Mean Std. Error 
95% Wald Confidence Interval 
Lower Upper 
CH Abstract Descriptive 3.212131 .4086602 2.411172 4.013090 
Iconic 2.888671 .1616220 2.571898 3.205444 
NCH Abstract Descriptive .629115 .1798742 .276568 .981662 
Iconic 1.145358 .2085097 .736687 1.554030 
Note: CH = Card Holder, NCH = Non-card holder.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Illustrating the Interaction Between Gesture Type and Role
tion throughout a social interaction, communicat-
ing messages indicating understanding and atten-
tion. The consensus appears to be coordination be-
haviour is related to empathy, rapport and liking, al-
though some see mimicry as the cause and effect of
empathic understanding. Chartrand and Bargh argue
that individuals use behaviour mimicry as a commu-
nicative tool on a completely non-conscious level
and that this mimicry usually leads to emotional
convergence (Chartrand and Bargh, 1999). How-
ever, non-concious mimicry is not suggested in our
results, as listeners did not tend to mimic the ab-
stract descriptive gestures, if the mimicry was truly
non-concsious in the way the perception-action link
and our first hypothesis suggest, the listener would
tend to mimic all gesture types as performed by the
speaker, and this was not the case in this situation.
For the experiences with higher ranked experi-
ences of (un)pleasantness, the amount and duration
of gestures both increase for the Cardholder than the
lower ranked experiences. However, the Non Card-
holder was not affected, or showed no difference in
terms of gestures, by the difference in rank. These
results are consistent with a situation in which the
person describing an experience will add iconic in-
formation to convey more negative experiences but
do not add information about the felt experience.
Listeners, by contrast, do not appear respond dif-
ferently, in terms of gesture, to different degrees
of (un)pleasantness. These results are also con-
trary to our second and third hypothesis, that the
listener would produce more mimicry either for the
more intense experiences, or for the more unpleas-
ant or negative experiences, however as the listen-
ers’ responses were not affected in terms of rank
at all, this is not consistent with either hypothe-
sis. Also, this provides further evidence inconsistent
with the perception-behaviour link, as again noncon-
scious mimicry would be affected by an increased
frequency of gestures, as is the case with speakers’
gestures in the higher ranked experiences, however
listeners’ gestures are not affected.
Why do listeners appear to avoiding mimicking
the abstract descriptive gestures produced by the
speaker? One alternative explanation is that this
might be an issue of politeness, perhaps an acknowl-
edgement of such inner experience is seen to be in-
trusive by the listener. This would result in the lis-
tener avoiding mimicking this description. A second
alternative is that the interlocutors may find it easier
to demonstrate the cause of the sensation or act out
the outcome for the listener to understand the expe-
rience to infer or simulate how it felt, rather than
describe the sensations itself.
An important limitation of the current study is that
it looks at a limited number of gesture categories and
doesn’t examine their specific content or the struc-
ture of the interactional sequences in which they
occur. Further work will examine the interactional
context more closely and the other ways a listener
can acknowledge or engage with speaker’s descrip-
tions of felt experience. For example, Bavelas et al.
(1986) classify empathetic listener responses as mo-
tor mimicry. Here motor mimicry is not a straight
mirroring or general imitation in the sense we have
used the term mimicry in this paper, but is defined
as the mimicry of an expressive behaviour, or the
performance of the expected expressive behaviour of
an occurrence in the perspective of another. Motor
mimicry is found within a micro-social interaction
where there is a high level of reciprocity and mutual
influence between speaker and listener. Conceptu-
alised as primitive empathy, motor mimicry is de-
scribed as an automatic reflex of conditioned cues
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based on ones own prior experience. Bavelas and
her colleagues suggest that motor mimicry serves
as an expression of the perceived emotion, an in-
terpersonal act to put across, in their words, I feel
as you do (Bavelas et al., 1986). This is a response
that acknowledges and engages with the felt experi-
ence, while not necessarily mimicking the Abstract
Descriptive gesture that accompany the description
as shown by this study, indicating a possible avenue
for further work.
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Abstract 
Building discourse structure in human 
discussions needs a task of dialogue act 
annotation. In this paper, we propose 
dialogue act taxonomy in Arabic 
language. The proposed scheme is based 
mainly on the argumentative function that 
occurs frequently in debate conversations 
expressing opinions, ideas and arguments. 
To validate the reliab ility of our 
classification, we measure the agreement 
between two human annotators. Results 
show an average kappa score of 0.84 
which expresses high reliability. To  
automatically generate annotated corpora, 
we developed an annotation tool that 
supports our dialogue act taxonomy for 
Arabic language.   
1. Introduction 
Dialogue Act (DA) annotation is a hot research 
topic in both human-to-human and human–
computer speech communication. This task 
performed mainly in understanding the role of 
a user’s utterance in the dialogue (Sridhar et 
al., 2009).  
This field attracted researchers in linguistics 
(Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969) and 
computational linguistics (Core and Allen., 
1997; Traum, 1999) since long time. Recent 
research on spoken dialogue processing has 
investigated computational dialogue act 
models of human-human and human-computer 
conversations (Stolcke et al., 2000).  
The annotation task is fundamental to many 
studies in human discussions analysis as they 
reflect shallow discourse structures of 
language that can be investigated to build an 
argumentative structure of discussions.  
Thus, the main goal of annotating DA in our 
work is to build adjacency pairs that reflect the 
DA sequences in Arabic discussions such as 
question/answer, opinion/reject, confirmation 
request/confirmation, etc.  
These pairs are then investigated to generate an 
argumentative structure of the discourse that 
can help user to answer complex queries as 
“who rejected the proposal of M. X?”. 
The argumentative information level is based 
mainly on exchanging information, raising 
issues, expressing opinions, making 
suggestions, providing arguments, negotiating 
alternatives, and making decisions.  
Thus tracking argumentative information is of 
central importance for building memories, 
browsing and summarizing discussions 
content.  
To facilitate extracting argumentative data, it is 
useful to automatically annotate participant 
interaction characteristics specifically by 
identifying agreement and disagreement in 
order to understand social dynamics.  
Annotating debate programs acts can be also a 
motivating task when a user needs information 
about a past discussion that he missed, or 
wants to recollect discussion dynamics (topic 
discussed, agreements, disagreements, 
arguments, etc). 
In this perspective, we propose a dialogue act 
taxonomy including mainly argumentative 
actions related to acceptations, rejects, etc, in 
Arabic debate programs. 
This paper is structured in four sections. First, 
we focus on the role of DA in building 
conversation structures. The next section 
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exposes previous works in Dialogue Acts 
annotation research field and summarizes the 
main annotations schemes. In the third section, 
we experiment, with an empirical study, 
Arabic discussions and we propose our own 
DA taxonomy. Finally, we illustrate our 
annotation scheme by developing an 
annotating tool that generates annotated 
structures which can be used later as the basis 
of machine learning algorithms. 
2. Argumentative Discourse Structure  
Dialogue acts play a vital role in the 
identification of discourse structure.  
In this context, (Grosz and Sidner, 1986) claim 
about task structure influencing dialogue 
structure. It seems likely that there are 
structures higher than a single utterance, yet 
more fine grained than a complete dialogue. 
Several researchers identify structures within 
dialogue at levels higher than individual 
utterances or speaker turns, but below the level 
of complete discourse description. There has 
been some significant exploration of the use of 
sequences of Dialogue Acts, at a number of 
levels of granularity.  
The simplest dialogue sequence model is the 
use of adjacency pairs (Schegloff et al. , 1973) 
which are functional links between pairs of 
utterances such as question/answer, opinion 
request/opinion, etc. 
Within the adjacency pairs model, the 
importance of tracking a deeper structured 
representation based on argumentation theory 
has been recognized in (Pallota et al., 2004; 
Galley et al., 2004; Hillard, et al., 2003). These 
models help in constructing the argumentative 
information needed to express participants’ 
intentions and to answer real user queries. 
A simple but expressive model of an 
argumentative structure is the "Issue Based 
Information Systems" (IBIS) model, proposed 
by (Kunz and Rittel, 1970) and adopted as a 
foundational theory in some computer-
supported collaborative argumentation 
systems. Thus, this model captures and 
highlights the essential lines of a discussion in 
terms of what issues have been discussed and 
what alternatives have been proposed and 
accepted by the participants. 
In our context, the argumentative structure of 
discussions can be helpful in browsing topics 
discussed, decisions made, agreements and 
disagreements between participants.  
3. DA Annotation Schemes overview 
In order to standardize annotation tags, a 
proliferation of labelling schemes has been 
developed, often started from the topology 
suggested by Searle (Searle, 1969).  
The granularity of DA annotation labels varies 
considerably from domain-specific to open-
domain annotation task. 
The MapTask project (Anderson et al. , 1991),                                       
outlining task-oriented dialogues, is a 
collection of human conversations in which 
two people negotiate an agreed route on 
separate maps. 
The MapTask labeling scheme uses 12 DA 
labels divided into two main categories: 
initiating and response moves.  
Later, the Verbmobil project developed in 
Germany (1993-2000) aimed at the 
construction of an automatic speech to speech 
translation system for the languages German, 
American English and Japanese (Wahlster, 
2000). A set of 43 DA is generated in a first 
phase (Jekat et al., 1995). These acts were 
organised in a hierarchy. There was a second 
phase of the Verbmobil project (Alexandersson 
et al., 1998), which expanded the dialogues 
from meeting scheduling to comprehensive 
travel planning. This domain change results a 
new hierarchy cluster of 18 top-level DA. 
These schemas were all designed for specific-
purpose application domains. They contained 
overlapping sets of communicative functions 
and made use of often mutually inconsistent 
terminology. 
In the 1990s, a general-purpose schema called 
DAMSL: Dialogue Act Markup using Several 
Layers (Allen and Core., 1997; Core et al., 
1998) is developed for multidimensional 
dialogue act annotation. With its focus on 
multidimensionality and domain-
independence, this represented an important 
step forward in dialogue act annotation.  
This annotation scheme leads to considering 
specific dimensions such as: communicative 
status, information level, forward-looking 
function and backward-looking function.  
Several extensions of the DAMSL schema 
have been constructed for specific purposes, 
such as Switchboard-DAMSL (Jurafsky et al., 
1997).  
The comprehensive DIT++ schema (Bunt, 
2006; Bunt, 2009) combines the 
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multidimensional DIT schema, developed 
earlier (Bunt, 1994) with concepts from these 
various alternative schemas, and provides 
precise and mutually consistent definitions for 
its communicative functions and dimensions. 
There are 11 dimensions of the DIT++ tag-set, 
with around 95 communicative functions, 
around 42 of which, like switchboard are for 
general purpose functions, whereas others 
cover elements of feedback, interaction 
management and the control of social 
obligations. 
These annotation schemes have been used to 
mark-up several dialogue corpora in different 
languages such as English, German and 
Spanish. 
However, very few works were developed for 
Arabic.  To our knowledge, there is only one 
work achieved at Memphis University (Shala 
et al., 2010) that proposes speech acts 
classification model including the following 
set of predefined categories: assertion, 
declaration, denial, expressive evaluation, 
greeting, indirect request, question, 
promise/denial, response to question, and short 
response.  
This tag set includes general-purpose actions 
that can be applied to independent domain 
corpora. 
Nevertheless, these acts are incomplete to 
build discourse structure and are unable to 
describe argumentative structure. 
In fact, this taxonomy cannot annotate 
argumentative actions related to exchanging 
opinions, arguments, acceptations, rejects, etc. 
4. Empirical Study 
4.1.  Experimental data 
The corpus used to perform the experiments is 
a set of transcriptions of debate programs taken 
from “AL JAZEERA”1 Arabic channel. It 
consists of human-human discussions about 
generic topics. The choice of this corpus is 
argued by the strong and intense argumentation 
hold in its content mainly conveyed by 
exchanging opinions, acceptations, rejects, etc. 
The study corpus has been manually annotated 
at the dialogue act level by two human experts. 
Each discussion turn was manually segmented 
into utterances. Each discussion contains about 
400 utterances with an average duration of 2 
hours. Each utterance was assigned one label.  
                                                 
1 www.al jazeera.net 
4.2.  Arabic taxonomy 
In Arabic language, semantics “ ” include 
statement  ” and construction “  “  
 Statement    
In general, a sentence or phrase that is a 
statement can be said to be true or false. 
A statement makes a claim about the world, 
and tries to change the belief of the listener. It 
generally refers to assertions, declarations 
following the representative class of Searle’s 
taxonomy. 
 Construction  
Opposed to statement, construction includes actions 
that do not support to be true or false. 
Two main categories  are defined under the 
constructions:  ” and ” 
referring respectively to request and non request 
construction.  
Request construction can be expressed into 
questions, orders, etc, whereas non request category 
refers generally to exclamat ion, praising or 
complaint.  
Actions included into these two subcategories are 
summarized in table 1.  
 
Request Construction   
Question  
Call  
Polite Request  
Incitation  
Order  
Discourage  
Promise  
Hope  
Wish  
Invocation  
Warning  
Non Request Construction  
Exclamation  
Praise  
Complaint  
 
Table 1. Construction taxonomy
  
4.3.   Our Dialogue Act taxonomy 
Starting from tags used in previous annotation 
schemes, we propose a dialogue acts taxonomy 
that enables the labelling of argumentative acts 
that are fundamental in generating 
argumentative structure of human 
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conversations. Thus, our empirical analysis 
leads to identifying five main groups of 
dialogue acts: Social Obligation Management, 
Turn Management, Argumentative, Request, 
Answer and Statement. We eliminate the non 
request category cause of its very few 
occurrence in the studied corpus.  
The given categories can be applied for other 
languages and can be common across 
annotation schemes especially those tracking 
argumentative data. 
Our taxonomy, following the same partition, is 
detailed in the next sections.  
 Social Obligation Management  
This category includes conventional acts such 
as opening, closing and greetings, in addition 
to the expressive acts following Searle’s 
classification as thanking, apology, regret, etc. 
 Turn Management  
Turn management acts are used to elicit and 
provide feedback in order to perform turn 
speaking management in the discussion.  
 Request 
This category includes different request 
categories (confirmation request, explanation 
request, etc) and takes different forms 
(question, order, hope, wish, etc). This class 
includes initiatives often called forward-
looking acts.  
Request utterances can express several kinds of 
demands such as confirmation request, 
explanation request, justification request and 
opinion request. These tags are generally 
associated respectively to the following acts: 
confirmation, explanation, justification and 
opinion acts. 
 Argumentation  
Argumentation is mainly based on exchanging 
opinions, accepting or rejecting others ideas. 
It’s the fact to convince others by giving 
arguments, explanations, examples … 
Thus, argumentative acts represent the core 
acts in the discussion that express 
argumentative actions.  
 Answer 
Answers consist of general-purpose acts that 
reply to questions. This category often 
represents the backward-looking function. It is 
generally paired with the question label.  
 Statement 
Statement label describes non opinion 
statement that can state an event or an 
assertion. 
 Other 
includes non-interpretable and non-classifiable 
utterances. 
4.4.   Kappa Ratio 
A first step in determining the quality of a set 
of annotations is to evaluate the agreement 
between annotators. 
The current standard metric used for measuring 
inter-annotator agreement in classification 
tasks is the Cohen kappa statistic (Carletta, 
1996). This metric can be used effectively only 
on break classifications when the number of 
segments is unconstrained. Also, this metric 
does not adequately accommodate near-miss 
topic break assignments and other desired 
tolerances for slightly differing segmentations.  
In this section, we present the results of 
evaluating inter-annotators agreement. 
First, we take discussions that have been 
segmented identically. Then, we appoint two 
human experts to annotate separately the 
tokenized conversations while following our 
classification taxonomy guidelines.  
The agreement between annotators is 
calculated using the kappa measure. We obtain 
an average score of 0.84. This inter-annotator 
agreement ratio expresses high reliability 
between human annotators. The main inter-
class differences are between Argumentative 
and Turn Management labels. For instance the 
word “ ” (yes) can 
express an acceptation, a confirmation or just a 
backchannel action to continue the discussion.  
Annotation 1: 
   Act1:  
We don’t believe that Tunisia is really 
ready to a military regime. 
<Class=”Argumentation”, DA=”opinion”> 
  Act2:  
           yes. 
<Class=”Argumentation”, DA=”Acceptation”> 
Annotation 2: 
   Act1:  
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Table 3. Our Dialogue Act Taxonomy 
Social Obligation Management 
Opening  Dialogue beginning  
Closing  Dialogue ending  
Greeting  Addressee’s salutation 
Polite Formula     Showing regard for others, in manners, speech, behaviour, etc. 
Introduce  Self-introduction, speakers and topics introduction.   
Thanking  Gratitude  feeling  
Apology  Regret having made an error in understanding, evaluating or 
executing an utterance 
Regret  Feeling of sorry and disappointment. 
Turn Management 
Acknowledgement  Agreement with previous utterance or addressee 
understanding feedback. 
Calm  Calming down speakers to control the situation.  
Clarify Request  Asking addressee for reformulation/repetition of previous 
utterance for clarification.  
Clarify  Reply to a clarification request 
Feedback  Remind addressees about what was evoked in previous  
utterances  
Out of topic   A way to change the topic and to bypass the addressee’s 
question 
Non understanding signal  Expressing non understanding of  the previous utterance  
Request 
Question  Asking for information from the addressee and requiring a 
reply. 
Order  Direct request obliging addressee to do something 
Promise  Potentially promising for achieving a certain goal 
Hope  feeling that something desired may happen 
Wish  Longing for something with expectation of its fulfillment  
Invocation  Prayer that implies to call upon God 
Warning  Desisting from a specified undesirable action 
Argumentation 
Opinion   Subjective belief that may be supported by arguments 
Appreciation  Favorable judgment or opinion 
Disapproval  Feeling of disliking something or what someone is doing 
Accept  Affirmative  answer expressing agreement with addressee 
Partial Accept  Expressing partial agreement with addressee 
Reject  Refusal to accept addressee’s opinion, judgment or proposal  
Partial Reject  Partial disagreement with addressee opinion, judgment or 
proposal  
Argument  Attempt to persuade someone of something, by giving reasons 
or evidence for accepting a particular conclusion.   
Justification  Defending by reasoning an action or a belief 
Explanation  Making something comprehensible by describing the relevant 
structure or operation or circumstances 
Confirmation  Additional proof that something which was believed is correct 
Conclusion  Decision or opinion or judgment reached after consideration   
Answer   Reply  to a question  
Statement   Affirming or asserting or stating something  
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We don’t believe that Tunisia is really 
ready to a military regime. 
 <Class=”Argumentation”, DA=”opinion”> 
   Act2:  
           yes. 
<Class=”Turn Management”, 
DA=”Acknowledgement”> 
In order to detail the intra-class reliability, we 
calculate the kappa score within each class (see 
Table 2).  
Class Kappa 
Request 0.96 
Social Obligation Management 0.90 
Turn Management 0.82 
Argumentative 0.66 
Table 2. Kappa per class 
Most categories seem to be labelled fairly 
reliably such as Social Obligation 
Management reaching a kappa ratio of 0.9 and 
Turn Management category with kappa = 0.82. 
However, experienced annotators scored a 
kappa of 0.66 for the Argumentative 
dimension. This rate decline can be justified by 
the difficulty of annotating argumentative tags. 
Major experts’ annotation differences are 
focused on ambiguities in labelling opinion 
tags, in detecting arguments.  
Besides, an utterance can refer to more than 
one action such as <argument, explanation>, 
<opinion, argument>. In these cases, human 
annotations could be different given that 
experts should assign only one label to each 
utterance. 
Annotators’ disagreement when annotating 
argumentative dialogue acts can be explained 
by the lack of linguistic markers. For instance, 
“explanation”, and “justification” acts can be 
ambiguous for annotation especially when they 
are used without specific cue words such as 
“ ” (“that means”), generally used for 
explanation, and “ ” (“because”) often 
followed by a justification.  
Moreover, the word “ ” (“that means”) 
used mostly as an explanation cue word can be 
a trivial expression often used in spoken 
dialogue as detailed in the following example. 
Annotation 1: 
       
      That means it is great when a 
human is aligned with people.  
 < Class=”Argumentation”, DA=”Explanation”> 
Annotation 2: 
       
        That means it is great when a 
human is aligned with people. 
 < Class=”Argumentation”, DA=”Appreciation”> 
In order to construct a training corpus for 
machine learning classification, we intend to 
reach a minimum of kappa score of 0.6.  
5. ActAAr Annotation Tool 
Dialogue acts annotation task requires a 
considerable effort from human annotators. 
Therefore, many annotating tools have been 
developed to offer more interaction with 
annotated corpora.  
In fact there are numerous tools for general 
annotation tasks such as GATE and MATE 
and other tools for dialogue act annotation like 
XDML and DAT.  
GATE system (Cunningham et al., 2002) is 
one of the most commonly used systems. It 
supports manual annotation, information 
extraction, semi-automatic semantic 
annotation, etc.  
MATE 
2
workbench (Klein, 1999) is a 
multimodal annotation tool. It can be used with 
different annotation schemes in XML format. 
It also allows the corpus designer to write rule 
based transformations using a language very 
similar to XSLT.  
XDML (eXtensible Dialogue Markup 
Language Tool) was designed for annotating 
transcribed dialogues according to semantic, 
functional and stylistic characteristics. It was 
developed within the AMITIES
3
 project.  
DAT is a Perl/Tk tool for dialogue act tagging 
which processes ﬁles in SGML format. It was 
developed in the DAMSL
4
 project. It directly 
supports dialogue structures (turns and 
utterances) and includes data from different 
modalities. 
As presented above, these tools are not suitable 
for dialogue act annotation in Arabic language. 
Besides, DAT and XDML tools were 
                                                 
    2 http://mate.nis.sdu.dk
 
    3 http://www.dcs.shef.ac.uk/nlp/amities/amitiesdemos.htm  
    4 http://www.cs.rochester.edu/research/speech/damsl/  
93
 7 
developed for specific purposes within 
annotation projects.  
GATE and MATE tools are not simple for use 
by human annotators as they need more 
proficiency and effort to be used to their 
annotation guidelines. 
Therefore, we have developed an annotation 
tool named ActAAr (Acts Annotation in 
Arabic) which is simple to use and supports 
our dialogue act taxonomy.  
In fact, our tool is a java application for 
dialogue acts annotation in Arabic discussions. 
It uses the taxonomy detailed in table 3.  
Indeed, the expected input format is plain text 
discussions files. The loaded file is then 
automatically segmented into turns. After the 
user’s annotation, the output structure is saved 
in an XML labeled file tokenized into 
functional units (turns and utterances). For 
each utterance, the output tag includes the 
DA’s label and class. 
The annotation process is done by the two 
following tasks: 
1- Select the utterance: the user selects 
the text by using the mouse from the 
dialogue shown in the left side of the 
screen. 
2- Select the relevant dialogue act: the 
user chooses the appropriate class 
from the list shown. Then he selects 
one dialogue act from the selected 
class by a simple mouse-right-click. 
When these two tasks are carried out, the 
program adds the following tag: <utterance 
ID=”n1” DA=”d1” Class=”c1” > under the 
corresponding turn (see figure 1). 
  <Turn ID ="79" Speaker=" "> 
<Utterance ID="50" DA=" Question"  Class=" 
Request "> 
 
</utterance>  
<Turn ID ="80" Speaker=" "> 
<Utterance ID="51" DA=" Answer"  Class="  
Answer "> 
     
</Utterance>  
</Turn> 
<Turn ID ="81" Speaker="  "> 
<Utterance ID="52" DA="Acknowledgement” 
Class =" Turn_Management"> 
  
</Utterance>  
<Utterance ID="53" DA="Polite_formula"  
Class=" Social_Obligation_Management"> 
 
</Utterance>  
<Utterance ID="54" DA=" 
Explanation_Request"  Class=" Request"> 
 
</Utterance>  
</Turn> 
<Turn ID ="82" Speaker="  "> 
<Utterance ID="55" DA="Explanation” Class 
=" Argumentative"> 
   
</Utterance>  
<Utterance ID="56" DA="Conclusion” Class 
=" Argumentative"> 
 
</Utterance>  
</Turn> 
 
Figure 1. An annotated corpus sample  
6. Conclusion and future work 
In this paper we have proposed a Dialogue 
Acts scheme for argumentative annotation of 
Arabic discussions. We evaluated the 
reliability of this scheme by manually 
annotating a corpus of debate programs 
transcriptions and assessing the inter-annotator 
agreement using the Kappa measure. From the 
obtained results, we can conclude that the 
proposed taxonomy is fairly reliable and at the 
current stage needs to be refined in order to 
obtain better agreement. However, we noticed 
that some disagreement might be due to our 
under-constrained guidelines that do not 
provide clear criteria for discriminating 
between possible categories. 
As a future work, we intend to improve the 
annotation guidelines by providing a set of 
mark-up labels and the rules for their 
application. These guidelines will be the basic 
reference for human annotators to generate 
coherent annotations of discussions. 
From a practical point of view, we intend to 
integrate navigation and research modules that 
extract statistics from annotated corpora (DA 
frequency in the corpus, acts per class, 
adjacency pairs, etc.). 
Finally, we will use our annotation tool to 
generate a large number of annotated structures 
which can be used later as a basis of a machine 
learning algorithm in automatic annotation 
task. 
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Abstract
Spoken dialogue systems are instantiated in
complex architectures comprising multiple in-
terconnected components. These architectures
often take the form of pipelines whose com-
ponents are essentially black-boxes developed
and optimised separately, using ad-hoc spec-
ification formats for their inputs and outputs,
domain models and parameters.
We present in this paper an alternative mod-
elling approach, in which the dialogue pro-
cessing steps (from understanding to manage-
ment and to generation) are all declaratively
specified using the same underlying formal-
ism. The formalism is based on probabilistic
rules operating on a shared belief state. These
rules are expressed as structured mapping be-
tween state variables and provide a compact,
probabilistic encoding for the dialogue pro-
cessing models. We argue that this declarative
approach yields several advantages in terms
of transparency, domain-portability and adap-
tivity over traditional black-box architectures.
We also describe the implementation and vali-
dation of this approach in an integrated archi-
tecture for human-robot interaction.
1 Introduction
Spoken dialogue systems typically rely on complex
pipeline architectures, including components such
as speech recognition, semantic parsing, dialogue
act classification, dialogue management, sentence
planning, surface realisation and speech synthesis,
in addition to extra-linguistic modules for e.g. situa-
tion awareness or the execution of physical actions,
see e.g. (Bos et al., 2003; Bohus et al., 2007; Krui-
jff et al., 2007). In many cases, these components
are developed separately and rely on dedicated rep-
resentation formats for their inputs and output vari-
ables, internal models and parameters.
For instance, a dialogue act classifier might take
as input a N-Best list of recognition hypotheses, and
outputs the corresponding dialogue act(s), using a
set of shallow patterns as internal model to relate the
input to the output. Similarly, a dialogue manager
takes a given dialogue state as input, and outputs the
optimal action (if any) to perform in such state based
on a specific planning procedure.
These representation formats are unfortunately
rarely compatible with one another, which makes it
difficult to derive a semantic interpretation for the di-
alogue state as a whole (in terms e.g. of a joint prob-
ability distribution). Moreover, much of the task
knowledge is typically encoded in procedural form
within the component workflow, reducing the sys-
tem portability to other domains due to the necessity
of reprogramming some of the modules.
We present in this paper an alternative approach
to the specification and optimisation of the various
models used in a dialogue system architecture. The
key idea is to declaratively specify the task-specific
models using a shared, generic representation for-
malism, and strip down the system architecture to
a small set of core algorithms for updating the di-
alogue state based on these models. The represen-
tation formalism we describe in this paper is based
on the concept of a probabilistic rule. These rules
are expressive enough to capture the structure for
most processing tasks, from dialogue understanding
to management and to generation. Moreover, they
can be either manually designed or have their pa-
rameters estimated from data.
This declarative approach to the design of spo-
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ken dialogue systems has several advantages. The
first one pertains to domain portability. Given that
the dialogue architecture is essentially reduced to a
generic platform for rule instantiation and inference,
porting the system to a new domain only requires
a rewrite or extension of the domain-specific rules,
without having to reprogram a single component. It
also provides a more transparent semantics for the
system as a whole, since all state variables are de-
scribed and related to each other in a unified and the-
oretically sound framework, grounded in probabilis-
tic inference. Finally, the use of probabilistic rules
enables the construction of very flexible processing
pipelines, by allowing state variables to depend or
influence each other in any order and direction. The
system designer is thus free to combine in the same
architecture both deep and shallow semantic parsers
for dialogue understanding, or both reactive and de-
liberative policies for dialogue management.
The architecture revolves around a shared dia-
logue state, encoded as a Bayesian Network includ-
ing all variables relevant for the interaction. The use
of a Bayesian Network allows us to account for the
various kinds of uncertainties arising in spoken dia-
logue (speech recognition errors, unknown user in-
tentions, etc.) as well as the conditional dependen-
cies between state variables. At runtime, this dia-
logue state is continuously updated via probabilistic
rules. As we shall see, these rules are instantiated by
extending the Bayesian network with new nodes and
conditional dependencies.
We showed in our previous work how to esti-
mate the parameters of these models given lim-
ited amounts of Wizard-of-Oz training data (Lison,
2012). The present paper builds upon this approach,
but concentrates on the design and specification of
these probabilistic rules for various processing tasks,
leaving out the question of parameter estimation.
Hence, we will simply assume through this paper
that the parameters have been already assigned, ei-
ther from training data or expert knowledge.
The rest of the paper is as follows. We first pro-
vide generalities about Bayesian Networks and di-
alogue models. We then describe our approach by
defining the probabilistic rules and their use in the
dialogue processing workflow. We also detail a sys-
tem implemented for a human-robot interaction do-
main, which exploits probabilistic rules to perform
A
C
B
D
E
Value for B: P(B)
T 0.6
F 0.4
Value for A: P(A)
T 0.3
F 0.7
Value for C P(C)
T
 1.0 if (A=T ∧ B=T)
 0.0 otherwise
F
 0.0 if (A=T ∧ B=T)
 1.0 otherwise
Value 
for D:
P(D|C)
C=T C=F
T 0.2 0.99
F 0.8 0.01
Value 
for E:
P(E|C)
C=T C=F
T 0.5 0.4
F 0.5 0.6
Figure 1: Bayesian network with 5 nodes. An example of
query on this network is P (A=T|D=T) ≈ 0.18.
tasks related to dialogue understanding, manage-
ment and generation. Finally, we discuss and relate
our approach to previous work, and conclude.
2 Background
2.1 Bayesian Networks
The probabilistic models used in this paper are ex-
pressed as directed graphical models, also known as
Bayesian Networks. Let X1...Xn denote a set of
random variables. Each variable Xi is associated
with a range of mutually exclusive values. In dia-
logue models, this range is often discrete and can be
explicitly enumerated: V al(Xi) = {x1i , ..., xmi }.
A Bayesian Network defines the conditional de-
pendencies between variables using a directed graph
where each node corresponds to a variable Xi. Each
edge Xi → Xj denotes a conditional dependence
between the two nodes, in which case Xi is said to
be a parent of Xj . A conditional probability distri-
bution P (Xi|Par(Xi)) is associated with each node
Xi, where Par(Xi) denotes the parents of Xi.
Conditional probability distributions (CPDs) can
be defined in various ways, from look-up tables
to more advanced distributions (Koller and Fried-
man, 2009). Together with the directed graph, the
CPDs determine the joint probability distribution
P (X1...Xn) . The network can then be used for in-
ference by querying the distribution of a subset of
variables, often given some additional evidence, as
illustrated by the example in Figure 1.
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2.2 Dialogue models
The dialogue state s can generally be decomposed
into a set of state variables s = {s1, ...sn} (Williams
and Young, 2007). Each state variable represents
a relevant feature of the interaction and its context.
For instance, the state variables for a human-robot
interaction scenario might be composed of tasks to
accomplish, the interaction history, past events, as
well as objects, spatial locations and agents in the
environment. A minimal dialogue state can be de-
fined as s = 〈uu, au, iu, am, um, c〉, where uu is the
last user utterance, au the last dialogue act, iu the
current user intention, am the last system act, um
the last system utterance, and c the context.
Due to uncertainty, many variables are only par-
tially observable. We thus encode our knowledge of
the current dialogue state in a distribution b(s) =
P (s1, ..., sn) called the belief state, conveniently
expressed as a Bayesian Network (Thomson and
Young, 2010). This belief state b is regularly up-
dated with new information. The workflow illus-
trated in Figure 2 can then be formalised in terms
of inference steps over this belief state:
1. Upon detection of a new speech signal, the
speech recogniser generates the N-best list of
recognition hypotheses u˜u = P (uu|o);
2. Speech understanding then estimates the most
likely dialogue act(s) realised in the utterance:
a˜u = P (au|b);
3. The user intention is updated with the new in-
terpreted dialogue act: i˜u = P (iu|b);
4. Based on the updated belief state, the action se-
lection searches for the optimal system action
to perform: a∗m = arg maxam Q(am|b);
5. The system action is then realised in an utter-
ance um, which is again framed as a search for
u∗m = arg maxum Q(um|b);
The models defined above use P (x|b) as a nota-
tional convenience for
∑
si∈V al(s) P (x|s=si)b(si).
The sequence above might be adapted in various
ways depending on the domain. A basic reactive
system might for instance ignore the user intention
and directly select its actions based on the last dia-
logue act. Similarly, user-adaptivity might be cap-
tured via additional processing steps to estimate and
exploit features related to the user model.
Speech 
recognition
Speech 
understanding
Generation
Speech 
synthesis
Extra-linguistic environment
input speech signal
(user utterance)
output speech signal
(machine utterance)
Dialogue
 act ãu
Recognition
hypotheses uu   ~
Shared belief 
state b
User
Dialogue 
Interpretation
Action 
selection
User 
intention iu
~
Intended
response am*
Utterance to 
synthesise um*
Perceived 
context c~
Figure 2: Dialogue system architecture schema.
3 Approach
The starting point of our approach is to express the
probabilistic dialogue models described above using
a compact encoding which takes advantage of the
internal structure present in most processing tasks.
This structure can take several forms:
• The probability (or utility) of a given output
variable typically depends on only a small sub-
set of input variables, although the number and
identity of these variables might naturally dif-
fer. The state variable encoding the physical lo-
cation of a mobile robot is for instance relevant
for answering a user requesting its location, but
not for responding to a greeting act.
• Moreover, the values for the dependent vari-
ables can often be grouped into a small num-
ber of partitions yielding similar outcomes,
thereby reducing the dimensionality of the
problem. The partitions can be expressed via
logical conditions on the variable values.
Probabilistic rules provide a general framework
for expressing this internal structure. The rules ex-
press the model distribution in terms of structured
mappings between input and output variables. At
runtime, these rules are then applied on the belief
state, thereby extending the Bayesian Network with
new nodes and conditional dependencies. This up-
dated Bayesian Network can then be directly used
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for inference, e.g. to compute the marginal distribu-
tion of a particular variable or to search for the op-
timal action to perform. The probabilistic rules thus
function as high-level templates for the incremental
construction of a classical probabilistic model.
3.1 Definitions
Rules can be of two possible types:
1. probability rules, which define probability
models of the form P (X|Y), where X and Y
both denote arbitrary sets of state variables;
2. utility rules, defining utility models of the form
Q(X,A), whereX represent a set of state vari-
ables, and A a set of action variables. The rule
defines here the utility of a particular action se-
quence in A given the state defined by X.
A rule is essentially defined as a condition-effect
mapping, where each condition is mapped to a set
of alternative effects. Depending on the type of rule,
each effect will be assigned to either a probability
or a utility value. The list of conditions is ordered
and takes the form of a “if ... then ... else” case
expressing the probability/utility distribution of the
output variables depending on the inputs.
Probability rule
Formally, a probability rule r is defined as an or-
dered list of cases, where each case is associated
with a condition ci as well as a distribution over
stochastic effects {(e1i , p1i ), ..., (eki , pki )}. For each
stochastic effect eji , we have that p
j
i = P (e
j
i |ci),
where p1...mi satisfy the usual probability axioms.
The rule reads as such:
if (c1) then
{P (e11) = p11, ... P (ek1) = pk1}
...
else if (cn) then
{P (e1n) = p1n, ... P (emn ) = pmn }
A final else case is implicitly added to the bottom of
the list, and holds if no other condition applies. If
not overridden, the default effect associated to this
last case is void – i.e. it causes no changes to the
distribution over the output variables.
Utility rule
Utility rules are defined similarly. Each case
specified in the rule is associated to a condition ci
and a utility distribution over possible action se-
quences {(a1i , q1i ), ..., (aki , qki )}, where aji is a value
assignment for a set of action variables, and qji =
Q(ci, a
j
i ). The rule reads as:
if (c1) then
{Q(a11) = q11, ... Q(ak1) = qk1}
...
else if (cn) then
{Q(a1n) = q1n, ... Q(amn ) = qmn }
The default utility value of an action is set to 0.
When several rules define a utility value for the same
action, these utilities are summed.
Conditions
For both rule types, the conditions are expressed
as logical formulae grounded in the input variables.
They can be arbitrarily complex formulae connected
by conjunctive, disjunctive and negation operators.
The conditions on the input variables can be seen
as providing a compact partition of the state space
to mitigate the dimensionality curse. Without this
partitioning in alternative conditions, a rule ranging
over m variables each of size n would need to enu-
merate nm possible assignments. The partitioning
with conditions reduces this number to p mutually
exclusive partitions, where p is usually small.
A wide range of conditional tests can be de-
vised. In our implementation, the rule conditions for
speech understanding were for instance expressed in
terms of regular expressions matches on the user ut-
terance uu. Generally speaking, a condition is sim-
ply defined as a function mapping state variable as-
signments to a boolean value.
Effects
The rule effects are defined similarly: given a con-
dition holding on a set of input variables, the associ-
ated effects define specific value assignments for the
output variables. The effects can be limited to a sin-
gle variable or range over several output variables.
The effect can also be void, i.e. trigger no change to
the distribution over output values.
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Each effect is assigned to a scalar value defin-
ing its probability or utility, and several alternative
stochastic effects can be defined for the same case.
If a unique effect is specified, it is then implicitly as-
sumed to hold with probability 1. These values are
parameters which can be either hand-coded or esti-
mated from data.
Example
Assume an action selection model structured with
probabilistic rules, which operates on a belief state
b containing the last user act au as well as a col-
lection of objects perceived in the environment. The
response to a polar question such as “is the object
red?” can be captured by the following rules:
r1 : if (au= VerifyColour(o, c)
∧ o.colour=c) then
{Q(am= Confirm) = 5}
else {Q(am= Confirm) = −4}
r2 : if (au= VerifyColour(o, c)
∧ o.colour 6=c) then
{Q(am= Disconfirm) = 5}
else {Q(am= Disconfirm) = −4}
r3 : if (au= VerifyColour(o, c)) then
{Q(am= SayDontKnow) = 1}
else {Q(am= SayDontKnow) = −2}
The rule specifies the following behaviour: if
there is a reasonable certainty that the object is (resp.
is not) of the correct colour, the system should con-
firm (resp. disconfirm). In case of uncertainty, it
should utter “I don’t know”. The trade-offs between
these actions are encoded by the utility parameters.
To illustrate the rules, assume that the dialogue
state contains the two independent variables au and
o1.colour, with the respective distributions:
P (au=VerifyColour(o1, blue)) = 0.8)
P (au=VerifyColour(o1, black)) = 0.2)
P (o1.colour=blue) = 0.75)
P (o1.colour=green) = 0.25)
It is then trivial to calculate that, in this setting,
the best action to perform is Confirm, which has a
utility Q = 1.4, while Q(SayDontKnow) = 1 and
Q(Disconfirm) = −0.4.
3.2 Processing workflow
To ease the design of the architecture, the probabilis-
tic rules are grouped into models. A model consists
of a set of rules and the specification of a “trigger”
variable which causes the activation of the model.
For instance, the trigger for the speech understand-
ing model P (au|uu) is the user utterance uu.
The dialogue system is integrated in an event-
driven, blackboard architecture (Buckley and
Benzmu¨ller, 2007) revolving around the shared be-
lief state b represented as a Bayesian Network. This
belief state is read and written by all the dialogue
models. Once a change occurs on a state vari-
able, the algorithm checks whether there are models
triggered by this update. Then, for each triggered
model, the rules are applied as follows:
1. For every rule r in the model, we create a rule
node φr and include the conditional dependen-
cies with its input variables. If the rule is a
probability rule, the rule node will be a chance
node describing the distribution of effects given
the input assignment. If the rule is a utility rule,
the node will be a utility node describing the
utility of action variables.
2. The nodes corresponding to the output vari-
ables are created (if they do not already ex-
ist). For probability rules, these nodes will be
chance nodes with a conditional dependence on
the rule node φr. For utility rules, they will be
action nodes, with an outward dependence re-
lation to the rule node φr.
Once no more models can be triggered, the
Bayesian Network is modified to replace the updated
variables. Finally, if the network contains action
variables, the algorithm searches for their optimal
action value and selects them. This selection might
trigger other inference steps, and the process is re-
peated until stability is reached. The procedure is
described in Algorithms 1 and 2. Figure 3 illustrates
the application of four rules on a belief state.
Once the Bayesian network is updated with the
new rules, queries can be evaluated using any stan-
dard algorithm for exact or approximate inference.
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Algorithm 1 : BELIEFUPDATE (b,M)
Require: b: Current belief state
Require: M: Set of rule-based models
1: loop
2: repeat
3: for all model m ∈M do
4: if m is triggered then
5: for all rule r ∈ m do
6: b← ADDRULE(b, r)
7: end for
8: end if
9: end for
10: until no model is triggered
11: for all node x′ ∈ b do
12: Prune x from b
13: Relabel x′ into x
14: end for
15: for all node a : action variable do
16: Find a∗ = arg maxv∈V al(a)Q(a=v|b)
17: Set a← a∗
18: end for
19: end loop
Algorithm 2 : ADDRULE (b, r)
Require: b: Current belief state
Require: r: Rule to add
1: Ir ← INPUTVARIABLES(r)
2: Create node φr ← RULENODE(r)
3: Add φr and dependencies Ir → φr to b
4: if r is a probability rule then
5: Or ← OUTPUTVARIABLES(r)
6: for all output variable o ∈ Or do
7: Create node o′ if not already in b
8: Add o′ and dependency φr → o′ to b
9: end for
10: else if r is a utility rule then
11: Ar ← ACTIONVARIABLES(r)
12: for all action variable a ∈ Ar do
13: Create node a′ if not already in b
14: Add a′ and dependency a′ → φr to b
15: end for
16: end if
17: return b
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Figure 3: Bayesian Network expanded with the rules rw,
rx, ry , rz on a set of state variables. Diamond nodes
represent value nodes, and square action nodes.
It is worth nothing that the outlined procedure is
an instance of ground inference (Getoor and Taskar,
2007), since the rule structure is grounded in a stan-
dard Bayesian Network.
4 Implementation
The framework outlined in the previous section has
been implemented in a system architecture, and ap-
plied to a human-robot interaction scenario. The
scenario involved a human user and a Nao robot1
(see Figure 4). The user was instructed to teach the
robot a sequence of basic movements (lift the left
arm, step forward, kneel down, etc.) using spoken
commands. The interaction included various dia-
logue acts such as clarification requests, feedbacks,
acknowledgements, corrections, etc.
The models for speech understanding, action se-
lection and generation were all encoded with proba-
bilistic rules, for a total of 68 rules. The expressivity
of the formalism allows us to capture complex prob-
ability or utility models in just a handful of rules.
1A programmable humanoid robot developed by Aldebaran
Robotics, http://www.aldebaran-robotics.com.
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Figure 4: Human user interacting with the Nao robot to
teach a sequence of movements via verbal instructions.
The structure of these rules is designed by hand, but
their parameters can be learned from data. In our ex-
periments, the utility parameters of the action selec-
tion module were estimated from limited amounts
of Wizard-of-Oz training data, while the understand-
ing and generation models were hand-crafted – these
rules encoding simple, deterministic pattern match-
ing techniques.
In addition, the dialogue also included a speech
recognizer (Vocon 3200 from Nuance) connected to
the robot microphones, a text-to-speech module, as
well as components for planning the robot move-
ments and controlling its motors in real-time. In
our experiments, the posteriors for the updated state
variables were calculated via importance sampling
(Koller and Friedman, 2009), but other inference al-
gorithms such as variable elimination (Zhang and
Poole, 1996) are also available.
Both the rule-based models and the external mod-
ules are connected to the shared belief state, and
read/write to it as they process their data flow. The
models and external modules listen for changes oc-
curring in the belief state and become activated
when one of these changes relates to their triggering
variable. It is worth noting that external modules
such as the ASR engine exhibit the same process-
ing behaviour as probabilistic rules, i.e. they extend
the belief state with additional rule nodes that them-
selves lead to updated variables.
4.1 Example of rules
We describe below five examples of rules: two used
for shallow dialogue act recognition, two used for
action selection, and one for generation.
1. Rule r1 below lists three regular expression pat-
terns for a particular case of dialogue act classi-
fication. If the value for the user utterance vari-
able uu matches at least one of the patterns, the
dialogue act au is classified as LeftArmDown,
else au is left unchanged:
r1 : if (uu matches “left arm down”)
∨ (uu matches “lower * left arm”)
∨ (uu matches “down * left arm”) then
{P (a′u= LeftArmDown) = 1.0}
2. Due to high levels of noise in speech recogni-
tion, it is often useful to dynamically “prime”
the results given expectations from the con-
text. Rule r2 is another rule for dialogue act
recognition triggered if the last system act is
AskRepeat. In this case, the rule r2 will prime
the probability that the new user act (a′u) is
identical to the previous one (au):
r2 : if (am = AskRepeat) then
{P (a′u=au) = 0.9}
Rule r2 specifies that, if requested to repeat his
last dialogue act, the user will do so with prob-
ability 0.9. The rule provides a prediction of
the next user act given the context, before the
observation of the user utterance. In combina-
tion with classification rules such as r1, the rule
determines the posterior distribution over the
most likely dialogue acts uttered by the user.
3. Rule r3 is an action selection rule which speci-
fies the utility of performing the action am =
DoMovement(X) if the user intention iu is
equal to RequestMovement(X), where X is
an argument corresponding to the actual move-
ment (lifting the arm up or down, etc.):
r3 : if (iu = RequestMovement(X)) then
{Q(a′m= DoMovement(X)) = 3.0}
Note the use of the unbounded variable X,
which is unified at runtime with the actual ar-
gument value for iu.
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4. Rule r4 specifies the utility of the clarification
request am = AskRepeat. The rule r4 has no
condition, which means that the utility of the
clarification request will be conditionally inde-
pendent of the value of iu:
r4 : if (true) then
{Q(a′m= AskRepeat) = 1.2}
Put together, rules r3 and r4 determine the
relative utility of requesting a clarification on
the user intention vs. performing the ac-
tion. In this particular case, the system will
select DoMovement(X) if the user intention
RequestMovement(X) has a probability >
0.4, and will ask for a clarification otherwise.
5. Finally, rule r5 determines the system utter-
ance to synthesise um given the system act
am = Ack (for ”acknowledgement”). In this
case, the system is free to select one of the three
alternatives, with equal utility:
r5 : if (am = Ack) then
{Q(u′m = “ok”) = 1.0 ∧
Q(u′m = “great”) = 1.0 ∧
Q(u′m = “thanks”) = 1.0}
For the sake of simplicity, the probability and util-
ity values shown above were hand-coded. Of course,
dialogue systems deployed in real domains need
to estimate these parameters from interaction data
(coming from e.g. Wizard-of-Oz experiments). Pre-
vious work has demonstrated how to perform such
parameter estimation using a Bayesian learning ap-
proach (Lison, 2012). One major benefit is that the
rule structure is described in exponentially fewer pa-
rameters than its plain counterpart, and is thus much
easier to learn and to generalise to unseen data.
It should be theoretically possible to also learn
the rule structure from data, as evidenced by work
done in Statistical Relational Learning (Pasula et al.,
2007). Such endeavour would however require sig-
nificantly larger amounts of training data, and re-
mains therefore impractical for most dialogue do-
mains. Furthermore, the rule structure can be seen as
a way for the system designer to enforce design con-
straints or business rules into the system (Williams,
2008), and such ability would be lost if the rule
structure was to be learned from scratch.
5 Discussion and related work
The development of generic, domain-independent
dialogue systems has a long history (Allen et al.,
2000; Bohus et al., 2007), and there is a clear
trend towards creating platforms with generic or
reusable components. There is however no agree-
ment on common modelling formats or processing
techniques. In this respect, it is interesting to draw
a parallel between dialogue systems and other fields
of NLP such as syntactic parsing. Before the 60’s,
most parsers relied on procedural routines buried in
the code. One of the major advances has come from
the decision to separate the domain knowledge (in
this case, the lexicon and grammar) on one hand,
and the parsing algorithms on the other hand. We be-
lieve that dialogue systems would also benefit from
a cleaner distinction between declarative knowledge
(i.e. task- and domain-specific models) and generic
processing functionalities (i.e. algorithms for rea-
soning, learning and planning under uncertainty.)
Most current dialogue systems are however re-
lying on numerous blackbox components in their
pipeline. An unfortunate consequence of this het-
erogeneity is that, while speech recognition results
often include explicit measures of uncertainty (in
the form of e.g. confidence scores), this uncertainty
is often lost at higher stages of reasoning, such as
semantic interpretation and dialogue management.
Recent papers have shown that confidence scores
can be exploited in dialogue management (Williams
et al., 2008), but their approach has not yet been
widely adopted. Thanks to the unified description
framework provided by probabilistic rules, our ap-
proach is able to provide a principled account for
this uncertainty at all processing stages.
Information-state approaches to dialogue man-
agement (Larsson and Traum, 2000; Bos et al.,
2003) are closely related to this work, since they
also rely on a shared state updated according to a
rich repository of rules, but contrary to the approach
presented here, these rules are generally determin-
istic and do not include learnable parameters. The
idea of state space partitioning, implemented here
via rule conditions, has also been explored in recent
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papers (Williams, 2010; Crook and Lemon, 2010).
The work presented in this paper can be seen as
an attempt to bridge the gap between “symbolic”
approaches to dialogue, which usually concentrate
on capturing rich interaction patterns, and “prob-
abilistic” approaches, more focused on aspects re-
lated to noise, uncertainty, and learnability. There
has been some initial work on hybrid approaches
to dialogue processing and management where both
statistically learned and designed policies are com-
bined (Williams, 2008; Lee et al., 2010), but they
generally use the designed policies as a mere filter-
ing mechanism for the stochastic policy. Our ap-
proach however directly incorporates the prior do-
main knowledge into the statistical model.
Structural knowledge in probabilistic models
has been explored in many directions, both
in decision-theoretic planning and reinforcement
learning (Hauskrecht et al., 1998; Pineau, 2004;
Lang and Toussaint, 2010; Otterlo, 2012) and in
statistical relational learning (Jaeger, 2001; Richard-
son and Domingos, 2006; Getoor and Taskar, 2007).
The introduced structure may be hierarchical, rela-
tional, or both. As in our approach, most of these
frameworks rely on expressive representations as
templates for grounded probabilistic models.
An important side benefit of structured repre-
sentations in probabilistic models is their improved
readability for the human designers, which are able
to use these powerful abstractions to encode their
prior knowledge of the dialogue domain in the form
of pragmatic rules, generic background knowledge,
or task-specific constraints. Moreover, the grouping
of related rules into models allows the system de-
veloper to specify dialogue domains in a modular
fashion, by clustering rules into various sets of mod-
els. Some models might be highly domain-specific
while others encode generic interaction behaviours
that can be easily ported to other applications.
6 Conclusion
We have described in this paper a new approach
to the development of dialogue systems, based on
the declarative specification of probabilistic rules.
These rules are defined as structured mappings
over variables of the dialogue state, specified us-
ing high-level conditions and effects. The rules are
parametrised with effect probabilities or action util-
ities. Probabilistic rules allow the system designer
to exploit powerful generalisations in the dialogue
domain specification without sacrificing the proba-
bilistic nature of the model.
The architecture revolves around a shared belief
state expressed as a Bayesian Network. This belief
state is continuously updated and extended based on
a set of probabilistic rules for speech understanding,
management and generation. This architecture has
been implemented and integrated in a spoken dia-
logue system for human-robot interaction. We are
currently in the process of refactoring our imple-
mentation to make it available as a generic, open
source dialogue toolkit called openDial.
We are currently working on extending this archi-
tecture in several directions. Our first line of work is
to extend the parameter estimation outlined in (Li-
son, 2012) to Bayesian model-based reinforcement
learning. The parameter estimation currently oper-
ates in a supervised learning mode, which requires
expert data. Alternatively, one could estimate the
model parameters in a fully online fashion, without
any supervisory input, by incorporating model un-
certainty into the inference and continuously adapt-
ing the parameter distribution from real or simulated
interaction experience (Ross et al., 2011).
Another research direction relates to the exten-
sion of the belief update algorithms towards incre-
mentality (Schlangen et al., 2010). We believe that
the framework presented in this paper is particularly
well suited to perform incremental processing, since
the chain of related hypotheses is explicitly captured
in the conditional dependencies of the Bayesian Net-
work. A probability change in one initial hypothesis
(e.g. the user utterance) will therefore be directly
reflected in all hypotheses depending on it (e.g. the
corresponding user intention). Extending the belief
update algorithm to run incrementally while remain-
ing tractable is however a non-trivial task.
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Abstract
A game-theoretic approach to linguistic com-
munication predicts that speakers can mean-
ingfully use ambiguous forms in a discourse
context in which only one of several available
referents has a costly unambiguous form and
in which rational interlocutors share knowl-
edge of production costs. If a speaker pro-
duces a low-cost ambiguous form to avoid us-
ing the high-cost unambiguous form, a ratio-
nal listener will infer that the high-cost entity
was the intended entity, or else the speaker
would not have risked ambiguity. We report
data from two studies in which pairs of speak-
ers show alignment of their use of ambiguous
forms based on this kind of shared knowledge.
These results extend the analysis of cost-based
pragmatic inferencing beyond that previously
associated only with fixed lexical hosts.
1 Introduction
A growing body of work demonstrates that joint
communication tasks yield alignment of referring
expressions, highlighting the role of interlocutors’
experience of shared common ground in establish-
ing conventions (Brennan & Clark, 1996; Garrod &
Pickering, 2004). Less well-established, however,
are predictions regarding which form∼meaning
mappings interlocutors will converge on. To address
this, we evaluate alignment in contexts where inter-
locutors’ common ground includes the costs of pro-
ducing particular forms.
Consider the shapes in Figure 1. In a context that
contains only the first item, a speaker can efficiently
draw attention to it by saying “Look at the circle.” In
a context with all three shapes, a more specific refer-
ring expression—such as “blue circle”—is required
to unambiguously indicate that same item. However,
if it is necessary to draw attention to the third item,
the speaker may need to accept either inefficiency
or ambiguity. Since there is no efficient label (e.g.,
“circle”) for the third item’s unique shape, it is costly
to unambiguously refer to it in the context of Fig-
ure 1—a longer or more obscure expression is nec-
essary (e.g., “the triangle-and-square thing” or “the
blue shape that’s not a circle”). On the other hand,
the speaker can avoid producing a costly expression
by instead using an ambiguous expression such as
“the blue thing” or “the blue shape.” The question is
whether a listener can be expected to infer that the
intended referent is the difficult-to-describe shape,
even though “the blue shape” could in principle also
refer to the blue circle.
An accurate inference about the intended referent
of “the blue shape” requires the following chain of
reasoning: The listener would have to realize that
had the speaker intended to refer to the blue circle, a
relatively short unambiguous expression would have
sufficed (“the blue circle”); since the speaker used a
low-cost ambiguous expression “the blue shape” in-
stead of the available low-cost unambiguous name,
Figure 1: Variation in cost of referring expressions
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the implicature is that the circle is not the intended
referent, leaving the difficult-to-describe item as the
preferred target.
Using ambiguous forms to convey meaning de-
pends in part on the listener’s ability to diagnose the
source of the ambiguity: Does the ambiguity likely
arise from the speaker’s own production decisions or
from other factors that make the expression noisy or
unclear (see Schlangen & Fernandez, 2007)? We fo-
cus here on productions whose ambiguity listeners
can be confident originates with the speaker herself.
This paper presents two studies testing speaker
alignment in dialog games with superimposed costs
and rewards that are predicted to guide production
and comprehension of ambiguous forms. Our re-
sults show that speakers’ use of ambiguous expres-
sions reflects the relative costs of available forms.
Rather than avoiding ambiguity, speakers show be-
havior that is in keeping with theories of commu-
nicative efficiency that posit that speakers make ra-
tional decisions about redundancy and reduction.
2 Game Theory and Implicature
Game theory is an area of applied mathematics,
which aims to provide a framework for analyzing
the behavior of individuals (players) in strategic sit-
uations (games) (von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1944; see Clark, 2011, Chapter 4 for an introduc-
tion). It is used to describe games in which play-
ers have choices regarding their behavior and pref-
erences over possible outcomes. The outcomes de-
pend on both players’ choices: While some games
are zero-sum, meaning that success requires that
only one player can win, in other types of games,
both players can succeed if they coordinate their ac-
tions. Linguistic communication is typically argued
to be an example of this second type (Lewis, 1969).
Games are characterized by shared knowledge,
meaning that players know the overall structure of
the game. They know what moves are possible in
which situation by each player, what consequences
are associated with each move, and what preferences
each player has. Crucially, all players know that the
other players know these facts. A game-theoretic
approach makes an assumption of player rationality.
In a recent computational model that treats lan-
guage use as a cooperative game, Golland, Liang,
and Klein (2010) show that a rational speaker’s
decisions about whether or not to use ambigu-
ous referring expressions can be significantly im-
proved by embedding a model of the listener that
represents the shared game knowledge described
above. In their communication game with a human
listener, unambiguous expressions were preferred
over ambiguous-yet-accurate expressions when the
speaker selected an expression that optimized utility
for the listener.
However, in that type of listener-oriented model,
a speaker’s choice of expression is based solely on
maximizing the probability that the listener under-
stands the speaker’s intent. In this paper, we con-
sider how a game-theoretic approach offers further
predictions about the players’ behavior when the
various (ambiguous and unambiguous) referring ex-
pressions also have different costs, when the play-
ers share knowledge of costs, and when the play-
ers know that they share knowledge. In particular,
this approach suggests cases in which literal ambi-
guity might actually be preferred in pursuit of effi-
cient communication.
The prediction from such an approach is that an
ambiguous form can be used to refer unambiguously
if an unambiguous form is costly and other mean-
ings can be conveyed at low cost (Clark, 2011; Ja¨ger,
2008). In other words, a listener who knows the rel-
ative costs of unambiguously referring to X (high-
cost) or Y (low-cost) may reason that a speaker us-
ing an ambiguous word “X-or-Y” (low-cost) intends
to convey X, or else she would have said “Y”.
This type of reasoning has been used to ex-
plain the conventional use of “some” (Ja¨ger, 2008).
Having heard a speaker use the word “some”,
the listener is faced with two possible interpreta-
tions: AT-LEAST-ONE-AND-POSSIBLY-ALL or else
AT-LEAST-ONE-AND-NOT-ALL. A rational listener
is said to reason that, had the speaker intended to
convey the meaning ALL, she would have used the
low-cost (short and easy to produce) form “all”. The
speaker, having instead used a low-cost but ambigu-
ous form “some”, can be taken to implicate that the
intended interpretation is not ALL, but is instead a
meaning that would have been costly to produce un-
ambiguously: AT-LEAST-ONE-BUT-NOT-ALL.
This account of “some” formulates in game-
theoretic terms the well-known Gricean account,
which focuses on the amount of information con-
veyed. In the Gricean version, the literal meaning of
“some”, AT-LEAST-ONE-AND-POSSIBLY-ALL, con-
veys less information than “all”. Its meaning is
strengthened to a more informative meaning of AT-
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LEAST-ONE-BUT-NOT-ALL via implicature: A co-
operative speaker who obeys the maxim of Quantity
and intends to convey the more informative meaning
ALL would have said “all”, but since she did not, the
meaning AT-LEAST-ONE-BUT-NOT-ALL is favored.1
Grice’s recognition of the importance of speaker in-
tention echoes a game-theoretic approach to signal-
ing and the calculation of what must be true in order
for a rational speaker to have produced a particular
utterance (Stalnaker, 2005).
The AT-LEAST-ONE-BUT-NOT-ALL implicature
associated with the use of “some” is what Grice
called a generalized conversational implicature: the
implicature AT-LEAST-ONE-BUT-NOT-ALL is typ-
ically associated with the proposition expressed.
What remains an open question is whether this type
of cost-based inferencing applies beyond a fixed lex-
ical host like “some”. The next sections describe two
studies aimed at measuring alignment in a commu-
nication game with explicit superimposed costs and
rewards for production and comprehension.
3 Study 1: Communicating about Objects
with Divergent Costs
We created a networked interactive two-player chat
environment (see Figure 2) in which pairs of players
could communicate about a set of objects. Costs and
rewards were made explicit via points, and players
shared both knowledge of the cost/reward structure
as well as a shared goal of working together to com-
municate successfully. In contrast to Study 2 in the
next section, the costs imposed in Study 1 served to
highlight a single high-cost entity in each category,
creating a bias to conventionalize the meaning of an
ambiguous form to refer to that entity. In produc-
tion, the prediction is that players will use a low-cost
ambiguous word to refer to an object with a high-
cost unambiguous name, as long as other objects can
be unambiguously referred to with relatively low-
1This logic is spelled out in the Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Davis, 2010) in terms of the interaction of cost
(maxim of Manner) and information (maxim of Quantity):
Assuming that the accepted purpose of the conversa-
tion requires the speaker to say whether or not all ath-
letes smoke, a speaker who said “Some athletes smoke”
would be infringing the Quantity maxim if she meant
only what she said. So she must have meant more. If she
believed that all athletes smoke, she would have said so.
Since she did not, she must have meant that some but not
all athletes smoke. As a bonus, she achieved brevity, in
conformity to the maxim of Manner.
cost names. In comprehension, the prediction is that
players will more often interpret ambiguous words
to refer to objects with a costly unambiguous name
than to objects whose unambiguous name is associ-
ated with a mid or low cost (henceforth ‘high-cost
objects’, ‘mid-cost objects’, and ‘low-cost objects’).
3.1 Participants
10 pairs of English speakers from Northwestern
University received $10 to participate in the study.
3.2 Methods
Materials The game involved a set of objects in
two categories—three flowers and three trees. Play-
ers could communicate using a set of eight referring
expressions: six unambiguous names and two am-
biguous words. The costs varied among the unam-
biguous names, but the ambiguous words were both
low-cost. Table 1 shows the point costs associated
with the eight forms. The point values themselves
are less important than the relative values: In this
study, the cost of the most expensive name in each
category (“Tulip”/“Pine Tree”) was more than four
times the cost of the least expensive name and more
than twice the cost of the mid-cost name.2
Name Cost Name Cost
“Rose” -60 “Apple Tree” -60
“Daisy” -120 “Palm Tree” -120
“Tulip” -280 “Pine Tree” -250
“Flower -80 “Tree” -80
Table 1: Referring expressions and their costs (Study 1)
Task Players were seated in separate rooms in front
of computers showing the interactive game interface
depicted in Figure 2. They were told that they would
take turns as Sender and Receiver in a game that in-
volved communicating about a set of objects. As
the Sender, a player would see a gnome highlight
an object with a spotlight, and the Sender’s task
was to send a message to the other player so that
the other player (the Receiver) could guess what the
highlighted object must have been. Sending a word
consisted of pressing a button on the screen which
2Alternate materials were constructed with abstract shapes
and nonsense names, but a pilot study found that participants
had difficulty learning the names. Variants of Study 1 were con-
ducted with first names (e.g., “Ann”) for unambiguous names
for objects in plant and vessel categories and family names or
nonsense names (e.g., “Puliniki”) for ambiguous words; the re-
sults matched those presented here with flower/tree materials.
109
Rose [-60]
/1000
Apple Tree
Apple Tree
Rose
Match! 18 min 20 sec
 Apple Tree
 Flower 
Time remaining:
/1000Your points:115
Your partner’s points:
Tulip
-145
Daisy [-120]
Tulip [-280]
Apple Tree [-60] Flower  [-80]
Palm Tree  [-120]
Pine Tree  [-250]
Tree  [-80]
Daisy
Figure 2: Player’s view of the interactive chat environment for both Study 1 and 2 (point values from Study 1)
displayed the name and cost; pressing the button
resulted in an immediate point decrement for the
Sender. If the Receiver successfully identified the
intended object, then both players got an immediate
reward (Sender and Receiver scores increased). Oth-
erwise, there was no reward and the Sender had to
retry until communication succeeded—the penalty
in that case being the continued point decrements
for sending multiple words. The reward for success-
ful communication was +85 points for each player.
If either player reached the target score of 1000
points, the game ended and both players were free
to leave. Otherwise, games continued for 20 min-
utes or until the gnome had highlighted a total of 60
objects. Scores could become negative if the point
decrements of production outstripped the point in-
crements for successful communication.
For each pair, we calculated a unique sequence of
objects to be highlighted so that it would be impos-
sible to reach 1000 points in less than 60 turns with-
out successfully coordinating the use of ambiguous
words. The first 10 turns were intended as practice
turns, involving only low-cost and mid-cost objects.
Shared Knowledge Both players were able to see
the available referring expressions and their costs
and were told that the other player could as well.
Both players were informed of the reward struc-
ture (+85 points each for successful communication,
1000 points to end early) and told that the other
player had likewise been informed. The game in-
terface showed the current scores of the two players,
the time remaining, and a scrolling chat window list-
ing previous words sent and received.
3.3 Results and Discussion
Of the 10 pairs, 5 consistently coordinated their re-
ferring expressions, allowing an early exit from the
game. Two pairs played for the full 20 minutes,
struggling to coordinate their efforts, and their lim-
ited attempts at coordination failed to yield an early
exit to the game. Of the remaining 3 pairs, 1 pair
did not make a serious attempt at using the ambigu-
ous words, and the other 2 pairs used them repeat-
edly but had difficulty finding a strategy while doing
so, although all 3 did eventually manage to exit the
game before reaching the time or turn limit.
Table 2 shows a transcript from one pair of play-
ers, listing the first 26 moves of their game. The
transcript demonstrates how the players developed a
coordinated strategy for using the ambiguous words:
the use of an ambiguous word by Player 1 when the
intended referent was not a high-cost object (which
led to Player 2’s initial guess that the high-cost ob-
ject was the target), the use of an ambiguous word
by Player 2 (which Player 1 failed to interpret as
a reference to the high-cost object), and eventually
their convergence. After the success shown in the
last line of the table, the players continued to reli-
ably use “Flower” and “Tree” to refer to the tulip
and pine tree, and the game ended after 44 moves
when Player 2 reached 1000 points.
For the analysis, we measured the effect of one
within-players factor (the target object’s unambigu-
ous cost) on two binary outcomes: whether the
Sender sent an ambiguous word (production out-
come) and whether an ambiguous word resulted
in successful communication (comprehension out-
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Sender
Highlighted Form Receiver’s
Target Used Guess
1 daisy (mid) ‘Flower’ tulip (high)
1 daisy (mid) ‘Daisy’ daisy (mid)
2 palm (mid) ‘Palm’ palm (mid)
1 palm (mid) ‘Tree’ pine (high)
1 palm (mid) ‘Palm’ palm (mid)
2 apple (low) ‘Apple’ apple (low)
1 palm (mid) ‘Tree’ pine (high)
1 palm (mid) ‘Palm’ palm (mid)
2 daisy (mid) ‘Daisy’ daisy (mid)
1 tulip (high) ‘Tulip’ tulip (high)
2 apple (low) ‘Apple’ apple (low)
1 pine (high) ‘Pine’ pine (high)
2 tulip (high) ‘Flower’ daisy (mid)
2 tulip (high) ‘Flower’ daisy (mid)
2 tulip (high) ‘Flower’ tulip (high)
1 pine (high) ‘Pine’ pine (high)
2 pine (high) ‘Tree’ pine (high)
1 rose (low) ‘Rose’ rose (low)
2 rose (low) ‘Rose’ rose (low)
1 palm (mid) ‘Palm’ palm (mid)
2 tulip (high) ‘Flower’ rose (low)
2 tulip (high) ‘Flower’ daisy (mid)
2 tulip (high) ‘Flower’ tulip (high)
1 pine (high) ‘Tree’ apple (low)
1 pine (high) ‘Tree’ pine (high)
2 pine (high) ‘Tree’ pine (high)
...
...
...
...
Table 2: Excerpt of a game transcript from two successful
players in Study 1 (‘Apple Tree’, ‘Palm Tree’, and ‘Pine
Tree’ are abbreviated without the word ‘Tree’). Consec-
utive rows with the same Sender show retries.
come). We also measured the effect of trial num-
ber on the interpretation of ambiguous words in or-
der to evaluate the time course of the Receivers’
cost-based inferencing. For that, the three-way out-
come of Receiver guess was treated as three binary
variables (high-cost-or-not, mid-cost-or-not, low-
cost-or-not). For all analyses, means, and figures,
we consider only non-retry moves. We report the
logistic-regression coefficient estimate and p-value
(based on the Wald Z statistic; Agresti, 2002) for
the factors cost and trial number (both treated as nu-
meric factors) with random participant-specific in-
tercepts and slopes.
Additionally, Figure 3 shows the overall rates of
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Figure 3: The percentage of trials with a low-, mid-, or
high-cost target in which a Sender produced an ambigu-
ous word. The lower part of each bar represents the per-
centage of trials in which the use of an ambiguous word
was successful.
use and success for the ambiguous words, measured
over proportions of trials. The height of each bar
in the graph shows the proportion of trials for each
cost—low, mid, high—where an ambiguous word
was used. The shaded (lower) portion of the bar
shows the proportion of those ambiguous words that
resulted in successful communication.
As predicted, Senders produced an ambiguous
word more often if the gnome had highlighted a
target object whose unambiguous name was high
cost (βcost=1.94, p<0.001): 58.9% of high-cost-
target trials yielded an ambiguous word, whereas
only 24.8% of mid-cost-target trials and 4.6% of
low-cost-target trials yielded ambiguity.
Receivers likewise paid attention to cost, correctly
guessing the target more often when an ambigu-
ous word was used for a high-cost target than for a
mid- or low-cost target (βcost=1.68, p<0.005): Tri-
als with an ambiguous word yielded successful com-
munication 74.1% of the time if the intended target
was high cost, compared to 37.8% and 37.5% suc-
cess when an ambiguous word was used for mid-cost
and low-cost targets, respectively. In other words, of
the 58.9% of trials in which an ambiguous word was
produced for a high-cost target, 74.1% of those tri-
als yielded successful communication (compared to
less than half the time for trials in which an ambigu-
ous word was used for a low- or mid-cost target), as
depicted in the ‘high’ bar of Figure 3.
We also ask whether the interpretation of an am-
biguous word changes over successive trials. Re-
stricting the analysis to trials in which an ambigu-
ous word was used, we find that the interpreta-
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Figure 4: Rate at which Receivers in Study 1 interpreted ambiguous words as referring to objects with high-, mid-,
and low-cost unambiguous names. Errors bars show standard error of the mean.
tion of ambiguous words favors high-cost objects
over time (βtrial=0.29, p<0.01) and disfavors, al-
beit not significantly, mid-cost and low-cost ob-
jects (mid: βtrial=-0.22, p=0.09; low: βtrial=-0.23,
p=0.11). Figure 4 shows the probability of a Re-
ceiver interpreting an ambiguous word as referring
to a high, mid, or low-cost object. Trial number in
Figure 4 (and in the regression) represents the num-
ber of trials for which an object of that cost has
been highlighted—e.g., the datapoints at Trial=10
are the 10th trials, within each game, in which the
gnome highlighted a high-cost object (either a tulip
or a pine tree) and the Sender sent an ambiguous
word (‘Flower’ or ‘Tree’) and the Receiver guessed
a high-cost object (solid line), a mid-cost object
(dashed line), or a low-cost object (dotted line).
What is apparent in Figure 4 is that the data af-
ter Trial=15 becomes noisier (more fluctuation) and
more sparse (limited/no error bars). This drop-off
corresponds to the point in the game when most suc-
cessful players had reached 1000 points and left, so
the data for the later trials represents the behavior of
pairs of players who had failed to coordinate their
referring expressions. These players overall used
fewer ambiguous words, and because of this, many
were watching their scores become more and more
negative. Data from all players up through Trial=15
was analyzed in the time course logistic regression.
These results show that players can and do coor-
dinate their use of referring expressions, convention-
alizing the meaning of an ambiguous form to asso-
ciate it with the object whose unambiguous name is
the most costly to produce.
4 Study 2: Communicating about Objects
with Similar Costs
As a further test of the predictions of a game-
theoretic model, a second study was conducted that
shifted the cost structure within each category. Com-
pared with the costs in Study 1, the high-cost names
in Study 2 were less costly than before, and the point
difference between the low-cost, mid-cost, and high-
cost names was smaller. The revised costs were pre-
dicted to reduce the likelihood that players would
coordinate their use of referring expressions. The
target score and the reward for successful commu-
nication stayed the same, but the stakes were lower
(i.e., the cost structure imposed lower costs overall)
so that it was possible for players to reach the target
score in less time without making recourse to the
ambiguous words. Rational players could choose
to waste less effort attempting to align their use of
referring expressions because the benefit of align-
ment was potentially outweighed by the points lost
in rounds in which successful communication re-
quired the Sender to send more than one word.
4.1 Participants
10 pairs of English speakers from Northwestern
University received $10 to participate. None had
participated in Study 1.
4.2 Methods
The game environment contained the same set of six
objects. The game rules and shared knowledge of
those rules matched Study 1. The only difference
was the costs (Table 3): The most expensive name
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Figure 5: The percentage of trials with a low-, mid-, or
high-cost target in which a Sender produced an ambigu-
ous word. The lower part of each bar represents the per-
centage of trials in which the use of an ambiguous word
was successful.
in each category cost slightly more than two times
the least expensive name and not more than one and
a half times the mid-cost name. Successful com-
munication was still rewarded with +85 points to
both players and the game ended when either player
reached 1000 points. Since the absolute costs for the
low- and mid-cost objects were similar to Study 1
while the absolute cost for the high-cost object was
reduced, the average point cost in Study 2 was re-
duced and therefore it was possible to end the game
after 48 turns rather than 60 without coordination.
Name Cost Name Cost
“Rose” -80 “Apple Tree” -80
“Daisy” -140 “Palm Tree” -135
“Tulip” -165 “Pine Tree” -170
“Flower -80 “Tree” -80
Table 3: Referring expressions and their costs (Study 2)
4.3 Results and Discussion
Of the 10 pairs, 8 coordinated their referring expres-
sions, allowing an early exit from the game. Con-
trary to prediction, the imposition of lower costs did
not reduce players’ motivation to conventionalize.
This can be seen in reliable effects of cost on pro-
duction and comprehension, as in Study 1. Figure
5 shows the overall rates of use and success for am-
biguous words in Study 2.
Senders produced an ambiguous word most often
if the highlighted object was high cost (βcost=2.56,
p<0.001): 72.6% of high-cost-target trials yielded
an ambiguous word, whereas only 25.6% of mid-
cost-target trials and 6.4% of low-cost-target trials
yielded ambiguity. Receivers likewise paid atten-
tion to cost, correctly guessing the target more often
when an ambiguous word was used for a high-cost
target than for a mid- or low-cost target (βcost=1.18,
p<0.001): Trials with an ambiguous word yielded
successful communication 82.5% of the time if the
intended target was high cost, compared to 51.0%
and 21.4% success when an ambiguous word was
used for mid-cost and low-cost targets, respectively.
The time course differs slightly from Study 1,
however. Receivers in Study 2 did not show a re-
liable rise in their preference to interpret ambiguous
words as referring to high-cost targets. Again re-
stricting the analysis to trials in which an ambiguous
word was used (see Figure 6), the only reliable effect
is that ambiguous words become less likely to be in-
terpreted as referring to low-cost objects over time
(βtrial=-0.65, p=0.05). The effect of trial number
on the use of ambiguity for mid-cost targets is again
not significant, though the coefficient is positive here
(it was negative in Study 1), meaning that ambigu-
ity tended to favor the mid-cost target slightly over
time (βtrial=0.13, p=0.32). The slight increase here
in the rate at which ambiguous words were inter-
preted to refer to high-cost objects is not significant
(βtrial=0.09, p=0.22), unlike in Study 1. Given the
different cost structure, the point in the game when
most successful players had reached 1000 points and
left comes at Trial=11. Figure 6 shows the subse-
quent sparseness after that point, and the time course
regression includes data only up to Trial=11.
Across the two studies, Sender/Receiver pairs
who coordinated their use of ambiguous forms were
better able to communicate. Two pairs in Study 2
converged on a pattern of usage whereby an ambigu-
ous word was used to refer to the object with the
mid-cost unambiguous name. This could explain the
time course result whereby the slope for mid-cost
guesses for ambiguous words was positive (though
not significantly so) in this study but not in Study 1.
Another difference between the two studies is that in
Study 2, convergence in the use of ambiguity in one
category did not guarantee convergence in the other:
two pairs used ‘Tree’ reliably but not ‘Flower’.
In terms of our predictions, players did show sen-
sitivity to the differences in the cost structure, but
what characterized the behavior of players in Study
2 was a more immediate and sustained use of am-
biguous words as referring to high-cost objects for
most pairs and an openness to assign the ambigu-
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Figure 6: Rate at which Receivers in Study 2 interpreted ambiguous words as referring to objects with high-, mid-,
and low-cost unambiguous names. Interpretation of axes and error bars as in Figure 3.
ous word to a mid-cost object for a small subset
of pairs. The players’ behavior seems to point to a
greater willingness to experiment with the ambigu-
ous words in a context like Study 2 where, despite
their experimentation, they could see their scores in-
creasing more quickly to the target value. Alterna-
tively, rather than casting Study 2 as the context with
increased experimentation, one can ask why play-
ers did not experiment more in Study 1. Perhaps
the higher production costs in Study 1 made players
avoid risking ambiguity and possibly having to retry.
Lastly, one can ask if players simply used a trial-
and-error strategy for finding an efficient alignment
without recourse to the pragmatic inference required
for the cost-based implicature. To rule this out, we
considered the trials in which a Sender first sent an
ambiguous word. We pooled the data from the two
studies since each participant could only contribute
one datapoint. In keeping with the cost-based impli-
cature account, Receivers inferred, more often than
chance, that the high-cost object was the intended
object (χ2(2)=11.54, p<0.005).
5 General Discussion
In keeping with the game-theoretic prediction, we
saw that ambiguous words can be used meaning-
fully to refer to entities with costly unambiguous
names, crucially if other referents can be identified
with low-cost unambiguous names. This extends the
claim that listeners draw cost-based implicature be-
yond the case of a fixed lexical host like “some”.
We also saw sensitivity to relative costs: In com-
paring the two studies, the trajectory for how am-
biguous words were interpreted over time in Study 1
(where the unambiguous names had more divergent
costs) differs from the trajectory in Study 2 (where
the unambiguous names had more similar costs).
Only in Study 2 did players ever assign the ambigu-
ous word to a mid-cost item, and only in Study 2 did
a pair of successful players coordinate their use of
one ambiguous word but not both. Contrary to pre-
dictions, however, the lower stakes in Study 2 did
not yield a reduction in the players’ overall ability to
coordinate referring expressions.
This line of research raises an important question
about how production cost should be measured. For
the studies here, we imposed our costs arbitrarily—
i.e., we could just as well have assigned the cost of
‘Rose’ to ‘Tulip’ or to ‘Daisy’. One could imag-
ine instead a cost metric that reflects properties such
as length (as in Figure 1) or the presence of non-
native phonemes or other articulation-based com-
plexity. Alternatively, there is evidence that fre-
quency contributes to production difficulty: Speak-
ers are slower to name objects with low-frequency
names than high-frequency names (Oldenfield &
Wingfield, 1965). Speakers also experience diffi-
culty, as measured by their disfluency, when de-
scribing objects which have not yet been mentioned
(Arnold & Tanenhaus, 2007), are unfamiliar or lack
a name (Arnold, Kam, & Tanenhaus, 2007). To
avoid the inference step of assessing what phonolog-
ical/lexical/pragmatic properties speakers perceive
as costly, the proof-of-concept studies presented
here used externally imposed costs to test the use of
cost-based implicatures. The next stage of this re-
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search will extend the experimental framework de-
scribed here to the kinds of costs that are imposed
naturally in regular conversation.
If cost does influence choice of referring expres-
sion, one must still ask whether its role is automatic
or strategic (Horton, 2008). By presenting this work
from the standpoint of calculable implicatures, we
have framed the questions in strategic terms. The
factors that guide speakers’ strategic selection of re-
ferring expressions may depend not only on the costs
associated with production (as we have shown here)
but also on speakers’ estimates of the costs and ben-
efits of successful communication and of the degree
of coordination between speaker and hearer (van
Deemter, 2009).
It is also possible that our participants had a more
automatic reaction to the salience of high-cost ob-
jects — maybe they just associated an ambiguous
form with the most salient object of that category,
where cost indicated salience. This scenario is com-
patible with a game-theoretic account — the reason-
ing being that it would be unnecessarily costly to
refer to a prominent entity with a full name when a
reduced or ambiguous form could be used.3
Lastly, these results fit with existing work on the
role of reduction in communication — namely, work
showing that speakers make rational decisions about
redundancy and reduction and do not necessarily
avoid ambiguity (Levy & Jaeger, 2007; Jaeger,
2010; Piantadosi, Tily, & Gibson, 2011). Like this
previous work, we argue that ambiguity arises from
a rational communication process. In our case, am-
biguity arises in contexts in which the explicit costs
of production are part of speakers’ common ground.
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Common ground is one of the key constructs
in (spoken) dialogue. It embodies the notion that
interlocutors build up, maintain, align their un-
derstandings of what is being talked about such
that they have a “shared” or (at least) “mutual”
understanding. What I understand is how you un-
derstand is what you understand. Leaving issues
aside whether such a symmetry actually does ex-
ist between humans, it should be clear to anyone
that it certainly does not hold between humans
and robots. Robots and humans experience real-
ity differently, they understand reality differently.
There is an inherent asymmetry between them.
And that creates a bit of a problem for building
up shared understanding, especially since that is
what we are particularly interested in, at least in
the kinds of task-oriented dialogues we are often
dealing with in human-robot interaction (HRI).
The talk starts by looking at what makes situ-
ated dialogue in human-robot interaction an inter-
esting and often amusing field of research. Videos
from a wide variety of projects illustrate typi-
cal problems, issues, and possibilities encoun-
tered in lab settings, as well as ”out-in-the-field”
(hospitals, rescue missions). From there the talk
then moves deeper into the issue of common
ground, looking at how it does (or where it ac-
tually does *not*) affect communication between
humans and robots, and to what extent existing
theories can actually really deal with the issue.
The talk ends with outlining ongoing work on for-
mulating a new approach to modeling common
ground in a constructive way, and setting these
efforts in practical experience with collaborative
dialogue in human-robot teams.
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Abstract
This paper proposes a formal semantics for
feedback acts in terms of updates of the in-
formation states of dialogue participants. A
wide range of forms and functions of feedback
is considered, including feedback about one’s
own processing of previous dialogue contri-
butions (‘auto-feedback’) and feedback about
someone else’s processing (‘allo-feedback’);
positive and negative feedback; articulate and
inarticulate feedback (having or not having a
specified semantic content); feedback which
is specific for a certain level of processing and
feedback which is level-unspecific, and ex-
plicit feedback versus feedback that is entailed
or implicated.
1 Forms and functions of feedback
Feedback is the mortar of conversation. Throughout
a dialogue, the participants continuously give and
elicit information about their attention, perception,
understanding, and reactions to what is said by oth-
ers (Allwood et al., 1993; Clark & Krych, 2004).
Feedback is not always expressed explicitly through
words or gestures, but may also be implicit, as in the
following dialogue fragment:
(1)
1. C: Can you tell me from which platform
the train to Utrecht leaves?
2. S: That’s platform 5.
3. C: Thank you.
The utterance “Thank you” will in this situation
be interpreted as implying that participant C un-
derstood S’s answer, and thus as providing positive
feedback by implication.
In general, the receiver of feedback obtains infor-
mation about the success of his actions. In a dia-
logue, the receiver of a feedback message obtains
information about the sender’s success in process-
ing previous contributions to the dialogue. This may
tell the receiver for example that he has been un-
derstood correctly, or that the speaker is uncertain
about what was meant, or has difficulty to believe
something that was said. Feedback can thus relate
to various levels of processing, such as hearing, un-
derstanding, and accepting something. Sometimes,
a feedback message is not specific about a particular
aspect of processing; for example, common forms of
positive feedback such as nodding or saying “okay”
are often ambiguous in this respect.
1.1 Auto- and allo-feedbeck
Feedback utterances most often provide information
about the speaker’s success in processing previous
utterances, but they may also provide information
about the speaker’s beliefs about the addressee’s
success in processing. Examples are:
(2) a. A: I don’t have a good connection on Thursday.
B: I said Tuesday.
b. A: Could you enhance the contrast please?
B: Is this okay?
c. A: Friday 13?
B: That’s what I meant.
This kind of feedback was first distinguished by
Bunt (1999) and called ‘allo-feedback’, introducing
for contrast the term ‘auto-feedback’ to refer to feed-
back about the speaker’s own processing. Both auto-
and allo- feedback can be positive, reporting suc-
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cessful processing, and negative, reporting on pro-
cessing that is not entirely successful.
Allo-feedback also includes feedback elicitation,
where the speaker wants to know whether the ad-
dressee successfully processed a previous utterance.
Like reportative feedback, feedback elicitation may
indicate a specific level of processing, like (3c) and
(3d) or may be level-unspecific. like (3a) and (3b).
(3) a. Okay?
b. Right?
c. Did you hear me?
d. See what I mean?
1.2 Articulate and inarticulate feedback
A distinction among different forms of feedback
concerns the specificity of the feedback. We call
feedback inarticulate if it reports positively or nega-
tively about the processing of (parts of) one or more
previous utterances without specifying which stretch
of dialogue the feedback is about (the scope) of the
feedback), or what the result of the processing or
the processing problem was. More precisely, inar-
ticulate positive feedback reports that the processing
of (parts of) one or more previous utterances was
successful without specifying the scope of the feed-
back, or what was the result of the processing; nega-
tive inarticulate feedback reports that the processing
of the utterance parts in its scope was not entirely
successful, without specifying the scope or the pro-
cessing problem. The examples in (4) illustrate this
form of feedback.
(4) a. OK. Yes. M-hm. Aha. (verbally expressed pos-
itive auto-feedback)
Nodding; smiling (nonverbally expressed posi-
tive auto-feedback)
In combination: multimodal positive auto-
feedback
b. Excuse me? Huh? What? (verbal negative
auto-feedback)
Frowning; raising eye brows; head shake (non-
verbal negative auto-feedback)
In combination: multimodal negative auto-
feedback
c. Quite. Yes. (positive allo-feedback)
Nodding (nonverbal positive allo-feedback)
In combination:multimodal positive allo-
feedback
d. OK? All right? (verbal negative allo-feedback)
Raising eye brows, looking at addressee (non-
verbal negative allo-feedback)
In combination: multimodal negative allo-
feedback
Petukhova (2011) found that in the AMI corpus
of multiparty dialogues, inarticulate auto-feedback
is expressed only verbally in 24.2% of the cases;
only nonverbally in 29.6%; and in multimodal form
in 46.2%.
In contrast with inarticulate feedback, articulate
feedback indicates the stretch of dialogue that the
feedback is about, typically by repeating or para-
phrasing it, and thereby also specifying a processing
result. The examples in (5) illustrate this form of
feedback.
(5) a. C: Which flights do you have on Friday, in the
morning?
S: To Munich, Friday the 23rd, the first flight is
at 7.45. (articulate positive auto-feedback)
b. Did you say Tuesday or Thursday? (articulate
negative auto-feedback)
c. Thursday, yes. (articulate positive allo-
feedback)
d. No, Tuesday. (articulate negative allo-
feedback)
While inarticulate positive feedback is often expressed
nonverbally, articulate feedback is typically expressed
verbally or in multimodal form with a verbal component,
since the specification of a (part of a) previous utterance
and of a processing result is difficult to realize nonver-
bally (though an iconic or a pointing gesture can some-
times be used for that purpose).
Note that positive articulate feedback need to articu-
late its scope by repeating or paraphrasing the entire ut-
terance(s) that it contains; often, only a part is repeated
or paraphrased, as the examples in (6) illustrate. The
paraphrase in (6a) of “next Friday” as “Friday the 13th”
should be understood as positive feedback about the en-
tire previous utterance at the level of understanding.
(6) a.
B: We meet again next Friday?
A: Friday the 13th at one-thirty.
b.
C: Can you tell me what time is the first train
to the airport on Sunday?
S: The first train on Sunday,... let me see...,
the first train is at five fifty-four.
By contrast, negative feedback about part of an
utterance should not be understood as negative feed-
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back about the entire utterance, but rather as impli-
cating positive feedback about the rest of the utter-
ance, as the examples in (7) illustrate:
(7) a.
A: Avon to Bath is four hours.
B: Four?
b.
A: then go past the mill, going north,...
B: slightly northeast?
Note that the articulate/inarticulate distinction is
one of (linguistic) form. A feedback act which is ex-
pressed in an inarticulate form does have a semantic
content; the difference is that this content is provided
by the utterance that the feedback is about, rather
than by the feedback utterance itself.
1.3 Feedback scope
For the interpretation of feedback it is essential to
know its scope. While articulate feedback explic-
itly indicates its scope, inarticulate feedback does
not. Very often, feedback has the last utterance of
the previous speaker as its scope, but not always.
An analysis of the scope of feedback behaviour in
two corpora, the AMI corpus1 and a French cor-
pus of two-party route explanation dialogue col-
lected at the University of Toulouse2 Petukhova et
al. (2011) shows that feedback mostly (in 61% of
the cases) has the immediately preceding utterance
as its scope.3 Table 2 shows the percentage of feed-
back occurrences with a scope of 1-10 utterances or
a much larger scope (namely the entire preceding di-
alogue), and the distance between the feedback and
its scope. We see that around 80% of the feedback
cases has its scope in the preceding 1-3 utterances.
1.4 Feedback studies and statistics
Feedback has been studied empirically for its forms,
functions, and contexts of occurrence, e.g. by All-
wood et al. (1993), Allwood & Cerrato (2003),
Clark & Krych (2004), Petukhova & Bunt (2009b),
Petukhova et al. (2011), and within the conversa-
tional analysis tradition notably by Drew (1997) and
Drew & Heritage (1992).
1See http://www.ami-project.org
2For more information see Muller & Pre´vot (2003).
3In fact this percentage is higher, since distance was mea-
sured in terms of ‘functional segment’s, which are smaller than
utterances. See Petukhova et al. (2011) for details and for the
precise definition of distance.
scope feedback distance feedback
1 54.1 0 61.0
2 9.8 1 8.8
3 7.7 2 9.3
4 1.1 3 4.9
5 3.9 4 2.7
6 2.8 5 2.2
7 1.1 6 2.2
8 0.2 7 1.1
9 0.0 8 0.8
≥ 10, <600 14.9 10 0.5
>600 4.4 >20 1.6
Table 1: Feedback scope and distance
Table 2 shows the frequency of occurrence of ex-
plicit feedback acts in three different corpora, the
AMI corpus, the Dutch DIAMOND corpus of tele-
phone dialogues with a help desk4, and the OVIS
corpus of Dutch human-computer telephone dia-
logues.5
AMI DIAMOND OVIS
Auto-Feedback 20.5 19.1 24.1
Allo-Feedback 0.7 3.8 39.2
Table 2: Frequency (percentage of functional segments)
of feedback acts in AMI, DIAMOND, and OVIS corpora.
2 Feedback as dialogue acts
2.1 Dialogue acts
Communicative feedback can be described in terms
of communicative actions, performed by a speaker
in order to provide information to his addressee(s)
or to elicit information from him/them about the pro-
cessing of previous utterances. We analyse feedback
behaviour therefore within a framework constructed
around communicative actions used in dialogue,
called dialogue acts. In this framework, called Dy-
namic Interpretation Theory (DIT), communicative
behaviour is viewed as consisting of actions that are
intended to change an addressee’s information state
in certain ways. Such a view, commonly known as
the information-state update approach to the seman-
tics of dialogue utterances, has widely been adopted
4See Geertzen et al. (2004)
5Corpus of dialogues over the telephone with the experi-
mental Dutch public transportation information system. See
http://www.let.rug.nl/˜vannoord/OVIS.
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for the analysis of spoken and multimodal dialogue
(see e.g. Larsson & Traum, 2000). The DIT frame-
work (Bunt, 1994; 2000) has been used in the con-
struction of a comprehensive domain-independent
dialogue act taxonomy, the DIT++ taxonomy.6 This
taxonomy has formed the basis of the recently es-
tablished ISO standard 24617-2 for dialogue act an-
notation (ISO 24617-2:2012); see Bunt et al. (2010;
2012).
2.2 Communicative functions and dimensions
In the DIT framework communicative behaviour is
analyzed as the performance of several parallel ac-
tivities, such as pursuing a certain task or activ-
ity, providing and eliciting feedback, taking turns,
and editing one’s contributions. Each of these types
of activity is called a dimension; in total 10 di-
mensions are defined: Task, Auto-Feedback, Allo-
Feedback, Turn Management, Time Management,
Contact Management, Discourse Structuring, Own
Communication Management, Partner Communica-
tion Management, and Social Obligations Manage-
ment (see Bunt, 2009; Petukhova & Bunt, 2009a)
Dialogue acts are the actions that dialogue partic-
ipants use to perform these activities. A dialogue
act has as its main components a semantic content,
which specifies the entities, relations, propositions,
events, actions, etc. that the dialogue act is about,
and a communicative function, that specifies how an
addressee should use the semantic content to update
his information state.
A distinctive feature of the DIT++ taxonomy is
that it consists of two parts, the ‘dimension-specific’
functions that can be used only for a dialogue act
in a specific dimension (such as Take Turn and
Turn Release in the Turn Management dimension,
Stalling in the Time Management dimension, and
Self-Correction in the Own Communication Man-
agement dimension ), and the ‘general-purpose’
functions, that can be used in any dimension, such
as Inform, Question, Answer, Confirm, Offer, Re-
quest, Suggest.
Figure 1 shows the taxonomy of general-purposse
communicative functions, which is shared by
DIT++ and the ISO 24617-2 standard; Figure 2
shows the DIT++ taxonomy of dimension-specific
6See Bunt (2009) and http://dit.uvt.nl.
communicative functions, of which the ISO 24617-
2 standard uses a subset.
2.3 Feedback acts
Feedback acts can be formed in two ways: (a) by
combining a general-purpose function (GPF) with
a semantic content that refers to the processing of
previous utterances; and (b) by using a dimension-
specific feedback function (FSF). GPFs can be used
to form an articulate feedback act, as illustrated by
the examples in (9), where we see e.g. an Auto-
Feedback Set-Question in (a), an Allo-Feedback
Confirm in (c), and an Auto-Feedback Inform in (d).
Both articulate and inarticulate feedback can be
specific or unspecific about a level of processing;
Petukhova & Bunt (2009b) show for example that
inarticulate positive feedback in the form of nod-
ding can indicate whether it is concerned with under-
standing or with evaluation by the speed, the num-
ber, and the amplitude of the nods. But sometimes
speakers do not commit to a level of processing, in
which case a level-unspecific feedback act should be
used to describe the behaviour.
In DIT++ five levels of processing are distin-
guished; ordered from ‘low’ to ‘high’, these are:
(8) attention
perception
interpretation
evaluation
execution
‘Evaluation’ should be understood here in relation
to the information-state update approach and the re-
quirement that information states at all times remain
internally consistent. For example, the recipient of
an inform act with a semantic content p knows that
the speaker wants him to insert the information p in
his information state. Before doing this, the recip-
ient has to check whether p is consistent with his
current state; the information p is therefore buffered
in the ‘pending context’. If the evaluation has a pos-
itive outcome, then the recipient can move on to the
stage of execution, which is the highest level of pro-
cessing of an input. For this example, execution
would be that the recipient moves the content from
the pending context into his information state. The
examples in (9) illustrate the occurrence of feedback
acts relating to each of the five levels of processing.
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Figure 1: Dimension-speccfic communicative functions for feedback.
(9) a. Sorry, I wasn’t listening. You were saying?
b. Between 11 and 1 you said?
c. A: Friday the 13th?
B: That’s what I mean.
d. That’s a good question.
e. A: To change the contrast first press F9.
B: Done.
The five levels of (8) have logical relationships;
e.g., a message has to be perceived to some extent
in order to be understood. These relations are the
basis of entailments between feedback acts at differ-
ent levels: a positive feedback act at one level logi-
cally entails positive feedback at lower levels, and
a negative feedback act at one level entails nega-
tive feedback at higher levels. ‘Positive’ feedback
means the utterance(s) concerned (or a dialogue act
that they express) has been processed with sufficient
success to not require a clarification or correction
before moving on.
Moreover, the ordering of processing levels gives
rise to conversational implicatures that derive from
the Gricean principle of informativeness. If, for ex-
ample, you did not understand well enough what
was meant, then this is what you should report,
rather than a perceptual problem. Therefore, posi-
tive feedback at one level implicates negative feed-
back at higher levels. For negative feedback it’s the
other way round.7 This is summarized in Table 1.
polarity levels relation polarity
positive Li > Lj entailment positive
positive Li < Lj implicature negative
negative Li < Lj entailment negative
negative Li > Lj implicature positive
elicitation Li > Lj implicature pos. allo-fb
Table 3: Entailments and implicatures between feedback
acts at different levels of processing (from Bunt, 2011b.)
2.4 Dialogue act semantics
Bunt (2011a) formalizes communicative functions
as specifications for updating an information state
with a given content. This formalization has the
form of a semantics for the Dialogue Act Markup
Language (DiAML), defined as part of ISO standard
24617-2. In this language, a dialogue act is charac-
terized by a sender, one or more addressees, a com-
municative function, a dimension, and possibly ad-
ditional specifications of certainty, conditionality, or
sentiment (so-called ‘qualifiers’), and relations with
7An expression such as “What are you saying?” can be used
to express e.g. astonishment or disbelief, rather than a percep-
tual problem; this is typically indicated by the use of prosody
and accompanying facial expression and gestures.
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Figure 2: Dimension-speccfic communicative functions for feedback.
other dialogue acts. A specification of values for
each of these parameterss gives a function that can
be applied to a semantic content, resulting in an in-
formation state update operation.
3 The semantics of feedback acts
3.1 Feedback-specific communicative functions
Figure 3 shows the dimension-specific communica-
tive functions of the DIT taxonomy for the di-
mensions of Auto- and Allo-Feedback. For auto-
feedback there are five level-specific positive and
five negative functions; likewise for allo-feedback,
which has additionally five level-specific functions
for feedback elicitation. In addition there are four
level-unspecific communicative functions.
3.2 Semantic primitives
An analysis of the definitions8 of the communica-
tive functions of Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 shows that a for-
mal description of the update effects of dialogue acts
with a GPF (general-purpose communicative func-
tion) requires a number of general concepts, such as
believes that, knows value of, has goal, is able to do,
is willing to do, and that for describing the update se-
8The definitions can be found in ISO 24617-2:2012 and on
http://dit.uvt.nl.
mantics of dimension-specific communicative func-
tions a number of dimension-specific primitives are
needed. Auto- and allo-feedback acts require the fol-
lowing primitive predicates: Attended, Perceived,
Understood, Accepted, and Executed.
3.3 Level-specific feedback acts
The semantics of level-specific feedback acts, pro-
viding information about the success of processing
at level Li, expresses that the sender of the feedback
wants the addressee to know in the case of positive
feedback that the utterances within its scope were
successfully processed at that level; in the negative
case that a processing problem occurred at that level;
and in the case of feedback elicitation that the sender
wants to know whether the addressee’s processing
was successful at that level.
The interpretation of a positive feedback act is
that an addressee’s information state is updated with
the information that speaker wants the addressee(s)
to know that the utterances in its scope were suc-
cessfully processed at level Li. This can be formal-
ized by means of combinations of elementary update
schemes in order to add two relevant beliefs to the
pending context part of an addressee’s information
state: (1) that the speaker believes he successfully
processed its content at level Li; (2) that he wants
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the addressee to know that.
For example, a positive feedback act at the level
of understanding, like in (6a), would be interpreted
as the combination, defined in (10a), of the elemen-
tary update schemes U33 and U53 (defined in Table
5). Applied to example (6a), the update effects are
that B’s information about A’s processing (i.e. B’s
pending contextB′PC), is extended (indicated by the
symbol =+) to include the information that A be-
lieves he heard B say “We meet again next Friday”,
and that A wants B to know that.
(10) a. F (AutoPerceptionPositive) = λX.λY.λz.
U33(X,Y, z) unionsq U53(X,Y, z)
b. B′PC =+ Bel(B, Want(A, Bel(B, Understood
(A, ‘we meet again next friday’))))
B′PC =+ Bel(B, Bel(A, Understood(A,‘we
meet again next friday’)))
Table 4 lists the semantics of 5 of the 25 level-
specific communicative functions of the DIT++ tax-
onomy, one for each level of processing; Table 5
shows the elementary update schemes involved. The
semantics of the remaining (20) functions and up-
date schemes can be extrapolated from these tables.
For example, a positive auto-feedback act by A at
the level of evaluation, addressed to B, with content
c0, updates B’s pending context (B′PC) using the up-
date schemes U34 and U54 as follows:
B′PC =+ Bel(B, Bel(A, Accepted(X, c0))) unionsq
B′PC =+ Bel(B, Want(A, Bel(B, Accepted (A, c0)))
3.4 Level-unspecific feedback acts
For determining the semantics of a feedback act
which is underspecified for a level of processing, a
maximally cautious approach would be to assume
level-unspecific feedback to apply at the lowest level
of processing, i.e. positive feedback as signalling at-
tention without making any assumptions about sig-
nal recognition, understanding, and higher process-
ing, and negative feedback as signalling an attention
problem, and therefore also problems at all higher
levels of processing. This does not seem realistic,
however; level-unspecific positive feedback signals
like “yes”, “okay”, and nodding typically signal
more than just paying attention, and negative signals
do not just signal a problem at the level of attention,
but rather at a higher level. We propose to determine
the levels of processing covered by level-unspecific
feedback acts empirically.
To this end, we analyzed the feedback level in-
terpretations in data obtained in an annotation ex-
periment, originally performed in order to assess
inter-annotator agreement among naive annotators
using the DIT++ annotation scheme (see Geertzen
et al., 2007). The experiment showed that anno-
tators often found it difficult to choose a level of
processing when annotating flevel-unspecific eed-
back acts. This explains why agreement scores
were found for auto- and allo-feedback of .36 and
.33, respectively, which are much lower than those
for other dimensions (average .61). This moti-
vated the designers of the ISO 24617-2 annota-
tion scheme to collapse the level-specific feedback
functions of DIT++ into the level-unspecific com-
municative functions Auto-Positive, Auto-Negative,
Allo-Positive, Allo-Negative, and Feedback Elici-
tation (which were subsequently also added to the
DIT++ taxonomy).
We analyzed the annotations produced in this ex-
periment for the number of times annotators as-
signed a particular level to a feedback act of which
the level was not clearly expressed in linguistic
and/or nonverbal features of the behaviour, and cal-
culated the number of times each level was chosen
in those cases where not all four annotators agreed.
The results are shown in Table 4 for human-human
dialogues from the Map Task corpus and for human-
computer dialogues from the OVIS corpus.
The table shows that level-unspecific feedback is
almost never interpreted as applying at the level of
attention. For the rest, the results are very differ-
ent. In the human-human condition positive auto-
and allo-feedback are both interpreted mostly as ap-
plying to evaluation or execution, whereas in the
human-computer dialogues most feedback acts con-
cerned perception or understanding. The latter result
is directly related to the deficiencies in automatic
speech recognition, and to some degree also to the
machine’s limited understanding of the user.
Since the interpretation of level-unspecific feed-
back acts depends on the setting in which the dia-
logue occurs, we propose to introduce a predicate
SuccessProcessing that represents successful pro-
cessing, whose interpretation depends on the dia-
logue setting. For human-human dialogue (the MT
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F (AutoAttentionPositive) = λX.λY.λz.U31(X,Y, z) unionsq U51((X,Y, z))
F (AlloPerceptionNegative) = λX.λY.λz.U37((X,Y, z)) unionsq U57((X,Y, z))
F (AutoInterpretationPositive) = λX.λY.λz.U33(X,Y, z) unionsq U53((X,Y, z))
F (AutoEvaluationPositive) = λX.λY.λz.U34(X,Y, z) unionsq U54((X,Y, z))
F (ExecutionElicitation) = λX.λY.λz.U75(X,Y, z)
F (AutoPositive) = λX.λY.λDi.λz.U39(X,Y, z) unionsq U59(X,Y, z)
Table 4: Semantics of feedback functions (selection)
U31(X,Y, z): Y ′PC =+ Bel(Y , Want(X, Bel(Y, Attended(X, z))))
U33(X,Y, z): Y ′PC =+ Bel(Y , Want(X, Bel(Y, Understood(X, z))))
U34(X,Y, z): Y ′PC =+ Bel(Y , Want(X, Bel(Y, Accepted(X, z))))
U37(X,Y, z): Y ′PC =+ Bel(Y , Want(X, Bel(Y, Perception-Problem(Y, z))))
U39(X,Y, z): Y ′PC =+ Bel(Y , Want(X, Bel(Y, SuccessProcessing(X, z))))
U51(X,Y, z): Y ′PC =+ Bel(Y , Bel(X, Attended(X, z))))
U53(X,Y,Di, z) Y
′
PC =+ Bel(Y , Bel(X, Understood(X, z))))
U54(X,Y, z): Y ′PC =+ Bel(Y , Bel(X, Accepted(X, z))))
U57(X,Y, z): Y ′PC =+ Bel(Y , Bel(X, Perception-Problem(X, z))))
U59(X,Y, z): Y ′PC =+ Bel(Y , Bel(X, SuccessProcessing(X, z))))
U75(X,Y, z): Y ′PC =+ Bel(Y , Want(X, Know-if(X , Execution-Problem(Y, z))))
Table 5: Elementary update schemes used in the semantics of auto- and allo-feedback functions.
condition), according to Table 6 this predicate can
be interpreted as representing successful processing
at the level of understanding or higher, i.e., as sig-
nalling successful understanding and possibly also
successful ‘higher’ processing. Negative feedback
would be interpreted as complementary to positive
feedback.
So a positive level-unspecific feedback act, with
the communicative function AutoPositive, like the
one contributed by B in (11a), would (according to
Table 4) be interpreted by the combination of ele-
mentary update schemes U39 and U59, defined in Ta-
ble 5.
(11) a. A: I said five buttons max.
B: Okay.
b. F (AutoPositive) = λX.λY.λz.U59(X,Y, z) unionsq
U39(X,Y, z)
c. B′PC =+ Bel(B, Want(A, Bel(B, SuccessPro-
cessing (A, ‘I said five buttons max’))))
B′PC =+ Bel(B, Bel(A, SuccessProcessing(A,
‘I said five buttons max’)))
Interpreting the predicate SuccessProcessing in
certain conditions as “well understood and possibly
also accepted and executed successfully” may seem
to mean that level-unspecific feedback is in fact in-
terpreted as level-specific feedback at the level of un-
derstanding, but there is a subtle difference in impli-
catures: level-specific positive feedback at the level
of understanding implicates negative feedback at the
levels of evaluation and execution, but in the case of
level-unspecific feedback these implicatures do not
arise. Similarly for implicated negative feedback.
3.5 Entailed and implicated feedback
Feedback may be entailed or implicated by non-
feedback acts. Example (1) illustrated the occur-
rence of implicated positive feedback, which is at
the highest level of processing (the answer that the
thanking applies to is not just understood, but also
accepted and adopted). Negative feedback may be
implicated e.g. when the speaker jumps abruptly to
a new topic, which may carry the suggestion that the
previous topic was closed in an unsatisfactory man-
ner; in such a case it is not evident at which level of
processing a problem occurred.
Positive feedback is entailed by all responsive di-
alogue acts such as answers, confirms and discon-
firms; acceptance or rejection of offers, suggestions,
or requests; return greetings, accept apologies, and
several others.
(12) a. A: So, um, how many buttons do you suggest?
B: I said five max.
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feedback auto- auto- allo- allo-
positive negative positive negative
level MT OV MT OV MT OV fMT OV
attention 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
perception 0 28 0 6 1 3 0 9
interpretation 4 20 0 6 2 0 0 14
evaluation 32 0 1 0 8 0 0 6
execution 34 0 1 8 12 0 0 0
Table 6: Interpretation levels (in percentages) in Map Task (MT) dialogues and OVIS (OV) dialogues)
b. A: Pete, could you start the presentation?
B: Sure.
c. A: Sorry, we have no information about that.
B: No problem.
In all these cases it can be argued that the respon-
sive dialogue act is only possible if the ‘antecedent’
dialogue act was sufficiently well understood, was
accepted, and was ‘executed’ successfully. This il-
lustrates that entailed feedback is in general at the
highest level of processing, that of execution, and
therefore at all levels.
In sum, implied positive feedback, wether en-
tailed or implicated, is positive at all levels of pro-
cessing. Implied negative feedback is virtually never
about failed attention or perception, but rather about
understanding, evaluation, or execution.
4 Applications
The study of the forms, functions, and semantics of
feedback has both theoretical and practical applica-
tions.
Theoretically, a good understanding of feedback
is indispensable for a good understanding of lan-
guage in interaction, and has been studied in relation
to natural language understanding e.g. by Ginzburg
(1994), Ginzburg & Cooper (2004), Purver et al.,
(2001). Feedback plays a crucial role in processes
of grounding (the establishment of common ground
among dialogue participants), and has as such been
studied e.g. by Traum (1994), Clark (1996) and Bunt
et al. (2007). The semantics of feedback plays a
role in some of these studies, but often not in an ex-
plicit and certainly not in a complete way; for exam-
ple, allo-feedback has not been considered in any of
these studies with the exception of Bunt (1999).
Sophisticated interactive automatic systems
should be able to understand and to generate
appropriate forms of feedback at appropriate points
in the interaction. This application of models of
feedback has been investigated e.g. by Van Dam
(2006), for the design of graphical user interfaces;
for designing the PARADIME dialogue manager of
the IMIX information extraction system (Keizer et
al., 2011), for the design of the multimodal DENK
dialogue system (Ahn et al., 1995) and for the
GoDiS dialogue system by Larsson et al. (2000).
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that a formal and
computational semantics in terms of information
state updates can be given for a wide range of
forms and functions of feedback, including auto-
and allo-feedback (including feedback elicitation),
which both can be positive or negative, articulate and
inarticulate, specific for a particular level of process-
ing or level-unspecific, and entailed or implicated.
For feedback acts which are unspecific regarding
a level of processing, we proposed to use an empir-
ically determined level of success, which appears to
be different for human-computer dialogue than for
natural human dialogue.
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Abstract
Spoken dialogue systems can encounter
different types of errors, including non-
understanding errors where the system
recognises that user has spoken, but does
not understand the utterance. Strategies
for dealing with this kind of error have
been proposed and tested in the context of
goal-driven dialogue systems, for example
by Bohus with a system which helps re-
serve conference rooms (Bohus and Rud-
nicky, 2005). However there has been lit-
tle work on possible strategies in more con-
versational settings where the dialogue has
more open-ended intentions. This paper
looks at recovery from non-understanding
errors in the context of a robot tourguide,
and tests the strategies in a user trial. The
results suggest that it is beneficial for user
enjoyment to use strategies which attempt
to move the dialogue on, rather than getting
caught up in the error by asking users to re-
peat themselves.
1 Introduction
The handling of understanding errors is an impor-
tant consideration in the design of a spoken dia-
logue system. Many dialogues take place in dif-
ficult conditions, with spontaneous speech, large
vocabularies, varied user populations and uncer-
tain line quality (Bohus and Rudnicky, 2005).
These conditions make understanding errors very
likely during the course of a dialogue.
There are two types of understanding error
which a spoken dialogue system may encounter:
non-understandings and misunderstandings. A
non-understanding is where the system fails to
extract a valid semantic representation of what
the user said. A misunderstanding is where a
valid representation is extracted which happens to
be incorrect. While detecting misunderstandings
requires some thought, non-understanding errors
are immediately apparent to the system due to
the failure of the natural language understanding
component.
This paper looks at strategies for dealing with
non-understanding errors in the context of con-
versational spoken dialogue systems, as opposed
to slot-filling or more generally goal-driven ap-
proaches. In such goal-driven systems, the user
and the system typically work together to ac-
complish a specific task, for example booking a
flight, finding a restaurant or reserving a confer-
ence room. This normally involves the system
obtaining some information from the user (or fill-
ing a list of slots with their values), checking a
database, and then completing the task. In a more
conversational dialogue system the only real task
is to take part in an interaction which is interest-
ing and enjoyable for the user, although in work
related to ILEX (Mellish et al., 1998) the system
may have the loose goal of communicating pri-
oritised pieces of information, and the research
reported here is in this tradition. There may not
be a definitive distinction to be drawn between
what we have termed ‘conversational’ and ‘goal-
driven’ systems, apart from pointing to the typical
need that the latter have to fill slots with informa-
tion elicited from the user, while there is no such
target in the former.
The INDIGO project (Vogiatzis et al., 2008),
(Konstantopoulos et al., 2009) followed the
ILEX notion of opportunistic language genera-
tion, adapting the approach to spoken interactions
with a robot museum guide. A later version of
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the guide was tested with an initial ‘fake’ strategy
(see below) for avoiding repetitions of the stan-
dard ‘Could you please repeat that’ form for deal-
ing with non-understandings. This unreported pi-
lot work is updated here and extended to include
a set of non-understanding error recovery strate-
gies which aim to improve user enjoyment of con-
versational dialogues with a robot tourguide. The
strategies are tested in a user trial which is de-
signed to elicit answers to the following ques-
tions:
• Can user satisfaction be increased by us-
ing smart strategies to deal with non-
understanding errors in a conversational di-
alogue system?
• How does the use of such strategies affect the
user’s perception of the dialogue and the di-
alogue system?
• How do the strategies compare to each other
in terms of user satisfaction, and in particular
is it important to employ a variety of strate-
gies?
2 The Tourguide Dialogue System
The Tourguide Dialogue system was built in or-
der to investigate non-understanding error recov-
ery strategies in a conversational domain. The
chosen application is that of acting as a tourguide
in an exhibition. The dialogues consist of the sys-
tem describing an item, and then taking questions
from the user. Specifically, the system talks about
3 items which can be found in the Informatics Fo-
rum at the University of Edinburgh.
During the course of the tourguide dialogues,
the point where most errors are anticipated is
when the system asks ‘Do you have any ques-
tions about this?’ This obviously constitutes an
extremely open question, and the lack of con-
straints on the user’s input results in a high prob-
ability of a non-understanding occurring. At all
the other points where the system elicits input
from the user it has full initiative and can sup-
ply the speech recognition module with a set of
highly constrained expectations, whereas in the
situation above (although the system does attempt
to predict the input), the range if possibilities
is very large. This is thus a good context in
which to investigate strategies for dealing with
non-understanding errors. The system is designed
to be programmed with a library of error recovery
strategies. For a list of the strategies implemented,
see Table 1.
Table 1: Summary of Strategies
Name Description
Subsume
Ask if the user would like to
hear more information about
the item
E.g. : “Would you like to hear
a little more about Paolozzi
and his sculptures?”
Subsume Split
Ask if the user is more inter-
ested in hearing about aspect
A or aspect B of the item
E.g. : “Well, are you more
interested in finding out more
about Paolozzi himself, or his
sculptures?”
Fake
Fake having forgotten to say
something of interest about
the item
E.g. : “I meant to add; one
of Paolozzi’s most famous
works can be found here in
Edinburgh. At the top of Leith
Walk, there are sculptures of
human body parts, including
a giant foot, by Paolozzi.”
Please Repeat
Ask the user to repeat their
question
E.g. : “Please could you re-
peat that? Just say ‘no’ if you
have no more questions.”
The dialogue manager is implemented in Pro-
log, using the Trindikit framework. It is a hand-
crafted dialogue system, which uses the informa-
tion state model to hold the system’s beliefs and a
set of update rules which define the system’s ac-
tions. See Larsson and Traum (2000) for a sum-
mary of information state and dialogue manage-
ment using the framework.
For speech input and output, modules devel-
oped by Acapela Group1 for the INDIGO project
were used. As mentioned, at each point in the
dialogue at which user input is expected, a hand-
crafted list of possible user utterances is sent to
the speech recogniser. For example, at a point
1http://www.acapela-group.com
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Figure 1: Overview of the Tourguide Dialogue
System
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where the system asks for questions on a particu-
lar exhibit, the speech recogniser is supplied with
a list of questions which were predicted by the
system designer. Language generation uses only
simple templates, which are sent to the Acapela
text-to-speech component.
In order to ensure that non-understanding er-
rors occur at a consistent and non-negligible rate,
a component is introduced into the system be-
tween the speech recogniser and the dialogue
manager which serves to introduce errors at a
predetermined rate. If a real non-understanding
hasn’t happened after 3 questions, an error is in-
troduced by throwing away the speech recogni-
tion result and simulating a null user act. An
overview of the structure of the system is pre-
sented in Figure 1.
3 Non Understanding Error Strategies
3.1 Motivating the Strategies
There have been studies using human communi-
cation to investigate how human agents deal with
non-understanding errors, in the hope that this
can be applied to spoken dialogue systems (Zollo,
1999; Skantze, 2003; Koulouri and Lauria, 2009).
Wizard of Oz methods allowed analysis of dia-
logues between human users linked by computer
systems. To emulate a real spoken dialogue sys-
tem, the Wizard sees the output of a speech recog-
niser, and the user either listens to the output from
a speech synthesiser or a vocoder. All three of
these studies focused on relatively restricted goal-
driven dialogues, where the user and system had
to work together to accomplish a task with a clear
target outcome.
In these experiments, the wizards and users
were always naive participants, and the responses
of the wizards were not limited in any way
(with the exception of some of the conditions in
Koulouri and Lauria (2009)). This allowed the ex-
perimenters to analyse how a human might try to
deal with speech recognition errors when trying
to conduct a dialogue.
A common theme in all three studies was
the importance of using error recovery strategies
which help the dialogue to progress. It was found
that wizards will often ask task-related questions,
the answer to which subsumes the information
missed by the non-understanding. The example
question from Skantze (2003) below illustrates
this:
wizard
Do you see a wooden house in front of you?
user
Yes crossing address now. (Actually: I’m
passing the wooden house now.)
wizard
Can you see a restaurant sign?
Here the Wizard asks a follow-up question
which is related, in that its answer implies the in-
formation they just missed. Skantze found that
this strategy not only improved the understanding
of the following utterances, but also resulted in
higher user perception of task success.
Other wizard of Oz studies have looked specif-
ically at evaluating error recovery strategies
(Schlangen and Ferna´ndez, 2006; Rieser et al.,
2005), and Bohus implemented a variety of non-
understanding error recovery strategies in a real
dialogue system (Bohus, 2007); relevant findings
are summarised in Bohus and Rudnicky (2005).
Again this study focuses on a goal-driven dia-
logue system, specifically a system which helps
users book conference rooms. In the current con-
text, one of the most interesting strategies imple-
mented was called MoveOn, where the system
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would continue by asking a new question when
faced with a non-understanding. An example is:
Sorry, I didn’t catch that. One choice
would be Wean Hall 7220. This room
can accommodate 20 people and has a
whiteboard and a projector. Would you
like a reservation for this room?
This strategy performed well with respect to
recovery rate, i.e. how often the following user
response was correctly understood. Bohus and
Rudnicky explained its success by comparing it
to other strategies, which would generally ask the
user to repeat themselves, or rephrase their an-
swer. In those cases it is unlikely that the system
will be able understand the user’s intention as it
did not understand the input the first time. This
process is prone to turning into a spiral of errors,
with the user getting more and more frustrated.
Frustration can affect the user’s voice, in turn ad-
versely affecting the Automatic Speech Recogni-
tion. On the other hand, with MoveOn, the system
abandons the current question and tries a new line
of attack.
The MoveOn strategy is related to the recom-
mendations of Zollo, Skantze and Koulouri, and
it seems from these studies that the idea of mov-
ing on, and asking a new question can be very ef-
fective. However it is not entirely clear how this
strategy can be adapted to use in a conversational
dialogue system. It is to this question that we now
turn.
3.2 The Strategies
In a conversational dialogue system, there is as
noted above no real goal in the sense of informa-
tion to be elicited and acted upon, so it is not clear
what constitutes a ‘task-related’ question in the
sense used in the above studies. Indeed, in the
Tourguide dialogue system, it is not usually the
robot which is asking questions of the user but the
other way around.
The general aim is thus to progress the dialogue
smoothly when the user has just asked a ques-
tion about an item in the exhibit which the system
hasn’t been able to understand. The first strat-
egy which attempts to do this is called Subsume
(see Table 1 for a summary of all the strategies,
with examples). The Subsume strategy asks if the
user is interested in finding out more about the
item, it then waits for a response – any response –
and then proceeds to output a short text about the
item. The text is designed to incorporate answers
to a lot of the possible questions which the user
may have asked. The strategy tries to broaden the
user’s goal from obtaining a specific piece of in-
formation to just hearing some general interesting
information about the piece.
The second strategy is Subsume Split, which is
similar to Subsume but gives the user a choice
of what subsuming information they prefer. The
questions for every item in an exhibit should
broadly be able to be split into two categories.
For example, for an artefact like a sculpture, these
could be (a) questions about the artefact’s cre-
ator and (b) questions about the artefact and other
examples of the creator’s work. In giving the
user a binary choice the hope is that the informa-
tion subsequently presented will be of more in-
terest, and more closely related to their original
question. Whereas Subsume did not rely on the
next utterance being understood, Subsume Split
requires the speech recogniser to distinguish be-
tween two possible answers. This is of course
back in line with standard system-initiative ap-
proaches in which speech errors are much less of
a problem as speech recognition generally works
well in constrained contexts.
The last strategy implemented is called Fake,
an approach which was investigated in the non-
published pilot study of the INDIGO project men-
tioned above. The idea is for the system to pretend
it has forgotten to include a piece of information.
Although it is clearly unrealistic for a robot to be
forgetful, it is hoped that the piece of information
which the system provides is sufficiently interest-
ing to justify saying it instead of answering the
user’s actual question. In the pilot study, the sys-
tem returned to the original dialogue state after the
diversion, asking Now, did you have a question?,
and attempted to combine the speech recogniser
scores from the two user turns to gain a higher
confidence hypothesis. The current version im-
plements the same dialogue moves but does not
combine the recognition scores.
As well as these strategies, the system has a de-
fault Please Repeat strategy which is used as a
baseline. This is used as a backup strategy when-
ever the other strategies are exhausted in a partic-
ular dialogue.
An excerpt from a typical dialogue follows,
where an error is introduced and the system uses
131
Table 2: Questionnaire
Communication Agent Attitude
The system understood
what I said
The system is intelli-
gent
I enjoyed talking to the
system
My conversation with the
system flowed smoothly
The system was help-
ful
I felt confused when
talking to the system*
It was clear what
was happening when
the system did not
understand me
My conversation with
the system was inter-
esting
I felt frustrated when
talking to the system*
For further analysis, responses to questions marked
with an asterisk are converted from (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) to
(5, 4, 3, 2, 1) so that higher numbers correspond to
higher user satisfaction as with the other questions.
the SubsumeSplit strategy.
Excerpt from Typical Dialogue
System: This is a sculpture by Eduardo Paolozzi, a
sculptor from Edinburgh. Paolozzi was interested in
science, and our quest to understand more about the
Universe and ourselves. The themes of his work relate
to the research done here in Edinburgh. This piece is
different in style to usual Paolozzi sculptures in its sim-
plicity and smoothness. Do you have any questions?
User: Umm. Where is he from?
System: Paolozzi was born in Leith, in north Edin-
burgh. Do you have any other questions?
User: Why did he chose this shape?
System: I’m not sure why the sculpture is this
shape. You’d have to ask Paolozzi himself! Do you
have any more questions?
User: What does it represent?
-Non-understanding error introduced-
System: Well, are you more interested in Paolozzi
himself, or his sculptures?
User: Eh, his sculptures.
System: Paolozzi’s sculpture work was inspired by
some of the great minds in the history of science. He
invented a method of casting bronze sculptures, anal-
ogous to the process of creating collages. His early
collage work in Paris pre-empted Pop Art. There are
4 of his sculptures in the Informatics Forum, and his
work can be seen throughout the cities of Britain. Do
you have any more questions?
4 Experimental Setup
The experiment consists of running a user trial
with the system in 3 different modes. In the
first mode (mixed) the system uses all the strate-
gies shown in Table 1. In the second (single)
the system uses a single strategy, either Subsume
Split, or Fake. And in the last (pleaserepeat)
it has no strategies except the default Please Re-
peat.
Participants were sat in front of a laptop run-
ning the Tourguide Dialogue System and asked to
conduct a 10 to 15 minute long dialogue. The lap-
top screen displays the text as it is synthesised by
the system, and also a list of example responses at
each stage in the dialogue. Other than the length
requirement, the users were not given any partic-
ular tasks to achieve in order to approximate a
natural interaction with a conversational system.
The participants were shown pictures of the three
items which the system can talk about, and were
told to ask the questions they believe they might
ask if they were actually at the exhibition with a
robot.
As mentioned, the system is configured to in-
troduce a non-understanding error at every third
question asked, as long as a real error did not
occur in the previous three turns. The error rate
is thus relatively consistent across the dialogues.
The misunderstanding error rate due to incorrect
speech recognition on user questions was 18%,
this did not change significantly between condi-
tions.
At the end of the interaction, participants were
asked to fill in a questionnaire which includes a
series of statements with which the participant
must specify their level of agreement on a scale
of 1 to 5. These statements are listed in Table 2,
and are designed to measure the user’s satisfaction
along multiple dimensions. These questions serve
to quantify the quality of the dialogue from the
user’s perspective better than an objective score
such as dialogue length could estimate.
5 Results
Data from 58 participants in total was gathered,
14 in the mixed condition, 29 in the single
condition (14 with Fake strategy and 15 with Sub-
sume Split) and 15 in pleaserepeat. The
questions on the questionnaire are grouped into
three collections as shown in Table 2. The col-
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Figure 2: Breakdown of Questionnaire Results
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lections correspond respectively to the quality of
the Communication, the user’s perception of the
system as an Agent, and the user’s Attitude to-
wards the dialogue. Within the three collections,
the question answers are found to be highly cor-
related. The individual scores of each question in
a collection are combined by simply adding them
together, giving a collection score between 0 and
15.
Figure 2 shows the results for each collection in
each of the 4 conditions as box-whisker plots. In
this paper, values more than 3/2 times the inter-
quartile range lower than the first quartile are
treated as outliers, as are values that are analo-
gously higher than the third quartile.
6 Analysis of Results
6.1 Analysis of Questionnaire Data
Kruskal-Wallis tests are used to test the hypothe-
sis that the boxplots shown in Figure 2 represent
Figure 3: Number of Questions Asked
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distinct distributions, i.e. that there is some dif-
ference in the distribution of a collection score
between the groups. These tests suggest further
investigation into Communication and Attitude
(with the probability of the null hypothesis being
less than 0.02), but not into the Agent scores.
Pairwise Mann-Whitney tests in the Commu-
nication and Attitude data are performed to test
whether the differences between the pairs of
groups are significant. Bonferroni correction is
used to account for the fact that there are 3 com-
parisons for each collection, so a threshold of
0.015 (< 0.05/3) on the p-value is chosen. From
this analysis, the following comparisons are found
to be significant:
• Communication
mixed > pleaserepeat;
mixed > single.
• Attitude
mixed > single.
These results imply that the quality of the Com-
munication of a dialogue (recall a combination of
the flow of conversation, clarity of the system’s
actions and how well it seems the system under-
stands the user) is significantly improved by using
a mixture of error recovery strategies as against
a single strategy, as well as against the baseline
please repeat. Variety in the dialogue may give
the user an impression of a richer dialogue. Fig-
ure 3 shows how the number of questions asked
is much higher in the pleaserepeat condition
than in mixed.
This is because the mixture of strategies allow
the system to do more of the talking, and to an-
swer many of the user’s questions before they are
asked. Less user questions means less possibility
for error, and thus better dialogues. The strate-
gies are exploiting the fact that users don’t mind
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being provided more information than they origi-
nally asked for.
As mentioned, the Attitude measure is a com-
bination of user enjoyment and lack of confu-
sion and frustration. This is found to be signifi-
cantly better in the mixed condition than in the
single condition, but the comparison between
mixed and pleaserepeat is not statistically
significant (p = 0.05).
Note that the mixed condition is at an advan-
tage relative to the single condition because it
will take longer before the system resorts to the
Please Repeat strategy. Therefore in the com-
parisons we must bear in mind that there are on
average more Please Repeats being issued in the
single condition.
6.2 Discussion
The strategies effectively use errors as an oppor-
tunity to tell the user something which it believes
could be of interest. In a more complex system,
the information provided could be tailored using
a user model, as in the approach noted in the
Introduction (Mellish et al., 1998). It is worth
noting that if a system can opportunistically ex-
ploit errors to actively improve user experience,
it could weaken the typical inverse correlation
between user satisfaction and non-understanding
rate, or at least, the rate of repetition-requests
(Walker et al., 2000). Demonstrating this remains
a matter for future work, however, since the cur-
rent study specifically maintained a constant non-
understanding rate across conditions, rather than
treating it as an independent variable.
Lastly, it is interesting to investigate some of
the correlations between the individual question-
naire answers using Pearson’s correlation tests.
The users’ enjoyment is not correlated with how
clearly they understand what the system is doing
when an error occurs. This implies that it is not
necessarily important for the user to understand
what motivates the system’s dialogue turns for
them to enjoy the interaction. This appears to con-
tradict the findings of Hockey et al. (2003) among
others, which show that making the system ‘visi-
ble’ to the user increases the level of task success.
The suggestion is therefore that the latter finding
only applies in goal-driven dialogue systems, and
so although the user must have some idea of what
is motivating the system, it is not necessarily as
important in more conversational settings.
7 Conclusions
In summary, this study has provided evidence that
these new strategies, which use the idea of moving
the dialogue on when the system has little or no
input from the user, can have a positive effect on
overall user satisfaction. It is shown that the bene-
fit of such strategies is in using them as a strategy,
and giving a conversational dialogue system a va-
riety of error handling techniques.
Use of all of the strategies was significantly
beneficial for the dialogues in the three dimen-
sions measured in the questionnaire. Therefore,
when designing a conversational dialogue system,
it is worthwhile putting thought into the design of
error recovery strategies which are more complex
than asking the user to repeat or rephrase them-
selves. It is particularly beneficial to ensure that
there is a variety of strategies available to the sys-
tem, both to increase the variation in the dialogue
and to make the individual strategies more effec-
tive. This has been confirmed experimentally in
the goal-driven domains (see Section 3.1), and
this paper provides initial supporting evidence in
conversational, less goal-directed applications.
8 Future Work
A number of potential further investigations are
possible:
• Presumably user enjoyment in a conversa-
tional dialogue system tends to degrade as
error rates increase (Walker et al., 2000). It
would be interesting to compare how quickly
this degradation occurs when different error
recovery strategies are employed. It is pos-
sible that strategies such as those presented
here would help to maintain a minimal level
of enjoyment longer.
• At one end of the spectrum, some goal-
driven dialogue systems can be associated
with a single objective metric of task suc-
cess, independent of user impressions. To-
wards the other end of that spectrum, con-
versational systems like museum tour guides
should allow different visitors to pursue dis-
tinct tasks, or single visitors to shift from one
task to the other, and even interleave them. In
such cases, more work is needed to identify
the varying criteria for success for any given
user.
• In this study the mixed condition chooses
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strategies at random. It might be useful to
investigate whether there exists a better-than-
random policy. Bohus et al. have looked at
this question in goal-driven applications (Bo-
hus and Rudnicky, 2005; Bohus et al., 2006).
• More strategies could be investigated, pos-
sibly ones which exploit a user model to se-
lect pieces of information to impart. The cur-
rent strategies use text which is the same for
all users, whereas the use of a full language
generation system producing dynamic texts
would not only allow for tailoring to the user
but also cause the strategies to be used more
than once in a given part of the dialogue.
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Abstract
We present a novel incremental approach to
modelling self-repair phenomena in dialogue,
using the grammar and parsing mechanism of
Dynamic Syntax (DS) to construct Type The-
ory with Records (TTR) record type represen-
tations incrementally in both parsing and gen-
eration. We demonstrate how a DS-TTR hy-
brid implementation when integrated into an
incremental dialogue system can be exploited
to account for the semantic processing of self-
repair phenomena in a unified way and in line
with psycholinguistic evidence.
1 Introduction
Self-repairs are too pervasive in human dialogue to
be considered exceptional and they should be inte-
gral to any dialogue model, an insight from early
Conversational Analysis work which revealed them
to be systematic (Schegloff et al., 1977). The fol-
lowing are typical of the within-turn (first position),
self-initiated type of self-repair often found in natu-
ral dialogue:
(1) Our situation is just [a little bit, + kind of the
opposite] of that (Switchboard)
(2) [the interview was {. . . } + it was] alright
(Clark, 1996, p.266)
(3) John goes to Paris [{uhh}+ from London]
(constructed example)
∗This work was partly supported by the RISER project EP-
SRC reference EP-J010383-1 and an EPSRC Doctoral Training
Account scholarship for the first author. Thanks to the Semdial
reviewers for their helpful comments.
For terminological and annotation purposes, fol-
lowing the disfluency-tagged Switchboard corpus,
first position self-repairs will be discussed with ref-
erence to a division into a reparandum (the speech
that is repaired, up to the repair point +), a possi-
bly null interregnum (the filler words or pause be-
tween {}) and the following repair (the strings after
the repair point + up to the closing square bracket).
We also consider extensions- also called ‘covert’
(Levelt, 1989) or ‘forward-looking’ (Ginzburg et al.,
2007) repairs- such as (3) which may not in fact
function to alter the previous part of the utterance,
but to extend it.
The formal model we describe here attempts to
address two principal aspects of self-repair phe-
nomena: firstly, in terms of cognitive processing,
the semantic parsing and generation of self-repaired
utterances is just as straightforward as for fluent
utterances in dialogue (and in fact, in some do-
mains semantic processing is aided (Brennan and
Schober, 2001)); secondly, that the repaired mate-
rial (reparandum) can be referred to in context, as in
(2) above where the reparandum still needs to be ac-
cessed for the anaphoric use of ‘it’ to succeed, “leav-
ing the incriminated material with a special status,
but within the discourse context” (Ginzburg et al.,
2007, p. 59).
2 Related work
Work on the processing of self-repair phenomena
has not generally focused on the semantics and prag-
matics of ongoing dialogue. Parsing approaches
have tended to implement a parse→string-edit→re-
parse pipeline, which which takes disfluent inputs
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and returns ‘cleaned-up’ grammatical strings rela-
tive to a given grammar- this was done with a TAG
transducer in the case of (Johnson and Charniak,
2004). In terms of psychological validity for dia-
logue the approach is questionable, as parts of an
utterance cannot be removed from the hearer’s per-
ceptual record, discounting the possibility of prop-
erly processing reparanda, as in example (2) above.
McKelvie (1998) introduces a more explicit disflu-
ency rule-based syntactic account, which instead of
expunging ‘junk’ material, exploits aborted syntac-
tic categories and provides optional rules for produc-
ing cleaned-up parses. However, again under the as-
sumption that self-repair operates as a module out-
side the principal grammar, no method for obtaining
the semantics of a self-repair is suggested.
Self-repair has received more attention from the
generation (NLG) community, particularly as incre-
mental NLG models were initially motivated by psy-
cholinguistics, most notably Levelt (1989)’s influ-
ential modularization of speech production into dis-
tinct conceptualization, formulation and articula-
tion phases. Following this, De Smedt showed how
developing the syntactic component of the formu-
lation phase in detail could give models of lexical
selection and memory limitations (De Smedt, 1991)
which could trigger syntactic revision and Neumann
(1998) introduced reversible incremental parsing-
generation processes to implement ambiguity detec-
tion and paraphrasing corrections. In conceptual-
ization, Guhe (2007) modelled online modifications
to pre-verbal messages that cause self-repair surface
forms to be realized.
Albeit less psychologically motivated, Buß and
Schlangen (2011) and Skantze and Hjalmarsson
(2010) introduce self-repair generation strategies in
incremental dialogue systems. Both systems make
use of the Incremental Unit (IU) dialogue framework
model (Schlangen and Skantze, 2009), which allows
online revision of input and outputs between mod-
ules. Skantze and Hjalmarsson (2010) use string-
based speech plans which may change dynamically
during interaction with a user, allowing for changing
ASR hypotheses, which could lead to the genera-
tion of a limited set of ‘covert’ (non-replacement ex-
tensions) and ‘overt’ self-repairs. The interactional
benefits of the approach are clear, however the lack
of incremental semantics and domain-general gram-
mar makes scalability to more complex domains and
integration with a parsing module difficult.
In terms of the dialogue semantics of self-repair,
Ginzburg and colleagues (Ginzburg et al., 2007;
Ginzburg, 2012) working within the KoS framework
(Ginzburg, 2012) with Dialogue Gameboard (DGB)
update mechanisms at its core, attempt to unify an
account of self-repair and other-initiated repair by
drawing the parallels between self-initiated editing
phrases (interregna) and clarification requests (CRs)
as cues for repair. They make an adjustment to KoS
in allowing CRs and editing signals and their follow-
ing corrections to occur mid-utterance, accommo-
dating incrementality by allowing the DGB word-
by-word updates to its PENDING component. They
also suggest that Type Theory with Records (TTR)
could be instrumental in enabling appropriate types
for word-by-word semantic updates in their future
work. However, while this provides a general di-
alogue model, the relationship of these updates to
incremental parsing and generation processes is not
made explicit.
3 Criteria for a unified account
The parsing, generation and dialogue semantics im-
plementations of self-repairs have been slightly or-
thogonal, so a grammar which can provide a suitable
semantic representation to capture the phenomena
in both modalities within a dialogue context is lack-
ing. We suggest that two requirements of a grammar
to remedy this are strong incremental interpretation
and incremental representation (Milward, 1991).
Strong incremental interpretation is the ability to
make available the maximal amount of information
possible from an unfinished utterance as it is being
processed, particularly semantic dependencies (e.g.
a representation such as λx.like′(john′, x) should
be available after processing “John likes”). Incre-
mental representation, on the other hand, is defined
as a representation being available for each sub-
string of an utterance, but not necessarily including
the dependencies (e.g. having a representation such
as john′ attributed to “John” and λy.λx.like′(y, x)
attributed to “likes” after processing “John likes”).
These representations should become available im-
mediately to connected modules, therefore requiring
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seamless integration with other dialogue semantics.1
Furthermore a record of processing context is re-
quired to be sufficiently detailed, and suitably struc-
tured, so that parsing, generation and dialogue man-
agement algorithms can access the material in the
reparandum straightforwardly, as shown by exam-
ple (2). This context must extend from the phonetic
level to the conceptual level: Brennan and Schober
(2001)’s experiments demonstrated self-repair can
speed up semantic processing (or at least object ref-
erence) in a small visual domain of shape selec-
tion, where an incorrect object being partly vocal-
ized and then repaired in the instructions (e.g. “the
yell-purple square”) yielded quicker response times
from the onset of the target (“purple”) than in the
case of the equivalent fluent instructions (e.g. “the
purple square”). This example will be addressed in
section 6.
Given these requirements and the lacunae from
previous work, in the remainder of the paper we
present a type-theoretic incremental model of pars-
ing, generation and context that addresses them,
showing how a suitable grammar formalism and se-
mantic representation (section 4) integrated into an
incremental dialogue system (section 5) can account
for parsing (section 6) and generating (section 7)
self-repairs in a psycholinguistically plausible way.
4 Dynamic Syntax and TTR
Dynamic Syntax (DS) (Kempson et al., 2001) is an
action-based and semantically oriented incremental
grammar framework that defines grammaticality as
parsability. The DS lexicon consists of lexical ac-
tions keyed to words, and also a set of globally appli-
cable computational actions, both of which consti-
tute packages of monotonic update operations on se-
mantic trees, and take the form of IF-THEN action-
like structures. For example, in DS notation, the lex-
ical action corresponding to the word john has the
preconditions and update operations in example (4):
if the pointer object (♦), which indicates the node
being checked on the tree, is currently positioned at
a node that satisfies the properties of the precondi-
tion then all the actions in the post-condition can be
1Recently, (Peldszus et al., 2012) show how incrementally
integrating incremental syntactic and pragmatic processing can
improve an interpreter module’s performance.
completed, these being simple monotonic tree oper-
ations.
(4)
john:
IF ?Ty(e)
THEN put(Ty(e))
put([ x=john : e ])
ELSE abort
(5) “John arrived”7−→
♦, T y(t),
[
x=john : e
p=arrive(x) : t
]
Ty(e),[
x =john : e
]
Ty(e→ t),
λr :
[
x1 : e
]
[
x=r.x1 : e
p=arrive(x) : t
]
In DS, the trees upon which actions operate rep-
resent terms in the typed lambda calculus, with
mother-daughter node relations corresponding to se-
mantic predicate-argument structure, with no inde-
pendent layer of syntax represented. Tree nodes are
typed, and can be either type-complete (e.g. Ty(e))
and decorated with a semantic formula, or have a
requirement for a type (e.g. ?Ty(e)). As can be
seen in (5) above, recent DS variants (Purver et al.,
2010) incorporate Type Theory with Records (TTR)
(Cooper, 2005), with TTR record types decorating
tree nodes, rather than simple atomic formulae.
Following Cooper (2005), each field in a record
type is of the form
[
l : T
]
, containing a unique
label l in the record type and a type T . Fields
can be manifest, i.e. have a singleton type such
as
[
l : Ta
]
where Ta is the type of which only
a is a member; here, we write this using the syn-
tactic sugar
[
l=a : T
]
. Fields can be depen-
dent on fields preceding them (i.e. higher up in
the graphical representation), e.g. the predicate type[
p=like(x,y) : t
]
, where x and y are labels in pre-
ceding fields. DS node semantic formulae are now
taken to be record types, with the type of the final
(i.e. lowest down) field corresponding to the Ty()
node type. Functions from record type to record type
in the variant of TTR we use here employ paths, and
are of the form λr : [ l1 : T1 ] [ l2=r.l1 : T1 ], an
example being the formula at the type Ty(e → t)
node in tree (5) above, giving DS-TTR the required
functional application capability: functor node func-
tions are applied to their sister argument node’s
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formula, with the resulting β-reduced record type
added to their mother node.2
In DS parsing, beginning with an axiom tree with
a single node of requirement type ?Ty(t), parsing
intersperses the testing and application of both lex-
ical actions triggered by input words such as 4 and
the execution of permissible (Kleene* iterated) se-
quences of computational actions, with their up-
dates monotonically constructing the tree. Success-
ful parses are sequences of action applications that
lead to a tree which is complete (i.e. has no outstand-
ing requirements on any node, and has type Ty(t) at
its root node as in (5)). The DS notion of incremen-
tality is two-fold, in that action sequences monoton-
ically extend the trees, and that these sequences are
maximally applied on a word-by-word basis.
Here we modify the traditional DS parsing and
generation model by allowing the compilation of
TTR formulae for partial trees in addition to com-
plete ones. This is achieved through a simple tree-
compiling algorithm which decorates terminal nodes
with record types containing underspecified vari-
ables of the appropriate type, then applies functional
application between sister nodes to compile a β-
reduced record type at their mother node, continu-
ing in bottom-up fashion until a record type is com-
piled at the root (see (Hough, 2011) for details). The
modification means the DS-TTR model now meets
the criteria of strong incremental interpretation, as
maximal record types represent all possible depen-
dencies made available as each word is processed.
4.1 DS-TTR generation as parsing
As Purver and Kempson (2004) demonstrate, an in-
cremental DS model of surface realization can be
neatly defined in terms of the DS parsing process
and a subsumption check against a goal tree. The
goal tree input is a complete and fully specified DS
tree such as (5), and the generation of each word
consists of attempting to parse each word in the lex-
icon to extend the trees under construction in the
parse state. Partial trees are checked for suitabil-
ity via goal tree subsumption, with unsuitable trees
2For functional application and record type extension (con-
catenation), which is required in DS grammar for merging the
formulae at the top of LINKed tree structures, relabelling is car-
ried out when necessary in the record types in the way described
by Cooper (2005) and Ferna´ndez (2006).
and their parse paths removed from the generator
state. The DS generation process is word-by-word
incremental with maximal tree representations con-
tinually available, and it effectively combines lexical
selection and linearization into a single action due
to the word-by-word iteration through the lexicon.
Also, self-monitoring is inherently part of the gen-
eration process, as each word generated is parsed.
However, this model requires fully structured trees
as input, problematic for a dialogue manager.
Here, though, with incremental representations
now available through the tree compiling mecha-
nism as described above, a modification can be made
by replacing the goal tree with a TTR goal concept,
which can take the form of a record type such as:
(6)


x1=Paris : e
x=john : e
p1=to(x1) : t
p=go(x) : t


Consequently, the tree subsumption check in the
original DS generation model can now be charac-
terized as a TTR subtype relation check between the
goal tree and the compiled TTR formulae of the trees
in the parse state. A definition for the check, adapted
from Ferna´ndez (2006, p.96), is defined in (7).
(7) Subtype relation check:
For record types p1 and p2, p1 ⊑ p2 holds just
in case for each field
[
l : T2
]
in p2 there is
a field
[
l : T1
]
in p1 such that T1 ⊑ T2,
i.e. iff any object of type T1 is also of type
T2. This relation is reflexive and transitive.
The advantage of this move is that for the logical
input to generation a goal tree no longer needs to
be constructed from the grammar’s actions, so the
dialogue management module need not have full
knowledge of the DS parsing mechanism and lexi-
con. An example successful generation path can be
seen in Figure 1,3 showing how the maximal TTR
record type for each tree is continually available.
3The incremental generation of “john arrives” succeeds as
the successful lexical action applications at transitions 1 7→ 2
and 3 7→ 4 are interspersed with applicable computational ac-
tion sequences at transitions 0 7→ 1 and 2 7→ 3 , at each
stage passing the subtype relation check with the goal (i.e. the
goal is a subtype of the top node’s compiled record type), until
arriving at a tree that type matches in 4 .
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0
[
p : t
]
♦, ?Ty(t)
7→
1
?Ty(t),
[
x : e
p =U(x) : t
]
?Ty(e),♦[
x : e
]
?Ty(e→ t)
λr :
[
x1 : e
]
[
x=r.x1 : e
p=U(x) : t
]
‘John’
7→
2
?Ty(t),♦
[
x=john : e
p=U(x) : t
]
Ty(e),[
x=john : e
]
?Ty(e→ t),
λr :
[
x1 : e
]
[
x=r.x1 : e
p=U(x) : t
]
7→
3
?Ty(t),
[
x=john : e
p =U(x) : t
]
Ty(e),[
x=john : e
]
?Ty(e→ t),♦
λr :
[
x1 : e
]
[
x=r.x1 : e
p=U(x) : t
]
‘arrives’
7→
4
(TYPE MATCH)
♦, T y(t),
[
x=john : e
p=arrive(x) : t
]
Ty(e),[
x=john : e
]
Ty(e→ t),
λr :
[
x1 : e
]
[
x=r.x1 : e
p=arrive(x) : t
]
Goal =[
x=john : e
p=arrive(x) : t
]
Figure 1: Successful generation path in DS-TTR
Another efficiency advantage is that subtype
checking can also reduce the computational com-
plexity of lexicalisation through pre-verbal lexi-
cal action selection, removing the need to iterate
through the entire lexicon on a word-by-word basis.
A sublexicon SubLex can be created when a goal
concept GoalTTR is inputted to the generator by
searching the lexicon to select lexical actions whose
TTR record type is a valid supertype of GoalTTR.
5 Incremental DS-TTR parsing and
generation in DyLan
In order to meet the criteria of a continuously up-
dating contextual record, we implement DS-TTR
parsing and generation mechanisms in the prototype
DyLan dialogue system4 within Jindigo (Skantze
and Hjalmarsson, 2010), a Java-based implementa-
tion of the incremental unit (IU) dialogue system
framework (Schlangen and Skantze, 2009). As per
Schlangen and Skantze (2009)’s model, there are in-
put and output IUs to each module, which can be
added as edges between vertices in module buffer
graphs and become committed should the appro-
priate conditions be fulfilled, a notion which be-
comes important in light of hypothesis change and
4Available from http://dylan.sourceforge.net/
repair situations. Dependency relations between dif-
ferent graphs within and between modules can be
specified by groundedIn links (see (Schlangen and
Skantze, 2009) for details).
The DyLan interpreter module (Purver et al.,
2011) uses Sato (2011)’s insight that the context of
DS parsing can be characterized in terms of a Di-
rected Acyclic Graph (DAG) with trees for nodes
and DS actions for edges. The module’s state is
characterized by three linked graphs:
• input: a time-linear word graph posted by the
ASR module, consisting of word hypothesis
edge IUs between vertices Wn
• processing: the internal DS parsing DAG,
which adds parse state edge IUs between ver-
tices Sn groundedIn the corresponding word
hypothesis edge IU
• output: a concept graph consisting of domain
concept IUs (TTR record types) constructed
between vertices Cn, groundedIn the corre-
sponding path of edges in the DS parsing DAG
In the generation module, the architecture is the
inverse of interpretation given the input of TTR goal
concepts:
• input: the concept graph has goal concept
IU edges (TTR record types) between vertices
GCn posted by the dialogue manager
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Figure 2: Incremental DS-TTR parsing of a self-repair. Revoked edges indicating failed search paths are
dotted. Inter-graph groundedIn links go from top to bottom.
• processing: the DS parsing graph (shared with
the interpreter module’s graph) is incremen-
tally constructed word-by-word by parsing the
lexical actions in the sublexicon and subtype
checking the result against the current goal con-
cept (see section 4.1)
• output: the word graph’s edges are added
to the output buffer during word-by-word
generation, and committed when they are
groundedIn DS parsing graph paths that form
part of a valid generation path type matched
with the goal concept (as in Figure 1).
6 Parsing self-repairs
Interpretation in DyLan follows evidence that dia-
logue agents parse self-repairs efficiently and that
repaired material is given special status but not
removed from the discourse context. To sim-
ulate Brennan and Schober (2001)’s experimen-
tal findings described in section 3, we demon-
strate a self-repair parse in Figure 2 using a do-
main of three domain concepts, yellow square,
purple square and orange square, each
with a distinct record type. When “yell-” is pro-
cessed, the word hypothesizer adds the edge ‘yel-
low’, which in turn is parsed, returning a TTR record
type. Search is initiated for domain concepts in a
subtype relation to it, in this case finding a valid
subtype in the concept yellow square- when
matched it is moved from the domain concepts to the
concept graph’s active edge. The following failure to
interpret ‘purple’ forces a repair under the definition
in 8 below:
(8) Repair IF from parsing word W there is no
edge SEn able to be constructed from vertex
Sn (no parse) or if no domain concept
hypothesis can be made through subtype
relation checking, repair: parse word W
from vertex Sn−1. Should that parse be
successful add a new edge to the top path,
without removing any committed edges
beginning at Sn−1.
This does not remove the initially matched con-
cept IU at edge C0-C1, but forces another match-
ing process to add a successor edge. The con-
sequent subtype-checking operation is then lim-
ited to just the concepts purple square and
orange square, finding a type match in the for-
mer. While this trivially reduces the subtype check-
ing iteration process here for illustrative purposes,
with a bigger domain this could remove many con-
cepts (i.e. all of those that are subtypes of the in-
criminated parse path’s current record type).
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Figure 3: Incremental DS-TTR generation of a self-repair upon goal concept change. Type-matched record
types are double-circled nodes. Inter-graph groundedIn links go from top to bottom.
This strategy will also allow the parsing of (2)
“the interview was.. it was alright”, with the cor-
rect reference resolution of ‘it’: any committed pre-
ceding edge on the word hypothesis graph can be ac-
cessed (i.e. any word/partial word heard in the user’s
speech stream), as can its corresponding groundedIn
DS-TTR parse graph edge IU, so the TTR formula
for ‘the interview’ is accessible and DS anaphora
mechanisms using context may run as normal.
While the rule in (8) will only allow the parsing
of replacement type self-repairs, in our prototype
dialogue system this can be triggered not only by
syntactic disfluency but also by pragmatic infelicity.
For example, if the user were to say “I pick the yel-
low square or rather the blue square”, which may
be parsable in the DS grammar without backtrack-
ing, the mechanism will still work in the same way
because in our micro-domain there is no available
concept that represents the user selecting both the
yellow and blue squares simultaneously in one turn.
Work is also under way to lexicalise editing signals
in terms of their effect on DS parsing context.
7 Generating self-repairs
In DyLan’s generation module, whose processing
is driven by parsing as described in section 4.1, the
parsing repair function defined in (8) will operate
if there is no resulting word edge output after a gen-
eration cycle to produce the next word. This will be
triggered by a change in goal concept during gener-
ation. As per parsing, in repair the generation algo-
rithm continues backtracking by one vertex at a time
in an attempt to extend the DS DAG until successful,
as can be seen in Figure 3 with the successful back-
track and parse of ‘Paris’ resulting in successful sub-
sumption to the new goal concept. The time-linear
word graph continues to extend but with the repair’s
edges groundedIn different paths of the parse DAG
to those which ground the reparandum.5 Our proto-
col is consistent with Shriberg and Stolcke (1998)’s
empirical observation that the probability of retrac-
ing N words back in an utterance is more likely than
retracing from N+1 words back, making the repair
as local as possible.
Another type of self-repair, extension, such as ex-
ample (3) above, is dealt with straightforwardly in
our generation module. For these covert repairs, the
incoming goal concept must be a subtype of the one
it replaces, and so the DS parser can induce mono-
tonic growth of the matrix tree through LINK ad-
junction (Kempson et al., 2001), resulting in sub-
type extension of the root TTR record type. Thus, a
change in goal concept during generation will not
always put demands on the system to backtrack,
such as in generating the fragment after the pause
in “John goes to Paris. . . from London”. It is only
5The previously committed word graph edge for ‘London’
is not revoked nor is its groundedIn parse graph edge, follow-
ing our parsing algorithm and the principle that has been in the
public record and hence should still be accessible.
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at a semantics-syntax mismatch, where the revised
goal TTR record type does not correspond to a per-
missible extension of a DS tree in the parsing DAG
where overt repair will occur. In contrast to Skantze
and Hjalmarsson (2010)’s string-based speech plan
comparison approach, there is no need to regener-
ate a fully-formed string from a revised goal concept
and compare it with the string generated thus far. Far
from a phonetic form deletion account, self-repair
in DyLan is driven by attempting to extend existing
parse paths to construct the new target record type,
retaining all the semantic representation and the pro-
cedural context of actions already built up in the
generation process to avoid the computational de-
mand of constructing semantic representations from
afresh. This way a unified mechanism for modifica-
tion and extension repairs is possible.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented a framework for parsing and gen-
erating word-by-word incrementally using a hybrid
grammar of Dynamic Syntax and Type Theory with
Records (DS-TTR) which has been implemented in
the DyLan dialogue system, utilising the mecha-
nisms of the Incremental Unit framework. DyLan
provides a preliminary model of the parsing and gen-
eration of self-repair in line with psycholinguistic
evidence of preference for locality and the availabil-
ity of access to the semantics of repaired material.
In terms of development, while our model cur-
rently covers replacement type repairs and exten-
sions, there is potential for expansion to insertion
type repairs such as “Peter went swimming with Su-
san... or rather surfing, yesterday”.6 The use of a
DS-TTR parsing context DAG constructed by the ut-
terance so far could again be used to resolve these
repairs, in this case by reusing preceding action
edges in the spirit of the recent DS account of verb
phrase ellipsis (VPE) (Kempson et al., forthcoming).
Schematically, the repair mechanism would work in
a similar way to the resolution of the VPE in “[Pe-
ter went] swimming [with Susan] and <Ai−Aj> surf-
ing <Ak−Al> yesterday”, where <Ai−Aj> is the se-
quence of action edges used in the construction of
the DAG triggered by the words “Peter went” and
6Many thanks to the anonymous reviewer who provided the
example and highlighted the importance of this.
<Ak−Al> is the sequence for “with Susan”, both of
which are re-used either side of the actions triggered
by “surfing”. The regeneration (Kempson et al.,
forthcoming) rule operating over DS context makes
this possible here, enabling the parser (and genera-
tor) to take a sequence of actions from context and
re-use them, provided that they were triggered by the
same type-requirement as is imposed on the node
currently under development in the tree being con-
structed in the DAG. The difference between the
VPE and repair mechanisms would lie in the com-
mitment status of the TTR formulae constructed by
these action paths: in VPE the record types yielded
from both construction paths would be committed to
the dialogue manager, whilst in repair, although the
reparandum’s path remains accessible to the pars-
ing and generation modules, only the repair’s resul-
tant TTR record type would be committed. This ac-
count is yet to be fully fledged out for these repairs,
particularly the consideration of how editing terms
would be interpreted appropriately, and the compu-
tational demands for the on-line resolution of the re-
pair, however the potential for extending the self-
repair model provided by the DS characterization of
context is clear.
Other future work planned includes investigating
the lexical semantic structure that TTR record types
may offer for modelling type dependencies between
reparanda and repairs.
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Abstract
The STAC project will develop new, for-
mal and robust models of non-cooperative
conversation, drawing from ideas in lin-
guistics, philosophy, computer science, and
economics. The project brings a state of the
art, linguistic theory of discourse interpre-
tation together with new data-driven mod-
els of agent interaction and strategic deci-
sion making. Here we discuss the project’s
linguistic underpinnings, and the concep-
tual and empirical challenges the project
faces. We also describe the project’s cur-
rent data collection activities.
1 Introduction
An assumption of all implemented dialogue sys-
tems and almost all formal work on discourse is
that agents are fully cooperative. What this means
is that agents adhere to principles such as: nor-
mally one believes what one says (e.g. (Grosz
and Sidner, 1990)) and that one normally tries to
help one’s interlocutors achieve their goals. The
latter in turn requires speakers to adopt shared
intentions; in other words, their preferences are
fully aligned, and they are sincere —they believe
what they say. Consequently, all dialogue sys-
tems to date are limited to domains where such
assumptions are sustainable, such as tourist in-
formation. But there are many scenarios where
this level of cooperativity doesn’t apply: for ex-
ample, dialogues involving complex negotiations
(Traum, 2008), or political debate (Lipman and
Sippi, 1995). In a dialogue from the Settlers of
Catan game below, (1b) is true but misleading be-
cause it implicates that B doesn’t have rock.
(1) a. A: Do you have rock?
b. B: I’ve got lots of wheat [in fact, B
has a rock]
c. A: I’ll give you 2 clay for a rock
d. B: How about 2 clay for a wheat?
e. A: I’ll give 1 clay for 3 wheat
f. B: OK, it’s a deal.
Nevertheless, here cooperativity has not broken
down entirely: (1b) supplies an (indirect) answer
to (1a), and so in contrast to an assertion such as
I won’t answer it meets at least one goal that is
associated with asking a question. Similarly, A’s
assertion (1e) attends toB’s underlying goal in ut-
tering (1d), of obtaining clay. We also note here
that such dialogue contributions describe the pref-
erences of individuals, so that modelling complex
preferences will be a key feature of dialogue state
representation for STAC.
2 Data collection: Settlers of Catan
We are currently collecting non-cooperative dia-
logue data using an online version of the pop-
ular board game “Settlers of Catan” (see figure
1). Negotiation dialogues are a critical part of the
game, and information hiding and deception are
observed in the data. The original JSettlers inter-
face was developed by (Thomas and Hammond,
2002), and we have modified it to include a chat
tool whereby players’ trading dialogues are being
collected (Guhe and Lascarides, 2012). An an-
notation scheme for non-cooperative negotiation
dialogues is being developed in the project.
3 Project components
3.1 Modelling Preferences
Just as the dynamic semantics of SDRT treats an
utterance as a relation between information states,
we will treat utterances as relations or transitions
between preference states. These states reflect the
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Figure 1: The adapted J-Settlers interface
structure and logical dependencies among the var-
ious factors that influence agent behaviour. Con-
ditional preference (CP) nets (Boutilier et al.,
2004) provide a computationally effective and
highly compact representation for expressing and
reasoning with preferences over large sets of fea-
tures, and we will use this in our model. CP-nets
provide an effective way to handle the fact that di-
alogue often reveals complex preferences, incor-
porating dependencies between features. STAC
will determine algorithms for uncovering prefer-
ences from conversation.
3.2 Modeling Non-Cooperative Dialogue
Segmented Discourse Representation Theory
(SDRT) has a well articulated theory of dia-
logue, which provides a clear and formal interac-
tion between attributions of attitudinal states and
discourse contributions (Asher and Lascarides,
2003). The dynamics of SDRT allows us to con-
strain agent modelling, restricting search over
actions and preferences (Asher and Lascarides,
2008). However, SDRT’s cognitive logic, as de-
tailed in (Asher and Lascarides, 2003), is a static,
BDI logic that fails to reflect the structural com-
plexity of decision problems, and it has nothing
to say about less than completely cooperative and
infallible agents. Work in STAC is replacing this
cognitive model to address these shortcomings.
3.3 Statistical models and Machine Learning
We are also exploring how reinforcement learn-
ing (RL) — a statistical planning method for ac-
quiring optimal dialogue policies (see e.g. (Rieser
and Lemon, 2011)) — can be used to learn opti-
mal strategic dialogue policies. A new challenge
for RL is to work in non-cooperative domains
such as resource negotiation in Settlers, where an
agent may not be fully honest when expressing
their preferences. This type of partial observabil-
ity falls outside the scope of current Partially Ob-
servable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) ap-
proaches to dialogue, which focus on uncertainty
derived from speech recognition errors. Finding
a suitable generalization of the POMDP framework
to handle such data is an important challenge for
the STAC project.
4 Future Work
As well as using the Settlers domain, the STAC
project is also exploring data from debating di-
alogues (Lipman and Sippi, 1995). Please see
http://www.irit.fr/STAC/
Acknowledgments
The research leading to this work has received funding
from the European Community (FP7/2011-16) under
grant agreement no. 269427 (STAC).
References
Asher, N. and A. Lascarides. 2003. Logics of Conver-
sation. Cambridge University Press.
Asher, N. and A. Lascarides. 2008. Commitments,
beliefs and intentions in dialogue. In Proc. of the
Workshop on the Semantics and Pragmatics of Dia-
logue, pages 35–42.
Boutilier, C., R. Brafman, C. Domshlak, H. Hoos, and
D. Poole. 2004. CP-nets : A Tool for Represent-
ing and Reasoning with Conditional Ceteris Paribus
Preference Statements. Journal of Artificial Intelli-
gence Research, 21:135–191.
Grosz, B. and C. Sidner. 1990. Plans for discourse.
In Intentions in Communication. MIT Press, pages
365–388.
Guhe, Markus and Alex Lascarides. 2012. Trading
in a multiplayer board game: Towards an analysis
of non-cooperative dialogue. In Proc. 34th Confer-
ence of the Cognitive Science Society.
Lipman, B. and D. Sippi. 1995. Robust inference
in communication games with partial provability.
Journal of Economic Theory, 66:370–405.
Rieser, Verena and Oliver Lemon. 2011. Rein-
forcement Learning for Adaptive Dialogue Systems.
Theory and Applications of Natural Language Pro-
cessing. Springer.
Thomas, R. and K. Hammond. 2002. Java settlers: a
research environment for studying multi-agent ne-
gotiation. In Proc. of IUI ’02, pages 240–240.
Traum, David. 2008. Exrended abstract: Computa-
tional models of non-cooperative dialogue. In Proc.
of SIGdial Workshop on Discourse and Dialogue.
146
Toward a Mandarin-French Corpus of Interactional Data 
 
Helen K.Y. Chen
1,2
, Laurent Prévot
1
, Roxane Bertrand
1
, Béatrice Priego-
Valverde
1
, Philippe Blache
1
(1) LPL, CNRS & Aix-Marseille Université 
5 Ave Pasteur 
13604 Aix en Provence-France 
(2) Dept. of Chinese and Bilingual Studies 
The HK Polytechnic University 
Hung Hom, KLM, Hong Kong 
 FirstName.LastName@lpl-aix.fr  
1. Introduction 
This paper provides a preliminary description of the 
construction of an audio-video speech corpus of 
face-to-face Mandarin interaction.  The corpus 
consists of 5 hours of two-party, face-to-face, 
spontaneous Mandarin interaction.  Following the 
construction of the Corpus of Interactional Data 
(CID), an audio-video corpus in French recorded 
and processed at the Laboratoire Parole & Langage 
(LPL), Aix-Marseille Universités (Bertrand et al., 
2008), the current project proposes the construction 
of a Mandarin speech corpus that will be annotated, 
based on a multimodal perspective, at various 
linguistic levels including prosody, morphology, 
syntax, as well as discourse and non-verbal 
representations such as gestures.  The objective of 
building such a corpus is to provide a speech 
resource annotated with wealthy and detailed 
information at each linguistic level.  The eventual 
goal is to facilitate analyses of conversational 
interaction from a multimodality perspective.    
2. Design of the corpus – the protocol 
It is preliminarily proposed that the corpus will 
consist of 5 segments of two-party, face-to-face 
Mandarin conversational recordings.  Each 
recording lasts about 1 hour.  Thus at the initial 
stage of the creation of the corpus, the total 
recording time will add up to 5 hours.  The eventual 
goal is to create a corpus of Mandarin spontaneous 
conversations of at least 10 hours.  
2.1 The subjects 
5 males and 5 females are involved in the 
recordings of face-to-face interaction.  All speakers 
are native speakers of Taiwanese Mandarin.  Some 
of the speakers have grown up bilingually speaking 
also Taiwanese.  Also some speakers may have 
worked in the same lab where the recording took 
place and are familiar with each other and the 
recording environment.   
2.2 The task 
The participants are invited to join the experiment, 
in which they are instructed to “have a chat” with 
another speaker.  There are 3 sets of guidelines 
provided randomly to the participants prior to each 
recording session: 1. the participants may be 
instructed to talk about the most difficult things 
they’ve encountered while living in France; 2. the 
participants may be instructed to talk about one of 
the unusual things s/he has encountered during a 
recent trip; 3. the participants may not be given any 
instruction about what to talk about and simply 
started the conversation on their own.  The reason 
to provide a guideline (especially for guideline 1 
and 2) is to enable speakers to be engaged in the 
interaction rather quickly as soon as the recording 
starts.  Although the speakers may be provided with 
one of the 3 guidelines as the initial topic for 
interaction, there was no further instruction about 
how long the topic should last.  The speakers are 
free to switch to other topics as the interaction 
carries on. 
2.3 The setting of the recordings 
Following the original French CID setting 
(Bertrand et al., 2008), all recording session took 
place in a soundproof chamber at LPL.  The two 
speakers in each session sat side-by-side and 
slightly tilted towards each other.  During the 
recording, each subject wore a headset and the 
voice from each speaker was recorded onto a 
separated track.  As result, the optimal quality of 
sound files of the spoken data can be obtained for 
the purpose of detailed annotations on the phonetic 
and prosodic levels.  Moreover, the recordings with 
two separated sound tracks have the advantage of 
allowing a more detailed analysis on the content in 
the overlapped sequences (Bertrand et al., 2008).  In 
addition to the specific setting for the sound 
recording, subjects were also filmed in long and 
fixed shot.  The video recordings otherwise provide 
data for non-verbal cues such as gestures. 
2.4 The characteristics of the corpus 
As result of the aforementioned experimental 
design and settings, the conversations recorded for 
the CID corpus is presented as closely simulating 
the data of naturally occurred, face-to-face 
interaction.  The dialogues of the current corpus 
resemble daily Mandarin interactions and can serve 
as a speech resource with rich information on turn-
taking and sequential organizations of conversation 
(Sacks et al., 1974).  Such characteristic of the 
corpus can contribute to the further analysis of the 
interactions between Mandarin speakers from an 
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interesting range of perspectives: the correlation 
between conversational interaction and sound 
realization (such as at the phonetic or prosodic 
levels, see Chen 2011), the examination of 
interaction between the speakers in terms of 
syntactic constructions or semantic/pragmatic 
implicatures, and finally, but not the least, the non-
verbal cues such as gestures. 
 
3. Levels of transcriptions and annotations 
The data will be transcribed and then annotated at 
various linguistic levels. The following describes 
the process of transcription and various levels of 
annotations proposed. 
 
Following Blache et al. (2009), prior to the 
transcriptions the data will be pre-processed by an 
automatic segmentation into blocks of sound stream 
by silent pauses of 200ms.  The purpose of the 
segmentation is to facilitate further orthographic 
and phonetic/phonological transcription, as well as 
the alignment of the signals and annotations.  The 
segmented data will then be transcribed 
orthographically (by using standard Hanyu Pinyin).  
Additional phonetic and/or phonological 
transcriptions may be added later on.   
 
At the prosodic level, the annotation scheme 
distinguishes two levels: a higher level of 
intonational phrases; and a lower one of 
interactionally related prosodic cues: including 
duration, cut-off, lengthening, special voice quality 
(such as laryngealized voice). For the lower level of 
prosodic annotations the unit will be the tokens. 
 
Concerning discourse and interaction, we will 
start from the Turn Constructional Unit (TCU).  
Following Schegloff (2007), a TCU corresponds to 
an action in interaction, i.e. a question, an answer, a 
request, etc.  It should be noted that a TCU does not 
necessarily correspond to a complete sentence; it 
can correspond to either a lexical item (as a reactive 
token), or a TCU may consist of more than one 
sentence.  The discourse/interaction information 
will be annotated by TCU, with notations about the 
specific action that consists of the TCU: i.e., a 
question/answer pair, a request or refusal to the 
request, etc.  Moreover a parallel annotation of 
disfluencies will identify the reparandum, reparans 
and break interval in the spirit of Shriberg (1994) ( 
see also Pallaud, 2006, Chen, 2011). 
 
Finally, with regard to the non-verbal gestures, 
5 types of gestures will be identified, following 
McNeill (1992), as well as Chui (2003): iconic, 
metaphoric, deictic, spatial gestures and beats.  
Each type of gesture will be further marked by its 
preparation, stroke, and retraction (McNeill 1992). 
4. Contribution of the corpus 
In addition to obvious benefits of such a 
multimodal richly annotated corpus, the perfect 
replication of the CID experimental setting will 
allow for systematic cross-linguistic studies.  In 
addition, the Mandarin CID corpus will be closely 
related to the Mandarin Conversational Dialogue 
Corpus (MCDC) (Tseng, 2004).  However the CID 
corpora will be perfectly comparable while the 
MCDC is different in terms of the experimental 
settings (e.g the speakers did not know each other 
when doing the recoding.)  Comparisons between 
these corpora would be nevertheless worthy further 
exploration. 
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Abstract 
The rapid and fluent nature of human 
communicative interactions strongly 
suggests the existence of an online 
mechanism for intention recognition. We 
motivate and outline a mathematical 
model that addresses these requirements. 
Our model provides a way of integrating 
knowledge about the relationship 
between linguistic expressions and 
communicative intentions, through a 
rapid process of Bayesian update. It 
enables us to frame predictions about the 
processes of intention recognition, 
utterance planning and other-repair 
mechanisms, and contributes towards a 
broader theory of communication. 
Introduction 
The ability to communicate effectively and 
flexibly with other humans is one of our species’ 
most impressive cognitive capacities. However, 
there are very few comprehensive theories that 
aim to address this capacity, and those that do are 
often sketchy and fail to capture the essential and 
unique aspects of human communication. 
Most notably among these, Shannon’s (1948) 
mathematical theory of signal transmission is of 
limited use in modeling human-human 
communication. This model assumes that the 
encoder function that the sender uses to convert a 
message into a signal is the inverse of the 
decoder function that the receiver uses to 
reconstruct the message from the signal. This is 
not descriptively adequate for human 
communication, whose complex many-to-many 
mappings sometimes break down, resulting in 
miscommunication. The influential recent 
Interactive Alignment model (Pickering and 
Garrod 2004) implicitly assumes even similar 
encoding and decoding functions, namely the 
identity function.  
From a more linguistic perspective, Grice’s 
(1957) theory of meaning provides a very 
concise definition of what constitutes 
(intentional) communication, but is atheoretic as 
to how this process is accomplished. Research in 
this tradition encounters the daunting 
complexities, and potential infinite regress, 
associated with the recognition of mutual 
knowledge or common ground (Stalnaker, 1978; 
Clark and Marshall, 1981). Reductionist 
approaches to this problem are motivated by the 
intuition that full common ground processing is 
implausible given the speed and efficiency of 
typical dialogue.  The immediacy of turn-taking 
(Stivers et al. 2009) and back-channel responses 
(Yngve 1970) speak to the need for rapid online 
heuristics that enable hearers to identify the 
general nature of the speaker’s communicative 
intention or illocution. 
The absence of models of human 
communication that address these competing 
concerns is keenly felt. Here we propose a 
mathematical model of communication that 
crucially relies upon the use of shared 
conventions to achieve efficiency, and that 
applies a form of Bayesian updating to address 
the many-to-many mapping problem. Rather than 
attempting to apply machine learning techniques 
such as POMDP to learn optimized mappings 
from utterances to appropriate responses in one 
fell swoop, we focus on the more tractable 
problem of recognizing the category of utterance 
involved. This enables us to consider the full 
range of different communicative contexts 
without succumbing to unsolvable complexity in 
the case of infinitely productive human language. 
In the following we outline the technicalities 
of the model and discuss some of its 
implications. 
Outline specification of the model 
The AIRBUS model takes a signal as its input 
and calculates the corresponding intention. The 
model assumes a finite, predefined set of 
communicative intentions. It has access to three 
forms of information: a convention database C, 
which specifies the probability of communicative 
intentions given a certain signal; a likelihood 
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database L, specifying the probability of signals 
given a certain communicative intention, and a 
set of prior probabilities E as to the 
communicative intention, conditioned by the 
social and discourse context.  
The operation of the model consists of 
updating the prior probabilities E in the light of a 
new incoming signal, taking into account the 
information in C and L. We propose the 
following stages of update. Given a new signal s, 
the model examines whether there is an entry in 
C corresponding to the signal s. If so, the 
probabilities in this entry are averaged with the 
probabilities in E, creating a set of revised 
probabilities R. R is then treated as a prior and 
subjected to Bayesian update in the light of L. 
The resulting probability distribution over I is 
used to infer the speaker’s intention. This process 
cycles as the signal continues and further 
convention-bearing units are transmitted. 
Within this model, we can measure the 
success or the usefulness of a communicative act 
by considering the extent to which it reduces the 
hearer’s uncertainty as to the speaker’s intention. 
Following Shannon (1948), we can measure this 
by considering the entropy of the prior and 
posterior probability distributions over the 
possible intentions in I. We propose that the 
hearer commences the planning of a response 
when the entropy is low enough.  
Separately, we propose that repair mechanisms 
are activated if there is too large a difference 
between prior and posterior distributions: that is, 
if the hearer’s understanding of the speaker’s 
intention is radically altered during the update 
process. A large difference would suggest 
disalignment between speaker and hearer, and 
the possible need for explicit repair negotiation. 
We can measure this difference using Kullback-
Leibler divergence, a standard measure of 
relative entropy, and posit that sufficiently high 
K-L divergence triggers explicit repair.  
 
Discussion 
The model outlined above provides a rapid 
means to infer communicative intentions. It 
posits a powerful decoding process, using the 
hearer’s knowledge about both directions of the 
relationship between signal and intention to draw 
pragmatic conclusions about the speaker’s 
intended meaning. Moreover, by its use of 
probability distributions rather than categorical 
rules, the model is able to handle improbable 
events gracefully. Relative entropy allows us to 
predict when the model does break down to such 
an extent that explicit negotiation is required. 
In this brief sketch we have necessarily left 
many issues open. We did not discuss how the 
likelihood and convention databases are to be 
populated. Another open question is which 
aspects of the utterance are listed in the 
convention database: that is, do the conventions 
relate to lexical items, syntactic categories (such 
as VP), or some other form of regular 
expression? Finally, a very general question 
concerns the nature of the possible intentions 
themselves, an issue that has been explored from 
many directions. However, although we concede 
that the correct set of intentions must be posited 
in order to precisely simulate human behaviour, 
we would argue that the use of any plausible 
proxy set should be adequate in principle to 
achieve a close approximation to this behaviour.  
In future work we aim to explore the 
capabilities of this model through a range of 
qualitative and quantitative tests. The model 
gives rise to testable predictions as to a wide 
range of behaviours. These include the 
attribution of communicative intentions, the 
planning of conversational turns, and instances of 
repair. We feel that the model has considerable 
practical potential in providing enhanced 
artificial discourse capabilities, and that if this 
promise is borne out, it could also have 
substantial implications for the modelling of 
dialogic behaviour in natural language. 
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The semantics of natural language spatial de-
scriptions such as “to the left of” and “above”
involve (i) perceptual knowledge obtained from
scene geometry , (ii) world knowledge about the
objects involved , and (iii) shared knowledge that
is established as the common ground in discourse.
Dialogue partners coordinate all three types of
meaning when describing and interpreting visual
scenes. One example of (iii) is the perspective or
the reference frame (RF). For example, the ta-
ble may be “to the left of the chair”, “to the right
of the chair”, “behind the chair” or “South of the
chair”. The perspective is determined by some
point in the scene called the viewpoint (VPT).
There are three ways in which the VPT is set in
human languages (Levinson, 2003): (i) relative
RF: by some third object distinct from the located
and reference objects (the speaker, the hearer, the
sofa); (ii) intrinsic RF: by the reference object
itself (the chair); or (iii) extrinsic RF: by some
global reference point (the North).1 The geo-
metric spatial template or potential fields are pro-
jected within the framework defined by the VPT
(Maillat, 2003). The RF may be inferred from the
perceptual context if given some configuration of
the scene a spatial description is true only in one
RF. It follows that when interpreting and generat-
ing spatial descriptions humans rely on verifica-
tion of spatial templates in different RFs which
requires considerable computational complexity
(Steels and Loetzsch, 2009). Alternatively, it may
be described linguistically “from your view” or
“from there”.
1Sometimes (mostly for route descriptions) it is distin-
guished between speaker-oriented (egocentric) and external
(allocentric) perspective or between (i) route and (ii) survey
perspective. The model we follow is more specific.
(Watson et al., 2004) show experimentally that
(i) participants are significantly more likely to use
an intrinsic RF after their partner used an intrin-
sic RF, compared when the partner used a rela-
tive RF (with the speaker as the VPT); (ii) partic-
ipants are significantly more likely to use intrin-
sic RF when the objects are aligned horizontally
(their typical alignment in the world) than when
they are aligned vertically; (iii) the alignment of
the RFs is not due to the lexical priming caused
by using the same preposition. (Andonova, 2010)
shows for the map task that overall partners align
with the primed route or survey perspective set by
the confederate if priming is consistent – when the
confederate changes the perspective only once in
the middle of the session. On the other hand, if
the confederate regularly alternates between the
perspectives their partner has nothing to prime to.
The self-assessed spatial ability (using a standard-
ised test) is also important – low ability partici-
pants only align with the primed perspective when
the switch is from the survey to the route perspec-
tive which is otherwise also the most frequently
used one.
Our interest is to implement these and sim-
ilar strategies as information state update rules
in a dialogue manager such as GoDiS (Larsson,
2002). In such a model each conversational agent
must keep a record of their own RF and that of
their partner in the common ground. The RFs are
updated following perceptual verification and an
alignment strategy. The proposal is a move to-
wards a more natural interpretation and genera-
tion of projective spatial descriptions in an arti-
ficial conversational agent compared to our pre-
vious attempt where the RF parameters were not
specifically included in the model but some RF
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knowledge has nonetheless been learned with ma-
chine learning. We proceed as follows:
1. Collect a corpus of dialogue interactions
containing projective spatial descriptions
made in a room scene.
2. Annotate the dialogue utterances with an
XML annotation scheme which identifies
perceptual states, objects in focus, utter-
ances, turns, speakers, located objects, RFs,
VPTs, spatial relations, ref. objects, etc.
3. Replicate the literature findings on the RF
usage in our dataset.
4. Repeat the experiments from (1) but where
one of the participants is a dialogue man-
ager following an RF strategy. Allow hu-
mans conversational partners to rate the per-
formance of the system.
(a) Always use the relative RF to yourself.
(b) Always align to the RF used by your
partner in the previous turn.
(c) For each turn select the RF randomly.
(d) Keep a randomly chosen RF for n turns,
then change.
To prevent over-agreement with the system
the evaluators should, ideally, compare pairs
of strategies and select the preferred one.
We collect our data and later test the in-
teraction in an online experimental environ-
ment specifically developed for this purpose
(http://goo.gl/8KLja). Participants may
create sessions to which they invite other partic-
ipants and complete them interactively in their
own time. During a session each participant sees
a 3d generated image of a room containing some
furniture. The image also contains two avatars:
the one with their back towards the participant is
the participant and the one facing the participant
from the opposite side of the room is their part-
ner. This is explained to the participants in the
instructions and different representations are used
to avoid the confusion. The other participant sees
the room from the opposite side. The participants
communicate via a text chat interface which al-
lows unrestricted entry of text and also logs and
partially annotates both the conversation and the
perceptual information in the background.
By the time of writing this abstract we con-
ducted two pilot studies for which we completed
stages 1 to 3 of our plan. In the first pilot study (7
conversations) we used a room with four distinct
entities (two participants, a chair and a sofa) ar-
ranged around a table in the middle which was
placed on a carpet. We instructed the partici-
pants to talk about the location of the objects in
the scene. Although this method was good in en-
couraging spontaneous conversations it had two
shortcomings: (i) the participants produced less
spatial descriptions than desired (11.9 per conver-
sation) as they also discussed their opinions about
the objects, etc.; and (ii) they spontaneously took
on roles where one was asking questions and the
other was giving answers and therefore the con-
versations included were very few cases of inter-
action that we were looking for. To overcome
these difficulties we designed a second pilot study
for which we (i) only used one kind of objects (the
chairs), (ii) restricted the conversational interac-
tion to pair of turns where in the first turn one par-
ticipant describes which chair they chose (one is
automatically selected for them and marked with
an arrow) and then in the second turn the partner
selects that chair on their view of the room. The
roles are reversed in the next turn. Thus, we get a
series of dialogue turns from which we record (i)
speaker’s strategy for RF choice; (ii) the hearer’s
understanding of the description. The latter is im-
portant as a particular description may be true un-
der more than one RF.
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Abstract
A probabilistic approach to the resolution
of referring expressions for task-oriented
dialogue systems is introduced. The ap-
proach resolves descriptions (e.g., “the blue
glass”), anaphora (e.g., “it”), and deixis
(e.g., “this one” w/ pointing gesture) in a
unified manner. In this approach, the notion
of reference domains serves an important
role to handle context-dependent attributes
of entities and references to sets. Previously
we reported the evaluation results in a puz-
zle solving task. This paper briefly explains
the approach and discusses the issues in two
work-in-progress application projects.
1 Introduction
Referring expressions (REs) can be classified
into three categories: descriptions, anaphora, and
deixis. Dialogue systems (DSs) are expected to
handle all the three categories of REs.
We employ a Bayesian network (BN) to model
a RE. One of the two major novelties of the ap-
proach is our probabilistic formulation that han-
dles the above three kinds of REs in a unified
manner. The other is bringing reference domains
(RDs) (Salmon-Alt and Romary, 2001) into that
formulation. RDs are sets of referents implic-
itly presupposed at each use of REs. By consid-
ering RDs, our approach can appropriately inter-
pret context-dependent attributes. In addition, by
treating a reference domain as a referent, REs re-
ferring to sets of entities are handled, too.
Our approach presupposes a certain amount
of manual implementation of domain-dependent
knowledge by developers. Therefore, it would
not be suited to general text processing. How-
ever, it has the potential to be used for any task-
oriented applications such as personal agents in
smart phones, in-car systems, robots, etc.
W C X D
Figure 1: WCXD fundamental structure.
2 Bayesian Network-based Modeling
Each REBN (Referring Expression Bayesian Net-
work) is tailored for a RE in the context at the mo-
ment. Its structure is determined by the syntactic
and semantic information in the RE and probabil-
ity tables are determined by the context. Here, we
describe REBNs briefly. The details and an eval-
uation are found in (Funakoshi et al., 2012).
2.1 Structures
Figure 1 shows the fundamental network structure
of REBNs. We call this structure WCXD. The
four nodes (random variables) W , C, X , and D
represent an observed word, the concept denoted
by the word, the referent of the RE, and the pre-
supposed RD, respectively. Here, a word means
a lexical entry in the system dictionary. Each
REBN is derived from the WCXD structure.
2.2 Domains of random variables
A REBN of N words referring to one en-
tity has 2N + 2 discrete random variables:
W1, . . . ,WN , C1, . . . , CN , X , and D. The do-
main of each variable depends on the correspond-
ing RE and the context at the moment. Here,
D(V ) denotes the domain of a variable V .
D(Wi) contains the corresponding observed
word wi and a special symbol ω that represents
other possibilities, i.e., D(Wi) = {wi, ω}. Each
Wi has a corresponding node Ci.
D(Ci) contains M concepts that can be ex-
pressed by wi and a special concept Ω that
represents other possibilities, i.e., D(Ci) =
{c1i , . . . , cMi ,Ω}. cji (j = 1 . . .M ) are looked up
from the system dictionary.
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D(D) contains L+1 RDs recognized up to that
point in time, i.e., D(D) = {@0,@1, . . . ,@L}.
@0 is the ground domain that contains all the in-
dividual entities to be referred to in a dialogue. At
the beginning of the dialogue, D(D) = {@0}.
Other L RDs are incrementally added in the
course of the dialogue.
D(X) contains all the possible referents, i.e.,
K individual entities and L + 1 RDs. Thus,
D(X) = {x1, . . . , xK ,@0, . . . ,@L}.
2.3 Probability tables
A REBN infers the referent (i.e., the true value of
node X) using four types of probability tables.
Realization model: P (Wi|Ci, X)
P (Wi = w|Ci = c,X = x) is the probability
that a hearer observes w from c and x which the
speaker intends to indicate.
Relevancy model: P (Ci|X,D)
P (Ci = c|X = x,D = d) is the probabil-
ity that concept c is chosen from D(Ci) to indi-
cate x in d. Developers can implement task do-
main semantics in P (Ci|X,D). By considering
d, context-dependent attributes are handled.
Referent prediction model: P (X|D)
P (X = x|D = d) is the probability that en-
tity x in RD d is referred to, which is estimated
according to the contextual information (such as
gaze) at the time the RE is uttered but irrespective
of attributive information in the RE.
Domain prediction model: P (D)
P (D = d) is the probability that d is presup-
posed at the time the RE is uttered, which is esti-
mated according to the saliency of d.
3 Work-in-Progress Apps and Issues
Currently we are working on two different appli-
cations: Map-search as a mobile/PC application
and Object-fetch as a robotic application. In Map-
search, the user can search locations on a map
and identify a location to query the information
of the location or to get a navigation to the loca-
tion. In Object-fetch, the user makes a robot iden-
tify an object in the user’s home or office to fetch
him/her it. By applying REBNs to these domains
different from each other and from the Tangram
task with which we made the first evaluation, we
will be able to verify the quantitative performance
and qualitative ability of our approach in diverse
aspects. For example, in Map-search, the num-
ber of referents can be huge while Tangram has
only 7 referents. Therefore, computational com-
plexity will be an important issue for realtime op-
eration. It is unrealistic to consider all locations
every time. We will have to devise a way to ef-
ficiently limit the number of candidates for each
time without excluding true referents.
Not limited to Object-fetch but especially in it,
handling of unknown objects is vital, while all ob-
jects are known in Tangram. The robot must rec-
ognize a RE to an object that it does not know.
For this purpose we can introduce χ for an un-
known referent in D(X). Hopefully, χ will have
the highest probability for REs to unknown ob-
jects. Uncertainty due to speech recognition er-
rors, unknown words, and unknown concepts is
also a severe issue. There is a possibility that ad-
justing the parameter ϵ (here, P (W = w|C =
Ω, X) = ϵ) eases the problem. The larger ϵ is, the
more P (X|D) influences inference results, i.e.,
the contextual information outside the RE gets
more importance. For example, in a low signal-
noise ratio environment, the robot could selec-
tively rely on the context by increasing ϵ.
In both applications, spatial relations are im-
portant to identify referents. To handle relations,
we are going to introduce another type of node for
relations in REBNs to combine multiple REBNs
into one.
System design methodology is the last but not
least issue. While REBNs allow different design
patterns of the world inherent in each application,
the best design pattern seems to depend on each.
For example, using the set of the location IDs in
a database as D(X) seems reasonable for Map-
search. However, this design pattern does not
work with Object-fetch. Object-fetch requires the
object IDs in the robot’s database to be included in
D(C). Through building Map-search and Object-
fetch in parallel, we would like to clarify different
design patterns and the conditions to chose a de-
sign pattern for each application.
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Abstract
Repair is crucial in achieving and main-
taining shared understanding in dialogue.
Recent work on consultations between pa-
tients with schizophrenia and psychiatrists
has shown that adherence to treatment cor-
relates with patterns of repair. We show that
distributions of repair in consultation dia-
logues are different to those in general con-
versation.We investigate whether particular
types of repair can be detected from high-
level dialogue features and/or lexical con-
tent, with encouraging results. We further
explore whether we can predict adherence
directly from these features. The results in-
dicate that prediction appears to be possible
from low-level lexical content.
1 Introduction
How conversational partners achieve and main-
tain shared understanding is crucial in the under-
standing of dialogue. One such mechanism, re-
pair, is pervasive and highly systematic. In Sche-
gloff et al. (1977), repairs are described in terms
of who initiates the repair, who completes it, and
in what position it is completed.
A speaker can repair their own utterance in the
course of producing it – a position 1 self-initiated
self-repair (P1SISR), by repeating (articulation),
reformulating (formulation), or adding something
(transition space). They may also repair one of
their own utterances following someone else’s –
a position 3 self-initiated self-repair (P3SISR). A
speaker can also repair another’s utterance – a po-
sition 2 other initiated other repair (P2OIOR) or
signal misunderstanding – a position 2 next turn
repair initiator (P2NTRI) prompting the original
speaker to repair their prior utterance – a position
3 other initiated self repair (P3OISR). See table 1
for examples.
Type Example
P1SISR(A) Dr: You probably have seen so many psychia-
trists o- o- over the years
P1SISR(F) Dr: Did you feel that did you despair so much
that you wondered if you could carry on?
P1SISR(TS) P: Where I go to do some printing. Lino
printing
P3SISR Dr: Clozaril or
P: Yeah
Dr: Clozapine yes
P2OIOR Dr: rather than the diazepam which I don’t
think . . . is going to do you any good
P: The valium
P2NTRI Dr: It doesn’t happen in real life does it?
and P: What do you mean by real life?
P3OISR Dr: you can’t- there are no messages coming
from the television to people are there?
Table 1: Repair types (repair bold; repaired italics)
McCabe et al. (in preparation) analysed repair
in dialogues between patients with schizophrenia
and their psychiatrists. More patient led clari-
fication, e.g. clarifying the psychiatrist’s utter-
ance with P2NTRIs, was associated with better
treatment adherence 6 months later. Explaining
the link between communicative patterns and ad-
herence has both clinical and theoretical implica-
tions.
2 Repair in different dialogue contexts
We compared the repair data from Colman and
Healey (2011)1 with that from McCabe et al. (in
preparation). These were annotated for instances
of repair using the same protocol.
As shown in figure 1, although all types of dia-
logue exhibit the preference for self repair (Sche-
gloff et al., 1977), this is especially the case in
the clinical dialogues. Conversely, in the clinical
dialogues there are fewer P2NTRIs and P3OISRs.
1This study looked at the demographic portion of the
British National Corpus, and HCRC Map Task dialogues.
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Figure 1: Repair per word by dialogue context
3 Classification Experiments
We first investigate the automatic detection of
P2NTRIs, and then prediction of adherence di-
rectly, using the Weka machine learning toolkit
(Hall et al., 2009) and the support vector machine
implementation SVMLight (Joachims, 1999).
3.1 Detecting Repair
We defined a set of turn-level features (table 2) ex-
tracted automatically and likely to correlate with
P2NTRIs. Words used by the patient were used to
extract (optional) lexical unigram features.
Measure Description
Speaker Doctor, Patient, Other
NumWords Number of words in turn
OpenClassRepair Contains pardon, huh etc
WhWords Num of wh-words (what, who, when)
Backchannel Num of backchannels (uh-huh, yeah)
FillerWords Number of fillers (er, um)
RepeatedWords Words repeated from preceding turn
MarkedPauses Number of pauses transcribed
OverlapAny Number of portions of overlapping talk
OverlapAll Entirely overlapping another turn
Table 2: Turn-level features
The classification task is to categorise each pa-
tient turn as containing a P2NTRI or not. The
target class is very sparse: 170 of 20,911 turns
were P2NTRIs, so a weighted SVM cost function
was used. Performance was evaluated using 5-
fold cross-validation. As shown in Table 3, abso-
lute F-scores are low due to target class sparsity.
Target Features F (%) P (%) R (%)
P2NTRI OCRProportion 35.8 85.7 22.6
P2NTRI High-level 41.4 42.8 40.6
P2NTRI All 44.0 44.9 43.6
Table 3: Repair detection
3.2 Predicting Adherence
We now turn to classifying each dialogue accord-
ing to the level of adherence after 6 months. The
features used were similar to those in the turn-
level experiments, calculated over the dialogue.
Given the small size of the dataset (77 in-
stances) and large possible feature space when us-
ing lexical features, we allowed only words men-
tioned >40 times, and selected the most predic-
tive 10-20 features based only on the training set
in each fold of the cross-validation.
As Table 4 shows, the performance using best
selected features is good; however, all features
selected are unigram lexical features. High-level
features do not prove useful.
Features F (%) P (%) R (%)
High-level 35.5 27.0 51.9
Best features 70.3 70.3 70.3
Table 4: Adherence prediction
4 Discussion
Patient led clarification is rare, leading to a highly
unbalanced dataset. Although P2NTRIs can be
predicted, the sparsity of the data mean they are
not sufficient to predict adherence. Patient led
clarification is not straightforwardly associated
with any high-level, general dialogue factors to al-
low us to accurately classify the adherent patients.
However, there is a link between patients’ con-
versational behaviour and their subsequent adher-
ence to treatment, as seen in the results of exper-
iments using words as features. Further work is
needed to clarify what this link is and whether we
can come up with a usable metric for predicting
probable adherence from dialogue transcripts.
References
M. Colman and P. G. T. Healey. 2011. The distribution
of repair in dialogue. In Proceedings of CogSci,
pages 1563–1568, Boston, MA.
M. Hall, E. Frank, G. Holmes, et al. 2009. The
WEKA data mining software: An update. SIGD-
KDD Explorations, 11(1):10–18.
T. Joachims. 1999. Making large-scale SVM learn-
ing practical. In B. Scho¨lkopf, C. Burges, and
A. Smola, editors, Advances in Kernel Methods –
Support Vector Learning. MIT Press.
R. McCabe, M. Lavelle, S. Bremner, et al. in prepa-
ration. Shared understanding in psychiatrist-patient
communication: Association with treatment adher-
ence in schizophrenia.
E.A. Schegloff, G. Jefferson, and H. Sacks. 1977. The
preference for self-correction in the organization of
repair in conversation. Language, 53(2):361–382.
156
A spoken dialogue interface for pedestrian city exploration: integrating
navigation, visibility, and Question-Answering
Srinivasan Janarthanam1, Oliver Lemon1, Xingkun Liu1, Phil Bartie2,
William Mackaness2, Tiphaine Dalmas3 and Jana Goetze4
1Interaction Lab, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh
2 School of GeoSciences, University of Edinburgh
3School of Informatics, University of Edinburgh
4KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden
sc445,o.lemon,x.liu@hw.ac.uk, philbartie@gmail.com,
william.mackaness@ed.ac.uk, tiphaine.dalmas@aethys.com, jagoetze@kth.se
Abstract
We demonstrate a spoken dialogue-based in-
formation system for pedestrians. The system
is novel in combining geographic information
system (GIS) modules such as a visibility en-
gine with a question-answering (QA) system,
integrated within a dialogue system architec-
ture. Users of the demonstration system can
use a web-based version (simulating pedes-
trian movement using StreetView) to engage
in a variety of interleaved navigation and QA
conversations.
1 Motivation
Although navigation and local information are avail-
able to users through smartphone apps, there are
still important problems such as how such informa-
tion is delivered safely and proactively, and with-
out cognitively overloading the user. (Kray et al.,
2003) suggested that the cognitive load of informa-
tion presented in textual and speech-based interfaces
is medium and low respectively when compared to
more complicated visual interfaces. Another impor-
tant challenge is to bring different sources of data to-
gether and present information appropriately based
on the dialogue context. Our objective, therefore, is
to build a hands-free and eyes-free system that en-
gages the pedestrian user by presenting all informa-
tion and receiving user inputs through speech only.
The system integrates a City Model and a Visibil-
ity Engine to identify visible landmarks, a Pedes-
trian Tracker to improve the GPS positioning of the
user, and a question-answering (QA) system to en-
able users to explore information about the city more
freely than with a graphical interface (see example in
table 1).
User: Take me to Princes Street.
System: Turn left on to South Bridge and
walk towards the tower in front of you.
...
System: Near you is the famous statue of David Hume.
User: Tell me more about David Hume.
System: David Hume was a Scottish philosopher....
Table 1: An example interaction with the system
2 Architecture
The architecture of the current system is shown in
figure 1.
Figure 1: System Architecture
2.1 Dialogue interface
The dialogue interface consists of an utterance
parser, an Interaction Manager and an utterance gen-
erator. The Interaction Manager (IM) is the central
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component of the system, which provides the user
with timely navigational instructions and interest-
ing PoI information. It receives the user’s input in
the form of a dialogue act (DA) and the user’s loca-
tion in the form of latitude and longitude. Based on
these inputs and the dialogue context, it estimates
the user’s orientation, and it responds with system
output dialogue act, based on a dialogue policy. The
utterance generator is a natural language generation
module that translates the system’s DAs into sur-
face text, using the Open CCG toolkit (White et al.,
2007).
2.2 Pedestrian Tracker
Using Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS)
(e.g. GPS, GLONASS) this module provides user
positioning information. Since urban environments
can be challenging with limited sky views, and
hence limited line of sight to satellites, this module
improves on the reported user position by combining
smartphone sensor data (e.g. accelerometer) with
map matching techniques, to determine the most
likely location of the pedestrian (Bartie and Mack-
aness, 2012).
2.3 City Model
The City Model is a spatial database containing in-
formation about thousands of entities in the city of
Edinburgh. These data have been collected from a
variety of existing resources such as Ordnance Sur-
vey, OpenStreetMap and the Gazetteer for Scotland.
It includes the location, use class, name, and street
address of many entities. The model also includes
a pedestrian network (streets, pavements, etc) which
can be used to calculate routes for the user.
2.4 Visibility Engine
This module identifies the entities that are visible
to the user using a 2.5D representation of the city.
This information is used by the IM to generate ef-
fective navigation instructions. E.g. “Walk towards
the castle”, “Can you see the tower in front of you?”,
“Turn left after the large building on your left, after
the junction” and so on.
2.5 Question-Answering server
The QA server currently answers a range of defini-
tion questions. E.g., “Tell me more about the Scot-
tish Parliament”, “Who was David Hume?”, etc. QA
identifies the entity focused on in the question us-
ing machine-learning techniques (Mikhailian et al.,
2009), and then proceeds to a textual search on texts
from the Gazetteer of Scotland and Wikipedia, and
definitions from WordNet glosses.
3 Web-based User interface
For the purposes of this (necessarily non-mobile)
demonstration, we present a web-based interface
that simulates users walking in a 3D city environ-
ment. Users will be able to provide speech or text
input. The web-based client is a JavaScript/HTML
program running on the user’s web browser. For a
detailed description of this component, please refer
to (Janarthanam et al., 2012). A simulated real world
is presented to the user visually using a Google
Streetview client (Google Maps API). It allows the
user to simulate walking around in real streets us-
ing arrow keys. The user can interact with the dia-
logue system using speech or text, which is sent to
the system along with the user’s location. The sys-
tem’s utterances are synthesized using the Cereproc
text-to-speech engine.
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Abstract 
We are modeling human dialogues where one 
participant tries to influence the reasoning 
process of the other in order to get him to per-
form an action. Our aim is to build a dialogue 
system which would interact with a user in a 
`natural human way´. In our model, reasoning 
is presented as a process of evaluating differ-
ent aspects of the action. To describe the in-
fluencing of reasoning, we introduce two 
conceptual structures: communicative strate-
gies and communicative tactics. 
1 Aims and Background 
One of the central tasks of pragmatics is to explain 
the mechanisms by which people reach their goals 
in communication; to this end, also several com-
puter models have been built (Jokinen, 2009; 
Ginzburg and Fernández, 2010). We believe that 
the central task is here to explain the process we 
call `influencing the reasoning of a communication 
partner´. A computer system should include a 
model of reasoning and account for the means used 
by people to influence the reasoning of others. This 
view has got strong support from the (evolution-
ary) psychologists who claim that the original 
function of the human reasoning is argumentative: 
to devise and evaluate arguments intended to lead 
partners to make/accept certain decisions (see 
Mercier and Sperber, 2011). 
In our Interaction Model (IM) we treat dia-
logues where one of the participants (A) is trying to 
achieve the partner´s (B) decision to perform an 
action (D), and have worked out a corresponding 
computer model. We follow the general ideas of 
the BDI model (Allen, 1995) and have elaborated 
it in the aspects relevant for us. The central sub-
models of IM are: (1) Model of reasoning subject 
(RS) which contains Model of motivational system 
(MS) and Reasoning model (RM), by which the 
process of evaluating (weighing) the relevant as-
pects of D is carried out; and (2) Models of com-
municative strategies (ComStr) and communicative 
tactics (ComT), by which the process of Influenc-
ing the reasoning is treated (Koit and Õim, 2004). 
The empirical data of our study are taken from the 
Estonian dialogue corpus1. 
2 Model of Reasoning Subject  
2.1 Motivation and Reasoning 
We assume that the reasoning process concerning 
D is triggered by one of three motivational factors 
of RS: (1) RS may like to perform D (wish-factor), 
(2) RS may assume that D is useful for reaching 
some goal (needed-factor), or (3) D is obligatory 
(must-factor). Together, these factors constitute the 
MS of the reasoning subject.  
MS is used by RS in reasoning about D, by 
weighing the positive/negative aspects of D depart-
ing from these factors: pleasant/unpleasant, use-
ful/harmful, obligatory/prohibited. If the positive 
aspects (pleasant, etc.) weigh more, RS will decide 
to do D, otherwise the decision will be not to do D. 
                                                           
1 http://www.cs.ut.ee/~koit/Dialoog/EDiC.html  
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Thus, we assume that RS is able to `sum up´ the 
results of weighing. In our model this assumption 
is formally realized so that the evaluated aspects 
are represented as scales that take numerical val-
ues, or weights. The scales are different. For ex-
ample, the weights of pleasant/unpleasant scales, 
w(pleasant), w(unpleasant) have values from 0 to 
n, where n depends on the participant, whereas 
weights of obligatory and prohibited scales have 
values 0 or 1. At the same time, the punishment 
scale is connected with these scales, the weights of 
w(punishment-not-D) and w(punishment-D), corre-
spondingly, can again have scalar numerical val-
ues. The scales are not independent: what is useful 
can also be pleasant; punishment is unpleasant, etc. 
One more motivational aspect is Resources (men-
tal, physical, etc.) needed to carry out D.  
Reasoning procedures (RP) are represented as 
algorithms of going through the weights of rele-
vant aspects of the action depending on the initiat-
ing factor (Wish, Needed, or Must). Algorithms are 
represented as decision trees including yes-no 
questions. For instance, in case of RP triggered by 
Wish-factor one question is: Is w(pleasant) > 
w(unpleasant) + w(harmful)? There are three RPs 
in our model: Wish, Needed, and Must. The first 
step of all the procedures is: Are there enough Re-
sources for doing D? If not, then do not do D, and 
every path of a tree ends with a decision: Do D or 
Do not do D. 
2.2 Influencing Reasoning 
If after the A´s first turn (request, proposal, etc.) B 
does not agree to do D (and A does not give up), 
interaction follows: A tries to influence the reason-
ing of B, departing, according to our approach, 
from the MS and RM of B. The influencing con-
sists in manipulating the weights of the relevant 
scales on MS/RS of B, information about which A 
gets from B´s (counter-)arguments during the in-
teraction. This `manipulation´ presupposes certain 
reasoning procedures of A, `reasoning about rea-
soning (of B)´, as the output of which he will 
choose a coherent line of action: which weights in 
RS of B to increase or downgrade. Here we distin-
guish between two levels of procedures: communi-
cative tactics and communicative strategies. 
ComT-s are procedures determined by the choice 
of the primary motivational factor (Wish, Needed, 
or Must). Accordingly, we have three ComT-s in 
our model which we call Enticing, Persuading, and 
Threatening. They consist in increasing the 
weights of w(pleasant), w(useful), w(obligatory), 
correspondingly, while downgrading the negative 
weights relevant for B. For instance, if A has cho-
sen ComT Enticement but B points at harmful con-
sequences of D, then A tries to downgrade 
w(harmful) for B. ComStr-s are higher order pro-
cedures that regulate the possible choices between 
ComT-s in a certain interaction. Concretely, in our 
model two kinds of ComStr-s are important: Attack 
and Defense (these apply to A as well as to B). In 
the first case, the participant tries to press his goal 
on the partner, in the second, he averts taking over 
the partner´s goal. The choice between these 
ComStr-s clearly restricts the use of possible 
ComT-s. 
3 Future Work 
We will include contextual dimensions to our rea-
soning-in-interaction model, first, involving per-
sonal background of the participants: their social 
relationships (status, distance: friends-adversaries); 
and second, characteristics of the interaction (rue-
ful, vehement, etc.). 
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Abstract
Many traditional dialogue systems use sim-
ple predicates to send information between
a Dialogue Manager and a Natural Lan-
guage Generation system. We propose a
flexible RST-style interface to allow for
more complex structures and multimodal
output, and we place the first stage of con-
tent planning under the control of the dia-
logue management system with access to a
system-wide information state.
1 Introduction
In many dialogue systems, a Dialogue Manager
(DM) sits at the centre of the interaction, taking
user inputs and sending an output specification to
a Natural Language Generation (NLG) system. In
multimodal systems, there may be a Dialogue and
Interaction Manager, and the outputs may go via
an intermediate stage where the different modali-
ties are synchronised, and in other cases a planner
may take over the duties of dialogue management,
but there is usually a need to store the history and
to specify the language output. Where the system
has a physical component, facial and hand ges-
tures may also be specified.
We propose a flexible interface between the
DM and the output modalities which can be used
in a variety of human-machine dialogue domains.
It is based on RST structures (Mann and Thomp-
son, 1988), and is related to work by (Stent et al.,
2004) who used a similar approach in MATCH,
their text-based restaurant recommendation sys-
tem. However in MATCH, the DM sends high-
level goals to the text planner, whereas in our sys-
tems, the DM performs part of the content selec-
tion task (in some cases by communicating with
a domain planner and/or knowledge representa-
tion module), and sends a structured representa-
tion to the NLG system. The potential content to
express can come from a wide range of sources,
including the dialogue history, the domain knowl-
edge or the task plan. For example, the task plan
may describe sequences of actions which need to
be carried out in constructing objects (Foster and
Matheson, 2008).
This work can be seen in the broader context of
attempting to integrate language processing, dia-
logue management, and NLG more closely.
2 Use Cases
To date, we have used our RST representation in
three working systems in varied domains:
• the JAST system (Foster and Matheson,
2008; Foster et al., 2009), which allows a hu-
man to collaborate with a robot in building
simple wooden toys
• the JAMES system (Petrick and Foster,
2012; Petrick et al., 2012), a robot bartender
• the Beetle II system (Dzikovska et al., 2011),
a tutorial dialogue system for basic electric-
ity and electronics
The top level rhetorical structures which we use
are the following:
enablement where one situation or action is nec-
essary (but not always sufficient) for another
situation to action to occur. e.g. “to build
a tower, insert the green bolt through the red
cube and screw it into the blue cube” (JAST).
elaboration where one piece of content adds fur-
ther information about an object which has
already been mentioned e.g. “the battery in
circuit 5 is in a closed path which does not
contain a bulb” (Beetle II).
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enablement
build
join
insert screw
tower green bolt
red
cube
green 
bolt
   blue
cube
Figure 1: Graph representation of enablement and join
relations
<output>
<objects>
<obj id="o1" type="bolt" color="green"/>
<obj id="o2" type="cube" color="red"/>
<obj id="o3" type="cube" color="blue"/>
<obj id="o4" type="tower"/>
</objects>
<rst>
<relation type="enablement">
<pred action="build" result="o4"/>
<relation type="join">
<pred action="insert">
<obj idref="o1"/>
<obj idref="o2"/>
</pred>
<pred action="screw">
<obj idref="o1"/>
<obj idref="o3"/>
</pred>
</relation>
</pred>
</relation
</rst>
<actions>
<action type="handover">
<obj idref="o1"/>
</action>
</actions>
</output>
Figure 2: Multimodal RST XML for enablement rela-
tion
definition where one piece of information de-
fines another e.g. “it means that the battery
is damaged” (Beetle II).
join which signifies a simple aggregation of two
pieces of content e.g. “hello, what would you
like to drink” (JAMES).
A graph of an enablement relation from JAST is
shown in figure 1, and a possible surface realisa-
tion for this is “to build a tower, insert the green
bolt through the red cube and screw it into the blue
cube”. The multimodal XML representation of
the RST is shown in figure 2; as well as giving the
content to be spoken, this specifies that the robot
should hand over object o1 (the green bolt) to the
user.
3 Conclusions
We designed a flexible interface for communica-
tions between the Dialogue Manager and the Nat-
ural Language Generation components in a di-
alogue system. We have used the interface in
a number of different systems, and shown that
it encourages the integration of multimodal out-
put modalities. The systems we have described
all use rule-based Dialogue Management or Plan-
ning, but the RST could also be used in a statis-
tical dialogue system as long as the NLG compo-
nent is grammar-based.
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Abstract
We discuss semantics of superlative quanti-
fiers at most n and at least n. We argue that
the meaning of a quantifier is a pair speci-
fying a verification and a falsification con-
dition for sentences with this quantifier. We
further propose that the verification condi-
tion of superlative quantifiers has a disjunc-
tive form, which should be interpreted in
an epistemic way, that is as a conjunctive
list of possibilities. We also present results
of a reasoning experiment in which we an-
alyze the acceptance rate of different in-
ferences with superlative and comparative
quantifiers in German. We discuss the re-
sults in the light of our proposal.
There is an on going debate concerning the
right semantical interpretation of so-called su-
perlative quantifiers, such as at most n and at
least n, where n represents a bare numeral, e.g
two. (Look inter alia: (Geurts & Nouwen, 2007),
(Koster-Moeller et al, 2008), (Geurts et al., 2010),
(Cummins & Katsos, 2010), (Nouwen, 2010),
(Cohen & Krifka, 2011)). Generalized Quantifier
Theory defines superlative quantifiers as equiva-
lent to respective comparative quantifiers: fewer
than n and more than n, that is:
atmost n (A,B) ⇐⇒ fewer thann+ 1(A,B) (1)
at least n (A,B) ⇐⇒ more thann− 1(A,B) (2)
It has been observed that in natural language
those equivalences 1 and 2 might not hold, or
at least they might not be accepted by language
user based on pragmatical grounds. There are
numerous differences between comparative and
superlative quantifiers involving their linguistic
use Geurts & Nouwen (2007), acquisition (Mu-
solino, 2004), (Geurts et al., 2010), their process-
ing (Koster-Moeller et al, 2008),(Geurts et al.,
2010), as well as – what is our main focus – the
inference patterns in which they occur. It has
been for instance shown that majority of respon-
ders usually reject inferences from at most n to
at most n+1, although they accept the equivalent
inference with comparative quantifiers (Geurts et
al., 2010), (Cummins & Katsos, 2010).
In this paper we provide an algorithmic inter-
pretation of superlative quantifiers that tries to ex-
plain the observed reasoning data. Furthermore
we report on the results of a reasoning experiment
that support our theoretical proposal.
We propose that the meaning of a quantifier
as a pair 〈CF , CV 〉, where CV is a verification
condition (specifies how to verify sentences with
this quantifier) and CF is a falsification condition
(specifies how to falsify sentences with this quan-
tifier). Verification and falsification conditions are
to be understood algorithmically (as partial algo-
rithms), with the “else” part of the conditional in-
struction being empty - thus, they verify (or fal-
sify) the formulas only if their conditional test is
satisfied. From a perspective of classical logic,
these conditions should be dual, namely if C is
a CV condition for sentence φ, then C is a CF
condition for sentence ¬φ, and vice versa. We
further, however, observe that in the case of su-
perlative quantifiers, there is a split between these
two conditions. We suggest, that this bifurcation
is a result of a pragmatic focus on the expressed
borderline n.
1Here and below n+ denotes any natural number greater
than n, while n− denotes any natural number smaller than
n.
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1 Two semantic conditions for “at most”
Krifka (1999) points out that semantic interpreta-
tion is usually a pair that specifies when the sen-
tence is true and when it is false. However, as he
observes, a sentence at most n x: φ(x) says only
that more than n x: φ(x) is false, and leaves a
truth condition underspecified. In other words, the
meaning of at most n provides an algorithm for
falsifying sentences with this quantifier, but not
(immediately) for verifying them. Consequently,
the primal semantical condition of at most n x:
φ(x) could be understood as an algorithm: “fal-
sify when the number of x that are φ exceeds n”,
and would constitute what we understand by the
falsification condition.
Definition 1 (falsification condition for at most)
CF (atmost x : φ(x)) := If ∃>nx(φ(x)), then falsify
But how can we know when it is true? From
the point of view of an algorithm, it is the “else”
part of the conditional that should define the truth-
condition. However a negation of a falsification
condition is in sense informationally empty: it
does not describe any concrete situation in which
the given sentence can be verified. As a result, in
those contexts that require to directly verify a sen-
tence, we refer to a verification condition, which
is specified independently. As expressing a pos-
itive condition, at most n may be understood as
a disjunction n or fewer than n (“disjunctive at
most”).
¬∃>nxφ(x) ⇐⇒ ∃<n+1xφ(x) ⇐⇒ ∃=nxφ(x)∨∃<nxφ(x)
(3)
In order to define the verification condition, we
adopt, following Zimmermann (2000), the view
that disjunctive sentences in natural language are
likely to get so-called epistemic reading that is
they are interpreted as conjunctive lists of epis-
temic possibilities. According to the proposed so-
lution a disjunction P1 or...or Pn is interpreted as
an answer to a question: Q: What might be the
case? and, thus, is paraphrased as a (closed) list
L: P1 (might be the case) [and]... Pn (might be
the case) (and nothing else might be the case).
This results in the following reading of a disjunc-
tive sentence:
Definition 2 (Zimmermann, 2000) P1∨...∨Pn ⇐⇒
P1∧...∧Pn and (closure) ∀P [P → [P G P1∨...∨P G
Pn]]
If we assume that disjunctions in natural language
are likely to be interpreted as conjunctions of epis-
temic possibilities, then we get the following ver-
ification condition for at most:
Definition 3 (epistemic interpretation of the verification con-
dition for at most)
CEV (atmost n x : φ(x)) := If (∃=nxφ(x) ∧∃<nxφ(x)), then verify
[and (closure) If  ∃>nxφ(x), then falsify]
The important point is the optional character of
the closure. This bases on our assumption that
the falsification and verification conditions are in
a sense independent and only as a pair constitute
the full semantic interpretation. Since the falsifi-
cation condition, as defined in 3, is sufficient to
account for the right semantical criterion of when
the sentence with at most n is false, the closure of
the verification condition is redundant and might
or might not be considered in the reasoning pro-
cess. The optional character of closure turns out
crucial in evaluating validity of inferences with at
most n.
It is easy now to observe that from ∃=nφ(x)∧
∃<nxφ(x) one cannot infer ∃=n+1xφ(x) ∧
∃<n+1xφ(x): the conjunct ∃=n+1x : φ(x) can-
not be proven based on the premise, though it can
be excluded only if the closure of the premise is
applied. On the other hand, the inference: n or
fewer than n→ n-1 or fewer than n-1 (in the epis-
temic interpretation) is blocked only due to clo-
sure of the conclusion. That is: ∃=n implied by
the premise is contradicted by the closure of the
conclusion, i.e. ¬  ∃>n−1. However, without
the closure the implication holds (if the epistemic
reading of the verification condition is applied).
2 “At least” and bare numerals
As an upward monotone quantifier, at least n ap-
pears to provide a clear verification algorithm:
“verify when n x (that are φ) are found”. Such a
semantical interpretation would not, however, ac-
count for the linguistical differences between at
least n and more than n-1.
Let us start with defining a falsification condi-
tion for at least n as follows:
Definition 4 (falsification condition for at least)
CF (at least n : xφ(x)) := If ∃<nxφ(x), then falsify
Defining a verification condition for “at least n”
we first take into account following pragmatic fo-
cus that is put on the borderline n, which leads us
to the disjunctive form of this quantifier: (exactly)
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n or more than n. Finally, we apply Zimmerman’s
epistemic interpretation.
Definition 5 (epistemic interpretation of the verification con-
dition for at least n)
CF (at least n : xφ(x)) := If (∃=nxφ(x) ∧
∃>nxφ(x)), then verify
and(closure) If (
∨n−1
i=0 ∃=ixφ(x)), then falsify
Let us now show how the interpretation of the
bare numeral n interacts with the validity of in-
ferences (n or more than n)→ (n-1 or more than
n-1), given the epistemic interpretation of disjunc-
tion. A bare numeral n (e.g. “two”) can be inter-
preted as denoting any set of at least n elements,
or a set of exactly n elements. Suppose now that
n is interpreted with a closure: exactly n. It is
easy to observe that, in such a case, possible that
n and possible that more than n does not imply
possible that n-1 or possible that more than n-1.
The premise which is interpreted as in Definition
5 does not imply ∃=n−1 ∧ ∃>n−1 (with closure∧n−2
i=0 ¬∃=ixφ(x)) While ∃>n−1 follows from
both ∃>n and ∃=n, the problematic element is
∃=n−1, which is directly contradicted by the clo-
sure of the premise. But suppose that n does not
get the “exact” reading, but it is interpreted barely
as there are n. Then from possible that n we can
infer possible that n-1, since the latter does not
exclude the possibility that there is a bigger set of
elements.
3 Main findings
In our pilot experiment on reasoning conducted
on German native speakers: nearly 100% of re-
sponders accepted inferences from at most n to
not more than n and vice versa, as well as from
n or fewer than n to at most n (and vice versa),
which suggests that they do see those expressions
as equivalent. (Similarly for mutual inferences
between: at least n and not fewer than n, and at
least n and n or more than n). The inferences:
at least n→ at least n- were accepted in only ca.
75% of cases, which suggests some, at least prag-
matic mechanism, suppressing this inference. We
propose that this rejection bases on the “exact”
reading of bare numerals. It is worth to note that
of subjects accepted inferences that base on the
“at least” reading of bare numerals in almost 60%
of cases, which highly correlated with their ac-
ceptance of the inferences: n or more than n →
n- or more than n- (p = .026) and with their ac-
ceptance of inferences: at least n → at least n-
(p = .019).
Furthermore, while inferences from at most n
to at most n+ were accepted only by 14% of re-
sponders, inferences from not more than n to not
more than n+ were already accepted by almost
32%. Thus, it seems that paraphrasing at most n
to the negative form: not more than n facilitates
the inference.
The results for the inferences with disjunctive
forms of superlative quantifiers (n or fewer than n
and n or more than n) are especially interesting.
While logically valid inferences (n or more than
n) → (n- or more than n-) are accepted by 65%
people, the invalid inferences: (n or more than
n) → (n+ or more than n+) are rather rejected
(only 18% accept). The opposite effect, however,
we get for disjunctive form of at most. The logi-
cally valid inferences (n or fewer than n) → (n+
or fewer than n+) are rather rejected (only 16%
accept), whilst invalid inferences (n or fewer than
n) → (n- or fewer than n-) are accepted in 39%
of cases. The surprising result that subjects ac-
cepted the invalid inferences with “disjunctive at
most” more frequently than the valid ones can be
explained by our proposal. As we have proposed
above, closure in the verification condition is op-
tional, since the falsification condition is suffi-
cient to account for the right semantics. However,
if context enforces applying one of the semantical
conditions (verification or falsification), then the
other one might be ignored. While, from the per-
spective of classical logic it should be enough to
use only one of the conditions (since the other can
be defined via the first one), in the case of superla-
tive quantifiers the epistemic reading of the ver-
ification condition creates the bifurcation in the
meaning. This results in different inferential pat-
terns in which those quantifiers occur, depending
on what the context primarily enforced: the veri-
fication or falsification condition.
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1 Introduction
A Gricean view of cognitive agents holds that
agents are fully rational and adhere to the max-
ims of conversation that entail that speakers adopt
shared intentions and fully aligned preferences–
e.g. (Allen and Litman, 1987; Lochbaum, 1998).
These assumptions are unwarranted in many con-
versational settings. In this paper we propose a
different view and an annotation scheme for it.
We propose a game theoretic approach to con-
versation. While we assume like Grice that con-
versational agents are rational, agents talk to max-
imize their expected utility (a measure that com-
bines belief and preference). Preferences together
with beliefs guide conversational actions as much
as they guide non linguistic actions. Conversa-
tions are dynamic and extensive games, and they
have an in principle unbounded number of pos-
sible moves and no mandatory stopping points—
you can, in some sense, always say anything, and
you can always continue a conversation. The
moves for each player consist in making a dis-
course contribution, which we finitely charac-
terize using discourse structure in the sense of
(Asher and Lascarides, 2003). Such discourse
structures consist of discourse units linked to each
via discourse relations like Elaboration, Question-
Answer-Pair (QAP) and Explanation. In addition
these discourse relations serve to link one partici-
pant’s contribution to another; for instance, if one
agent asks a question, another may respond with
an answer, the two contributions then linked to-
gether by the relation QAP. Conversational partic-
ipants are alternatively senders (S) or receivers of
messages (R). S sends a signal s bearing in mind
that receiver R has to figure out: (a) what is the
message m(s)? What is S publicly committed
to? (b) Is m(s) credible or not? (c) Given a status
for m(s), what signal s′ should R send in return?
R now becomes sender and S, now the receiver,
goes through the calculation steps (a)-(c). We as-
sume that at least part of the conventional mean-
ing of the signal is determined prior to game play.
In calculation (a), R must calculate using a form
of generalized signaling game what are the pub-
lic commitments that S has made—these include
not only the fixed semantics but also the impli-
catures that introduce discourse relations between
contributions. Sometimes these involve strategic
considerations: for instance, is S actually reply-
ing to the question asked in the prior turn or is she
engaged in some other discourse move? If she is
answering the question, is this something that S
cannot plausibly later deny? (Asher and Quinley,
2011) argue that a trust game format is the right
one for computing optimal moves in task (c).
(Traum and Allen, 1994) advocates a related
view on which cooperativity is determined only
by the social conventions guiding conversation,
obligations that do not presuppose speakers adopt
each other’s goals (Traum et al., 2008). For us,
the social conventions that are foundational on
Traum’s account are however themselves based
on utility. Utility is also the basis for train-
ing agents to behave in a certain way through
reinforcement learning for conversational agents
(Frampton and Lemon, 2009).
2 Example negotiation dialogue
We provide a sample annotation of a negotiation
dialogue (table (1) from our corpus, which con-
sists of recorded chat negotiations taking place
during on-line games of The Settlers of Catan,1
a popular boardgame. The annotations are done
1See the original game on www.catan.com, adapted
by us on homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/mguhe/socl/
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Speaker Id Turn Dom. function Rhet. function Prefs
Euan 47 [And I alt tab back from the tutorial.] 1 OTHER
[What’s up?] 2 OTHER Result*(47 1,47 2)
Joel 48 [do you want to trade?] OFFER Q-elab(47 2, 48)
〈Joel,?,?,Euan〉
Card. 49 [joel fancies a bit of your clay] STRAT.-COMMENT Expl*(48, 49) Pref(joel)
Joel 50 [yes] OTHER Ackn(49, 50)
Joel 51 [!] OTHER Comment(50, 51)
Euan 52 [Whatcha got?] COUNTEROFFER Q-elab([48-50], 52)
〈Euan,?,?,Joel〉
Joel 53 [wheat] HAS-RESOURCES QAP(52, 53)
〈Joel,wheat〉
Euan 54 [I can wheat for clay.] COUNTEROFFER Elab([52,53], 54)
〈Euan,wheat,clay,Joel〉
Joel 55 [awesome] ACCEPT(54) Ackn(54, 55)
Table 1: Example annotation, with offer arguments: offerer, requested resource, offered resource, receiver.
using the GLOZZ tool developed by the Univer-
sity of Caen.2
Our annotation model features both a discourse
structure level (DS) and a dialogue act (DA) level,
which categorizes elementary discourse units or
EDUs, given by a pre-annotation, relative to their
role in negotiations. DS encodes communicative
functions of EDUs or clusters of EDUs using the
relations of (Asher and Lascarides, 2003), simi-
lar to but more detailed than DAMSL’s (Core and
Allen, 1997). Unlike (Sidner, 1994), which also
provides domain level acts for negotiations, our
semantics for DAs does not assume Gricean coop-
erativity. Our DAs are: OFFER, COUNTEROFFER,
STRATEGIC COMMENT a comment about a play
in the game, OTHER. Each act also comes with
an annotation of resources that are offered, re-
quested, or simply possessed. With respect to the
discourse relations, Expl* and Result* stand for
“metalinguistic” relations: Result*(47 1, 47 2)
means that the action described in 47 1 causes the
speech act of asking the question in 47 2. Sim-
ilarly, Expl*(48,49) indicates that Cardlinger ex-
plains why Joel asked the question in EDU 48.
Q-elab is the relation of follow up question or Q-
elab, and Ackn stands for the acknowledgment re-
lation, while QAP stands for Question-Answer-
Pair. The semantics for all these relations can be
found in (Asher and Lascarides, 2003).
Our annotators received training over 22 nego-
tiation dialogues with 560 turns. The inter annota-
tion agreement at both EDU and rhetorical struc-
ture levels for this training will be used to refine
the guidelines. In over 91 instances of doubly-
annotated EDUs considered, we have a kappa of
0.54, a moderate level due to the very high num-
2www.glozz.org
ber of “other” acts . For rhetorical structure, using
an exact match criterion of success (easy to com-
pute but harsher than necessary), we have a Kappa
of 0.45. These figures are very preliminary.
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Abstract 
Synchronous multimedia teleconferen-
ces like Skype have limitations of relia-
bility and quality, and they restrict basic 
communicative functions. One cannot 
monitor how one is heard and seen. 
Generally, the spiral of mutual aware-
ness is impaired. Nevertheless, children 
create amazing scenes of apparent and 
hidden givings, of serious and fictitious, 
expectable and surprising. With drama-
turgical talent, they compensate techno-
logical imperfection and bring about 
delightful and supportive encounters. 
1 Impaired spiral of awareness in tele-
conferences 
Communication requires means for awareness, 
anticipation and action.  In many face-to-face 
situations, these conditions are sufficiently given 
and not reflected in detail. However, if commu-
nication is practiced over large distances by use 
of mediating computers and audiovisual technol-
ogy, the required resources may be available 
only to a limited extent.  
A typical limitation concerns the relation be-
tween the remote partner and the remote envi-
ronment. If a local participant gets a video image 
of his remote partner, he may become aware of 
his partner‘s facial or bodily expressions. But he 
will not see what his partner is seeing and what 
he is doing in order to see it. Only additional 
video images of what his partner is looking at 
might remedy this shortcoming. In particular the 
participant is lacking an image of the remote 
display. So he cannot watch how his own video 
input is displayed. He has not enough cues to 
monitor how he is perceived. The same holds for 
auditive data. It is nearly impossible for the local 
participant to guess how he is being heard at the 
remote side. So he cannot reliably adapt his own 
voice to the conditions of his remote partner. 
Taken together, his awareness of his own effi-
cacy is handicapped, and anticipations of his 
partner’s reactions are impaired.  
As a consequence, mutual awareness of 
awareness, which is given under the homogene-
ous conditions of face-to-face interaction, does 
not  emerge in communication between separated 
places. In this case, the „spiral of awareness“ is 
precarious. This was already noticed in studies 
on CSCW. The concept of „meta-awareness“ 
(Fashchian, 2003) was to cover this phenome-
non, similarly the concept of „translucence“ 
(Oemig, 2004; Szostek et al., 2008). However, 
technological solutions that allow to monitor 
how one‘s own input is being received at the 
remote end, are still missing. At least consumer 
equipment with Skype has no features to over-
come these restrictions.  
Instead, progress is made by users’ competen-
cies. Experienced users are aware of the short-
comings. They frequently perform cooperative 
sound and video checks, gather verbal feedback, 
and exchange screenshots of their video images 
(Bliesener, 2002).  
Particularly interesting are sequences in tele-
conferences where action plans with higher order 
anticipations are pursued successfully. Examples 
were found in Skype conferences, recorded in a 
pilot project of the Dept. of Communication Sci-
ence (Prof. Dr. H. W. Schmitz) 
1
: In a paediatric 
ward for bone marrow transplantations, the chil-
dren stay three months isolated in a sterile room. 
Very few visitors are admitted, and they must be 
cloaked in whole-body germ-free gear. The chil-
dren’s bridge to the familiar world outside are 
Skype conferences with audio, video, chat and 
games. The screen captures comprise 200 hours. 
                                                          
1
 „TKK-ELF: Telecommunication between Pediatric 
Cancer Patients and their Families, Teachers and 
Friends”. Report in (Bliesener et al., 2012) 
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2 Successful deceptions and surprises 
Three  examples of little orchestrations shall be 
described, illustrated and scrutinized with regard 
to their recipe for success. 
a. A patient shows Yu-Gi-Oh cards to a peer. 
He approaches them to the camera so that they 
look larger and, as a side effect, hide his face. 
The first and the second presentation appear like 
rehearsals for targeting the card into the shot. 
The third time, he retracts the card exactly on the 
axis between the camera and his hidden face. 
Suddenly he takes it aside, thereby unveils his 
face like starting a Punch and Judy show, smiles 
demonstratively and makes a sound like „Hello“. 
His formula for success is the use of repetition 
for both the creation of an expectation and the 
rehearsal of an action to be performed “blindly”.  
b. A patient announces “Now I am going to 
smash the cam”. He moves back one arm, forms 
a fist and pushes it towards the camera. There, he 
covers the lens with his palm and, protected by 
invisibility, turns off the camera. Simultaneously 
he makes a sound like broken glass. His formula 
for success is creating the expectation of a result 
of his action, then using different actions to cre-
ate the semblance of the expected result. This is 
the same principle as in a piece of legerdemain. 
c. A friend of a patient changes his audio con-
figuration so that he can listen by boxes instead 
by headset. He puts his headset beyond the cam-
era angle and ensures by a sound check that the 
associated microphone still captures his voice. 
Invisibly to the patient, he lays his cat on the 
headset. When the cat starts purring, the patient 
is highly surprised and delighted. A camera shift 
to the cat with headset unravels the mystery. 
Here, the recipe for success is a combination of 
precise knowledge of the audio features and a 
purposeful reduction of an object to audio only. 
It is technological sophistication paired with 
dramaturgical minimalism. 
3 Résumé: Factors of telecommunicative 
competence 
Success in creating surprise and delight via 
Skype comes about by at least three factors: 
- sophisticated knowledge of technological fea-
tures within the limits of their disposability, 
- trained action sequences for „blind“ perform-
ance with insufficient or no sensomotoric feed-
back, 
- artful creation, condensation and implementa-
tion of peculiar references to shared knowledge. 
Taken together, these factors resemble much 
what a dramaturgical talent is expected to com-
prise. This finding should not be a big surprise. 
From the social viewpoint of a user, technology 
for synchronous multimedia telecommunication 
offers just a new stage with new requisites. Tal-
ented players will make the most of it, since this 
is the core of their art: showing  a world in a 
grain of sand. 
4 Conclusion: Competence as a compen-
sation for technological imperfection 
In ratings of the Skype recordings by neutral 
observers, such examples of interactions with 
deception, surprise, pantomime etc. are consid-
ered as highlights of interpersonal closeness. The 
children’s unfolding of dramaturgical competen-
cies seems to work as a compensation for the 
technological restrictions. It does do so simply 
by their joy and art of playing,. If children’s in-
clination is not channelled to pre-defined and 
pre-fabricated digital games with fixed rules and 
scores, it can have the power to turn sober and 
imperfect teleconferences into playful interac-
tions with a considerable potential of social sup-
port. As a consequence, future training and 
support for Skype should encourage adults, too, 
to reawaken the phantasy and creativity of their 
childhood, to play with features and to parody 
failures. They might learn from their children 
how much fiction can improve experience. 
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1 Introduction
This paper describes a dialogue manager, which
provides support for multiple, interleaved conver-
sation threads. Multi-threaded dialogues are fre-
quently initialized by humans (Shyrokov et al.,
2007), (Yang et al., 2008). Interleaved dialogue
threads differ from embedded dialogue threads
insofar that they allow for threads being alter-
nated entangled. Although multi-threaded con-
versations are a frequent human behavior, sup-
port for multi-threaded conversations in dialogue
systems is very rare. One example is (Lemon
et al., 2002), who describe a possibility to in-
tegrate multi-threading into an Information State
Update model. However, (Yang et al., 2008) crit-
icize (Lemon et al., 2002), because they neglect
to signal conversation switches made by the sys-
tem. The system described in (Nakano et al.,
2008) is able to manage multiple tasks through
several expert components for every task. How-
ever, experts cover fine-grained tasks such as “un-
derstanding a request for weather information”.
They do not capsulate substructures of a dialogue
and are therefore not comparable to conversation
threads.
This paper presents a state-based dialogue
manager, which supports multi-threaded behavior
and offers conversation switch markers.
2 Multi-threaded Dialogue Support
Input to the dialogue system is by default inter-
preted in the context of the currently active dia-
logue thread. If the current thread is found to be
inappropriate, the dialogue manager needs to re-
place the active thread with either an until now in-
active thread or with an active but paused thread.
Dialogue Management is based on a finite-state
graph. The finite-state automaton is described by
a hierarchical state-transition diagram including
Harel’s state charts. In our dialogue manager con-
versation threads are special types of supernodes.
Conversation threads can occur in three differ-
ent conditions: active, paused and inactive. Ana-
log to the activation, termination and pausing of
conversation threads, the underlying graph inter-
preter activates, terminates and pauses the belong-
ing thread supernodes.
Empirical research has stated that the change of
conversation threads by the system can easily be-
come confusing to the user (Heeman et al., 2005),
especially if the system does not provide a dis-
course marker to notify the change.
Therefore, the described system provides
“bridging utterances” to indicate a thread switch.
They consist of two parts: The first one is a more
general reference to the newly activated or reacti-
vated thread (mostly through verbalizing the topic
of the selected thread), the second one the rep-
etition or rephrasing of the last utterance which
was made by the system to reestablish common
ground.
3 Selection of Dialogue Threads
In the system initiative scenario the dialogue
manager has to decide which dialogue thread con-
stitutes an appropriate continuation of the con-
versation, e.g. after a dialogue thread was fin-
ished and the conversation pauses. The system
can choose between reactivating a paused dia-
logue thread or activating a new thread. Two cri-
teria are used for the selection: time information
(since when an active thread is paused) and im-
portance information (how important is the thread
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for the overall conversation).
For user initiative, all incoming user utter-
ances are by default at first processed in the con-
text of the currently active thread. If the ac-
tive thread fails in offering a valid transition to
a new state, the dialogue manager selects a dia-
logue thread which fits to the incoming utterance.
This can be a paused thread or a thread which has
to be freshly initialized. The selection process is
led by the matching values for the topic of the ut-
terance as well as the recognized dialogue act and
domain. If more than one thread with matching
values for topic, domain and a valid dialogue act
can be found, the selection process continues with
the measures for importance and time.
4 Evaluation of Thread Selection
The dialogue manager was evaluated through con-
versation logs from user experiments. Each utter-
ance in the conversation logs was manually an-
notated with thread function information. Thread
functions include the opening of new threads, the
reinitialization of paused threads and the selection
of threads according to user utterances.
Unfortunately, in the evaluation experiments
the users did not make use of the interleaved di-
alogue possibilities, but only used embedded di-
alogue threads. However, since the system does
not differentiate between embedded or interleaved
threads, we expect the system to also provide
good support for interleaved conversations.
Figure 1: User initialized dialogue threads and system
reaction
In general, the evaluation shows that the thread
selection works very well.
Figure 1 shows the division of the system’s
thread selections as reaction to thread initializa-
tion by the users. There were no incorrectly se-
lected threads by the dialogue manager, but a
number of problems originating from failures of
the NLU component of the system (U-I-T-NU)
and some cases in which the users initialized di-
alogue threads unknown to the system (U-I-UT).
In total 23 of 102 user’s attempts to initialize new
dialogue threads were not understood by the input
analysis (25,48%).
Thread selection for system initiative also
works very well. There were only 16 errors in
157 thread selections. Most of the errors (13 of
16) are caused by a missing behavior in the selec-
tion algorithm, which did not consider the number
of already uttered rejections by the user.
The system reinitialized 63 paused threads ei-
ther because of a user utterance or as system ini-
tiative. The number of reinitialized threads per
conversation differs from 29 (the highest number)
to 8 (the lowest number of reinitialized threads).
All threads for reactivation were correctly se-
lected.
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Abstract
‘Concern Alignment in Conversations’
project aims to elucidate interplay between
rational agreement seeking and affective
trust fostering in conversation. The project
is based on empirical analyses of real life
conversation data in medical counseling do-
main, and development of computational
models.
1 Introduction
Conversational interactions in real life, in many
cases, are purported to form a consensus on some-
thing among conversational participants. Consen-
sus can be conceived as a formation of shared
commitments on certain choice of future joint ac-
tions by a group of people. However, process is
as important as outcome in consensus-building.
Consensus decision making process should be
collaborative and participatory so that ‘consensus
seeks to improve solidarity in the long run’ and
participants ‘shape it into a decision that meets the
concerns of all group members as much as possi-
ble’(wikipedia, ). This affective process, which
eventually leads to fostering of trust, is in par-
allel with the rational process of seeking agree-
ment. ‘Concern Alignment in Conversations’
project aims to elucidate this interplay between
rational agreement seeking and affective trust fos-
tering processes in conversation, based on analy-
ses of real life conversation data.
2 Research issues
Descriptive concepts: Identify the descriptive
concepts needed to adequately capture the pro-
cesses in which conversation participants work to-
gether to promote ‘affective solidarity.’
Trust-related dialogue acts: Identify dialogue
acts performed by conversational participants that
contribute to ‘affective solidarity.’
Agreement/Trust interrelationship: Identify
relationships between rational agreement seeking
and affective trust fostering.
Mapping: Devise a mapping between surface
linguistic acts and trust-related dialogue acts.
3 Concern alignment model
We picture a consensus decision-making pro-
cess as consisting, conceptually, of two parts
(Fig.1)(Katagiri et al., 2011; Katagiri et al., 2012).
First, once a group of people are placed in a sit-
uation in which they need to make an agreement
on their joint course of actions (issues), they start
by expressing their value judgments on properties
and criteria on actions each considers significant
(concerns). After they share their concerns, they
start proposing and negotiating on concrete choice
of actions (proposals). When we decide on which
restaurant to go for lunch, we first discuss on what
restaurant properties we put most priorities, e.g.,
price, location, cuisine etc. We, then, start talking
about actual restaurants.
Figure 1: A schematic diagram of the concern align-
ment process
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4 Dialogue data & analysis
Data
We chose dialogues in medical counseling ses-
sions where people diagnosed as obese (metabolic
syndrome) see expert nurses to get advises on
their daily life management. Screening and coun-
seling for obese people have been mandated by
the Japanese government, and counseling services
are now regularly offered by many hospitals. The
patients are often reluctant to follow nurses’ ad-
vices, and it is important for nurses to establish
rapport with patients to enforce their advices. We
have collected a total of 9 sessions, about 5 hours
of dialogues on video. All the sessions were tran-
scribed.
Analysis
We have observed several dialogue acts for con-
cern alignment.
Concern introduction: Since an issue has
mostly been shared in our setting, e.g., decid-
ing on plans to counter the patient obesity, nurses
and patients express their concerns in the form of
broad category of actions to take, e.g, whether to
reduce calorie intake, to increase exercise, to stop
smoking or to rely on other methods.
Evaluative responses to concerns: Once a
concern is introduced, the interlocutor expresses
a positive or negative evaluations of it. The ex-
pression can be either linguistic or non-linguistic.
Negative expressions often take the form of ex-
pressing conflicting concerns.
Incremental alignment: When a concern is
positively evaluated by the interlocutors, they can
now proceed to discuss more concrete proposals
based on the shared concern. When a concern is
negatively evaluated, they have to negotiate. The
negotiation often takes the form of focusing, e.g.,
introducing a related but slightly modified con-
cern. Figure 2 is an abbreviated excerpt showing
a focusing type incremental alignment, in which
initial concern of ‘eating less’ was rejected by a
counter introduction of ‘bicycle,’ which is modi-
fied by ‘commute,’ which leads to a proposal of
‘bicycle commute.’
A Body weight reduction, reduction of fat, is ef-
fective in many cases. So, you should con-
sume about 230 kCal a day, maybe, by
eating a little bit less than now, I think.
B Uh huh.
· · ·
B I hear people talk about walking, but how about
bicycle?
A Bicycle is of course fine. · · · Do you ride a bicy-
cle?
B Well, not much exercise. I commute by car.
A Uh huh.
B I wonder how long it takes on foot to my office.
· · ·
It takes more than 30min., so I think it’s a bit too
much for commute.
A Yeah, Well, it’ll getting cooler
B Yeah
A in the morning and at night.
B It would be nice if I can exercise by bicycle, may
be.
A Yes. Do you get back home early or late?
B It’s late.
· · ·
A Then, if it’s OK for you,
B uh huh
A how about bicycle
B Bicycle
A commute?
B I think I will try bicycle commute.
A Yeah, that will be good.
Figure 2: Concern alignment by focusing.
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Introduction 
One of the central findings in dialogue research 
is that interlocutors rapidly converge in their use 
of referring expressions, and that this 
convergence is driven by the interaction: if 
interlocutors are able to provide each other with 
communicative, turn-by-turn feedback, this leads 
to the quicker development of representations 
that are more concise (Clark, 1996), more 
compositional (Garrod et al, 2007), more 
systematic and more abstract (Healey, 1997),  
and are also more tailored to specific 
conversational partners (Healey and Mills, 2006; 
Brown-Schmidt et al 2007). 
 
1 Procedural co-ordination in dialogue: 
Complementary contributions 
However, in addition to co-ordinating on the 
content of referring expressions, interaction in 
dialogue also requires procedural co-ordination: 
interlocutors must co-ordinate on the sequential 
and temporal unfolding of their contributions. 
Empirical studies of conversational interaction 
have demonstrated that procedural co-ordination 
is underpinned by interlocutors' use, not of the 
same, but of different kinds of contribution. For 
example, questions are usually followed with 
answers, not with another question, requests are 
usually followed with compliance, not with 
counter-requests, praise is usually followed with 
self-denigration, and offers with acceptance. 
These adjacency-pairs (Schegloff, 1992) are 
conventions which operate normatively, and 
consist of a first-pair part and a second-pair part, 
performed by different speakers.  A central 
feature is that their successful use typically 
requires interlocutors to perform different and 
complementary contributions on subsequent 
turns. However, both conversation analytic and 
cognitive studies of interaction have treated these 
adjacency pairs as already shared and known to 
be shared by interlocutors, and do not study how 
interlocutors converge on them in the first place. 
It is also unclear whether convergence is driven 
primarily by egocentric processes (i.e. relatively 
low-level routinization), or whether interlocutors 
readily associate these conventions with specific 
conversational partners. 
2 Alphabetical sorting task 
To address these questions, we report a 
collaborative 3-participant task which presents 
participants with recurrent procedural co-
ordination problems.  Participants communicate 
via a text-based chat tool (Healey and Mills, 
2006). Each participant's computer also displays 
a task window containing randomly generated 
words. Solving the task requires participants to 
combine their lists of words into a single 
alphabetically ordered list. To select a word, 
participants type the word preceded with "/". To 
ensure collaboration, participants can only select 
words displayed on the other participant's screen 
and vice versa.  Note that this task is trivial for 
an individual participant. However, for groups of 
participants, this task presents the co-ordination 
problem of interleaving their selections correctly: 
participants cannot select each other's words, 
words can't be selected twice, and words need to 
be selected in the correct order (See Mills, 2011 
for a similar task). 
     To examine whether participants readily 
associate these conventions with specific 
conversational partners, the 3 participants were 
divided into a main dyad and a second side-
participant. The task was configured such that at 
key moments in the development of the 
conventions, the side-participant is only required 
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to observe the interaction, but does not directly 
participate in establishing the conventions. 
    To test for partner-specific effects, we drew on 
the method of (Healey and Mills, 2006) of using 
a chat server to intercept and selectively 
manipulate participants' turns in real-time. This 
technique is used to generate artificial 
clarification requests that query the procedural 
function of participants' turns. The apparent 
origin of these clarification requests is 
manipulated to appear as if they originate from 
either of the 2 other participants (Main Dyad vs. 
Side participant). 
     Comparison of the responses to these two 
types of artificial clarification request allows 
direct testing of the hypothesis that interloctors 
associate the co-ordination they achieve with 
specific conversational partners. 
3 Results  
We demonstrate that participants' responses to 
these clarification requests provide strong 
evidence of interlocutors associating procedural 
conventions with specific partners. Despite the 
clarification requests having exactly the same 
surface form (all that differs is their apparent 
origin), responses to both types of clarification 
are treated differently: Participants are slower to 
respond to clarification requests from the side-
participants, their responses are also longer, 
contain more self-corrections, and they also 
subsequently make more mistakes in the task. 
Drawing on global interaction patterns in the 
task, we also demonstrate that these partner-
specific effects are sensitive to the specific 
sequential location in the dialogue where 
problematic understanding is signaled.  
 
4 Complementarity, Convergence and  
Conventionalization. 
We argue that focusing on procedural co-
ordination suggests a more nuanced view of 
convergence in dialogue. The rapid development 
of conventions consisting of complementary 
contributions suggests that the global 
development of procedural co-ordination that 
occurs over the course of the interaction involves 
systematic divergence at a local turn-by-turn 
level. Drawing on participants' patterns of 
interaction in the task, we argue that this 
differentiation is indicative of a greater "forward 
momentum" in the interaction, as it indicates that 
participants have converged on what the next 
relevant step is in the dialogue. By contrast, high 
levels of local convergence between turns is 
indicative of lower levels of communicative 
success, as this typically indicates that 
interlocutors have halted the interaction in order 
to identify and resolve problematic 
understanding. 
     We also argue that the finding of partner-
specific effects also points towards 
differentiation and divergence occurring at more 
global levels of interaction – although all the 
participants are exposed to exactly the same 
communicative behaviour from each other (they 
all see the same interaction unfold on the screen), 
as they become more co-ordinated in the 
interaction, the main dyads and the side-
participants systematically adopt different 
procedural conventions that become 
progressively complementary as their roles 
diverge. 
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Abstract
Within the wider context of the STAC
project, we are developing new models
of non-cooperative strategic conversation.
We concentrate on learning optimised ne-
gotiation strategies (such as deception and
information hiding) from real data col-
lected in the domain of “Settlers of Catan”,
a multi-player board game. This paper
illustrates how multi-agent reinforcement
learning techniques can be used to model
strategic dialogue behaviour. In particu-
lar, we discuss novel probabilistic models,
called “interactive POMDPs”, which com-
bine game theoretic opponent modelling
with Partially Observable Markov Decision
Processes.
1 Introduction
Within the wider context of the STAC project
(2012-2017) we are developing models of non-
cooperative strategic conversation1. While other
partners explore the linguistic and game-theoretic
underpinnings of non-Gricean behaviour (Asher
and Lascarides, 2008), we focus on learning ne-
gotiative dialogue strategies from real data.
The STAC project is collecting data on human
trading strategies while playing a modified on-
line version of the board game “Settlers of Catan”
(Thomas and Hammond, 2002) where players ne-
gotiate trades via a chat interface (Guhe and Las-
carides, 2012).
In the following we illustrate how multi-agent
reinforcement learning (RL) can be used to op-
timise strategic trading actions such as decep-
tion and information hiding. Previous work has
explored single-agent RL for negotiation strate-
gies (Georgila and Traum, 2011; Heeman, 2009),
1http://www.irit.fr/STAC/
using very limited amounts of data and limited
strategic reasoning.
2 Opponent Modelling for Strategic
Trading
Single-agent RL approaches were successfully
applied to handle uncertainty in Spoken Dialogue
Systems, see e.g. (Rieser and Lemon, 2011).
However, when considering non-cooperative bar-
gaining domains such as resource negotiation in
Settlers, a new type of uncertainty has to be mod-
elled: agents can lie, deceive, bluff, and hide in-
formation (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990). This
type of partial observability falls outside the scope
of current Partially Observable Markov Deci-
sion Processes (POMDPs) approaches to dialogue
(Williams and Young, 2007), which focus on un-
certainty derived from speech recognition errors.
Examples from an initial data collection (Guhe
and Lascarides, 2012) show that human Settlers
players employ elaborate strategic conversational
moves: On the one hand, players deflect by
providing misleading implicatures (Example 1b),
hold back information by not answering a ques-
tion (1c), or tell explicit lies. On the other hand,
seemingly cooperative strategies, such as volun-
teering information, can be observed (Guhe and
Lascarides, 2012). Furthermore, offers as in Ex-
ample (1a) are also often under-specified or “par-
tial”, i.e. instead of explicitly specifying how
many resources are offered and how many are
needed, this information is only revealed strate-
gically in the course of the dialogue.
(1) a. A: Do you have rock?
b. B: I’ve got lots of wheat [in fact, B
has a rock]
c. C: [silence]
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In order to account for this type of strategic di-
alogue behaviour, we are exploring novel prob-
abilistic models which combine game-theoretic
and POMDP control strategies. In game theory,
the process of inferring strategies of other play-
ers is also known as “k-level thinking” or op-
ponent modelling (Leyton-Brown and Shoham,
2008). The RL community has adapted these
ideas for multi-agent adversarial learning using
minimax Q-learning (Littman, 1994) or interac-
tive Partially Observable Markov Decision Pro-
cesses (iPOMDPs) (Gmytrasiewicz and Doshi,
2005). We extend iPOMDPS for extensive-form
games with sequential actions, see (2).
I−POMDP =< ISi, Ai, Ti,Ωi, Oi, Ri > (2)
ISi = S × Mj is a set of interactive states,
where S is the set of states of the physical envi-
ronment, and {Mj...m} is the set of possible mod-
els of agents j...m. {Ai} describes agent i’s set
of actions. Ti : IS×Ai× IS → [0, 1] is a transi-
tion function which describes results of an action.
Ωi is the set of observations the agent i can make.
Oi : IS × Ai × Ωi → [0, 1] is the agent’s ob-
servation function which specifies probabilities of
observations given agents’ actions and resulting
states. Finally, Ri : S × Ai → R is the reward
function representing agent i’s preferences.
By formulating an “interactive state” which in-
cludes explicit possible behavioural models of
other agents, iPOMDPs recognise that agents are
not playing against distributions like in single-
agent RL, “but other players who understood the
rules and were prepared to leverage them against
slower players” (Wunder et al., 2011).
3 Action Set for Learning
We will employ iPOMDPs to model and reason
about hidden states and strategic conversational
behaviour of other players. In particular, we aim
to learn optimal behaviour for the following deci-
sions:
1. How to make a strategic offer and how much
information do I expose?
2. How do I reply to an offer and how sincere
is my reply?
For learning the first decision, we modify the
JSettlers system, where an artificial trading agent
can only pose a fully specified offer (“[A], I’ll
give you 1 wheat for 1 sheep.”) via a graphical
interface. We will handle partial offers (see Sec-
tion 2) as well as disjunctive offers and requests
(e.g. “wheat or sheep”).
For optimising the latter decision, STAC has
developed an annotation scheme which distin-
guishes between observable replies and their sin-
cerity based on the logged game state. We plan
to evaluate the success of these strategic dialogue
capabilities against the original graphical version.
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Abstract
We present two dialogue systems developed to
support chating with French speaking virtual
characters in the context of a serious game:
one hybrid statistical/symbolic and one purely
statistical. The player is guided in the quest by
different interactions including twelve distinct
dialogs with different virtual characters.
1 Introduction
We present two state-of-the art dialogue systems.
The first system (H) is a hybrid approach that com-
bines an information-state dialogue manager (Burke
et al., 2003) with a classifier for interpreting the
players’ phrases. The second system (QA) is a ques-
tion/answering model which predicts the system di-
alog move based on a player’s utterance (Gandhe
et al., 2011). Both systems use a generation-by-
selection strategy 1. While previous work has fo-
cused on relatively short dialogs in a static setting,
we consider longer interactions where dialogs occur
in a setting that dynamically evolves as the game un-
folds. Our conversational agents interact in French
with virtual characters (VCs) in the context of the
serious game Mission Plastechnologie (MP). In Sec-
tion 2, we present the MP game and the dialogue
strategies. Section 3 presents the two dialog sys-
tems. Finally we present a brief discussion in Sec-
tion 4.
1The system’s utterances are selected from a corpus anno-
tated with system dialog moves
2 Dialogues in the MP Game
The MP game is a multi-player quest where 3
teenagers seek to build a joystick in order to free
their uncle trapped in a video game 2. To build this
joystick, the player (who alternatively represents
anyone of these three teenagers) must explore a plas-
tic factory and interact with different VCs through
twelve distinct dialogs, each of them occurring in
a different part of the virtual world with different
goals to be achieved. We identified four main di-
alog strategies, one general and three specific, and
used these to define the plans guiding the rule-based
engine in the H system. The general strategy is for
information-seeking, the player looks for informa-
tion about how to achieved some game-goals and
the system provides this information. The specific
strategies covers a request for pursuing a goal, a con-
firmation that a task has been accomplished and a
negociation step.
3 Dialogue Systems
The game and the two dialog systems built were
integrated as agents within the Open Agent Archi-
tecture (Cheyer and Martin, 2001). Both systems
access a database for starting the appropriate subdi-
alogs at the appropriate place in the virtual world;
and for simultaneously storing all interactions in the
database.
3.1 The Hybrid Dialogue System
The H system combines an interpreter, a rule
based, Information State Approach dialog manager,
2The MP game was created by Artefacto, http://www.
artefacto.fr/index_ok.htm
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a generator and the game/dialog communication
components.
The Interpreter Module The interpreter is a
Logistic-Regression classifier which maps the
player’s utterance to a dialog move. The features
used for training are the four previous system moves
and the words filtered by tf*idf (Rojas-Barahona et
al., 2012a). The best prediction given by the clas-
sifier is matched against the expected move deter-
mined by the last move stored in the information-
state. In case of a mismatch, the interpreter selects
a valid move in the current context and updates the
information state with this move.
The DialogManager We designed a plan for each
dialog strategy and extended Midiki (Burke et al.,
2003) to support the OAA architecture and access
the database with the configuration of the different
dialogs in the game. Each time a new dialog is
launched, the information state is loaded with the
corresponding context (e.g., speakers, list of goals to
be discussed) and the plan modeling the correspond-
ing dialog strategy. We implemented a set of update
and selection rules for integrating players’ moves,
handling the information-state and for preparing the
agenda according to the plan. Once the system move
has been selected, the Generator searches an appro-
priate verbalisation.
The Generator Given the system dialog move
predicted by the dialog manager and the identi-
fier of the current dialog, the generator picks ran-
domly from the annotated corpus an utterance with
these dialog move for that dialog identifier. In ad-
dition, propositional questions (i.e., proposals by
the system to discuss additional topics) were anno-
tated with their respective dialog goals. For exam-
ple, Samir’s sentence: Are you interested in hearing
about my job, the people that work here or the se-
curity policies?, was annotated with the goals: job,
staff and security policies. For these dialog acts, the
generator checks the list of current missing goals so
as to retrieve an appropriate propositional question.
In this way, the system can coherently direct the
player by suggesting possible topics without using
vague and repetitive sentences such as Would you
like to know more?
3.2 The QA System
The QA system combines a Logistic-Regression
classifier that matches players’ turns to system di-
alog moves with the same generation-by-selection
algorithm used in the H system. This classifier has
been trained with the same features used for training
the interpreter in the H system. Like the H system,
the QA dialog system maintains a constant interac-
tion with the game to allow for the game coherence
and continuity.
4 Discussion
We have presented two system architectures for
conversational agents situated in a serious game.
While the QA system simply matches the player’s
input to a system response, the H system has a much
more elaborate dialog managment policy including
re-interpretation and the use of game and dialog his-
tory information, to guide the dialog. As a result, the
QA dialogs are generally more spontaneous, giving
the player more initiative whereas the H system en-
forces a more System-Driven dialog strategy thereby
guiding the player through the game. A detailed
comparison and evaluation of these two systems has
been reported in (Rojas Barahona et al., 2012b)3
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“The hand is not a banana” 
On Developing a Robot’s Grounding Facilities 
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We investigate human-robot interaction and human-robot communication (HRI, HRC) with a 
robot named Flobi trained to acquire category terms like “banana” or “pine-apple”. More 
precisely, we present a system in which a robot and a human WOZ observer interact on this 
purpose. For ease of reference we call the whole system robot.  
Intuitively, we consider a sort of tutorial dialogue between a human user and the robot. We do 
a deep evaluation of such a dialogue relying on standard paradigms, CA, dialogue theory, 
pragmatics, and formal theories of public information. Consequently, the HRC is seen as a 
datum in the ethno-methodological sense. As standards of comparison we use several notions 
set up or extended by H. Clark (Clark 1996, Clark and Marshall 1981) such as “action 
ladder”, common ground (CG), grounding (G), and mutual information. These notions all 
derive from human-human interaction (HHI), hence we call them STandard CG and STandard 
G. We contrast STandard CG and STandard G with Foundational CG and Foundational G 
needed in our tutorial dialogues. There is a difference between these two concepts, standard 
and foundational: Foundational CG and Foundational G deal with rooting a concept. They are 
hence at the basis of establishing a convention of use. To grasp that in David Lewisian terms 
one can say that Foundational CG and Foundational G mark the very beginning of a 
convention for the use of a category term, where a dyad, a robot and a human, starts to form a 
group initiating a convention of use. In other words, we deal with the building up of a 
precedent, a case not treated in Lewis’ “Convention” (1969).  
 
We show in our talk how Foundational CG and Foundational G can fail or be achieved in the 
human-robot interaction. For this purpose we present two case studies, “The hand is not a 
banana” (fail) and “The pine-apple” (success). Both studies relying on standard paradigms 
and Clark’s “action ladder” as reference points show general problems arising in HRC. We 
point out which of these are due to the set up of the system, for example to the ASR and the 
grammar used or to the behaviour of the human user interacting with the robot. On the user’s 
side problems might arise due to his style of pointing (deixis) or to his use of politeness 
conventions not accounted for in the set-up of the current system (see however Peltason et al., 
2012). From the case studies we can derive a preference list of mechanisms to be generally 
observed in the construction of robots, a FCG and FG scale. Most communication problems  
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arising in human-robot dialogues are well known from semantics, pragmatics and dialogue 
theory. Others do simply not arise in natural data since they are due to the workings of the 
system, for example, to its parsing component or its interaction patterns.  
 
In contrast, from investigation of HRC we also get information we cannot normally access in 
HH communication. A case in point is the possibility to inspect the robot’s mind, since we 
have access to the results of the ASR decodings and the content of deictic acts and can trace 
which internal state led to which verbal behaviour. This constellation has an interesting 
methodological side-effect: Especially the success case in the “pine-apple” study shows that 
in order to derive a working proposition one need not always rely on a standard “action-
ladder” and that a proposition can be derived using multi-modal information. 
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1 Introdution
The recent years have seen growing the num-
ber initiatives related to the interface be-
tween syntax, prosody and discourse. While
in English the computational counterpart of
this perspective has been largely advanced
both from more formal modeling and machine
learning perspectives, in French the situation
is much less clear. Some automatic tools
for analyzing prosody (Avanzi et al., 2010),
(Goldman et al., 2007) have been developed
but tested so far mostly on monologue data.
The determination of the relevant units of the
different linguistic domains is a crucial issue
for this kind of work. In this poster, we will
present a series of quantitative evaluations of
the output of various automatic tools dealing
with prosody, syntax and discourse.
The data we are using is the Corpus of In-
teractional Data. This is a corpus made of 8
conversations of one hour involving two speak-
ers.
2 Automatic tools
We ran Analor and Momel-Intsint on our cor-
pus. Moreover, we implemented a version of
the Simon and Degand (2011) characteriza-
tion of the prosodic units by using (as they
do) the output of Prosogram (Goldman et al.,
2007). In the discussions below, the units
of Analor are called Periods while the ones
of Simon and Degand (2011) are called UIM
(Major Intonative Units). We also have Inter-
pausal Units (IPU) as a baseline.1
1We do not pretend that these different units are
supposed to capture the same prosodic level. We sim-
ply want to experiment with the units produced by
these tools to decide how to use them later.
At the syntactic level, at the current stage,
we simply used a projection of the punctu-
ation learned on a large balanced corpora.2
More precisely, from a tagged corpus we have
learned where strong (periods, exclamation
marks etc.) and weak (commas) punctuations
occur.
3 Manual Annotations
Among other linguistic elements, prosodic and
discourse units have been annotated in the
framework of the OTIM project (Blache et al.,
2010).
Concerning prosody, several kinds of seg-
mentation have been produced. Originally ex-
perts have segmented about 2 hours of cor-
pus into Accentual Phrases (AP) and Intona-
tive Phrases (IP). More recently, an annota-
tion campaign involving naive annotators has
been realized. The whole CID corpus has been
double-annotated. The task for naive annota-
tors consisted in marking prosodic boundaries
of different levels (1, 2, 3 ; 0 being the default
non-annotated case of no boundary).3
Concerning discourse, the annotation cam-
paign also involved naive annotators that have
segmented the whole corpus (half of it being
cross annotated). This was realized thanks to
a discourse segmentation manual, inspired by
(Afantenos et al., 2010) but largely adapted to
our interactional spoken data and simplified
to be used by naive annotators. The man-
ual combined semantic (eventualities identi-
fication) and discourse (discourse markers)
2This corpus was mostly a written corpus which
could be an issue. However, we consider the informa-
tion captured to be relevant.
3This was realized according to a coding manual
developed by Roxane Bertrand and Cristel Portes.
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Recall Precision
IPU Start 0.415 0.838
End 0.376 0.736
Units 0.177 0.245
Period Start 0.353 0.843
End 0.339 0.783
Units 0.153 0.364
UIM Start 0.478 0.794
End 0.428 0.710
Units 0.218 0.360
Table 1: Precision and recall. Reference segmen-
tation: manual IP
Reference segmentation
IP Discourse Pseudosyntax
IP - 0.322 0.603
Discourse 0.238 - 0.435
Pseudosyntax 0.369 0.364 -
Table 2: Divergence between linguistic domains
and pragmatic (recognition of specific speech
acts) instructions to create the segmentation.
Such a mixture of levels has been made nec-
essary by the nature of the data featuring
both rather monologic narrative sequences
and highly interactional ones. Manual dis-
course segmentation with our guidelines has
proven to be reliable with κ-scores ranging be-
tween 0.8 and 0.85.
4 Experiments
Prosodic units Concerning prosodic units,
we first compare the automatic tools to the
manual annotation into Intonative Units (See
Fig. 1). Overall, IP manual annotation is
much more fine grained than the segmentation
performed by the automatic tools. It is there-
fore no surprise to find that precision is rather
good (at least for boundary detection) while
recall is extremely low. It is noticeable to re-
mark how low are the scores when we shift our
attention to unit determination rather than
simple boundary detection. By the time of
the conference, we will have also compared all
the naive annotations (in terms of strength of
frontiers) with the automatic tools.
Interfaces In order to try to shade a new
light on the interfaces we attempted rather
rough quantitative comparison (using the
WindowDiff measure (Pevzner and Hearst,
2002)) of the units from the different linguistic
domains (See Fig. 2). This was done by us-
c1 (strong punctuation+period) 0.285
c3 (Pseudophrase+UIM) 0.264
c5 (strong punctuation+IPU) 0.241
IPU 0.198
UIM 0.217
Period 0.265
strong punctuation 0.419
Table 3: WindowDiff comparison of segmentations
combining prosody and pseudosyntax, reference:
manual discourse units
ing (i) the expert segmentation into Intonative
Units, (ii) the manual discourse segmentation
and (iii) the projection of the punctuation for
the syntactic level.
Finally, we evaluated automatic tools
against the manual discourse segmentation
(See Fig. 3). The results is that the IPU
baseline provides the closest segmentation to
the one of the naive annotators. Quite de-
pressingly, both more sophisticated tools are
less related to the manual annotation, adding
syntactic information create significant diver-
gences with the manual annotations. Lack of
space prevent us from a deeper analysis of this
results but the poster will be focused on ex-
plaining them and finding solutions.
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1 Overview
We describe ongoing work in the area of seman-
tic parsing, which is an emerging subfield in NLP
that concerns the task of mapping sentences to
formal semantic representations. Recent work in
this area has focused on using data-driven meth-
ods for learning this mapping, both in a super-
vised setting and in more complex ambiguous
learning settings [Mooney, 08]. In the latter learn-
ing scenarios, training examples might be given
with several possible target semantic representa-
tions, the bulk of which don’t relate directly to
the particular sentence but are instead part of a
broader grounded perceptual context. In such a
setting, the aim is to model language as being ‘sit-
uated’ in a potentially wide range of observable
events.
Well known work by [Chen et al. 2008] on the
sportscaster corpus looks at interpreting soccer
commentary in ambiguous contexts where sev-
eral closely occurring (grounded) events are tak-
ing place. For example, a naive language ob-
server might hear commentary such as The pur-
ple goalie kicks out to purple3 in the context of
several different actions, and at first be uncer-
tain about which event in view is being described.
They present a novel bottom-up learning method
for accurately parsing unseen game commentary
to symbolic semantic representations by ‘observ-
ing’ ambiguous training games, which has in-
spired a number of subsequent learning studies.
As pointed out by [Bordes et al. 2010], how-
ever, the sportscaster corpus has many shortcom-
ings, most notably its lack of lexical ambiguity
and small size. Contexts are limited to informa-
tion about events occurring within a very crude
window of time around each comment. In a di-
alogue setting having more background informa-
tion might be essential. For example, knowing the
referent of ‘he’ in the sentence he is cooking in the
kitchen requires having knowledge of which indi-
viduals are in the kitchen at this time. Similarly,
such contextual information is useful for detect-
ing and learning inferential patterns in language.
The Grounded World corpus described in [Bor-
des et al. 2010] gets at some of the issues, and
is a set of English descriptions situated within a
virtual house. Sentences in the corpus are often
ambiguous and employ pronouns, which must be
resolved using information about the state of the
house (e.g. the location of objects ). The corpus,
however, was designed largely for doing named
entity recognition, and learning is done in a su-
pervised fashion. We describe an extension to this
corpus that looks at learning to interpret these de-
scriptions in an ambiguous learning setting.
2 Grounded World*
U"erance:"while&he&is&sleeping&in&the&bedroom"
Original,Annota0on:,#"<friend>"#"<sleep>"#""#"<bedroom>"
Observables*:"""bring(friend,water,toLoc(bedroom))"
""""get(baby,videogame)"sleep(friend,loc(bedroom)),
,,World,State:,,
"""""""loca=on:bedroom<'bed',"'closet',"'friend’,"…>"
"""""""loca=on:kitchen<'baby',"'fridge’,"‘cat’,…..>"
Figure 1: training example from Grounded World*
The original Grounded World corpus consists
of 50k (automatically generated) training sen-
tences, paired with a target set of named entities
and a world state description, and 30k testing ex-
amples. Inside the simulated house is a fixed set
of objects, including, for example, a set of actors
(e.g. ‘father’, ‘brother’), and a set of furniture
pieces (e.g. ‘couch’, ‘table’). There is also a fixed
set of 15 events, such as eating , bringing, and
drinking. For our study, we used a small subset
of 7k examples from the training set, and mod-
ified the sentences to have syntactic alternations
and paraphrases not seen in the initial corpus.
The original annotations were expanded to nor-
malized semantic representations, and using the
world state information we produced a set of dis-
tractor events (the observables) intended to repre-
sent the background knowledge or uncertainty an
observer might have about related or simultane-
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SS-sleep-baby-loc-bedroom--
Phrase-baby
PhX-baby
Word-null
the
Word-baby
baby
Phrase-sleep
Word-sleep
sleeps
Phrase-loc-bedroom-
Phrase-loc
Word-loc
in
Phrase-bedroom
PhX-bedroom
PhX-bedroom
Word-null
the
Word-bedroom
front
Word-bedroom
room
Figure 2: Grounded World* example parse
ous events in view. Figure 1 shows a training ex-
ample in our Grounded World* corpus, alongside
the original annotation. The utterance is situated
is three separate observable events, two of which
are contradictory and represent an observer’s un-
certainty about whether the friend is involved in
the sleeping or bringing event.
Expanding the relations from the original cor-
pus and situating them within larger ambiguous
contexts makes the learning task much harder.
Given a set of training examples in this narrow
domain, we aim to learn, merely from ambiguous
observation, how to map novel sentences about
the house to their correct semantic representa-
tions.
3 Learning
One trend in Semantic Parsing has been to use
learning methods that assign rich structure to
the target semantic representations, which can be
used for finding alignments with latent structures
in the language. In many available datasets, the
target semantic representations have correspond-
ing semantic grammars that produce tree repre-
sentations. Using ideas from [Wong 2007], [Chen
2008] uses statistical alignment-models for find-
ing alignments between production rules in the
semantic grammars and the corresponding words
or phrases in the language. In a similar spirit,
[Borschinger et al. 2010] recasts the problem in
terms of an unsupervised PCFG induction prob-
lem, and he develops a technique for automati-
cally generating large PCFGs from the semantic
relations in the sportscaster data. In such a setting,
the target semantic relations are the S-Nodes in the
grammar, and the arguments of the relations and
relation names are the constituent phrases (in all
possible orders) consisting of pre-terminals that
correspond to domain concepts. Words in the
training data are uniformly assigned to all pre-
terminals and the PCFG weights are learned using
EM training and the ambiguous contexts as filters.
4 Experiments
In a pilot study to test our extension to the cor-
pus, we adopt the grammar induction technique
used in [Borschinger et al. 2010]. We automat-
ically generate a large PCFG using the total se-
mantic relations in our dataset which includes in-
formation about the ambiguous contexts. Follow-
ing the experimental design in [Chen et al. 2008]
and [Borschinger et al. 2010], we perform cross
validation by making 4 splits in our 7k sentence
set (5k for training, and 2k for testing). We then
train on each set using the Inside-Out Algorithm,
and evaluate by parsing the remaining unseen sen-
tences and compare each S-node relation to a gold
standard.1 In our initial experiments, we don’t
consider the world state information, and instead
resolve pronouns by choosing the most probable
analysis observed in the training.
An example analysis produced after training is
provided in figure 2, where the derived S-node re-
lation is sleep(baby, loc(bedroom)). In the initial
experiments, we achieve an average precision of
77.6 % over the four splits. Most errors relate to
pronoun resolution, which had an average accu-
racy of 37.4%. Further work will look at building
a parser that considers world information, build-
ing on insights from [Schuler 2001].
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Abstract
We describe an experimental study designed
to evaluate the effect of overspecification on
L2 language acquisition. Our hypothesis is
that overspecification helps establish align-
ment, which facilitates the acquisition of lex-
emes. Our results show that subjects receiv-
ing overspecified references during the exer-
cise phase are slower at resolving the exer-
cises, but have better lexeme acquisition rates.
This supports the claim that overspecification
is a useful mechanism for communication.
1 Introduction
The study of the generation and interpretation of re-
ferring expressions (REs) has been an active area of
research for many years, due to its importance for
communication. In particular, the role of overspeci-
fication in reference has received much attention –
studies have shown that, although it makes inter-
pretation more costly, redundant information is fre-
quently used in the referring expressions produced
by speakers and that while subjects take longer to re-
solve overspecified references, they do not rate them
them any worse than minimal ones (Maes et al.,
2004; Engelhardt et al., 2006). There are two main
competing explanations that have been proposed for
the overspecification phenomenon. One explanation
holds that (1) overspecification is a result of speak-
ers’ cognitive limitations and impairs the compre-
hension of the REs (Engelhardt et al., 2011). The
second claims that (2) overspecification is a useful
part of communication because it gives the listener
more chances to align with the speaker, compensates
for perceptual difficulties, and makes future commu-
nication more effective (Nadig and Sedivy, 2002).
In this paper, we aim to support explanation (2) by
empirically evaluating the effect of overspecification
on lexical acquisition in second language (L2) learn-
ing. Our hypothesis is that overspecification helps
establish alignment (Brennan and Clark, 1996) be-
tween the speaker and the listener, which in turn fa-
cilitates lexical acquisition.
2 The Experiment
To test our hypothesis, we created an instruction-
giving system that produces minimal and overspec-
ified REs of objects located in the context of a
3D virtual world, designed using the GIVE plat-
form (Koller et al., 2008).
Figure 1: Exercise Phase: Referring expression received
by a subject in the OR condition zoltii stul sleva ot krasnii
svet means ‘yellow chair on the left of the red light’.
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We recruited fifty subjects and made two equal
groups: the MR (Minimal Reference) group re-
ceived minimal REs regarding objects in the Exer-
cise Room, whereas the OR (Overspecified Refer-
ence) group received overspecified REs. Figure 1
shows a RE as received by a subject in the OR con-
dition — REs were overspecified with a relation to
a neighbouring object since there are case studies
that show that this is the preferred property that is
most frequently overspecified in corpora (Viethen
and Dale, 2008).
3 Results
In order to test our hypothesis, we extracted infor-
mation on whether and how much the number of er-
rors decreased between the First Test Phase and the
Second Test Phase of the experiment. In Table 1,
we can see that 33% more OR subjects decreased
their errors compared to MR subjects, which is rep-
resented by the lexeme acquisition rate, and that a
bigger percentage of errors was overcome in the OR
condition (43%) than in the MR condition (29%)
(the error overcoming rate). We can also see that
the average resolution speed with which the sub-
jects in each condition resolved the referring expres-
sions in the exercise phase is two times slower for
the OR condition than the MR condition. Finally, in
a post-experiment questionnaire, we found that OR
subjects did not rate the received expressions worse
and evaluated that the Exercise Phase as more useful
to acquire the lexemes than the subjects in the MR
condition.
Metric MR OR
Lexeme acquisition rate (%) 56 89
Error overcoming (%) 29 43
Resolution speed (cm/s)a 101.1 49.88
aThe metric unit used for speed is an interpretation of per-
ceived size in the virtual world.
Table 1: Objective metrics gathered during the experi-
ment for the two group of subjects.
Our hypothesis was confirmed by our results: the
overall OR lexeme acquisition rate was significantly
higher than that of the MR condition and subjects
perceived the training exercises as more effective
when overspecified REs were used. These results
are coherent with previous work that reports that it
takes more time to resolve overspecified referring
expressions and that overspecified REs are evaluated
as equal to minimal ones (Engelhardt et al., 2006).
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that subjects learning
Russian words via a virtual-world task had better
success rates when they were provided with over-
specified training exercises, and evaluated the exer-
cises as more useful. This has applications in di-
alogue system development — if overspecification
is useful for establishing alignment, then algorithms
should produce overspecified references to facilitate
communication.
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